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Foreword
The Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG1
Academic lawyers in Australia have long played a vital role in the national 
project of law reform. They thought about it; they wrote about it; 
they worried about its haphazard ways; and they taught their students, 
and others who would listen, about the need for a more systematic and 
effective approach to the challenge.
As I discovered, soon after my appointment as inaugural Chairman 
(as the office was then styled) of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC), many members of the judiciary and practising branches of the 
legal profession were hostile to, or apathetic about, law reform.2 It was 
substantially left to academic scholars and civil society organisations and 
individual politicians to stimulate the demand for reform and to propose 
the directions that it should take.
In part, this impasse came about because judges and practitioners were 
distracted by the daily tasks of resolving, according to the law, the large 
and often mundane problems presented for the application of the existing 
law. Although that task frequently revealed imperfections, uncertainties, 
antiquities and inconsistencies in the law, there was a great deal of 
complacency. Where injustice was revealed, this was ascribed to the 
inevitable deficiencies of law since ancient times, against which victims 
might protest but would rarely prevail. 
1  Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission (1975–1984); President of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal (1984–1996); Justice of the High Court of Australia (1996–2009).
2  See, for example, P A Jacobs, ‘A Plea for Law Reform’ (1940) 13 Australian Law Journal 398.
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Whereas many judges and practitioners retained this attitude well into the 
life of the ALRC, academics were much more ready to challenge the law 
and to urge changes that would bring it into line with contemporary social 
attitudes, perceptions of justice, technology and needs for rationalisation 
and simplification. 
The ALRC quickly became a vehicle by which Australia’s academic 
lawyers  were brought into a more active contact with the formal law 
reform process in Australia. They were appointed commissioners (full-
time and part-time), consultants and staff members of the ALRC. They 
were consulted, listened to, engaged with and involved in the development 
of  the program of law reform and with its fulfilment. Many of them 
found the opportunity to serve for a short time stimulating to their careers 
and their interests in legal doctrine and useful to their professional tasks 
of teaching, analysing and writing about the law. This was one of the 
useful consequences of establishing full-time institutional law reform 
commissions in Australia, after the model established in England by 
Sir Leslie Scarman in 1965. 
By the 1970s and 1980s, such full-time bodies had been created in 
Australia in the federal sphere and in New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland and Western Australia. Commissions or Committees with 
part-time members were created in the Australian Capital Territory, South 
Australia and Tasmania. In addition to these bodies, particular statutes 
created advisory bodies to perform specialised law reform work.3 Academic 
lawyers continued, of course, in their lectures and publications to propose 
both small and large projects of law reform. These supplemented their 
engagements with law reform commissions. But the latter enhanced the 
role and function of Australia’s legal academics in contributing to actual 
improvements in the legal system. It gave many of them a direct voice to 
government. It also encouraged them to think more systematically about 
law reform and to view it more emphatically, as part of their duties as 
legal scholars. This meant not only chronicling and describing the law 
as it existed, but also critiquing its provisions and identifying faults and 
deficiencies so as to make the legal system work more efficiently and fairly 
for the people governed by it.




The manifest inefficiencies of the traditional part-time model for 
institutional law reform gave rise to full-time law reform commissions 
in India, the United Kingdom and Australia. Unfortunately, hostility 
towards the resulting bodies in Australia did not disappear with the 
established efficiencies and successes of the agencies. Right into the 
present time, a number of members of the Australian judiciary and 
practising legal profession have exhibited animosity towards institutional 
law reform. Such critics never comprised a majority of the practising 
profession. But their voices were loud and influential. They tended to 
undermine the credibility of, and respect for, the law reform institutions 
in circles where this mattered. They played into the hands of bureaucratic 
opponents who viewed full-time law reform agencies as a challenge to the 
power and control they had held over the emergence of law and public 
policy, which they desired to centralise in their own hands. Ostensibly, 
their antagonism was justified by reference to cost saving and such noble 
causes as the protection of ministers, the government and the Westminster 
system itself. 
An instance of the hostility to which I refer was given a voice in the recent 
retirement speech of a distinguished and capable judge in New South 
Wales. Surveying the perceived defects in the law that had emerged during 
his lifetime, astonishingly he included amongst the worst offenders 
institutional law reform. He revealed that they were, with journalists, 
amongst his ‘pet hates’. According to a whimsical description by one such 
journalist of these retirement remarks, the judge described law reformers 
as people who have an ‘unwholesome ambition for personal power and 
aggrandisement, or people who, to speak frankly, are … unstable’.4
Perhaps the judge on this occasion was speaking with tongue in cheek. 
His  own subsequent engagement with academic life suggests that this 
might have been the case. But his words were seen by the journalist as 
‘blowing a gasket’.5 However, if so, he was not the only one to react 
to institutional law reform in this way.
In the years after the ALRC was created in 1975, we witnessed in Australia 
the rise and ascendency of institutional law reform. However, this was 
quickly followed by a decline and fall. From a thriving body – usually with 
4  Richard Ackland, ‘A Sully Serve for Sullied Media, Law Reformers’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
30 March 2017, www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/a-sully-serve-for-sullied-media-law-reformers/2007/ 
03/29/1174761664005.html.
5  Ibid.
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three or four full-time commissioners (many academics) and five or more 
part-time commissioners (many judges, academics and practitioners) – 
the Commission shrank in the number of its members; the recruitment 
of consultants; the engagement of staff; and the enlistment of social 
scientists, whose empirical research capacity was designed to support the 
quality of the Commission’s reports. 
At the time of the blown judicial ‘gasket’ over institutional law reformers, 
the ALRC had but one full-time commissioner and two part-time 
(judicial) commissioners. Its budget had been slashed from former times. 
Its work program limped along but without a substantial program. 
No longer could it be described as a thriving, busy assistant to the Federal 
Parliament in diverse tasks necessary for the reform, modernisation and 
simplification of the law. Instead, it was crippled by the lack of multiple 
references from the Attorney-General; resources suitable to viability and 
effectiveness; and personnel essential to be taken seriously if it were to 
fulfil the function envisaged for it under its statute.6 Describing such 
a body as ambitious for ‘personal power and aggrandisement’ could only 
be viewed as absurd, unless the near demolition worked upon it was 
itself a consequence of a similar view held by the successive ministers and 
officials who had brought the body to this fate.
For small mercies one must be grateful in recounting this chronicle. 
The  Law Reform Commission of Canada was abolished not once but 
twice. State law reform commissions in Australia have also been abolished 
on the suggested ground that they were ‘expensive luxuries’.7 As one writer, 
after describing the successes of institutional law reform in England and 
South Africa, laments: ‘When we turn to Australia, the sky becomes much 
more cloudy, and in places extremely dark and gloomy – a far cry from the 
confident days of the early 1980s’.8
It is distressing to write in this way, and in this book, about the 
institutional  law reform scene in Australia today. It has lacked political 
engagement from a new generation of champions who see a need for 
a proper system of auditing and modernising the legal system of the nation. 
6  Law Reform Commission Act 1973 (Cth) s 6; now Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 
(Cth) s 21. 
7  Michael Tilbury, Simon N M Young and Ludwig Ng, ‘Law Reform Today’, in Michael Tilbury, 
Simon N M Young and Ludwig Ng (eds), Reforming Law Reform: Perspectives from Hong Kong and 
Beyond (Hong Kong University Press, 2014) 5.
8  John Hannaford, ‘The Changing Face of Law Reform’ (1999) 73 Australian Law Journal 503, 511.
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It lacks advocates who can point to the economic and financial case for 
constantly and systematically reforming the law in a country pretending 
to adherence to the rule of law. It ignores the generally good strike rate 
of the full-time commissions in the conversion of their law reform 
recommendations into enacted law and implemented policy. It overlooks 
the capacity of such independent bodies to consult the community in 
ways that politicians and the public service could not do, and thereby to 
defuse unsettling controversy in society. It removes the academic and the 
private legal profession’s talent and inclination for independent thinking 
and criticism of the law. It lacks reform derived from conceptual thinking 
and empirical data. It returns the landscape of law reform in Australia to 
a thing of shreds and patches, of band aids and political fixes: something 
to be done in tiny projects by overworked part-time volunteers at the fag-
end of the week, over a glass of whisky or two.
When, as is occasionally the case, I am invited to return to the Attorney-
General’s Department in Canberra, I remember the very different place 
it  presented on my first visit in 1975. There I found a small, highly 
talented, expert cadre of excellent federal lawyers enthusiastic for 
institutional law reform. Now it is a huge undertaking, greatly expanded 
by the addition of larger operational functions of federal police, security 
and anti-terrorism. Whilst these tasks are surely essential features of 
a modern society that protects the rule of law, so also is institutional law 
reform. Withdrawal or radical reduction of the budget subventions for 
institutional law reform represents a shift from an optimistic and liberal 
view of the role of the law in Australian society to a controlling and 
pessimistic view which should not be allowed to predominate. At least it 
should not be allowed to eviscerate the regular institutional improvement 
of the law by the use of expert, well resourced and full-time machinery to 
that end. If we ran a large corporation without incorporating institutional 
means of examining, updating, simplifying and reforming its processes, 
we would soon run into trouble from the shareholders. 
One of the saddest consequences of the decline and fall of institutional 
law  reform in Australia has been the substantial withdrawal of the 
engagement of Australia’s distinguished legal academics in law reform, 
which was a hallmark of the splendid work, in federal, state and territory 
jurisdictions, that was performed in decades gone by. This book shows 
that the involvement of Australia’s legal scholars in issues of law reform 
continues. It is most valuable. I praise and honour it. However, engagement 
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in the processes of government has been substantially lost or certainly 
radically reduced. This is a tragedy for the conversion of bold ideas for law 
reform into action and implementation.
I hope that the former state of affairs will be restored. And that the 
legal scholars of Australia will raise their voices to complain about the 
institutional breakdown we have witnessed. This is not a partisan political 
appeal. Each of the major political groupings in Australia has contributed 
to where we have now ended up. Each of them needs to reconsider the 
simple proposition that the rule of law in our nation requires more than 
rules. It requires rules that are just, modern, efficient and in harmony 
with the values of a free and democratic people. And that means a revival 
of the confident days of the past and the restoration of well-funded 
public institutions of law reform, appropriate to a period of rapid social, 






Ron Levy, Molly O’Brien, Simon Rice, 
Pauline Ridge and Margaret Thornton1
This volume emerges from the inaugural National Law Reform 
Conference  held in April 2016 at The Australian National University. 
The  conference’s animating idea was that, for reasons of effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity, directions in the development of the law should 
be planned carefully, and that academics can and should take the lead 
in this process. The conference organisers’ intention was to provide an 
opportunity for academic experts to incubate considered proposals 
for contemporary law reform in Australia. The 60-plus academics in 
attendance were invited to focus on future directions that the law ought 
to take in their areas of expertise. They addressed these central questions: 
To what challenges should [your area of law] be geared in the near-to-
medium term future; what should be the legal and policy responses, 
and why?
The conference deliberations were broad in scope and organised into six 
streams: commercial activities, criminal law and evidence, environmental 
law, private law, public law, and legal practice and legal education. 
Indigenous perspectives on law reform were encouraged across all 
streams. An informed group of 160 conference participants, drawn from 
government, practice and the academy, discussed, evaluated and helped to 
improve the resulting papers. 
The conference opened with an address from the Honourable Michael 
Kirby AC CMG, former Justice of the High Court of Australia. In his 
historical survey of law reform in Australia, Mr Kirby reminded us 
1  All of ANU College of Law, The Australian National University.
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that at the same venue 40 years earlier, as President of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission, he had addressed the second Australasian 
Law Reform Agencies Conference. It is fitting that the foreword to this 
book is by him. The keynote address, which now appears in revised form 
at the outset of this book, was delivered by Professor Margaret Davies. 
She advocated for a sophisticated and nuanced approach to law reform, 
and urged participants to challenge accepted meanings of both ‘law’ and 
‘law reform’ – a challenge which some took up in their contributions. 
A selection of conference papers was revised, edited and double-blind peer 
reviewed to produce the remaining 50-plus chapters of the book.
Like the conference itself, this book provides a national focal point for 
legal innovation. The chapters provide a bird’s-eye view of the current 
state and the future of law reform in Australia. The book’s six main parts 
mirror the six subject streams of the conference; each part contains a set 
of reform ideas, drawing on theoretical, sociolegal and doctrinal work, 
and encapsulated in short, digestible 3,000-word essays. We hope that 
the book will be of value to policymakers, media, law reform agencies, 
academics, practitioners and the judiciary. The proposition that academic 
research serves the public interest in Australia is strongly supported by 
efforts such as these, especially in an era of reduced public resourcing 
of law reform agencies.2
We would like to thank the ANU College of Law and the Dean, Professor 
Stephen Bottomley, for providing financial support for the conference 
and publication of this collection of essays. We are also grateful to John 
Mahony, Isabella Wildsmith and Harry McLaurin for editorial assistance.
Keynote: Reforming Law
In the opening chapter, Margaret Davies provides a provocation to the 
conventional understanding of law reform. Although legal positivism 
remains the dominant legal theory that underpins both law and law reform, 
Davies encourages us to transcend a narrow conceptualisation. Feminist, 
sociolegal and pluralist legal scholars have shown that law comprises far 
more than that found in the statute books for, as Sarat says, it is in fact 
2  One notable previous effort in Australia – albeit one focused primarily on the process 




‘all over’. Accordingly, we need to think about meta-legal reform, that is, 
new concepts of law that transcend the realm of legal experts. Alternative 
ways of thinking about law reform have the potential to effect a shift 
in legal consciousness so that we can imagine justice in new ways. 
Part I: Commercial and Corporate Law
The chapters in this Part, organised thematically, propose new directions 
for law to address challenging issues in commercial and corporate 
activity. The first three chapters address corporations, consumers and 
taxation. Ross Grantham argues that ‘an increasingly self-executing, 
enclosed system’ of corporate activity has significant implications for the 
form of the Corporations Act. Further, his research shows that this shift 
to corporate self-regulation significantly reduces the supervisory role of 
the court. Grantham argues that the exercise of corporate power is now 
largely unaccountable, creating ‘a significant democratic deficit’. Russell 
Miller puts his account of reforming the anti-competition provision (s 46) 
of the Australian Consumer Law in the context of consumer protection 
reforms in Australia since the 1990s. He describes the difficult journey of 
the Harper Panel’s proposed reforms which negotiated ‘vigorous debate’ 
over two approaches to the same end, neither of which ‘could be said to be 
entirely right or entirely wrong’. John Passant discusses the role of taxation 
in addressing social inequality. He argues that taxation can ameliorate 
‘the fundamental inequality between capital and labour’, and canvasses 
two possible tax reforms: a net wealth tax; and a minimum threshold, or 
‘Buffett rule’, for individuals and companies. Passant makes the argument 
to direct policymakers towards measures that can ‘address growing 
inequality and the threat that poses to our democracy and economy’.
The next three chapters move to specific issues of employer regulation and 
home lending. Joellen Riley proposes a way of regulating the new, shared 
economy. Riley focuses on the current inadequacy of the protection of the 
rights, pay and conditions of workers in the new economy, and suggests 
that existing small business regulation in Australia offers models for 
regulating unconventional work arrangements. With similar attention to 
protecting workers’ pay and conditions, Tess Hardy examines the measures 
for holding ‘lead firms’ liable for employment contraventions in their 
supply chain, corporate group or franchise network. Drawing on existing 
models of third party liability, she reviews proposals for statutory measures 
to reconceptualise legal responsibility for employment contraventions. 
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Gill North notes the large proportion of household debt represented by 
residential property mortgage debt in Australia, and proposes three policy 
reforms that protect against possible future consumer losses and hardship 
should the housing market decline sharply.
This Part closes with two chapters addressing our understanding of 
corporate whistleblowers. Kath Hall and Heather Cork challenge two 
limiting assumptions about whistleblowing – that whistleblowers act 
alone, and that reporting involves a single disclosure – and propose 
definitional reforms to broaden the reach and protection of whistleblowing 
laws. Suzanne Le Mire and Christine Parker also promote a broader 
understanding of whistleblowing, focusing on lawyers and their potential 
as ‘gatekeepers for justice’. Le Mire and Parker propose a reexamination of 
lawyers’ ethical duties to enable lawyers to disclose information that they 
hold of corporate wrongdoing. 
Part II: Criminal Law and Evidence
The first chapter in this Part, by Lorana Bartels, explores the need for 
reform in criminal law and critiques Australia’s ‘addiction to prison’. 
She posits a new future in which all public policy proposals must hold 
the promise of decreasing the imprisonment rate. She points to the recent 
increase in the incarceration rate, its cost, the unfairness of the over-
incarceration of Indigenous people, and the fact that prison is not an 
effective crime reduction tool. Both victims and offenders could be better 
served, she argues, by reallocating resources away from prison. In  the 
second chapter, Simon Bronitt reviews the past few decades’ practice 
in law reform commissions in the United Kingdom and Australia, 
especially in relation to criminal law. He asks whether, as in the past, 
our aspirations for criminal law reform should extend no further than 
the ‘liberal promise’ of a more ‘principled and codified’ criminal law. 
Next, Wendy Larcombe advocates a new approach to rape law, arguing 
that the law should better support the needs of sexual violence victims. 
Larcombe contends that, in spite of 40 years of law reform, the system 
does not provide accessible and effective resolutions for the vast majority 
of victims. She argues that trials for sexual offences should be heard by 
a judge alone, and that innovative and restorative justice alternatives to 
criminal prosecution should be provided to give victims of sexual assault 
more options. In another chapter that focuses on sexual assault cases, 
John Anderson argues that the dichotomy between tendency and context 
5
INTRODUCTION
evidence is false: relationship or context evidence must be presumed 
prejudicial and inadmissible unless the prosecution can show its probative 
value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Jonathan Clough takes a broader 
reform scope in his chapter which proposes improving the mechanisms 
for prosecuting transnational corporate crime. He argues that corporate 
criminal liability continues to evolve, and that Australia must make 
sure it  has appropriate structures in place so that large transnational 
corporations can be effectively prosecuted.
Several chapters place the focus of reform on jury activity. Blake 
McKimmie examines the influence of stereotypes on jurors, and argues 
that changes should be made in the manner of presenting expert evidence 
and in the appearance and positioning of defendants in the courtroom. 
Diane Sivasubramaniam suggests that the potential divergence between 
the deliberative legal and the retributive community notions of justice may 
not be reduced by restorative justice and preventative detention reforms. 
She argues that the retributive impulse is a strong human response and must 
not be ignored in the process of implementing legal reforms. In another 
chapter that relates to jury decision-making, Helen Fraser reviews a case 
in which the jury listens to a covertly made recording of a conversation 
between police and the accused. In accord with standard practice, the 
jury read a transcript of the conversation written by a detective acting 
as an ad hoc expert. Fraser examines the recording and concludes that 
the transcript is inaccurate. Because the process of involving the police 
in making a transcript is flawed and invites injustice, Fraser advocates 
designing a system that will produce reliable transcripts. In the final 
chapter in this Part, Anne Wallace looks at criminal courtroom processes 
and finds that they are in transition toward a more efficient system that 
makes use of online resources and is more user-centric. She  points to 
reforms that she sees leading the courts into the 21st century. 
Part III: Environmental Law
Irene Watson begins this Part with the provocative proposition that 
ecocide of First Nation territories parallels the genocide committed 
against First Nation peoples. She rejects conventional law reform because 
of its unlawful colonial foundation associated with terra nullius, and 
argues for a re-emergence and acknowledgement of the ancient laws of 
the land which, she avers, would be truly mainstream. Virginia Marshall’s 
chapter also addresses the impact of the postcolonial legacy on the 
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environmental interests of Indigenous peoples, with particular regard 
to water to overturn aqua nullius. She is critical of the characterisation 
of Indigenous peoples as a minority interest, and argues for a focus on 
international human rights principles as expressed in the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which would more 
effectively give expression to the exercise and enjoyment of Indigenous 
communities’ rights to water. In her chapter, Natalie Stoianoff describes 
Australia’s slow progress towards recognising Indigenous ecological 
knowledge (IEK) in conserving biological diversity and managing natural 
resources. She reports on the development of an Indigenous governance 
framework for environmental management, the 2014 NSW Office 
of  Environment and Heritage White Paper, Recognising and Protecting 
Aboriginal Knowledge Associated with Natural Resource Management.
Beginning with the idea that the earth’s life support systems are 
experiencing profound and potentially devastating change, Jan McDonald 
takes on the task of reforming environmental law to make it more responsive. 
She identifies a reform agenda for environmental law, comprising 
techniques and tools for building in flexibility to environmental decisions 
and environmental law-making processes more generally. She argues 
that law reform must be part of a broader shift towards polycentric and 
adaptive governance that recognises system complexity.
Cameron Holley’s chapter considers one of Australia’s central 
environmental  challenges: sustaining the supply of water. He considers 
a suite of reforms to improve upon past initiatives in the area. In the final 
chapter, Paul Martin, Amanda Kennedy and Jacqueline Williams provide 
one of several ‘meta-reform’ perspectives in this book. They examine 
the proliferation of laws on rural biodiversity and, finding past efforts 
wanting, suggest changes to the process of reform: future law-making 
should take a ‘whole-of-landscape, socioeconomically realistic’ approach.
Part IV: Private Law
The first group of chapters on private law exposes the perils of statutory 
law reform in areas traditionally governed by judge-made law. Darryn 
Jensen provides a simple illustration: a perceived flaw in the common law 
concerning receipt of misapplied trust assets was corrected by legislation in 
some states. But these ‘piecemeal’ reforms have proved to be problematic 
and redundant. Matthew Harding and Joachim Dietrich expose serious 
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problems that may arise from the interaction of legislation and common 
law in a federal system. Harding explains how the proliferation of statutory 
definitions of ‘charity’ has created complexity, inconsistency and, in some 
instances, rule of law concerns. Dietrich criticises the extraordinarily 
complex package of tort law, contract law and legislation concerning 
liability for personal injuries sustained during performance of a contract 
for recreational services. He illustrates his theme by reference to the 
differing tort defences under different regimes, the failure of legislatures 
to further the objective of a uniform national consumer law, and the 
uncertainty surrounding contractual exclusion of liability. Elise Bant 
and Jeannie Paterson consider the challenges of ‘meta-legislation’ such as 
the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). Using the remedial provisions that 
respond to misleading conduct and unconscionable conduct, the authors 
consider how coherent development of the law can be achieved and 
how to ensure that the ACL’s density and complexity do not undermine 
its efficacy. They recommend, among other measures, soft law practice 
notes for consumers and decision-makers. Finally, in the first group 
of chapters, Robyn Carroll and Catherine Graville explain the potency of 
alternative remedies to damages for defamation, and evaluate the efficacy 
of alternative remedial schemes in the current uniform defamation laws. 
They argue for inclusion of a ‘reasonable apology’ requirement in an offer 
to make amends. 
The second group of chapters uses private law theory to inform regulatory 
design. Simone Degeling and Kit Barker argue that corrective justice 
provides the most morally and ethically appropriate framework for 
reparative schemes to redress grave historical injustices. They make 
important recommendations for the improvement of existing reparation 
schemes, such as the scheme established to redress abuse within the 
Australian Defence Force, and for the design of new schemes, such as 
that proposed to redress institutional child sexual abuse. Prue Vines also 
focuses on corrective justice. She argues that the law of negligence for 
personal injury responds inadequately to the parties’ symbolic, emotional 
and monetary needs and that an apology may better meet the corrective 
justice objectives of tort law.
The third group of chapters identifies two areas where fundamental reform 
is required. Robyn Honey argues for a more nuanced understanding of 
capacity and consent in property and contract law. She proposes a set 
of  reform principles that will avoid paternalism and appropriately 
promote autonomy. Ian Murray’s chapter concerns the point in time 
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at which a charity should be expected to produce a public benefit from 
currently held resources. He argues on theoretical and practical grounds 
that more attention should be paid by charities to intergenerational 
balance in accumulating or applying charity funds, and he spells out how 
this might be done.
Part V: Public Law
The chapters on public law offer 10 proposals, including blueprints for 
dramatic legal change. Initial chapters argue for meta-reforms: ways to 
reform the process of law reform itself. Graeme Orr’s chapter takes on 
the vexed question of compulsory voting in constitutional referendums. 
Orr argues that, given the distinctive nature of constitutional law and 
reform, voting at constitutional referendums should be voluntary. 
Scott  Stephenson’s chapter also rethinks constitutional referendums. 
His solution to the problem of Australia’s stalled process of constitutional 
change is the use of citizens’ assemblies – randomly selected, rigorously 
informed and demographically representative bodies empowered to draft 
referendum questions. As dramatic as Orr and Stephenson’s reforms 
would be, the next two meta-reforms arguably would be even more 
fundamental. Lael Weis compares the culture of constitutional reform 
in Australia to that of the United States, where a ‘popular constitutional 
culture’ sees many or even most Americans deliberate about the meanings 
and directions of their founding document. Weis advocates approaches 
to help ‘cultivate’ an Australian popular constitutional culture. Gabrielle 
Appleby and Anna Olijnyk in turn consider an important set of cases 
where the constitutionality of a legislative Bill is uncertain. Their proposed 
reforms aim to enhance parliamentary constitutional deliberations.
The first four chapters described share a common focus on deliberation 
– a dominant concern in academic studies of politics, and an emergent 
concern for public law scholars. Two more chapters also consider 
deliberation, in particular in relation to human rights. Dominique 
Dalla-Pozza’s chapter assesses the Commonwealth’s Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security, while Julie Debeljak’s examines 
the first decade of judicial decisions – and legislative reactions – under the 
Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities. Both models leave 
parliaments ultimately sovereign, yet both seek to increase the scrutiny of 
legislation against rights standards. Before recommending key reforms, 
each author recounts the recent histories of the respective rights models. 
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The next chapter, by Andrew Henderson and Kim Rubenstein, reflects 
some of the themes Debeljak raises. But Henderson and Rubenstein 
invert these themes by considering how courts can constitute an historical 
record of key Australian debates and events.
Three final chapters rethink particular subjects in public law. Andrew 
Kenyon’s chapter charts expanding notions of free speech in jurisdictions 
including Germany. Kenyon lays out a case for speech interests to be 
understood not only in classical negative terms (i.e. anti-censorship), 
but also as a positive and collective interest requiring, for example, the 
airing of diverse points of view. Melissa Castan and Paula Gerber explore 
the profound personal and social significance of a seemingly innocuous 
document: the Australian birth certificate. Noting how the certificate’s 
absence is both a consequence and a cause of social disadvantage 
(e.g.  among immigrant and Indigenous communities), they suggest 
specific reforms. Daniel Stewart closes this Part by bringing to light 
problems in government secrecy laws. He considers law reforms that would 
better manage disclosure and privacy interests in relation, for instance, to 
immigration detention centres and public servants’ uses of social media. 
Part VI: Legal Practice and Legal Education
In this final Part of the book, six chapters are devoted to the reform 
of  legal  practice and three to legal education. The first three chapters 
address the perennially vexed issue of ethics in legal practice. The Legal 
Profession Uniform Law (LPUL) (so far enacted only in NSW and Victoria) 
represents an important step towards uniformity, but Vivien Holmes, 
Stephen Tang, Tony Foley and Margie Rowe argue that the LPUL adopts 
a retrograde stance in regard to ethics. They advocate a  return to the 
proactive model of ethics management devised in NSW only a few years 
earlier. In evincing concern about the complicity of lawyers in the unethical 
conduct of their clients, Adrian Evans identifies numerous weak points 
in lawyer education and training. Rather than institutional reform, he 
argues for a heightened awareness on the part of individual practitioners. 
In contrast, Justine Rogers advocates that the ethical focus should be on 
the team, the typical organisational unit within firms. She recommends 
that attention be accorded to ‘teamthink’ in legal education, professional 
regulation and scholarship.
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The next three chapters offer reformist perspectives on discrete aspects 
of legal practice. First, Bronwen Morgan, Joanne McNeill and Isobel 
Blomfield consider the legal ambiguity confronting sustainable economic 
initiatives in response to environmental challenges. As this type of 
entrepreneurialism falls between for-profit and not-for-profit models, 
Morgan et al recommend that attention be paid to creating a dedicated 
professional network for legal practitioners and service providers. Second, 
Mary Anne Noone addresses the challenges that arise when lawyers act as 
mediators, as required by courts and tribunals, because the lawyer then 
becomes both an officer of the court and third party neutral. Noone 
suggests that the tension be minimised by making parties aware of their 
rights, reporting systemic issues and placing a prohibition on immunity 
from liability. Third, Liz Curran articulates her concern that the voices of 
the marginalised are rarely heard in the law reform process. She argues that, 
with imagination and little cost, it is possible to empower marginalised 
people, a proposition she illustrates with examples. 
The final trio of chapters is concerned with the reform of legal education. 
The first, by Craig Collins, draws attention to the Renaissance movement of 
Ramism that harnessed the power of printing, and to the textbook, which 
became central to legal education. As technological change is effecting 
the end of Ramism, Collins argues that less weight be paid to academic 
requirements and more to practical legal education. Paul Maharg addresses 
the complexity of the increasingly onerous regulation requirements of legal 
education, which are subject not only to mediation and intermediation, 
but also to the disruptive process of disintermediation. Maharg argues 
for a neutral space where regulators and others can meet and deliberate, 
a process likely to improve the quality of regulation. Finally, Margaret 
Thornton highlights the disjuncture between the standardised curriculum 
and the reality that most law graduates no longer enter traditional private 
practice. She argues that the Priestley 11 should cease to be mandatory, 
enabling law schools to develop diverse curricula that would better equip 
graduates for a range of destinations. 
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Keynote: Reforming Law – 
The Role of Theory
Margaret Davies1
I. Introduction
The anarchist Peter Kropotkin began his 1886 pamphlet Law and 
Authority by describing the tendency of law to proliferate so that it takes 
over every aspect of social life:2
when ignorance reigns in society and disorder in the minds of men, laws 
are multiplied, legislation is expected to do everything, and each fresh law, 
being a fresh miscalculation, men are continually led to demand from it 
what can proceed only from their own education and their own morality. 
Kropotkin continues by noting that, because of this demand for law to 
fix things, laws continue to multiply, to the point that there is ‘a law 
everywhere and about everything!’ As an anarchist, Kropotkin thought 
that the desire for law to rectify society’s problems stemmed from a learned 
reliance on others rather than reliance on the intrinsic resources of the self 
and the immediate community. He argued that law achieves its power by 
weaving together two elements: longstanding and useful customs which 
society is committed to, and mechanisms allowing the privileged classes 
to maintain their power. It was not an entirely simplistic view of law as 
an instrument of dominance. However, he saw the socially accepted parts 
of law as a foil, which were there to conceal the fact that law essentially 
operates to strengthen the power of the privileged. 
1  Matthew Flinders Distinguished Professor of Law, Flinders University.
2  Peter Kropotkin, Law and Authority: An Anarchist Essay (Open Socialist Publishing, 2006) 6.
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If there was too much law for Kropotkin in 19th century Europe I don’t 
like to imagine what he would have made of modern nation states and the 
legal effects of globalisation. (Indeed the phenomenon of ‘juridification’ 
has been much analysed in the later 20th and early 21st centuries.3) In some 
ways Kropotkin’s underlying image of law was not completely unlike the 
image held by 19th and 20th century liberal thinkers. This image was of 
a law with its own sphere, a law with a conceptual limit beyond which 
people could organise their lives as they saw fit. Beyond law’s sphere 
of regulation lay freedom and the private sphere. Kropotkin’s agenda was 
to reduce and eventually eliminate law – he concludes his pamphlet with 
the words ‘no more laws! No more judges!’4 The more moderate concern 
of many other writers who also adopt the image of a limited law and 
an outside or non-regulated area of freedom and privacy has been and 
continues to be where to draw the line of legal intervention, and how 
to improve the limited law to make it more efficient and consistent, less 
obscure, and in tune with current social values.
The idea of a limited sphere of law and a non-legal sphere of freedom 
was tested repeatedly throughout the 20th century, often in conjunction 
with an appreciation of the disseminated nature of power. The image of 
a limited law was, for instance, revealed to be incoherent in the 1980s by 
feminist writers such as Frances Olsen and Katherine O’Donovan who 
pointed to the many ways in which law shapes the conditions for social 
life and structures legal subjects and their relationships.5 Law is not neutral 
as regards social order, but rather creates, normalises and replicates social 
life. At the same time, by perpetuating the idea that abstract individualism 
is gender-neutral and race-neutral, and that the person is a  natural 
rather than constructed feature of social life, law obscures its own role 
in producing social relations. As feminists argued, beyond law was not 
freedom but, rather, a pervasively normalised and legally inflected social 
and private life. As Margaret Thornton wrote in the 1990s, ‘For women, 
neither the polity nor the market have been realms of freedom or self-
realisation, but realms of hostility’.6
3  See, in particular, Jurgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action Vol 2 (Beacon Press, 1987) 
356–73.
4  Kropotkin, above n 2, 34.
5  Frances Olsen, ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ (1983) 
96 Harvard Law Review 1497; Katherine O’Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1985).
6  Margaret Thornton, ‘The Cartography of Public and Private’ in Margaret Thornton (ed), Public 
and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Oxford University Press, 1995).
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Sociolegal scholars also pointed to the unlimited nature of law. In 1990 
Austin Sarat wrote an influential article about the legal experiences of 
welfare recipients in New England.7 One of his respondents claimed 
that the ‘law is all over’ – in other words it is pervasive and unavoidable. 
This  was  not so much a view of formal law as having expanded 
uncontrollably in the way that Kropotkin envisaged – rather, it was 
a realistic assessment of the fact that law is a different thing for people in 
different social situations. The welfare recipient had a constant need to 
engage with law and so felt its presence immediately and materially. Such 
necessity leads to an experience of law which is, as Sarat says, ‘embodied 
in a particular set of lived conditions: … a law of practices, not promises, 
of material transactions, not abstract ideals’.8 Understood from the bottom 
up, law is everywhere and has an oppressive weight – it doesn’t liberate 
but sets the conditions for survival and demands constant engagement.
Legal pluralists have also challenged the limited view of law, and I would 
broadly divide this scholarship into two different types. One rather 
dominant strand of pluralism has examined forms of law outside the state, 
from Indigenous and religious law to semi-formalised systems of non-
legal governance. Such approaches, like legal positivism, tend to view law 
as an objectifiable and self-contained thing. A second type of pluralism, 
which has grown in part out of the first, looks at law as emerging from 
human interactions and narratives, making it fluid and local, and often 
leading to hybrid forms where people combine norms from different 
sources in order to create a kind of social law.
Clearly the writers of recent decades did not mean (or perhaps did not 
only mean) that the nightmare implied by Kropotkin had come to pass 
– that doctrinal law has reached further and further into the interstices 
it creates so that no corner of life is left unlegislated and unregulated. 
It would perhaps be plausible to hold this view, but feminist, sociolegal 
and many pluralist theorists start with a different view of law, where it is 
always embedded in social life. Rather than think of law as an additive 
or an intervention which expands from a small space to occupy almost 
everything but which still has its own identity and autonomy, law is seen 
7  Austin Sarat, ‘“The Law is All Over”: Power, Resistance, and the Legal Consciousness of the 
Welfare Poor’ (1990) 2 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 343.
8  Ibid. 378.
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
14
as more pervasive and less cohesive, a dispersed set of practices and values, 
not necessarily emanating from a single place, and experienced and 
performed differently by different groups of people.
Where does law reform sit in an image of law which is ‘all over’, as Sarat’s 
respondent said, and where different groups of people have quite different 
views of what law is and how it operates? I’d like to address this question 
in three parts. First, by reference to the familiar notion that law reform is 
about changing doctrinal law so that it better suits the social conditions of 
the times. Second, by thinking about the idea that law reform can equally 
address a changing concept of law. Third, by looking at changes in the 
social and cultural conditions which underpin law.
II. Reforming Law
First, then, to the familiar notion that law reform essentially concerns 
improvements to the positive law to make it more coherent, to deal 
with new social, economic and technological conditions, or to address 
social problems. In 1949,9 Lord Denning compared a national society to 
a river and the law to the ‘conservator’ who keeps the river in good shape. 
He argued that once the law is stable and developed, the conservator only 
has to do occasional maintenance – cutting the weeds and repairing the 
banks, for instance. ‘The river flows peacefully and slowly’ he said.10
But in … days of great social changes … the law ha[s] to develop apace 
so as to meet the needs of the time. The greater the social revolution, the 
greater the need of law reform. The river is turbulent and restless and 
is in danger of getting out of control. The hatches have to be opened. 
New channels have to be cut. It requires legal statesmanship of the highest 
order to keep the law abreast of the social changes. If it does not do so, the 
rule of law itself may be engulfed and flooded out.
In this image, society usually goes along within the constraints set in 
place by the law. Social life is the water which flows through the form 
preserved by law. There is no sense in this image that the characteristics of 
the river as a whole have been formed by the flow of water; rather, the flow 
is determined by the solid surfaces maintained by the law. Law reform 
9  Alfred Thomson Denning (Baron), ‘The Universities and Law Reform’ (1949) 1 Journal of the 
Society of Public Teachers of Law 258.
10  Ibid. 258.
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is about tidying up the banks and eliminating obstructions, and, in times 
of dangerous social upheaval, undertaking more substantial changes to 
the size, depth and direction of flow. It is an extremely benign view of 
law – law is basically fine and has a pre-given form, but needs to be tidied 
up from time to time. 
Denning’s river is a variation on the idea of a limited sphere of law outside 
which there is freedom. The image does imply that law provides rather 
total conditions and shape for social life, but it nonetheless promotes 
a largely contained view of law. Law provides a neutral form for social 
existence and, within the confines of the river banks, the individual water 
molecules can do largely as they please.
There was of course dispute throughout the 20th century about whether 
both parliament and judges are the appropriate agents of reform in 
the law. The debate has many layers which I will not go into here, but 
primarily it counterposes the common law tradition and the newer 
theory of legal realism, against the more rationalist positivism of Austin 
and Bentham.11 The common law tradition gave judges a prime role in 
identifying and developing the law, and realists took the view that judges, 
as human actors, necessarily interpret and apply law in the light of social 
values. By contrast, Austin and Bentham were adamant about the need 
to distinguish sharply the question of what law is from what it ought 
to be. They saw the inquiry into what law is as a matter for those who 
identify and apply the law, while the question of what law ought to be is 
determined by parliament and law reformers. Keeping a clear view of the 
separation of these things was essential for law reform to operate properly 
and, indeed, in their view much law reform by way of clarification and, 
ideally, codification was needed in order to make it possible. 
As foreshadowed at the beginning of my chapter, the success of the 
positivist  view of law also poses real dilemmas for broad change. 
For  instance, in gender relations, because the underlying idea of law is 
so doctrinally focused, positivism enforces a pernicious choice between 
engaging or not engaging with law, between standing inside or outside 
the law.12 Because this idea of law is so invested with a view of its own 
11  John Gava, ‘The Rise of the Hero Judge’ (2001) 24 UNSW Law Review 747; J D Heydon, 
‘Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law’ (2004) 10 Otago Law Review 493; Michael Kirby 
‘“Judicial Activism”? A Riposte to the Counter-Reformation’ (2005) 11 Otago Law Review 1.
12  See Mari Matsuda, ‘When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential 
Method’ (1988) 11 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 7, 8.
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neutrality vis-à-vis social power, engaging from a position that does not 
accept its neutrality has been very difficult. This has led to a good deal of 
caution among all critics of state law about whether and how to engage 
with law and law reform: What can be expected of law reform? Does 
engaging with law simply legitimate its exclusion of alternative knowledges? 
How can values of care be imported into doctrinal law? How can the 
experiences of marginalised others be incorporated into the assumed 
knowledge of law? How can legal subjects be reconstructed as relational 
rather than atomistic? How can entrenched biases in the operation of 
law be addressed? How can we even commence the ‘horizontal dialogue’ 
that Irene Watson has spoken of between modern Australian colonial law 
and the first, original, law of this country?13 The very form of positivist 
law seems to prevent anything but ad hoc change which may, of course, 
accumulate into something larger over time, but it is a very slow process.
III. Reforming Concepts of Law
It has always been extremely interesting to me to think that Austin 
and Bentham were themselves engaged not only in law reform but in 
a meta-legal reform – the reform of the concept of law. The theory of 
legal positivism, much criticised throughout the 20th century but also 
completely ingrained in legal pedagogy and ideology, was itself the product 
of a strategic conceptual change and emerged as part of a reformist agenda. 
Theory is not only about describing and understanding the world; rather, 
it both responds to and makes the world. Legal positivism is an extremely 
successful example of what might be termed conceptual reform.14 It made, 
and continues to make, the concept of law as something separate from 
society while also purporting to describe what it has itself made. The point 
has been made by Wayne Morrison in relation to Austin:15
knowledge claims are part of, and not antecedent to, [Austin’s] overall 
project. Austin is not a simple positivist in the sense that his knowledge 
claim has no pretence to anything other than the ‘thing-in-itself ’, for his 
13  Irene Watson, ‘What is the Mainstream? The Laws of First Nations Peoples’, see Ch 18, this 
collection.
14  See, in particular, Frederick Schauer, ‘The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism’ (2015) 101 
Virginia Law Review 957, 960–69.
15  W Morrison, Jurisprudence: From the Greeks to Post-modernism (Cavendish, 1997) 227; see 
also, discussing Bentham, Schauer, above n 14, 960–69; Tom Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical 
Positivism (Dartmouth, 1996). 
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image of positive law is one element of an overall project. … Austin’s 
claims for jurisprudence are pragmatic in the sense that the demand for 
a clear jurisprudence arises to get something done, and that something 
is to create an image of law suitable for law to become a powerful and 
rational image of modernity.
HLA Hart also described Austin and Bentham’s project in terms 
of  conceptual reform – to construct a workable concept of law which 
would enable the doctrinal law to be improved. He described them as 
‘the vanguard of a movement which labored with passionate intensity and 
much success’ and also insisted that their ‘prime reason’ for insisting on 
the separation of law and morality ‘was to enable [people] to see steadily 
the precise issues posed by the existence of morally bad laws’.16 In other 
words, separating is from ought was not a description of a reality, but 
rather an act of theory construction which was part of an overall agenda of 
rationalisation in the law. They made what they wanted to describe and it 
obviously resonated more broadly – in time it became true because people 
acted as if it were true. However, as I have indicated, the problem with the 
success of positivism was that it seemed to leave the only option for legal 
change as change in the content of law – its doctrines and procedures. 
I have laboured this point, because for some years I have taken inspiration 
from Austin and Bentham on this issue and regarded theory to be not only 
about analysing and describing, but also constructing alternative concepts 
of law which are future-oriented. That this is possible is reinforced in 
social theory and critical philosophy. Drawing out aspects of the present 
which appear to provide direction for the future, and intensifying them 
theoretically, prefigures a world that is commensurable with the present 
and past, but which perhaps adds additional emphasis to those elements 
of it worth promoting. Theory can therefore be seen as an imaginative 
response to present circumstances, in which theorists actively choose their 
abstractions from a complex world. This is true of all theory, not only 
of theory based on an explicit normative vision.
This broader need for law reform to encompass not only reform in 
doctrinal law but also new concepts of law was explicitly recognised in the 
now disbanded Law Commission of Canada. As well as more recognisable 
law reform objectives, it had a statutory mandate to ‘work towards the 
16  H L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morality’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law 
Review 593, 596.
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development of new concepts of law and new approaches to law’.17 
The Law Commission stated that it ‘interprets this legislative purpose as 
directing it to examine critically even the most fundamental principles 
of the Canadian legal system’.18
Over the past half century there have been some efforts to develop 
alternative concepts of law and I think it would be correct to say that some 
paradigm shifting is underway. This was true when I began my career as 
a legal scholar, though 25 years ago I hoped things would have become 
more certain by now. That was a misplaced hope, and legal theory remains 
in an uncertain but very interesting situation. No alternative concept has 
at this stage reached the prominence of legal positivism which, as I have 
said, has attained its status because of its widespread adoption. But some 
themes can perhaps be observed. 
First, as I indicated above, there is an appreciation of law as distributed 
or networked across social life as opposed to existing in its own limited 
sphere. Understanding law as distributed, or perhaps diffused, means 
several things: it means, as many scholars have observed, that law shapes 
and leaves imprints across all social relationships, even or especially those 
that were once regarded as intrinsically private;19 it means that law has 
a spatial and material presence and not just an abstract one;20 and it means 
that doctrinal law is a conceptually crystallised form of human normative 
relationships but is never self-contained or self-generating, because of 
its reliance on human intervention in the form of interpretations and 
applications of law.
These observations are connected to a second theme of the newer 
approaches to law, which is that law is not simply a top-down imposition, 
but also in many forms has to be regarded as emerging from subjective and 
material human experiences.21 In a sense, this has involved two or possibly 
three shifts. First, there is an appreciation that law is not a thing in itself 
that can be reflected or represented in theory but, rather, is the product 
17  Law Commission of Canada Act 1996 s 3(a).
18  Records of Law Commission of Canada held on the website of the Library and Archives 
of Canada: epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/law_commission_of_canada-ef/2006-12-06/www.lcc.gc.ca/
about/mandate-en.asp.
19  O’Donovan, above n 5.
20  See, for example, David Delaney, The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of World-Making: 
Nomospheric Investigations (Routledge, 2010).




of active knowing, active performance and active construal. Second 
there is an appreciation that those who ‘know’ and perform law are not 
just legal experts and judges, and that legal knowledge is formed also 
in the situated and narrative positions of a far more diverse range of 
identities; in other words, that knowledge of law is produced and it can 
be produced by people other than experts in law. Third, and increasingly, 
we  are also seeing materialist ideas of law emerge, which place all 
normativity in the relationships formed between human society and our 
physical environments.
This is not to say that legal expert knowledge does not have its own specific 
role and technical purpose; rather, that the theoretical questions ‘What is 
law?’, ‘Where is law?’, ‘Who is law for?’ and so on cannot be answered 
simply by reference to this perspective. Thus feminists and pluralists 
have made efforts to replace the ‘embodied imagining’ of an idealised 
masculine subject with diverse and relational subjectivities, situated in 
gendered social contexts.22 Legal consciousness scholars have studied the 
everyday knowledge about law, decentring official knowledge of law in 
favour of everyday knowledge.23 And Robert Cover famously argued for 
norm-construction or jurisgenesis at the level of religious communities, 
an insight which has since been extended to the processes of norm 
construction across all cultural groups.24 In all of these contributions, we 
see an image where the traditional view of state law is only one narrow and 
exclusive form distilled from the widespread circulation and construction 
of norms throughout society. But we also see a different image of state law 
emerging – instead of being a mirror image of the autonomous person 
with his boundaries and rationality, the law constructed in the image of 
(gender and otherwise) diverse subjects is more relational, more embedded 
in social practices, and less cohesive.
What does such change in the concept of law have to do with law reform? 
Or, to return to my original question, if law is distributed or ‘all over’, 
how can we conceptualise change in legal doctrine? Who is in control 
of it, how is change generated?
22  On ‘embodied imagining’, see Judith Grbich ‘The Body in Legal Theory’ (1992) 11 University 
of Tasmania Law Review 26.
23  Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, ‘Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account 
of Legal Consciousness’ (1992) 26 New England Law Review 731.
24  Robert Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4; see also Robert Post, 
‘Who’s Afraid of Jurispathic Courts: Violence and Public Reason in Nomos and Narrative’ (2005) 17 
Yale Law Journal of Law and the Humanities 9.
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I don’t have a very clear answer to these questions, but my sense is that the 
more traditional attitudes to law reform have substantially changed and 
are now more in keeping with an expansive and even experimental view 
of what law is. I would make a couple of observations.
First, critical and sociolegal approaches add support to using an evidence-
based approach to reform rather than an approach based on abstract 
rationality. Empirical sociolegal evidence is very significant in this 
context, as are efforts (discussed below) to read or interpret legal doctrine 
in ways which accommodate both diversity of values and diversity of 
life experiences. Second, a more disseminated image of law is perhaps 
more receptive to efforts to test successor legalities in and around the 
edges of state law. In some contexts, state law itself can become an 
experimental space for new ideas about law. One could cite, for example, 
so-called ‘alternative’ practices of law, such as non-court-based dispute 
resolution or Indigenous sentencing courts which introduce values of 
negotiation, accommodation, recognition of the other, and legal plurality 
into the practice and meaning of law. At the margins of or beyond state 
law, examples might include truth and reconciliation commissions and 
efforts to mobilise civil society in justice initiatives, such as the Women’s 
International War Crimes Tribunal and other people’s tribunals.25 
These instances draw on state legality but also deliberately eschew it in 
the interests of (in part) taking law beyond its self-defined boundaries. 
They are of course indicative of a two-way process or oscillation between 
practice and theory:26 new practices help to generate new theory, which 
in turn widens the possibilities for further new practices.
IV. Changing Culture
The problem with deliberately choosing or trying to shape a concept of law 
is that it is not possible to predict the consequences of such a change. And 
therefore it is also necessary to pay attention to the surrounding culture and 
the ways in which it informs what is even thinkable. Around the same time 
as Denning was speaking about the river of society with its conservator – the 
25  Ustinia Dolgopol, ‘Redressing Partial Justice – A Possible Role for Civil Society’ in Ustina 
Dolgopol and Judith Gardam (eds), The Challenge of Conflict: International Law Responds (Martinus 
Nihjoff, 2006); Christine Chinkin, ‘Women’s International Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual 
Slavery’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 335.




law reformer – keeping it in order, Ludwig Wittgenstein also wrote about 
a river in his collection of notes, subsequently published as On Certainty.27 
Wittgenstein’s river differentiates between things we know to be true, and 
the inherited mythologies and shared cultural background which we need 
to support this knowledge. His writing is ambiguous, but essentially he 
differentiates between the riverbed on the one hand, which is the substratum 
of knowledge or the shared ideas we have that make knowledge possible, 
and on the other hand the river flow itself, which consists of everyday claims 
and propositions made possible by the background to our knowledge. The 
image is very similar to Denning’s, except that in Wittgenstein’s case there 
is no reformer to keep the river clear and flowing. It changes itself and, over 
time, parts of the riverbed become dislodged:28
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of 
thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters 
on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp 
division of the one from the other.
Wittgenstein does not explicitly place law in his metaphor, but it might 
be supposed that everyday knowledge about law is part of the flow, while 
shared and presumed cultural knowledge is part of the riverbed – the 
presupposed cultural knowledge would include the liberal and colonial 
views of law as discrete, and as disconnected from social identity.
Philosopher Susan Hekman notes that philosophical theories that 
differentiate between an epistemological background and everyday truths 
are often extremely conservative, because they do not acknowledge that 
cultural assumptions may change, and do not offer any ideas about how 
to encourage such change.29 They simply rely on cultural background as 
pre-given and immutable. She argues that Wittgenstein’s image holds 
more potential for theorising and promoting change than most theories of 
the background because it acknowledges that the riverbed may shift and 
that it is not sharply divided from the everyday truths which it supports. 
So how can cultural change be promoted? Cultural change does not occur 
because people are presented with a logical argument as to why something 
ought to be the case. It is much more incremental, and depends as much 
27  Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans G E M Anscombe (Blackwell, 1969).
28  Ibid. s 97.
29  Susan Hekman, ‘Backgrounds and Riverbeds: Feminist Reflections’ (1999) 25 Feminist Studies 
427. I would like to thank Sami Alrashidi for drawing my attention to this article and for his 
persuasive arguments as to its significance.
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on what are understood to be the criteria for truth within the cultural 
background as it does on any new claim. As Hekman says, ‘feminist truth 
does not make sense in the discourse of abstract masculinity’, and ‘we must 
first alter the criteria of what it makes sense to say before we can proclaim 
another “truth” and expect it to be heard’.30 To take a historical example, 
claims for gender and racial equality could not be heard until presupposed 
knowledge had shifted sufficiently for women and those of non-Caucasian 
heritage to be regarded as people and equal citizens. Many cultural norms 
still exist which make the resulting formal equality inadequate. Claims to 
marriage equality still do not make sense to some people who see marriage 
as necessarily heterosexual. There is no logic in this view but there is 
a  foundation – the foundation provided by a heteronormative cultural 
background that still divides people into two sexes. In a quite different 
sphere, it is still almost impossible for those educated within a Eurocentric 
legal paradigm, with its obsessive taxonomies and entrenched distinctions, 
to comprehend the relationality and connectedness of First Nations’ 
approaches to law. It seems almost beyond impossible for us to move past 
human exceptionalism and separation to a view where people are seen as 
fully part of the physical and natural world.
Hekman argues that changes in the cultural background essentially occur 
by the emergence of new narratives and perspectives which decentre, 
defamiliarise and eventually alter accepted knowledge.31 The trends I have 
alluded to above, in relation to bringing different perspectives into doctrinal 
law and understanding law itself in a more disseminated and less hierarchical 
way, are themselves part of such a cultural change, as is the extensive 
scholarship which challenges the accepted nature and limits of law.
One partial illustration of a contestation of the doctrine, concept and 
cultural presuppositions of law is evident in the feminist judgments 
projects, which have an English and Australian iteration, as well as several 
others to come.32 The feminist judgments projects asked academic and 
activist writers to provide an alternative feminist judgment to a case 
chosen by the writer. Although all of the judgments were feminist, there 
are of course many varieties of feminism, and also many ways in which 
feminism can be brought to bear on particular issues. The objective in 
30  Ibid. 438.
31  Ibid.
32  Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to 
Practice (Hart, 2010); Heather Douglas, Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker and Rosemary Hunter (eds), 
Australian Feminist Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law (Hart, 2014).
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the English project was to leave ‘a female-gendered mark on the law’.33 
This was achieved not in any simplistic translation of feminist theory into 
practice: feminism is far too diverse for that, and what a theory requires 
in a practical sense is not always evident. Rather, the impact of the 
feminist judgments projects lies in the amassing of feminist readings of 
cases, which collectively illustrate a potential shift in legal consciousness. 
That  is, the feminist judgments show how law is gendered and how it 
could be different, how the resources for a different understanding of law 
are to be found in the law itself in combination with the interpretations 
made by (academic or real) judges.34 The judgments remained within the 
narrowly circumscribed horizon of mainstream colonial law.35 But the 
academic performance of this law did bring different voices to that law 
and push it towards being a different thing.
In this way, changes in law may be promoted by foregrounding changes 
in the cultural background. Like the alternative or experimental legal 
forms mentioned above, feminist judgments also test the boundaries 
of the present with an eye on the future. As I have said elsewhere, such 
‘prefigurative practices cross the divide between the legal present and our 
legal futures: they enact possible futures in the present and leave indelible 
traces of what is to come on the here and now’.36
* * *
In this chapter I have very artificially distinguished between the law 
understood as substance, the law understood as concept, and the cultural 
presuppositions which constitute the conditions for thinking and talking 
about law and its concept. But of course – and as I hope will be clear 
by now – these are artificial distinctions. Changing the content of law 
over time may also change its shape and contours, and such changes are 
also connected to shifts in cultural presuppositions. The riverbed is not 
distinct from the river, and more importantly, the flow of the river is as 
important as the banks and bed in influencing its overall shape and form.
33  Hunter et al, ibid, 8.
34  See generally Margaret Davies, ‘The Law Becomes Us: Rediscovering Judgment’ (2012) 20 
Feminist Legal Studies 167.
35  Irene Watson, ‘First Nations Stories, Grandmother’s Law: Too Many Stories to Tell’ in Douglas 
et al, above n 32.
36  Davies, above n 21, 17.
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The Privatisation of Australian 
Corporate Law
Ross Grantham1
Anyone looking at the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) would be justified in 
thinking that company law in Australia was both wholly statutory and 
an instrument of public regulation. Although Anglo-Australian company 
law may have originally grown out of the law of partnership and been 
built, largely by the courts, from the material of the private law, the 
growth over the last 30 years in the complexity, range of matters covered 
and sheer volume of the Corporations Act would seem to confirm the 
intuition that Australia’s company law is now both statutory and public. 
However, while there is no denying the shift in the source of company 
law, the particular form corporate regulation now takes is actually making 
Australian company law more, rather than less, private.
This trend has at least two important implications for the future of 
Australian company law and the Corporations Act in particular. First, the 
primary audience of the law must now be understood to be those who 
are involved in the operation of companies – business people rather than 
lawyers and the courts. If that is the case, then the form, language and 
complexity of the Corporations Act seems wholly ill-suited to that task. 
Second, privatisation brings to the fore the issues of the legitimacy of 
corporate power, and the purposes for which as a matter of policy we 
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should recognise the corporate form. These two factors combine to suggest 
that the Corporations Act is no longer fit for purpose and must be reformed 
and reconceived from the ground up.
I. The Privatisation of Australian 
Company Law
The privatisation of company law is, in large measure, a consequence of 
a ‘proceduralised’ approach to regulation.2 Broadly, this means that instead 
of directly prescribing the policy goals or desired outcomes, the legislature 
seeks to achieve the substantive policy goals by creating a self-balancing 
system that creates and relies upon incentives designed to induce those being 
regulated to bring about the desired conduct or outcomes. The policy goals 
remain public-regarding, but the mechanisms no longer rely on a direct 
prescription backed by sanctions and imposed by external regulators such 
as the courts. Instead, the mechanisms now used to implement corporate 
regulation focus on the process of decision-making and the creation of 
largely internal governance procedures as the means of regulating the 
behaviour of the participants in the corporate enterprise. 
By prescribing the way in which a company might achieve its goals – 
through restructuring its decision-making processes such that the ‘right’ 
people are involved and that the decision-making process itself is conducted 
in a way that is permeable to the state’s social-economic policies – the overall 
regulatory goals for the company are achieved. Thus, corporate regulation 
increasingly reflects an ideal model of decision-making that embodies the 
essential features of procedural correctness. These features are broadly that 
the decision-makers are impartial, that they are informed, and that the 
decision is rational or reasonable. 
Evidence of proceduralisation may now be found in most parts of 
the Corporations Act, but two examples will suffice.3 One example is 
the procedure established to deal with directors’ conflicts of interest. 
Traditionally, this was dealt with by a common law rule which prohibited 
a director from acting while conflicted and was enforced by claims brought 
2  J Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597 and 
‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part II’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33.
3  The case for a proceduralised approach now being a defining characteristic of Australian 
company law is made fully in R Grantham, ‘The Proceduralisation of Australian Corporate Law’ 
(2015) 43 Federal Law Review 233.
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in the courts by those aggrieved by a breach of the rule. The solution 
to this issue that is now found in ss 191 to 196 of the Corporations Act 
requires that a conflicted director disclose the conflict, in a prescribed 
form, to designated groups. The procedure vests in those designated 
groups power to approve the conflicted director’s continuing involvement 
and to validate tainted transactions, and then provides an escape valve 
through a delegation to ASIC to make exemptions.
A second example is in relation to changes to the company’s capital 
structure  – reductions in capital, companies buying their own shares, 
and providing financial assistance. Historically, there was an absolute 
prohibition on such activity. The law then moved to allow such changes 
with external regulatory supervision (court approval). Now we have 
a  situation where the regulatory approval is given by shareholders. 
The  likely incentives of the shareholders are such that their approval 
(or not) will secure the underlying policy goals.
The important consequence for present purposes is that whether by 
design or consequence, a proceduralised approach is making company law 
more, rather than less, private. The use of internal governance procedures 
to address many of the perennial issues of company law, in place of 
external supervision by regulators or the courts, is making company 
law an increasingly self-executing, enclosed system. The state may have 
prescribed how things must be done, but the application of these processes 
is increasingly vested in the participants in the corporate enterprise.
The second and closely related factor contributing to privatisation is the 
sharp decline in recent decades in the volume, and type, of matters 
reaching the courts. Some sense of the magnitude of the change is 
provided by a survey of the cases reported in Australia’s two specialist sets 
of corporate law reports.4 In the period from 1991, before the reforms of 
the Corporate Law Simplification Program and Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program were introduced, to 2013, there was a decline in the 
number of cases being reported of 37 per cent. The change is even more 
marked when one focuses on core company law issues – matters that 
define and reflect the essential characteristics of the corporate form and 
the minimum content of corporate law – where the rate of decline in cases 
is well over 50 per cent in the same period. 
4  See Grantham, n 3 above.
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It is also clear from this survey that the role of the court has changed. 
Whereas in 1991 the majority of cases saw the courts fulfilling the 
traditional judicial role of interpreting statutory provisions and corporate 
constitutions, and applying common law doctrines, to determine the 
rights and duties of the litigants, by 2013 the courts were hearing only 
a handful of core corporate law issues and in the vast majority of those the 
court’s role was merely a regulatory one of supervising a decision-making 
process prescribed by the Corporations Act or the company’s constitution.
Whether the decline in court cases is a consequence of proceduralisation 
or part of the worldwide decline in civil litigation in favour of private 
dispute resolution,5 the result is that issues and practices that would 
hitherto have been aired publicly in court are now dealt with within the 
company behind closed doors. While it is true that there are now more 
cases of directors’ personal liability, it is important to recognise that the 
basis of liability is not the substance of corporate decisions but rather 
how the directors went about making the decision. The directors of James 
Hardie were not held liable for abandoning the victims of asbestos, but for 
the way in which they announced this to the market. Where previously 
litigation between private disputants brought issues of substance about 
what companies were doing into the public forum, this is no longer 
the case. 
II. The Implications of Privatisation
The somewhat paradoxical effect of the regulatory approach leading 
to a  privatisation of company law has many potential implications. 
Two merit comment. 
A. The manner and form of the Corporations Act
An important implication of privatisation concerns the manner and form 
of Australian company law and the Corporations Act in particular. If the 
intention is to internalise much of the regulation of the company within the 
company’s own governance structures – where the focus of the legislation 
is to set out the processes and procedures those involved in the corporate 
enterprise must follow – then the question arises as to whom the Act 
5  See H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (Hamlyn Lectures 2008, CUP, 2009) Ch 2.
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is primarily addressed. Historically, all legislation, including companies 
legislation, was addressed to lawyers and the courts. The  language of 
legislation, its layout, its presuppositions as to background knowledge 
and context, and even its accessibility, were all tailored by and for lawyers. 
If, however, the intention now is to directly address those involved in the 
corporate enterprise – to set out what they must do and how they must 
do it – then the Corporations Act seems ill-suited to that role. Some idea 
of what a user-oriented corporate statute would look like can be had by 
looking at the companies legislation of Canada and New Zealand: it is 
concise, principles-based and expressed in genuinely plain language.
In contrast, to use Cally Jordan’s phrase, the Corporations Act is 
‘unlovely and unloved’.6 It is extraordinarily dense, complex, unclear, 
poorly organised and, in many respects, rather outdated. At over 2,600 
substantive sections, few people if any can claim to know the Act in its 
entirety. Although the Simplification program in the 1990s tried to ‘make 
it capable of being understood so that users can act on their rights and 
carry out their responsibilities’,7 the large number of amendments made 
to the Act over the years has effectively deprived it of any rational or 
conceptual organisation – any statute that needs sections numbered to 
four capital letters has a problem.8 The result is that as a user guide or 
statement of first recourse for those involved in the corporate enterprise, 
the Act may as well be written Sanskrit.9 What is needed, therefore, is a 
root and branch review and rewriting of the Act. This endeavour, however, 
faces a number of significant challenges. 
First, there will be an understandable reluctance to reopen the 
constitutional  settlement underpinning the Act. The gestation of 
the federal legislation was long and painful and it may be thought better 
not to reopen old wounds. On the other hand, however, there may be 
advantages in reassessing the merits of federal corporate legislation. 
Although the advantages of federalising company law were presented 
during the federal takeover of corporate law in the 1990s as being 
6  C Jordan, ‘Unlovely and Unloved: Corporate Law Reform’s Progeny’ (2009) 33 Melbourne 
University Law Review 626.
7  Corporations Law Simplification Program, Task Force – Plan of Action (Attorney-General’s 
Department, December 1993) 1.
8  Section 601SCAA, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
9  The inaccessibility of the Act may in part explain the rise of ‘soft law’ guides and codes of best 
practice.
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obvious,10 there were in fact other models and what is arguably the most 
successful corporate economy, the US, has a state-based model with 
significant, productive diversity. One of the insights of the Public Choice 
theory is that law is a product and that there is a market for this product.11 
The federalisation of corporate law created in substance a single supplier 
of corporate law (the Commonwealth Parliament) and thus an effective 
monopoly for the supply of company law in Australia, with all of the 
downsides entailed by such monopolies.12
Second, Australian company law is a one-size-fits-all model. This builds 
complexity into the law as it seeks to carve out exceptions to adapt 
a model originally designed to meet the needs of large-scale enterprises 
in the 19th  century to micro-firms and small family businesses in the 
21st century. Again, this is not the only model. Most notably, both Europe 
and the US have created a range of special purpose entities tailored to the 
specific needs of the business or activity.13 If the ultimate aim of Australian 
company law is to provide an efficient and simple vehicle to conduct 
business, then Australia must at least consider more tailored structures.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, any reform of the Corporations Act 
to make it more user-friendly faces the challenge presented by Australia’s 
current predilection for large, highly prescriptive and prolix legislation. 
Whatever the reasons for the explosion in legislation in the 1980s,14 and 
the prescriptive drafting style now in vogue, this approach clearly stands 
in the way of Australia adopting the sort of plain-language, principles-
based, user-oriented companies legislation adopted by the likes of New 
10  M Whincop, ‘The Political Economy of Corporate Law Reform in Australia’ (1999) 27 Federal 
Law Review 77.
11  Generally, see G Tullock, ‘Public Choice’ in S Durlauf and L Blume (eds), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edn, 1987).
12  A monopolistic market is one characterised by barriers to entry to the market by other suppliers, 
the imposition of higher prices, a reduction in consumer surplus and a limiting of consumer choice. 
In relation to corporate law in Australia, see Whincop (n 10) and I Ramsay, ‘Company Law and the 
Economics of Federalism’ (1990) 19 Federal Law Review 169.
13  In the US, for example, the Limited Liability Company (LLC) is a vehicle tailored to the specific 
needs of small businesses and quasi-partnerships, while the Professional Limited Liability Company 
(PLLC) is a vehicle tailored to the needs of those conducting a profession, such as medical services. 
A ‘benefit corporation’ is a particular type of for-profit entity but which includes in its defined goals 
consideration of social and environmental impact. Europe has always provided for quite separate 
forms for closely held companies and publicly held companies (designated in Germany, for example, 
as ‘GmbH’ and ‘AG’ respectively).
14  C Berg, Policy without Parliament: The Growth of Regulation in Australia (Institute of Public 
Affairs, IPA Backgrounder, November 2007, Vol 19/3) 3. Berg’s analysis shows a sudden and massive 
leap in legislative production starting in the late 1980s.
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Zealand and Canada. However, if the primary audience of company law 
in Australia is to be those involved in the corporate enterprise, then the 
expression and accessibility of the law must be massively simplified.
B. Privatisation and the legitimacy of the 
corporate form
The second fundamental implication of the privatising trend in Australia 
relates to the legitimacy of the corporate form and its social and economic 
power. Companies have always been repositories of wealth and power and 
it is a fundamental premise of modern Western liberal society that power 
must be legitimated.15 Where that power is subject to public oversight 
and control, corporate power is legitimated on fundamentally the same 
basis as the power of the state. However, to the extent that companies 
are or have become more private, questions arise as to whether, and how, 
the aggregation of economic, political, social and cultural power in the 
hands of ostensibly private entities that are legally accountable to only a 
small group of shareholders and in practice are accountable to no one may 
be justified.
This is obviously a deep and complex issue that cannot be addressed 
properly here. However, it is worth noting that changes over the 
last 20  years in the nature of corporate power have changed how this 
question must be understood.16 Historically, the most widely accepted 
basis of legitimacy of corporate power was the instrumental value of the 
company as a creator of wealth. The efficient utilisation of scarce resources 
and the maximisation of the wealth of society is a good thing, both as 
a means to other substantive goals and as an end in itself. The pursuit 
of the maximisation of social wealth is, therefore, in the public interest 
and, being in the public interest, serves to legitimate those institutions 
that bring about that goal. The modern company has proven itself to 
be a highly efficient means of producing wealth and, although it is not 
perfect and the power that is inevitably vested in the company may 
generate costs, those costs are more than justified by the gains. Thus, the 
power that arises from placing the means of production in private hands 
is legitimated by its superiority in maximising social wealth.
15  J W Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation (Charlottesville, University Press 
of Virginia, 1970) 58.
16  See R Grantham, ‘The Legitimacy of the Company as a Source of (Private) Power’ in K Barker 
et al (eds), Private Law and Power (Oxford, Hart, 2016) Ch 10.
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The real difficulty now, however, lies in the rising social and cultural power 
of the company. The last 20 years have seen the rise of social media, social 
networking, and ‘Big Data’, and the ability of companies such as Google, 
Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft to shape our social interactions, what we 
know of the world, and even our identities as individuals.17 As Richards 
and King have said: 
With even the most basic access to a combination of big data pools like 
phone records, surfing history, buying history, social networking posts, 
and others, ‘I am’ and ‘I like’ risk becoming ‘you are’ and ‘you will like.’ 
Every Google user is already influenced by big-data-fed feedback loops 
from Google’s tailored search results, which risk producing individual and 
collective echo chambers of thought.18
In respect of the costs arising from this social and cultural power, the 
argument for the legitimacy of the company as a generator of material 
wealth simply does not hold. The benefits to society of the survival of 
a small town or the rural way of life, or the reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions, or the right of the individual to be forgotten,19 and the increases 
in profitability of moving a major source of employment off-shore or 
the invasion of our privacy to more precisely target marketing, seem to 
be expressed in fundamentally different currencies. The increase in one 
cannot bear upon or make up for losses in the other. Therefore, while 
as a purely economic institution the company’s preeminent capacity to 
generate material wealth seems to more than justify the economic power it 
has come to hold, these economic benefits cannot justify or legitimate the 
social power and impact of the company. To that extent, the privatisation 
of Australian company law exposes a significant democratic deficit and 
the issue of how that deficit is to be accounted for is, arguably, the most 
significant challenge facing company law.
17  The rise and extent of this power is described more fully in Grantham, above n 16.
18  N Richards and J King, ‘Three Paradoxes of Big Data’ (2013) 66 Stanford Law Review Online 
41, 43–44.
19  The proposed European Union General Data Protection Regulation would allow an individual 
to request their erasure from metadata held by companies such as Google: European Commission, 
‘Agreement on Commission’s EU Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market’, Press 
Release, 15 December 2015 (IP/15/6321).
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III. Conclusion
In its fundamentals, the Corporations Act embodies a model that was 
created in 1844. That model is now overlaid with decades of amendments 
that reflect the ebb and flow of socioeconomic policy from laissez-faire to 
interventionist, and the knee-jerk reactions to a succession of scandals. 
The Corporations Act has thus been built up through an accretion of ideas 
and events whose features continue to cast a confusing shadow long after 
those ideas were discarded and we have forgotten the events which gave rise 
to them. As a practical guide and user manual for those who are actually 
involved in the corporate enterprise, the Act is not only wholly unsuited, 
but its complexity, prolixity and incoherence represent the single largest 
obstacle to addressing the central issues facing companies and company 
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The Australian Law Reform Commission’s role is to review Australia’s 
laws to ensure they provide improved access to justice for all Australians 
by making laws and related processes more equitable, modern, fair and 
efficient.2 While the Commission has an excellent record in addressing 
access to justice issues, in their many guises, access to justice is only one 
aspect to law reform. 
The essential focus of law reform is on contributing to an Australian 
society that is more equitable, modern, fair and efficient. Or, to put it 
in the language of economists, to improve both consumer welfare and 
producer welfare through competition and consumer protection laws that 
are fair, open, efficient and effective. This is no easy task in any area of law 
reform and the economic area is no exception.
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Nevertheless, Australia has come a long way with competition and 
consumer protection law reform in the past 25 years, and that journey 
continues. I will demonstrate this by reference to three examples: 
a competition law example from the past, a more recent consumer law 
example, and a new horizon competition law example.
Before I do so I should observe that, while we all accept as self-evident 
the contribution consumer protection law makes to goals of equity, 
transparency and fairness, the same may not be said for competition law. 
We value competition not for its own sake, but because it provides 
a flexible set of rules to promote efficiency and fair business dealings, 
thereby enhancing the welfare of all Australians.3 While competition rules 
do not always work in the way some would like, every modern market 
economy sees benefit in a set of equitable rules intended to ensure that 
competitive processes are not undermined by anticompetitive behaviour. 
In short, we value competition because it fosters opportunity, innovation, 
productivity and growth, thereby creating national wealth.4
For the purposes of this chapter, our journey on the road to improved social 
and economic welfare in Australia through competition and consumer law 
reform starts with a competition example drawn from the 1990s.5 At that 
time Australia had fallen behind other developed countries, in part because 
our economy was, as the then Chair of the Productivity Commission, 
Professor Gary Banks, explained,6 ‘highly regulated, anti-competitive and 
redistributive: captured nicely by the expression “protection all round” 
– a policy that for much of the last century had bi-partisan support and 
wide community acceptance’. 
As Professor Banks pointed out,7 Australia had the highest per  capita 
income in the world at the start of the 20th century, but this had 
steadily declined. There were many causes for that decline, but for the 
purposes of this chapter I will concentrate on one – the limited reach of 
3  The object of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (as with the Trade Practices Act 1974 
before it) is to ‘enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition and fair 
trading and provision for consumer protection’, s 2.
4  See, for example, Nick Godfrey, Why is Competition Important for Growth and Poverty Reduction?, 
OECD Global Forum on Investment, March 2008, 3.
5  In fact it started in the early 1900s. See Miller’s Australian Competition Law and Policy (Thomson 
Reuters 2nd edn, 2012) 1.
6  Gary Banks, Structural Reform Australian-Style: Lessons for Others? Presentation to the IMF and 
World Bank (Washington DC, 26–27 May 2005) and OECD (Paris, 31 May 2005) 2.
7  Ibid. 2.
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competition law.8 By 1993, although competition laws had applied to 
Australian businesses for almost 20 years, the competition law did not 
apply to federal and state statutory authorities that provided public utility 
and other services, sometimes on a monopoly basis and sometimes in 
competition to others.9 They did so, Professor Banks said, by and large on 
the basis that their ‘fair’ prices incorporated the cost of poor management 
and labour practices.10
In October 1992 the then Prime Minister, with the agreement of the 
states and territories, commissioned a panel, led by Professor Fred Hilmer, 
to review national competition policy and law, giving effect to principles 
including:
• No participant in the market should be able to engage in anticompetitive 
conduct against the public interest. 
• As far as possible, universal and uniformly applied rules of market 
conduct should apply to all market participants regardless of the form 
of business ownership. 
• Any changes to the coverage or nature of competition policy should be 
consistent with, and support, the general thrust of reforms:
 – to develop an open, integrated domestic market for goods 
and services by removing unnecessary barriers to trade and 
competition; and
 – in recognition of the increasingly national operation of markets, 
to reduce complexity and eliminate administrative duplication.
In August 1993, the panel’s report recommended what was then regarded 
as very radical law reform across a spectrum of competition policy areas. 
For the purposes of this example I will focus on a few. First, the report 
recommended that the exemption from competition laws that then applied 
to government businesses should be removed, and that competition law 
should extend to sectors of the economy, such as professions, not then 
8  Australia had had statutes addressing competition law since 1906, but modern competition law 
in Australia has its origins in the Trade Practices Act 1974.
9  The Industry Commission (now the Productivity Commission) undertook major studies of rail 
transport (1991), energy generation and distribution (1991) and water resources (1992), concluding 
that, in those industries alone, efficiencies could increase gross domestic product by $8 billion per 
annum: National Competition Policy: Report by the Independent Committee of Inquiry, 23 August 1993 
(the ‘Hilmer Report’), 129.
10  Banks, above n 6.
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covered by the law.11 Second, it recommended pro-competitive structural 
reform of public utilities, with the separation of regulatory and business 
functions, and vertical separation of integrated utilities. 
Both recommendations were based on the firm conviction that, 
by increasing competition, including by removing regulatory restrictions, 
restructuring public monopolies and applying competition law to sectors 
of the economy not then subject to the law, Australia would be a more 
equitable, modern, fair and efficient society. As the Hilmer Report stated:12
if Australia is to prosper as a nation, and maintain and improve living 
standards and opportunities for its people, it has no choice but to 
improve the productivity and international competitiveness of its firms 
and institutions. Australian organisations, irrespective of their size, 
location or ownership, must become more efficient, more innovative and 
more flexible.
The Hilmer Report’s recommendations were accepted by all Australian 
governments and implemented through law reform projects that saw 
significant changes to the national competition law. Complementary 
state and territory laws13 were introduced to apply competition law to 
areas of the economy where the Commonwealth lacked constitutional 
competence. Unprecedented reform of state and territory statutory utility 
regulation was implemented, leading in some cases to privatisation and 
in others to corporatisation, assisted by compensation payments by the 
Commonwealth.
One measure of the success of this law reform initiative, and all the other 
initiatives that surrounded it, was that Australia’s economic ranking 
internationally had risen from 15th in 1990 to 8th in 2002.14 But, far more 
importantly, this law reform initiative and the policies that accompanied 
it radically and permanently improved the welfare of all Australians. 
11  The Hilmer Report, ibid. 124–39.
12  Ibid. 1.
13  Uniform Competition Policy Reform Acts; for example, Competition Policy Reform (New South 
Wales) Act 1995.
14  Banks, above n 6, 9. According to Banks, Australia had been number 5 in 1950. Australia’s 
ranking in per capita incomes had slipped by the late 1980s from 12th to 16th.
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In 2004 the then federal treasurer requested the Productivity Commission 
to review the results of Hilmer reforms. In its report, released in February 
2005,15 the Commission reported that:16
National Competition Policy (NCP) has delivered substantial benefits to 
the Australian community which, overall, have greatly outweighed the 
costs. It has:
• contributed to the productivity surge that has underpinned 13 years 
of continuous economic growth, and associated strong growth in 
household incomes;
• directly reduced the prices of goods and services such as electricity 
and milk;
• stimulated business innovation, customer responsiveness and choice; 
and
• helped meet some environmental goals, including the more efficient 
use of water.
The second example of improved social and economic welfare in Australia 
through competition and consumer law reform is in the consumer 
law field. 
Australia has a strong tradition in consumer protection but, until the 
introduction of the Trade Practices Act in 1974, consumer protection had 
been the sole province of state and territory governments. While the Trade 
Practices Act made an important contribution to consumer protection and 
fair trading, constitutional limitations meant that it could not cover the 
field. The result was a patchwork of state and territory laws. While the 
Trade Practices Commission17 pursued consumer complaints vigorously18 
within the limits of its authority, a range of consumer affairs departments 
and agencies administered the rest with varying degrees of success. 
In December 2006, the then treasurer requested the Productivity 
Commission to undertake an inquiry into Australia’s consumer policy 
framework. The terms of reference included:19
15  Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, No 33, 28 February 2005.
16  Ibid. xii.
17  Now the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
18  See, for example, the cases brought by the ACCC under ss 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act 
up to 2010 digested in Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act – Australian Competition and Consumer 
Law (Thomson Reuters 31st edn, 2010).
19  Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No 45, 2008: Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework, vi.
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• ways to improve the consumer policy framework so as to assist 
and empower consumers, including disadvantaged and vulnerable 
consumers, to meet current and future challenges, including the 
information and other challenges posed by an increasing variety 
of more complex product offerings and methods of transacting;
• any barriers to, and ways to improve, the harmonisation  and 
coordination of consumer policy and its development 
and administration across jurisdictions in Australia, including ways to 
improve institutional arrangements and to avoid duplication of effort;
• any areas of consumer regulation which are unlikely to provide net 
benefits to Australia and which could be revised or repealed.
The law reform objective in this, as in other areas of the law, was to 
advise on improvements that would benefit the community as a whole. 
That means, in the context of consumer protection, improving protections 
for consumers but only where the improvements produce a net benefit 
when weighed against the cost regulation imposes on society.
The Productivity Commission reported in 2008, concluding that:20
While Australia’s consumer policy framework has considerable strengths, 
parts of it require an overhaul.
• The current division of responsibility for the framework between the 
Australian and State and Territory Governments leads to variable 
outcomes for consumers, added costs for businesses and a lack 
of responsiveness in policy making.
• There are gaps and inconsistencies in the policy and enforcement tool 
kit and weaknesses in redress mechanisms for consumers.
• These problems will make it increasingly difficult to respond to rapidly 
changing consumer markets, meaning that the associated costs for 
consumers and the community will continue to grow.
Addressing these problems will have significant direct benefits for 
consumers. Also, by better engaging and empowering consumers and 
furthering the development of nationally competitive markets, reform 
will enhance productivity and innovation.
The result was the most comprehensive law reform initiative in the 
consumer protection field that Australia had ever seen. The Productivity 
Commission’s report was so persuasive that the federal, state and territory 
20  Ibid. 2.
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governments all agreed to embark on the creation of a national consumer 
law. The result was the Australian Consumer Law, introduced in an 
innovative way as a Schedule to the renamed Trade Practices Act – the 
Competition and Consumer Act – as a free-standing code,21 then applied in 
each state and territory by complementary legislation.22 
In addition to repeating the provisions of the old Trade Practices Act in 
relation to misleading and deceptive conduct and false representations 
– provisions that had in any event been largely duplicated in state and 
territory law23 – the Australian Consumer Law expanded and upgraded 
coverage. This includes a nationally consistent law on unfair contract 
terms24 and on unconscionable conduct,25 an upgrade of statutory implied 
warranties to consumer guarantees,26 stronger product safety laws,27 and 
detailed laws on door-to-door, internet and over-the-phone selling.28 
This law reform measure produced a more equitable, modern, fair and 
efficient commercial and trading environment for consumers and traders 
alike: the Productivity Commission assessed the net benefit to Australia in 
monetary terms and concluded that the economic gain to the community 
by implementing its recommendations would be between $1.5 billion 
and $4.5 billion each year.29 But there is little doubt that the contribution 
to a fairer, more equitable Australian society was the major benefit.
A third example of improved social and economic welfare through 
competition and consumer law reform – the ‘new horizon’ competition 
law example – is law reform in the making. Although I will briefly 
describe what has been proposed and has subsequently been enacted, my 
primary reason for raising this example is to highlight the difficulties often 
encountered in the law reform process.
21  Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, applied as a law of the Commonwealth 
under Pt XI of that Act.
22  For a list, see Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (Thomson Reuters 
38th edn, 2016) 1470.
23  See, for example, Fair Trading Act 1985 (Victoria), Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW).
24  Originally introduced in Victoria and now Pt 2-3 of the Australian Consumer Law. This law is to 
be extended to small business contracts from 12 November 2016.
25  Now Pt 2-2 of the Australian Consumer Law. 
26  Part 3-2, Div 1 of the Australian Consumer Law. 
27  Part 3-3, Div 1 of the Australian Consumer Law. 
28  Part 3-2, Div 2 of the Australian Consumer Law. 
29  Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No 45, 2008, 3.
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On 27 March 2014 the then Minister for Small Business commissioned 
Professor Ian Harper to lead a panel to undertake a broad ranging review 
of competition policy,30 the first such review since the Hilmer Report.31 
The panel reported on 31 March 2015,32 providing the government with 
wide-ranging recommendations covering all areas of competition policy 
and administration. The sections on access and choice in high-quality 
health, education and community services – areas not often seen at the 
forefront of competition policy reform – had the potential to be a real 
game changer, but they are not the areas I am focusing on here. 
The following summary of a cross-section of recommendations 
demonstrates the scope of the law reforms the Harper Panel recommended:
• legislative frameworks and government policies and regulations that 
bind the public and private sectors should not restrict competition;33
• cost-reflective road pricing, with independent oversight;34
• an overarching review of intellectual property law, including the 
contentious competition law exemption;35
• removal of restrictions on competition in state and territory planning 
and zoning laws unless they result in a net benefit;36
• removal of remaining restrictions on retail trading hours;37
• removal of restrictions on parallel imports unless the restrictions 
produce benefits that outweigh the costs and those benefits cannot 
be achieved in less restrictive ways;38 and
30  Media Release by the Hon Bruce Billson MP, 27 March 2014, bfb.ministers.treasury.gov.au/
media-release/014-2014/.
31  Sir Darryl Dawson had led a more limited review in 2003: see Review of the Competition Provisions 
of the Trade Practices Act (The Dawson Review), tpareview.treasury.gov.au/content/report.asp.
32  Competition Policy Review Final Report, March 2015, competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/final-report/.
33  Ibid. Recommendation 1. The government supported this recommendation.
34  Ibid. Recommendation 3. The government supported this recommendation.
35 Ibid. Recommendations 6 and 7. On 18 August 2005 the then treasurer instructed the 
Productivity Commission to conduct such a review ‘to ensure that the intellectual property system 
provides appropriate incentives for innovation, investment and the production of creative works while 
ensuring it does not unreasonably impede further innovation, competition, investment and access to 
goods and services’: www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/intellectual-property/terms-of-reference.
36  Ibid. Recommendation 9. The government supported this recommendation but noted that it is 
a state and territory responsibility.
37  Ibid. Recommendation 12. The government supported this recommendation but noted that it 
is a state and territory responsibility.
38  Ibid. Recommendation 13. The government supported this recommendation in part.
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• removal of current legal restrictions on pharmacy ownership and 
location in the long term interests of consumers.39
The Harper Panel reaffirmed that, if Australia is to improve economic 
performance, there is much that can and should be done in relation 
to competition policy, and therefore law reform in this area. Indeed, 
a concerted effort on law reform in the competition policy area is 
crucial if Australia is to achieve the outcomes foreshadowed in its G20 
Comprehensive Growth Plan: to ‘raise Australia’s economic growth 
potential, create one million new jobs over the next five years … and 
support continued improvements in national living standards’. 
It is trite to observe that law reform is never easy. When reforms are 
proposed there are inevitably winners and losers. There is a fine balance 
to be struck by governments, weighing the benefits likely to be achieved 
against the costs to be imposed on those who enjoy the protections of 
the law as it currently stands. Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
relation to the law reform proposals the Harper Panel recommended. 
One example stands out.
Notwithstanding the breadth of the Harper recommendations, almost 
all of which were accepted in principle by the government and most of 
which are controversial, the recommendation that drew the most public 
comment was for changes to the law on misuse of market power.40 
The battle over this law provides an interesting example of the challenges 
in delivering law reform.
The Harper Panel’s consideration of the current misuse of market power 
law reenlivened a debate Australia has been having, on and off, for over 
40  years. The current provision, introduced in 1974,41 prohibits firms 
with market power using that power for the purpose42 of damaging 
competitors, preventing competitors entering a market, or deterring 
competitors from engaging in competitive conduct. 
39  Ibid. Recommendation 14. The government noted the recommendation.
40  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 s 46.
41  Section 46. The provision originally appeared in the Trade Practices Act 1974. Although 
amendments were made in 1986, 2007 and 2008, they did not affect the essential features relevant to 
this chapter.
42  For the meaning of ‘purpose’, in this context, see Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty 
Ltd [2001] HCA13; (2001) 205 CLR 1 at [31]; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v ACCC [2003] 
FCAFC 193; (2003) ATPR 41-947 at [256]. 
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Those who supported changing s 46 argue that the provision is wrongly 
directed at competitors rather than protecting the competitive process, 
and that it is out of step with modern competition law in other countries 
which focuses on the effect of market power on the competitive process, 
not on a firm’s subjective purpose.43 Further, they argued that the current 
law results in under-capture of exclusionary conduct, because it requires a 
court to determine whether a firm is using its market power (and not any 
other power it may have), by considering whether a firm that does not 
have market power would likely behave as the firm under investigation 
has acted.44 Those who argued for the status quo asserted that the 
provision, particularly the requirement to establish that the firm had 
taken advantage of its power, appropriately distinguished between pro-
competitive and anticompetitive conduct, and that the changes proposed 
would have unintended adverse consequences for consumers.
The Harper Panel supported change. They recommended that the 
prohibition should focus on protecting the competitive process – on 
conduct by firms with market power that has the purpose, effect or 
likely effect of substantially lessening competition.45 The Harper Panel 
also recommended that the courts should be required to mitigate against 
inadvertently capturing pro-competitive conduct, by having regard to the 
extent to which the conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of both 
increasing competition (including by enhancing efficiency, innovation, 
product quality or price competitiveness) and lessening competition 
(including by preventing, restricting or deterring the potential for 
competitive conduct or new entry). 
However, the recommendation that the prohibition should focus on 
protecting the competitive process brought strident and vocal opposition 
from some within the business community. Objections were so strong that 
the government deferred a decision on the recommendation, deciding 
instead to undertake further consultations before making a decision. 
On 11 December 2015 the treasurer issued a discussion paper with six 
43  See ACCC v Pfizer Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 113.
44  See Rural Press Ltd v ACCC [2003] HCA 75; 216 CLR 53 and Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 s 46(6A)(c).
45  Competition Policy Review, above n 31. Recommendation 30, 348. For an explanation of the 
phrase ‘substantially lessen competition’, see Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law 
Annotated (Thomson Reuters, 38th edn, 2016) [1.45.60].
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options for change, including that recommended by the Harper Panel.46 
Submissions on the options were called for and the assistant treasurer 
convened two roundtable sessions attended by representatives of small 
and large business and the Law Council of Australia. In all, 86 written 
submissions were received, arguing strongly for or against change.47 
As one submission correctly put it:48 ‘There are two deeply entrenched, 
vigorous and irreconcilable positions being taken on the Harper Review’s 
recommendation to amend Section 46’.
Although there was a sharp divide, neither point of view could be said 
to be entirely right or entirely wrong. The concerns of some of those 
opposing change were overstated, and the expectations of many who 
supported change were overly optimistic. The fact is that this is a very 
complex area of economic regulation. There is no bright line rule for 
determining what is, and what is not, exclusionary conduct that adversely 
affects the competitive process.49 However, international experience shows 
that a law that focuses on conduct that adversely affects the competitive 
process presents the best approach in this vexed area. 
In the end the government decided to accept the Harper recommendation, 
in what would seem to be a triumph for good public policy because 
the focus of the law should be on exclusionary conduct that adversely 
affects the competitive process. On 16 March 2016 the Prime Minister 
announced that the government would proceed with an exposure draft 
of legislation to fully implement the Harper Panel’s recommendation, 
stating that:50
The Government is committed to fixing Australia’s competition policy 
and the amendment of Section 46 to deal with unilateral anti-competitive 
conduct is an important step to ensure Australia has the best possible 
competition framework to support innovation and boost economic 
growth and jobs.
46  The options paper is accessible at www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20
and%20Reviews/Consultations/2015/Options%20to%20strengthen%20the%20misuse%20of%20
market%20power%20law/Key%20Documents/PDF/dpoptions_marketpowerlaw.ashx.
47  The public submissions are available at www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/
Consultations/2015/Options-to-strengthen-the-misuse-of-market-power-law/Submissions. 
48  Submission by John Dahlsen, JC Dahlsen Pty Ltd, 28. 
49  See, for example, Novel Inc v Microsoft Corporation [2013-2] Trade Cases 78,523 at 128,271.
50  Prime Minister’s media release 16 March 2016 at www.pm.gov.au/media/2016-03-16/joint-
media-statement-fixing-competition-policy-drive-economic-growth-and-jobs.
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Few would disagree with those objectives – but the vigorous debate over 
s 46 illustrates that there is no single right or wrong way to reform this 
law to achieve them.
Finally, on 1 December 2016, the government introduced legislation51 
to replace s 46 in accordance with the Harper Panel recommendation. 
The Senate Economics Legislation Committee considered the Bill and 
reported in February 2017,52 with members divided on party lines on 
whether or not to support the initiative. The majority agreed that s 46 is 
unfit for purpose because it has not provided adequate protection for non-
dominant firms.53 The minority, while welcoming ‘strong competition 
policy’, thought that the change would add a ‘new layer of red tape’ 
deterring job-creating investment in Australia.54 However, the Bill was 
passed on 23 August 2017 to come into effect later in 2017.55
To conclude the journey by returning to consumer law reform, on 31 March 
2016 the Minister for Small Business and assistant treasurer published 
a review of the Australian Consumer Law.56  That review, briefed by the 
minister57 to consider whether or not ‘the law is operating as intended and 
addresses the risk of consumer detriment without imposing unnecessary 
red tape’,58 recommended 18 changes to the Australian Consumer Law, 
including a significant increase in penalties for contravention.
With that report and the pending legislation to implement the Harper 
Panel recommendations, we continue on the road to improving Australian 
society through law reform in the areas of competition and consumer law 
and policy.
51  Competition and Consumer Amendment (Misuse of Market Power) Bill 2016. A second Bill 
was introduced on 30 March 2017 to implement other Harper Panel recommendations supported by 
the government: Competition and Consumer Amendment (Competition Policy Review) Bill 2017.
52  The Senate Economics Legislation Committee, Competition and Consumer Amendment (Misuse 
of Market Power) Bill 2016 Report, February 2017, www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/
Committees/Senate/Economics/Misuseofmarketpower16/Report.
53  Report, paras 2.74, 2.75.
54  Report, paras 1.27, 1.28. 
55  Competition and Consumer Amendment (Misuse of Market Power) Act 2017 (Cth).
56  consumerlaw.gov.au/review-of-the-australian-consumer-law/final-report/. 
57  Media Release by the Hon Kelly O’Dwyer MP, 31 March 2016, kmo.ministers.treasury.gov.au/
media-release/029-2016/.
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Tax, Inequality and 
Challenges for the Future
John Passant1
I. Introduction
As in most countries in the developed world, inequality in Australia has 
been growing for more than three decades.2 In part this is due to systemic 
issues associated with the relative power of capital and labour and the 
decline in the share of national factor income going to labour.3 In part 
it has to do with deliberate government policy. In a nutshell, growing 
inequality undermines the meritocracy on which democracy depends. 
It creates a sense of unfairness and disillusionment with society, both 
politically and economically, concentrating more wealth and power in the 
hands of already powerful and wealthy people. It corrupts or can corrupt 
institutions and, as the past 30 or so years have shown, can undermine 
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both directly and indirectly those institutions and policies aimed at 
redistributing wealth from the rich to the less well off. In addition, 
growing inequality creates economic instability because it undermines 
the capacity of those in lower income brackets to consume the products 
of the top income earners and wealth holders. As Sheil and Stilwell say: 
‘The deep-seated economic inequalities also have major social and political 
consequences. They fracture social cohesion and create power imbalances 
that can undermine the nominally democratic institutions.’4
Tax reform – or what I have elsewhere described as neoliberal tax reform5 
– has contributed to that increasing inequality.6 Australia’s tax system has 
become less and less progressive over time.7 The tax base has shifted to 
some extent from income to consumption, and the income tax system 
itself is less progressive. Over time, tax rates have decreased, for individuals 
and for companies. In addition, the creation of tax expenditures such as 
a range of superannuation-related taxation concessions and the capital 
gains tax concessions, among others, favour and benefit those in the richer 
and wealthier strata of society.8
While income inequality has grown in Australia, wealth remains 
concentrated in the hands of those at the top. As ACOSS puts it: 
‘The top 10% of households own 45% of all wealth, most of the remainder 
4  Christopher Sheil and Frank Stilwell, The Wealth of the Nation: Current Data on the Distribution 
of Wealth in Australia (Evatt Foundation 2016), evatt.org.au/files/files/The%20Wealth%20of%20
the%20Nation.pdf (viewed 16 July 2016).
5  John Passant, ‘Neoliberalism in Australia and the Henry Tax Review’ (2013) 8(1) The Journal 
of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 117, www.business.unsw.edu.au/About-Site/Schools-
Site/Taxation-Business-Law-Site/Journal%20of%20The%20Australasian%20Tax%20Teachers%20
Associati/JATTA_8-1_2014.pdf (viewed 28 April 2016).
6  See, for example, Bob Douglas, Sharon Friel, Richard Denniss and David Morawetz, Advance 
Australia Fair? What to Do About Growing Inequality in Australia (Australia21, 2014) 17, gallery.
mailchimp.com/d2331cf87fedd353f6dada8de/files/1b2c7f48-928f-4298-81db-cf053a224320.pdf 
(viewed 3 May 2016). 
7  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Divided We Stand: Why 
Inequality Keeps Rising – Country Note: Australia (Paris 2011) 1, www.oecd.org/australia/49177643.
pdf (viewed 3 May 2016); Andrew Leigh, Battlers and Billionaires: The Story of Inequality in Australia 
(Redback Press, 2013) 77; Neil Brooks, ‘Taxing the Wealthy’ in Chris Evans, Richard Krever and 
Peter Mellor (eds), Australia’s Future Tax System: The Prospects After Henry (Thomson Reuters, Sydney 
2010) 197, 202. 
8  The superannuation concessions and the capital gains discount tax expenditures, together with 
rental property negative gearing, total according to the Treasury about $40 billion in revenue forgone 
annually, of which the superannuation concessions make up about $30 billion. For a compilation of 
the more than $100 billion worth of tax expenditures (i.e. disguised grants through the tax system), 
see The Treasury, ‘Tax Expenditure Statement 2015’ (Canberra, January 2016), www.treasury.gov.au/
PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2016/TES-2015 (viewed 4 May 2016).
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of wealth is owned by the next 50% of households, while the bottom 
40% of households own just 5% of all wealth’.9 More recent analysis 
suggests the top 10 per cent of households own more than 50 per cent 
of all wealth.10 Writing for the Evatt Foundation, Sheil and Stilwell argue 
that increasing inequality is deepening two rifts within society. They say:
This affluent elite – the Top 10% and especially the Top 1% – is getting 
cumulatively richer, not only relative to poor households but also, 
significantly, in relation to the next 50% of households. Two fault lines 
are widening – between the bottom 40% and the rest, and between the 
Top 10% and the 50% in the middle.  
They are not alone in their disquiet. Thomas Piketty, Joseph Stiglitz, 
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, Neil Brooks, Andrew Leigh and 
ACOSS have all, among many others, raised concerns that this growing 
disparity of income and wealth threatens social stability and economic 
performance, and is even a threat to democracy.11
Tax won’t address the fundamental inequality between capital and labour, 
but it can ameliorate that inequality. The suggestions in this chapter of 
a net wealth tax and minimum taxes on wealthy individuals and big 
business are made in light of the fact that by OECD standards Australia is 
a low tax country,12 and understanding that about 2.99 million citizens in 
2013–14 lived in poverty, including 731,300 children.13 These proposals 
have the capacity to contribute to the lessening of inequality and poverty. 
Reintroducing equity into the tax debate means considering, among 
other things, wealth taxes, ways to make the current income tax system 
more progressive (including higher tax rates at higher income levels and 
addressing tax expenditures that favour well-off taxpayers), and revisiting 
taxes on all economic rent (that is, not limiting tax to resource rents). 
9  ACOSS, above n 2, 31. 
10  Sheil and Stilwell, above n 4, in the Overview, not page numbered.
11  Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2014); Joseph E Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (Penguin Books 
Ltd, London, 2012); Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality 
Makes Societies Stronger (2009, Bloomsbury Press, New York); Neil Brooks, ‘Taxing the Wealthy’ in 
Chris Evans, Richard Krever and Peter Mellor, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Prospects After Henry 
(Thomson Reuters, Sydney 2010) 197; Andrew Leigh, Battlers and Billionaires: The Story of Inequality 
in Australia (Black Inc, Collingwood, 2013), ACOSS above n 2, 8.
12  OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Revenue Statistics 2015 – Australia (OECD, 
2015), www.oecd.org/tax/revenue-statistics-australia.pdf (viewed 2 May 2016). 
13  Social Policy Research Centre and ACOSS, Poverty in Australia 2016 (Strawberry Hills, 2014) 5, 
www.acoss.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Poverty-in-Australia-2016.pdf (viewed 6 April 2017).
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Rethinking ways to deal with the low tax burdens of big business could be 
part of that discussion. Pollution and financial transaction taxes could also 
be part of any wide ranging tax reform discussion and debate.
These are just a few reform proposals we could investigate. We are limited 
only by our own imaginations and the power of capital and the rich. 
Given space constraints, this chapter deals with just two of the proposals. 
The first is a Buffett rule for individuals and companies. The second 
is a wealth tax.
II. A Buffet Rule for Individuals 
and Companies?
A. Individuals
Warren Buffett was shocked to learn that his average tax rate was lower 
than that of his secretary.14 This was because, for example, his business 
deductions, exemptions, offsets (credits), concessional taxation of some 
activities and deferral of liability reduced his taxable income. Many of 
these are deviations from accounting norms and the benchmark tax base. 
Such deviations from the tax benchmark are known as tax expenditures.15 
The Treasury explains this benchmark against which to judge income tax 
expenditures in this way:
The tax base for the income tax benchmark is based on the Schanz–Haig-
Simons definition of income. An entity’s income is defined as the increase 
in the entity’s economic wealth (stock of assets) between two points in 
time, plus the entity’s consumption in that period. Consumption includes 
all expenditures except those incurred in earning or producing income.
In other words, a buck is a buck is a buck and should be taxed in the same 
way irrespective of the nature of the gain or who made it. 
14  The National Economic Council, The Buffett Rule: A Basic Principle of Tax Fairness 
(Washington,  April 2012), obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/04/10/white-house-report-
buffett-rule-basic-principle-tax-fairness (viewed 2 May 2016).
15 The Treasury, Tax Expenditure Statement 2015 (Canberra 2016) 3, www.treasury.gov.au/~/
media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/2016/Tax%20Expenditures%20
Statement%202015/Downloads/PDF/2015_TES.ashx (viewed 2 May 2016).
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The Buffett rule attempts to recoup some of those tax expenditures by 
imposing a tax liability based on gross income, not taxable income. 
For example, in 2012 it was reported that President Obama ‘proposed the 
Buffett Rule as a basic rule of tax fairness that should be met in tax reform. 
To achieve this principle, the President … proposed that no millionaire 
pay less than 30% of their income in taxes.’16 
The President is not alone. The Greens in Australia have suggested 
a Buffett rule of 35 per cent of the gross income of those individuals whose 
gross income is $300,000 or more, while the Labor Party Opposition 
appears split on the issue.17 The Greens’ proposed $300,000 threshold 
covers the top 1 per cent of income earners;18 they use as an example 
the case of 56 millionaires with gross income in total of $129 million 
who, through deductions, reduced their taxable income to below the tax-
free threshold of $18,200 and hence paid no income tax.19 Among the 
deductions claimed by the 56 was $47 million for tax advice.20 A Buffett 
rule at the level the Greens propose would recoup 35 per cent of their 
$129 million gross revenue or $45.15 million. There will be many more 
well off taxpayers caught by such a rule and yielding much more revenue 
for the Commonwealth. 
A Buffett rule conflicts with general tax principles. Under such principles, 
taxable income equals assessable income less allowable deductions. 
The appropriate tax rate is then applied to this net amount. The tax to 
be paid can then be reduced by any offsets (such as franking credits and 
foreign tax credits). In part, what a Buffett rule does is recoup the tax 
expenditures (in the Greens’ example, the deductibility of tax advice) 
built into the tax system. Even if the tax reduction occurs not because of 
tax expenditures but, for example, as a result of ‘legitimate’ benchmark 
appropriate deductions, the Buffett rule accepts that such a large gross 
revenue requires some contribution back to society because it arises from 
society, and that people with incomes of $300,000 or more a year have 
a capacity to pay (or borrow to pay) despite their non-taxable or low tax 
status for the income year in question. 
16  The National Economic Council, above n 14, 1.
17  The Greens, ‘Buffett Rule: A High-Income Tax Guarantee’, greens.org.au/buffett-rule (viewed 
3 May 2016); Katherine Murphy, ‘Labor Faces Internal Wrangle Over “Buffett rule” to Stop Wealthy 
Avoiding Tax’, The Guardian Australia 4 April 2017, www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/apr/04/
labor-faces-internal-wrangle-over-buffett-rule-to-stop-wealthy-avoiding-tax (viewed 6 April 2017).
18  The Greens, above n 17, 1. 
19  Ibid.
20  Ibid.
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B. A Buffett rule for big business?
The same arguments apply to big business. In December 2016 the 
Commissioner of Taxation released the Corporate Tax Transparency Report 
for the 2014–15 Income Year. It covers public companies with a turnover 
of more than $100 million and $200 million for private companies. 
The report shows that 679, or 36 per cent, of the 1,904 entities in the 
target group paid no income tax in the 2014/2015 income year.21 There 
are, as the report points out, a range of reasons why the big businesses in 
question paid no income tax, including market conditions, use of previous 
year tax losses, offsets and the like. Tax expenditures and tax avoidance are 
only part of the explanation.
However, we can look at this from another angle. A Buffett rule for 
companies can be seen as the Australian Government, on behalf of the 
Australian people, imposing an operating fee on big business to allow it to 
pursue its profit-seeking activity in Australia. The fee would be a ground 
rent imposed on business for the ability or potential to derive profit from 
Australian workers and consumers. Such a fee or tax could apply not just 
to companies who paid no income tax but also to those with a low effective 
tax rate.22 On top of the non-taxable companies, there are many ‘low tax’ 
companies; a Tax Justice Network/United Voice study of the ASX top 200 
companies, for example, found that one-third of those companies have an 
effective tax rate of less than 10 per cent.23 
It is a valid criticism that a Buffett rule for companies would undermine 
the intent and actuality of the tax expenditures that allow deductions, 
offsets or exemptions outside the benchmark. However, the equitable 
and socially responsible response must be that those with very large gross 
21  Australian Taxation Office, Corporate Tax Transparency Report for the 2014–15 Income 
Year (Canberra, 2017), www.ato.gov.au/business/large-business/in-detail/tax-transparency/corporate-
tax-transparency-report-for-the-2014-15-income-year/?page=5#Net_losses_and_nil_tax_payable 
(viewed 6 April 2017).
22  For an argument in favour of royalties on resource companies as a substitute for this, see 
John Passant, ‘Taxing Resource Rents in Australia – What a Capital Idea’. A draft is available here: 
www.researchgate.net/publication/292149294_Taxing_resource_rents_in_Australia_-_what_a_
capital_idea (viewed 5 May 2016). A company’s effective tax rate is the amount of tax actually paid as 
a percentage of accounting (not taxable) income. A revised version of this article will be published in 
2017 in the Journal of Australian Political Economy. 
23  United Voice and the Tax Justice Network, Who Pays for Our Common Wealth? Tax Practices 
of the ASX 200 (Melbourne, 2014) 21, www.unitedvoice.org.au/news/who-pays-our-common-wealth 
(viewed 4 May 2016).
55
3 . TAx, INEqUALITy AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
incomes can afford to contribute to Australian society and the winding 
back of such tax expenditures is a limit on those expenditures, not their 
abolition. 
The fee or tax could, for example, be a percentage of a company’s gross 
revenue from Australian sources, reducing as the company’s effective tax 
rate approaches the company tax rate of 30 per cent. Estimates are that the 
untaxed gross income of big public companies and foreign private entities 
revealed by the Commissioner of Taxation’s Corporate Tax Transparency 
Report is $462 billion.24 A 3 per cent tax on that gross income would 
yield over $13 billion in income from those 679 companies.25 The same 
fee-based ground rent approach could apply to those big businesses with 
an effective tax rate of 10 per cent or less, at the rate say of 2 per cent of 
the gross revenue, and similarly a rate of 1 per cent for those big businesses 
with effective tax rates between 10 and say 20 per cent.
Let’s now turn to wealth taxes.
III. Wealth Taxes
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century,26 Thomas Piketty – to use the 
words of a roundtable on inequality in Australia – suggested ‘that the most 
powerful force pushing in the direction of growing inequality is the 
tendency of the rate of return on capital “r” to exceed the rate of growth 
of output “g”’.27 For the reasons mentioned in the first paragraph of this 
24  Richard O’Brien, ‘Turnbull & Morrison Tax Consultants’, The Australian Independent Media 
Network, 11 December 2016, theaimn.com/turnbull-morrison-tax-consultants/ (viewed 6 April 
2017); for the 2013–14 Report issued December 2015, the estimate was $405.9 billion of gross 
revenue that was untaxed for public companies alone. See Nassim Khadem and Craig Butt, ‘Which of 
Australia’s Biggest Companies Are Not Paying Tax’, The Sydney Morning Herald 17 December 2015, 
www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/which-of-australias-biggest-companies-are-not-paying-tax-
20151216-glpl3a.html (viewed 4 May 2016).
25  The figure does not include the 30 per cent of private Australian companies in the target group 
who paid no income tax. ATO, Corporate Tax Transparency Report for the 2013–14 Income Year 
(Canberra 2016), www.ato.gov.au/Business/Large-business/In-detail/Tax-transparency/Corporate-
tax-transparency-report-for-the-2013-14-income-year/ (viewed 4 May 2016).
26  Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2014).
27  Bob Douglas et al, above n 6, 21. In my view Piketty misunderstands the nature of capitalism in 
that he fails to differentiate between the means of production (and ownership of such) and other assets. 
At page 52 he dismisses Marx’s law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as ‘quite wrong’. The law 
is based on the labour theory of value, and in my view is an excellent way of understanding the shift in 
wealth and income from labour to capital as one countervailing tendency to address the law. 
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chapter, this systemic and increasing inequality of income and wealth 
threatens both growth and democracy.28 To address this, Piketty argues 
for a progressive global tax on capital29 in conjunction with financial 
transparency.30 He sees a global wealth tax as both a counterweight to 
increasing concentrations of wealth (and, as a consequence, declining 
democracy) and as a spur for greater fiscal openness and transparency.31 
By ‘capital’ Piketty essentially means assets, irrespective of whether they 
are productive or not. Specifically, Piketty suggests 0 per cent tax for net 
assets below €1 million, 1 per cent between €1 million and €5 million and 
2 per cent above that.32 He also suggests consideration of much higher 
rates – in the order of 5 per cent or 10 per cent – for the super wealthy, 
those with assets greater than €1 billion.33
While Piketty recognises that the global cooperation needed for this tax 
renders the proposal utopian, he argues it is nevertheless useful as both 
a benchmark and to help countries and regions (such as the European 
Union) to move incrementally towards this goal.34 Let’s be utopian and 
incremental. Australia could begin the taxation of wealth process that other 
countries could then follow. Since the top 10 per cent own 45 per cent 
of Australia’s wealth,35 and given that Australia’s net wealth is about 
$10 trillion,36 the top 10 per cent own about $4.5 trillion. A 1 per cent 
annual wealth tax on that group would yield about $45 billion annually. 
Further, the minimum net worth of the top 1 per cent is over $5 million 
each.37 As there are 90,000 people in the top 1 per cent, a net wealth tax 
of 2 per cent would raise as a minimum well over $9 billion. The amount 
is likely to be much higher: using the Evatt Foundation figures mentioned 
above, the top 1 per cent of households own more than 15 per cent of 
Australia’s wealth, which means in concrete terms they own more than 
28  Ibid.
29  Thomas Piketty, above n 26, 515.
30  Ibid. 518. 
31  Ibid. 527. 
32  Ibid. 517.
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid. 515. 
35  ACOSS, above n 2, 31. 
36  Philip Lowe, ‘National Wealth, Land Values and Monetary Policy’, address by Philip Lowe, 
Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, to the 54th Shann Memorial Lecture, Perth, 12 
August 2015, 3, www.bis.org/review/r150812f.pdf (viewed 4 May 2016).
37  Douglas et al, above n 6, 14.
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$1.5 trillion of assets here. On those figures a 1 per cent wealth tax on 
the wealth of the top 1 per cent would yield $15 billion annually and 
a 2 per cent tax would bring in about $30 billion.
One argument Piketty uses for net wealth taxes is that, apart from 
helping to reclaim democracy and citizen participation in society through 
redistributive policies, wealth is a better indicator of capacity to pay than 
income.38 Further, net wealth taxes will see an increase in productive 
investment into assets capable of producing adequate income returns 
to pay the tax.39 In addition, a global wealth tax can exist only in an 
environment of fiscal transparency, and such transparency would clear 
up the opaque nature of wealth ownership and allow a more rational 
debate about, for example, the social state, addressing climate change, 
and global poverty.40 
An alternative to an annual net wealth tax is, as the Henry Tax Review, 
Neil Brooks and the Australia Institute suggest, a tax on net wealth transfers 
on death.41 Inter-state tax competition, driven by then Queensland 
Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen, destroyed estate and gift duties in Australia 
in the 1970s when Queensland abolished such taxes and the other states 
and the Commonwealth responded quickly by also abolishing theirs. 
The reintroduction of such duties on, for example, the top 1 per cent of 
wealth holders (that is, those with estates greater than $5 million), at rates 
which recognise that such intergenerational transfers occur only once, 
would tax the ‘undeserving rich’.42 It could be structured so as to provide 
the equivalent, over time, of an annual net wealth tax,43 thereby providing 
funds to help address to some extent further growth in inequality through, 
for example, increases in social welfare payments and establishing new or 
strengthening existing institutions of governance that restrain the market 
and empower the less powerful.44 However, as Piketty argues, a progressive 
38  Piketty, above n 26, 526.
39  Ibid. 
40  Ibid. 519. 
41  Australian Government, Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer, Part Two: Detailed 
Analysis, Vol 1 (AGPS, Canberra December 2009), 137; Neil Brooks, ‘Taxing the Wealthy’ in Chris 
Evans, Richard Krever and Peter Mellor, Australia’s Future Tax System: The Prospects After Henry 
(Thomson Reuters, Sydney 2010) 197, 223ff; David Richardson, Surprise Me When I’m Dead: 
Revisiting the Case for Estate Duties (The Australia Institute, February 2016), www.tai.org.au/sites/
defualt/files/Revisiting%20the%20Case%20for%20Estate%20Duties.pdf (viewed 9 May 2017).
42  Neil Brooks, ‘Taxing the Wealthy’ in Chris Evans, Richard Krever and Peter Mellor, Australia’s 
Future Tax System: The Prospects After Henry (Thomson Reuters, Sydney 2010) 197, 206.
43  Thomas Piketty, above n 26, 374.
44  Neil Brooks, above n 42, 223ff.
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annual global tax on wealth is but one of a suite of progressive taxes to 
achieve this aim and other aims.45 For Piketty, the tax is not so much 
about financing the social state on its own as about addressing growing 
inequality and, to avoid future economic crisis, regulating the financial 
and banking systems; it is about regulating capitalism.46 
IV. Conclusion
A Buffett rule for individuals and companies, and a wealth tax, are but 
two reforms among many that would make the overall tax system more 
equitable. Powerful, very wealthy forces and the democratic institutions 
they dominate are, as the history of the last 40 years or so globally shows, 
pushing in the direction of greater and greater freedom for market forces, 
resulting in greater and greater inequality. This means that at the present 
juncture in human history the two proposals I have proffered will not 
be taken up. Nevertheless these two measures, among a range of other 
tax and non-tax prescriptions, would help policymakers address growing 
inequality and the threat that poses to our democracy and economy.
45  Thomas Piketty, above n 26, 518.
46  Ibid. 
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Brand New ‘Sharing’ or Plain 
Old ‘Sweating’? A Proposal for 
Regulating the New ‘Gig Economy’
Joellen Riley1
I. Enter the ‘Collaborative Economy’
Politicians on both sides of the political spectrum in Australia have been 
embracing what they are calling the ‘sharing’, or ‘collaborative’ economy, 
typified by new app-enabled business enterprises linking up consumers 
with service providers of many kinds. Examples include Uber and Lyft 
in the passenger transport business; Airtasker and TaskRabbit in the 
market for odd-job services; Deliveroo and Foodora in takeaway food 
delivery; and Airbnb in short-term accommodation letting. The notion 
that these businesses involve ‘sharing’ or ‘collaboration’ depends on seeing 
them as means by which those who have surplus energy or assets can 
make money from sharing their skills or assets with others – and the app-
based intermediary takes a commission from making the introduction. 
In New South Wales, a November 2015 position paper stated: ‘The NSW 
government welcomes the positive impact of the collaborative economy 
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for consumer choice, employment and productivity’.2 This same paper 
stated that at the end of 2015 the collaborative economy in NSW was 
valued at about $504 million a year, and approximately 45,000 people 
earned income from it – though this income was described as ‘additional’ 
or ‘supplementary’. 
Both sides of politics appear to recognise the need for some regulation 
of this new sector of the economy, although all are concerned that new 
regulation should not strangle innovation and forfeit all these coveted 
economic benefits. To date, most regulatory initiatives have focused on 
consumer protection, and the risks of unfair competition with existing 
services. So, for example, the Road Transport (Public Passenger Services) 
(Taxi Industry Innovation) Amendment Act 2015 (ACT) introduces 
amendments to the Road Transport (Public Passenger Services) Act 2001 
(ACT) to ensure that the new passenger transport services provided 
by the likes of Uber and Lyft are regulated alongside the taxi hire car 
industries in the interests of passenger safety, by ensuring the registration 
and accreditation of drivers. With the possible exception of regulation of 
‘maximum driving times and minimum rest times’3 (matters which may 
be made subject to regulations, but had not been at the time of writing4), 
this legislation manifests no particular concern with the labour standards 
observed by these new ‘ridesharing’ services.
There are, however, real risks to labour standards in the operation of 
those businesses in the so-called sharing economy that depend on the 
engagement of workers. These risks have become apparent in recent news 
stories in Australia about Uber drivers being ‘blocked’ (a new word for 
‘sacked’) in apparently unfair circumstances.5 And in the United States 
there have been stories of driver protests against Uber for cutting fares 
without warning by 25 per cent.6 Workers in the ‘gig’7 economy are as 
2  State of NSW Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, ‘The Collaborative Economy 
in NSW – A Position Paper’, November 2015, www.finance.nsw.gov.au/publication-and-resources/
collaborative-economy.
3  See Road Transport (Public Passenger Services) Act 2001 (ACT) s 60I(d).
4  The Regulations were consulted on 4 April 2017.
5  See Georgia Wilkins, ‘Driver Sues Uber after termination’, Australian Financial Review, 19 May 
2016, 9.
6  See Adrian Chen ‘An Uber Labor Movement born in a LaGuardia Parking Lot’, New Yorker, 
8 February 2016, www.newyorker.com/business/currency/an-uber-labor-movement-born-in-a-laguardia 
-parking-lot (viewed 13 May 2016).
7  The ‘gig’ is well-known in the music industry as the one-off performance of a job of work, with 
no expectation of continuing engagement.
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much in need of basic labour market protections as are other kinds of 
workers.8 The question for law reform is: What kind of regulation best 
accommodates this kind of work? Should these workers be treated as 
employees, and enjoy all the protections available in the Fair Work Act 
2009 (Cth)?9 This chapter recommends that a better solution would be 
the introduction of a special scheme providing protections similar to those 
available to other small business workers in special kinds of commercial 
relationships.
Two current regulatory schemes spring to mind: legislation protecting 
owner-drivers in the transport industry, and the Franchising Code of 
Conduct (FCC) dealing with the rights of the small businesses who 
operate in franchised business networks.10 A particular provision, typical 
in statutory schemes for protecting small business operators from 
exploitation, is protection from capricious termination of work contracts. 
A ‘gig’ worker who has invested heavily in a car or other equipment to 
perform the job is extremely vulnerable if they are working under a contract 
which can be terminated immediately and without sufficient justification. 
Another important protection is the right to form associations for the 
purpose of collective bargaining. Before explaining this proposal, it is 
worth reflecting on the realities of work for the ‘gig’ economy labourer.
II. Who Profits From the ‘Gig’ Economy?
Businesses such as Uber (in the ‘ridesharing’ market), and Airtasker 
(in the odd-job business) have become multimillion dollar enterprises 
(multibillion dollar in the case of Uber), by creating and managing phone 
‘apps’ that connect customers with services. They derive their revenue by 
deducting a commission from the automatic electronic payment made 
for every ride or gig arranged on their apps. In the case of Airtasker the 
8  See the special issue on ‘Crowdsourcing, the Gig-Economy and the Law’ in (2016) 37(3) 
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, for a number of academic studies on the need for labour 
protection in a proliferating world of digitally-sourced work.
9  In the United Kingdom, an Employment Tribunal has held that Uber drivers are ‘workers’ (but 
not necessarily ‘employees’) for the purposes of the Employment Rights Act 1996 s 230(3)(b): see 
Aslam, Farrer v Uber BV, Uber London and Uber Britannia Ltd, Case Nos 2202551/2015, decided on 
12 October 2016.
10  The FCC was made under the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes – Franchising) 
Regulation 2014 and is enforceable as a consequence of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
s 51AD.
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commission is 15 per cent of the agreed fee for the work.11 Airtasker 
claims to have around 480,000 users on its platform, and turned over 
$13 million in tasks in the year to April 2016.12 
These organisations emphatically disavow any suggestion that they are 
employers of the workers. They describe what they do as ‘facilitating 
sharing’, in ways that unlock and exploit the unused potential in 
underused assets – such as cars that might otherwise be sitting in garages. 
In reality, there is very little ‘sharing’ involved in these relationships, 
notwithstanding that Uber has been successful in persuading the ACT 
legislature to adopt the terminology of the ‘rideshare’ service in its newly 
enacted provisions in the Road Transport (Public Passenger Services) Act.
The true nature of these relationships is that Uber and others are 
intermediaries profiting from the sale of labour. Some may say that 
they are ‘commodifying’ labour13 in a way abhorrent to a fundamental 
principle of the International Labour Organization, that ‘labour is not 
a commodity’.14 They do not provide any tools of trade for the worker, 
apart from maintaining the app that connects supply and demand in the 
market for the work. The workers bear the costs of maintaining their 
tools and equipment. In the case of Uber drivers, that may mean covering 
the loan or finance lease repayments on an expensive, late model motor 
vehicle.15 The intermediary also forswears any entitlement to control the 
worker, and so avoids characterisation as an employer under the common 
law definition of employment.16 Workers decide themselves how much 
time to spend on the job, and which tasks to accept. The intermediary 
does not need to monitor performance as an employer would, because 
11  Ewin Hannan ‘Old School, New School’, AFR Boss, April 2016, Vol 17, 23.
12  Cara Waters ‘Outsourcing Jobs Frees Up Entrepreneurs’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 April 
2016, 24.
13  See Antonio Aloisi, ‘Commoditized Workers: Case Study Research on Labour Law Issues 
Arising from a Set of “On-demand/Gig Economy” Platforms’ (2016) 37(3) Comparative Labor Law 
and Policy Journal 653.
14  See Paul O’Higgins, ‘“Labour is not a Commodity”– an Irish Contribution to International 
Labour Law’ (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal 225–34.
15  It is a condition of driving for Uber that the driver maintains an unblemished late model vehicle. 
16  For a recent analysis of the concept of ‘employment’, see Joellen Riley, ‘The Definition of the 
Contract of Employment and its Differentiation from Other Contracts and Other Work Relations’ 
in Mark Freedland, Alan Bogg, David Cabrelli et al (eds), The Contract of Employment (Oxford 
University Press, United Kingdom, 2016) 321–40. Note that some commentators have suggested 
that Uber’s arrangements in Australia may constitute an employment relationship between Uber 
and the drivers. See, for example, Josh Bornstein’s blog: joshbornstein.com.au/writing/the-great-uber-
fairness-fallacy-as-a-driver-how-do-you-bargain-with-an-app/ (viewed 5 April 2017). See also Aslam, 
Farrer v Uber BV, Uber London and Uber Britannia Ltd, above n 9.
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the app itself contains a rating tool to gather the views of customers. 
The  worker is  ‘blocked’ from using the app if ratings drop below an 
acceptable standard, so drivers have a big incentive to remain upbeat and 
cheery. (This could be why Uber users regularly report that Uber drivers 
love chauffeuring them around: nobody ‘likes’ a depressed and grumpy 
servant.) If the allegations in the press surrounding the ‘blocking’ of 
drivers are true, Uber drivers have no opportunity to contest poor ratings, 
and so are at the mercy of mean-spirited or possibly discriminatory 
assessments by customers.17 Some apps – such as Airtasker – allow the 
worker to propose their own rate of pay, so workers bid competitively for 
tasks. As there is no minimum wage for a gig worker, rates can be low. 
According to a study conducted by the International Labour Organisation 
of online clerical workers engaged by Amazon Mechanical Turk, the mean 
hourly pay for a worker in the United States was $US5.55.18 
Low prices for work mean that the other beneficiaries of this kind of work 
are the customers who are able to source labour more cheaply than by 
direct employment. We know that many young people use Uber because 
it is cheaper than hiring a taxi, but it is not only individual domestic 
customers who are attracted by lower prices. At the university I work for 
it has been suggested that we switch from Cabcharge to Uber accounts 
to save on transport costs. Airtasker has reported that about a third of its 
turnover is driven by small businesses, not householders. According to an 
enthusiast for these kinds of services, ‘This is a new wave of outsourcing 
micro tasks when you don’t need to hire someone for a day, you just 
need them for an hour’.19 This kind of micro-outsourcing by businesses 
may not be all that new at all. It looks very like the labour engagement 
practices of a hundred or more years ago, before the establishment of 
the standard weekly wage, when impecunious wharf labourers had to bid 
each day for work loading and unloading ships on the Hungry Mile at the 
Sydney wharves. Over the course of the past century we have regulated the 
engagement of labour to protect workers from the risks of highly precarious 
work. Past regulation has generally accepted that those who profit from 
the exploitation of labour ought to bear some of the cost of protective 
17  See the story of Mr Mike Oze-Igiehon in Georgia Wilkins, ‘Driver Sues Uber after Termination’, 
Australian Financial Review, 19 May 2016, 9. Similar stories are collected in Janine Berg, ‘Income 
Security in the On-demand Economy: Findings and Policy Lessons for a Survey of Crowdworkers’ 
(2016) 37(3) Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 543–76.
18  See Janine Berg, above n 17.
19  Author Rachel Botsman, cited in Waters, above n 12.
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regulation. After all, how much of Uber’s billion-dollar value is down to 
the creation of the app, and how much depends upon the availability of 
the drivers, with their shiny new vehicles and perpetual smiles?
III. What Kind of Regulation?
In designing regulation for this new-old form of labour engagement 
it would be wise to resist squeezing these inventive app intermediaries 
into employment regulation – bearing in mind that employment is itself 
a  relatively new concept, historically speaking,20 and the strictures of 
employment regulation have sometimes created the incentives to invent 
new forms of labour engagement. The Uber driver agreement21 is itself 
insistent that the company operating the Uber app is ‘a technology service 
provider that does not provide transportation services … nor operate as 
an agent for the transportation of passengers’. It also explicitly forswears 
the existence of any employment relationship with drivers, and devises 
its terms to avoid any appearance of controlling when, where or whether 
drivers agree to pick up passengers. The only thing the company does 
control (rigidly) is maximum fares, and its own commission, which 
is withheld before drivers are paid.
If we accept that the drivers are not employees of Uber (as seems 
sensible, given that the terms of the arrangement do thrust a great deal of 
responsibility and discretion on the drivers), how else might they access 
some worker rights? Are there innovative ways of regulating these kinds 
of labour market exchanges without stifling innovation, but also without 
risking a return to the Hungry Mile?
We can look to existing small business regulation in Australia to see some 
models for reducing the harshest effects of precarity for gig economy 
workers. If we focus particularly on the rideshare drivers, we may find 
a potential model of regulation in aspects of state-based regulation in 
the road transport industry.22 This state legislation remains enforceable, 
20  See John Howe and Richard Mitchell, ‘The Evolution of the Contract of Employment 
in Australia: A Discussion’ (1999) 12 Australian Journal of Labour Law 113.
21  The author obtained a copy of the Rasier Pacific VOF Services Agreement, last updated on 
23  December 2015, under which drivers agree to provide transportation services to Uber users. 
Copy on file with the author.
22  Such as Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) Ch 6, which provides for regulation of work in the 
taxi and owner driver transport industries.
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notwithstanding the enactment of the federal Independent Contractors Act 
2006 (Cth) (IC Act), because s 7(2) of the IC Act specifically preserves the 
operation of these statutes.
The Victorian Owner Drivers and Forestry Contractors Act 2005 (Vic) 
(ODFC Act), provides a useful illustration of the kinds of provisions that 
might also be enacted to protect rideshare drivers. As outlined below, these 
include provisions seeking to promote decent levels of remuneration, 
protection from capricious termination of working arrangements, and 
access to affordable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to enable 
drivers to secure these entitlements. The legislation also accommodates 
a pragmatic application of the right to freedom of association, so that 
drivers can join together to agitate for fair treatment. 
The standard Uber driver contract permits Uber to determine maximum 
fares, and to vary fares without consultation with drivers.23 There is no 
provision for fares to be set taking into account any of the drivers’ costs for 
motor vehicle expenses, or for a telecommunications provider’s charges to 
a driver for accessing the large amounts of data required to operate the 
app. Under the ODFC Act, rates and cost schedules for truck drivers can 
be reviewed by the minister, in consultation with the Transport Industry 
Council and Forestry Industry Council, with a view to ensuring that 
owner drivers can earn similar remuneration to employees engaged to 
do the same work.24 Hirers must include these rates schedules in written 
information provided to drivers.25 A hirer who fails to provide this 
information takes the risk that the Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal (VCAT) will exercise a power to order that the contractor be paid 
what VCAT determines is a ‘fair and reasonable rate’, notwithstanding the 
terms of the contract.26 The establishment of an administrative body to 
provide similar review of fares and costs for rideshare drivers would help 
them to secure fair remuneration for their work. 
Truck drivers can also complain to VCAT if they believe they have 
been subjected to ‘unconscionable conduct’,27 the definition of which 
includes ‘whether or not the regulated contract allows for the payment 
of any increases in fixed and variable overhead costs on a regular and 
23  Clause 4 of the contract, see n 21.
24  ODFC Act s 14(2)(b).
25  ODFC Act s 16.
26  ODFC Act s 45.
27  Defined in ODFC Act s 31.
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systematic basis’.28 The available remedies include a ‘contract variation 
order’.29 The special danger of a ‘contract variation order’ is that it may be 
extended generally, to other contracts of a specified class. A trade union 
has standing to apply for a contract variation order made in one case to be 
extended to cover other contracts.
Rights to collective negotiation should also be supported for rideshare 
drivers. Uber drivers with grievances about things like Uber’s sudden 
reduction of fares have already demonstrated a propensity to protest 
collectively, and to form associations.30 Under the ODFC Act, drivers are 
permitted to bargain collectively through ‘negotiating agents’,31 and such 
conduct is expressly exempted from any sanction under the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).32 
Protection from capricious loss of one’s job is also a key entitlement for 
workers, whether they are employees or contractors. According to the 
Uber driver contract, drivers can be given seven days’ notice of termination 
for any reason or no reason at all,33 and they can lose access to the app 
without notice if their ratings drop below an acceptable level.34 By way 
of contrast, under the ODFC Act heavy vehicle drivers must be given 
a minimum of three months’ notice,35 recognising that these drivers have 
invested in job-specific, expensive rigs. Although a shorter period may 
be warranted for Uber drivers who have invested in ordinary passenger 
vehicles which are more readily sold, there ought to be some recognition 
of drivers’ sunk costs in acquiring a vehicle when determining a fair and 
appropriate notice period for terminating driving contracts.
28  ODFC Act s 31(2)(k).
29  ODFC Act s 44(1)(g) and 47(2).
30  See Adrian Chen, ‘An Uber Labor Movement born in a LaGuardia Parking Lot’, New Yorker, 
8 February 2016, www.newyorker.com/business/currency/an-uber-labor-movement-born-in-a-laguardia 
-parking-lot (viewed 13 May 2016).
31  ODFC Act ss 25–26.
32  ODFC Act s 64(1)(c)–(e). In Australia, the anti-trust provisions in the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (Cth) operate to limit, if not curtail entirely, the scope for independent contractors to 
engage in collective industrial action. See Shae McCrystal, ‘Organising Independent Contractors: 
The Impact of Competition Law’ in Judy Fudge, Shae McCrystal and Kamala Sankaran, Challenging 
the Legal Boundaries of Work Regulation (Hart, Oxford, 2012) 139.
33  Clause 12.2.
34  Clause 2.5.2.
35  ODFC Act s 21.
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Two other provisions in the ODFC Act might be included in a specific 
scheme to protect rideshare drivers. One is similar to the general 
protection provisions in the Fair Work Act Pt 3-1, which prohibits 
threatening a  person with detriment if they claim any of their rights 
under the Act.36 Another is access to a Small Business Commissioner 
for mediation or other dispute resolution processes, before resorting to 
VCAT with a complaint;37 any regulatory scheme designed to assist small 
business people needs to provide access to quick and inexpensive dispute 
resolution services.
IV. General ‘Fair Trading’ Protections
A special scheme for rideshare drivers, designed to provide similar 
protections to those enjoyed by owner truck drivers, is one solution to 
providing satisfactory worker protection for one part of the ‘gig’ economy. 
More general protections may be needed for the freelancers working on 
other platforms, such as Airtasker. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth) already includes protections for small businesses against predatory 
practices of larger ones in its provisions prohibiting unconscionable 
dealing.38 Perhaps these provisions need to be supplemented by a special 
industry code of conduct, similar to the Franchising Code of Conduct 
(FCC), which also deals with matters such as adequate disclosure of 
contract terms, and protections from capricious termination of contracts.39 
The policymakers who framed the original FCC were responding to 
a number of reports and enquiries that had uncovered widespread 
exploitative practices in the franchising industry.40 The typical franchise 
36  ODFC Act s 61.
37  ODFC Act s 35.
38  See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 51AA–51AC.
39  See Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes – Franchising) Regulation 2014, and the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 51AD.
40  See the Swanson Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Report to the Minister for Business 
and Consumer Affairs (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1976); Trade Practices Consultative 
Committee, Small Business and the Trade Practices Act Vol 1 (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
1979) (Blunt Committee); House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry Science and 
Technology, Small Business in Australia: Challenges, Problems and Opportunities (Commonwealth 
of Australia, Canberra, 1990) (Beddall Committee); R Gardini, Review of the Franchising Code of 
Practice: Report to the Minister for Small Business, Customs and Construction (Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 1994); Reid Committee Report, Finding a Balance towards Fair Trading in 
Australia. Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997).
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agreement requires considerable investment by the franchisee in a business 
heavily controlled by someone else. Franchisees are especially vulnerable 
to the risk of losing their investment if the franchise is terminated, much 
in the same way as a gig economy worker is at considerable financial risk 
if she or he sets up a business in reliance on a clientele sourced through 
the app, but is subsequently ‘blocked’ from using the app. The FCC 
deals with this risk by including provisions protecting franchisees from 
capricious termination of the franchise. Even if a franchisee has committed 
some breach of the franchise agreement, a franchisor may not summarily 
terminate the franchise, but must notify the franchisee of the alleged 
breach and the proposal to terminate, and give the franchisee a reasonable 
time (not exceeding 30 days) to remedy the breach. If the franchisee 
remedies the breach, the franchisor is not permitted to terminate on 
account of that breach.41 If gig economy workers had this kind of right, it 
would go some way to protecting any investment they have made in their 
‘micro enterprises’ by ensuring they could not have their capacity to earn 
withdrawn without warning.
Like owner truck drivers, franchisees also enjoy a freedom to form 
associations, and they are protected from any conduct of the franchisor 
to restrict or impair that right by a 300 penalty unit fine.42 The FCC 
does not, however, clarify whether this freedom extends to engaging in 
collective negotiations or boycotts. 
Like the ODFC Act, the FCC also encourages parties to use mediation 
to resolve disputes (though parties retain their rights to litigate), and 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) empowers a third party 
watchdog – the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission – to 
take action on behalf of franchisees, and seek a range of flexible remedies, 
including orders for the variation of contracts.43 
V. Conclusion
Workers in the ‘gig’ economy, like all others who rely on their own labour 
for a livelihood, need the security of decent incomes and protection 
from capricious termination of jobs. We have laws protecting these kinds 
41  FCC cl 27(4).
42  FCC cl 33.
43  See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87.
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of interests for other workers outside the boundaries of employment 
legislation, in all manner of special schemes designed to promote fair 
dealing for small enterprise operators. Politicians across the spectrum in 
Australia ought to be looking at these models with a view to designing 
suitable regulation to protect the growing armies of workers in the ‘gig’ 
economy. Key elements of new regulation need to be a suitably empowered 
watchdog (similar to the ACCC, or the Fair Work Ombudsman), and an 




1  Senior Lecturer, Melbourne Law School.
2  Unless otherwise specified, the terms ‘employment standards’ or ‘workplace standards’ are used 
to refer to the regulation governing minimum rates of pay, hours of work, and leave and termination 
entitlements, including by way of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), modern awards and enterprise 
agreements.
3  See, for example, Senate Education and Employment References Committee, Inquiry into 
the Impact of Australia’s Temporary Work Visa Programs on the Australian Labour Market and 
on the Temporary Work Visa Holders (Final Report, 17 March 2016); Caro Meldrum‐Hanna and 
Ali Russell, ‘Slaving Away’, Four Corners, 4 May 2015; Adele Ferguson and Klaus Toft, ‘7-Eleven: 
The Price of Convenience’, Four Corners, 31 August 2015.
Good Call: Extending Liability 
for Employment Contraventions 
Beyond the Direct Employer
Tess Hardy1
I. Introduction
A raft of recent inquiries and investigations have revealed that non-
compliance with employment standards regulation2 is a pressing problem 
in Australia.3 While there are many factors which may have contributed 
to a lack of employer compliance, including the growing vulnerability of 
segments of the workforce and a decline in unionisation, this chapter will 
focus on some of the most critical limits of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) 
(FW Act). The inquiry into the 7-Eleven franchise network undertaken 
by the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) in 2016 will be 
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used to illustrate some of the key regulatory challenges.4 In exploring 
possible reform options, this chapter will consider whether, and in what 
circumstances, liability for employment standards contraventions should 
extend beyond the direct employer. In particular, this chapter is especially 
focused on the extent to which so-called ‘lead firms’ should be held 
liable for employment contraventions taking place in their supply chain, 
corporate group or franchise network.5 The paper will conclude with 
some preliminary observations regarding the merits (or otherwise) of the 
Fair Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Bill 2017 (Cth) 
(‘Vulnerable Workers Bill’) which was introduced into federal parliament 
on 1 March 2017.
II. Limitations of the Current 
Regulatory Regime
The FW Act largely continues to reflect the unitary conception of the 
‘employer’ – the idea that there is only one person or entity responsible 
for setting and complying with employment conditions.6 However, there 
is growing evidence to suggest that key conditions of employment – such 
as recruitment, pay, working hours, supervision and termination – may 
be determined by a number of organisations outside and beyond the 
direct employer as a result of outsourcing, subcontracting, labour hire or 
franchising.
While these various commercial arrangements are all legitimate business 
strategies, the fragmentation of corporate structures and working 
arrangements into loosely connected networks has blurred the lines of 
responsibility for ensuring workplace compliance. It has also made 
the enforcement of employment standards regulation undoubtedly 
more complex and potentially less effective.7 Civil remedy litigation 
is  increasingly foiled by the fact that the putative employer entity may 
4  Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman, ‘A Report of the Fair Work Ombudsman’s Inquiry into 
7-Eleven’ (Australian Government, April 2016) (7-Eleven Inquiry).
5  The term ‘lead firm’ is used in a broad sense to capture those companies which sit at the top of a 
supply chain, the head of a corporate group or at the apex of a franchise network. In reality, identifying 
only one lead firm may not be straightforward, particularly where the putative lead firm is part of a larger 
corporate group. For further discussion of this issue, see Tess Hardy, ‘Who Should Be Held Liable for 
Workplace Contraventions and on What Basis?’ (2016) 29 Australian Journal of Labour Law 78.
6  See generally Jeremias Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (Oxford University Press, 2015).
7  David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be 
Done to Improve It (Harvard University Press, 2014).
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elect to liquidate or deregister the relevant employing corporation. This 
not only has the effect of rendering the employer immune from the legal 
consequences of its non-compliance, it may mean that underpayments are 
never fully recovered.8 Moreover, targeting the direct employer may not 
be effective in addressing some of the systemic drivers of employer non-
compliance, which may be determined by more powerful firms positioned 
higher in the supply chain, the corporate group or the franchise network.
It seems that the laws which were originally intended to protect workers 
from  exploitation may now perpetuate such problems ‘by focusing 
regulatory attention on the wrong parties’.9 By positioning the direct 
employer entity as the primary wrongdoer, the civil remedy regime 
established under the FW Act does not fully account for the disaggregation 
of employer functions described above. Rather, the existing legal 
framework appears to permit lead firms to ‘have it both ways’10 – that is, 
firms positioned at the top of a supply chain, at the head of a corporate 
group, or at the apex of a franchise network, may exercise high levels of 
control over the performance of work, and yet remain legally insulated 
from the problems this may create. This particular issue was highlighted 
in the FWO’s recent public inquiry into allegations of widespread 
underpayment of workers in the 7-Eleven franchise network.
III. The FWO’s Inquiry into the 7-Eleven 
Franchise Network 
A significant component of the FWO’s current compliance and enforcement 
strategy is the conduct of formal, public inquiries. These in-depth inquiries 
are generally prompted by allegations or concerns about systemic employer 
non-compliance in an industry, region, supply chain or labour market. They 
normally entail the regulator undertaking a detailed examination of the 
drivers of compliance behaviour through site visits, interviews and payroll 
audits. Specific focus is placed on the role of lead firms. At the conclusion of 
an inquiry, a written report is made publicly available which sets out the key 
findings, the regulator’s recommendations, and any actions taken including 
whether the regulator has (or is likely to) initiate enforcement litigation 
against one or more persons.11 
8  See, for example, Fair Work Ombudsman v Haider Pty Ltd  [2015] FCCA 2113 (30 July 2015).
9  Weil, above n 7, 4.
10  Ibid. 14. 
11  Fair Work Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014–15, 31. 
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The FWO’s inquiry into the 7-Eleven franchise network sought to better 
understand the regulatory role played by head office of the 7-Eleven 
franchise, namely 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (‘7-Eleven Stores’), as well as 
its franchisees and their employees. The FWO’s report makes clear that 
7-Eleven Stores ‘had a reasonable basis on which to inquire and act’12 into 
allegations of franchisee non-compliance with employment standards. 
In particular, the regulator noted that, for at least five years prior to the 
public airing of these issues, 7-Eleven Stores was aware that multiple 
outlets within its network had deliberately sought to evade employment 
regulation through the falsification of employment and payroll records.
Notwithstanding the mounting evidence of widespread workplace 
contraventions in this period, the FWO found that 7-Eleven head 
office largely failed to take any substantive steps to curb employer non-
compliance. In particular, the FWO noted that while 7-Eleven Stores 
exercised a high degree of control over its franchisees, it did not implement 
any significant changes to its franchise model, its existing monitoring 
mechanisms or its payroll systems. Indeed, despite the pattern of poor 
compliance behaviour across its network, 7-Eleven Stores expressly 
declined to participate in the FWO’s voluntary franchise program which 
was specifically designed to leverage the franchise relationship in a way 
that enhanced employment standards compliance amongst franchisees.13 
In short, the FWO found that while 7-Eleven Stores ostensibly promoted 
compliance with workplace standards, it ‘did not adequately detect or 
address deliberate non-compliance and as a consequence compounded it’.14
Notwithstanding this finding, the FWO ultimately determined that 
7-Eleven Stores’ failure to do more or act earlier did not give rise to 
any legal liability. In particular, the FWO concluded that it did not 
have sufficient probative evidence to pursue 7-Eleven Stores under the 
accessorial liability provisions of the FW Act.15 Accordingly, the regulator 
decided not to initiate civil remedy litigation against the lead firm in 
this instance.
12  7-Eleven Inquiry, above n 4, 67.
13  Ibid. 10. See also Tess Hardy, ‘Brandishing the Brand: Enhancing Employer Compliance 
through the Regulatory Enrolment of Franchisors’ (Paper presented at the Labour Law Research 
Network Conference, Amsterdam, 25–27 June 2015).
14  7-Eleven Inquiry, above n 4, 4. 
15  FW Act s 550.
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Initially, the conclusion reached by the FWO in this inquiry – that 
7-Eleven Stores was not liable for the employment contraventions which 
had taken  place in its network – was not especially concerning from 
a regulatory perspective given that the 7-Eleven head office had already 
taken a range of far-reaching compliance measures in the intervening 
period, including:
a. reviewing key aspects of the franchise model;
b. setting up an independent panel to receive and process wage claims; 
and
c. introducing more rigorous and accountable monitoring and payroll 
systems.16
While these types of voluntary measures are valuable, it is somewhat 
telling that these proactive steps were only taken by 7-Eleven Stores after 
the media story broke and the brand had suffered a significant public 
bruising. Indeed, it seems that ongoing media pressure and intense public 
scrutiny were critical to the finalisation of a proactive compliance deed 
with the FWO.17 This deed, which formalised many of the compliance 
commitments the franchisor had already adopted, was concluded only 
after extensive negotiation and continuing controversy about the way 
in which head office was handling claims following its surprise decision 
to dismantle the independent panel previously led by Professor Fels.18 
Another factor which may have further amplified the pressure being 
placed on 7-Eleven Stores was the Coalition Government’s announcement 
in May 2016 of its intention to introduce new civil remedy provisions 
‘that capture franchisors … who fail to deal with exploitation by their 
franchisees’.19
Since then, the Coalition Government has moved to implement this policy 
by way of the Vulnerable Workers Bill. This Bill is explicitly designed to 
respond to some of the problems identified by the FWO in the 7-Eleven 
Inquiry and elsewhere, including the fact that some franchisors may 
‘operate on a business model based on underpaying workers’20 and ‘have 
16  7-Eleven Inquiry, above n 4, 52–65.
17  See Proactive Compliance Deed between the Commonwealth of Australia (as represented by the 
Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman) and 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (6 December 2016).
18  Adele Ferguson and Sarah Danckert, ‘7-Eleven Kills Independent Wage Panel’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 11 May 2016.
19  Liberal Party of Australia, ‘The Coalition’s Policy to Protect Vulnerable Workers’, 19 May 2016.
20  Explanatory Memorandum, Vulnerable Workers Bill, 6.
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either been blind to the problem or not taken sufficient action to deal with 
it once it was brought to their attention’.21 In particular, in a submission 
regarding the Bill, the FWO noted that: 
franchisors can be reluctant to proactively engage with the FWO 
before issues are uncovered, either by the FWO or through the media. 
Reputational leverage works as a ‘push’ factor for franchisors to act, but 
has had limited effect as a general deterrence measure to encourage other 
franchisors to take reasonable steps to detect non-compliance and support 
franchisees to be compliant.22
These observations reflect the existing sociolegal literature which similarly 
suggests that, without compelling incentives or coercive sanctions, it is 
difficult for a regulator to leverage lead firms to genuinely and sustainably 
engage with softer, voluntary initiatives.23 Indeed, the 7-Eleven case 
summarised above not only illustrates some of the problems of relying on 
methods of self-regulation, but also underlines a number of the limits of 
the existing legal framework in making lead firms accountable for conduct 
taking place in their business networks.
IV. Limitations of Accessorial Liability 
Provisions
Under existing law, the principal statutory mechanism for extending 
liability beyond the direct employer – and holding lead firms to account 
with respect to employment standards compliance – are the accessorial 
liability provisions of the FW Act. Essentially, these provisions provide 
that persons found to be ‘involved in’ a contravention of the FW Act 
may be liable under a civil remedy provision, even where they are not the 
actual employer of the worker whose rights have been breached. Broadly 
speaking, a person will be taken to be ‘involved in’ a contravention if the 
person has:
21  Ibid.
22  Fair Work Ombudsman, Submission to the Senate Education and Employment Legislation 
Committee Inquiry into the Fair Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Bill 2017, 
6 April 2017.
23  Guy Davidov, ‘The Enforcement Crisis in Labour Law and the Fallacy of Voluntarist Solutions’ 
(2010) 26 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 61. See also David 
Weil, ‘Improving Workplace Conditions through Strategic Enforcement’ (Report to the Wage and 
Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, 2010) 87.
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a. aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; 
b. induced the contravention (whether by threats or promises or 
otherwise); 
c. been in any way, by act or omission, ‘knowingly concerned’ in the 
contravention; or
d. conspired with others to effect the contravention.24 
The third limb of this definition is arguably the most critical given 
that it is this subclause which is routinely relied upon by the FWO 
and other regulators. However, a series of recent cases have set a high 
bar in relation to satisfying the ‘requisite knowledge’ requirement under 
s  550(2)(c) of the FW Act, particularly with respect to contraventions 
of modern awards.25 One of the challenges with using s 550(2)(c) is the 
need to establish that the accessory had ‘actual knowledge’ of the essential 
elements of the contravention. Actual knowledge is said to include ‘wilful 
blindness’ but does not generally encompass ‘recklessness or negligence’.26 
Further, constructive knowledge is not sufficient.27 
The way in which the requisite knowledge requirement has been 
interpreted and applied by the courts may make it difficult to pin liability 
on the alleged accessory, especially in complex supply chains, where the 
lead firm may be more removed from the affected employees and less 
aware of the precise employment arrangements (e.g. the employment 
status of the employee, the duties performed, the hours worked etc.). 
Further, it is not yet clear to what extent it is possible to aggregate the 
knowledge of multiple officers in larger companies, franchise networks or 
corporate groups.28 Questions arise as to when, and in what circumstances, 
an accessory’s omission to act is likely to ‘support the inference of actual 
knowledge’.29 
24  FW Act s 550(2).
25  FW Act s 45. See, for example, FWO v Devine Marine [2015] FCA 370; and Potter v Fair Work 
Ombudsman [2014] FCA 187. 
26  Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 55. 
27  Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473; Young Investments Group Pty Ltd v Mann (2012) 
293 ALR 537, 541.
28  Ingmar Taylor and Larissa Andelman, ‘Accessorial Liability under the Fair Work Act’ (Paper 
presented at the Australian Labour Law Association, Sydney, 14–15 November 2014). 
29  Fair Work Ombudsman v South Jin Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1456 [49]. See also Fair Work Ombudsman 
v Liquid Fuel Pty Ltd [2015] FCCA 2694. 
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
78
In the view of the FWO, previous cases suggest that ‘[m]ere knowledge 
of general non-compliance or suspicions about compliance will not be 
sufficient to meet the test of section 550(2)(c)’.30 This appeared to present 
a real problem for a finding of liability in the 7-Eleven case. The FWO 
found that a number of individuals employed or engaged by 7-Eleven 
Stores may have had knowledge of, or capacity to access, essential facts 
relating to the contraventions committed by the franchisees. However, 
many of these individuals were unwilling to provide evidence to the 
FWO about their own conduct or the conduct of others.31 The lack 
of relevant evidence meant that the FWO believed that it was not in 
a position to prove that 7-Eleven Stores had been ‘knowingly concerned’ 
in the contraventions of its franchisees and therefore unable to institute 
proceedings against 7-Eleven Stores on this basis. 
In order to better address these evidentiary issues, the FWO has called for 
the power to require a person to answer questions on the record in relation 
to alleged contraventions of the FW Act.32 The Vulnerable Workers Bill 
contains provisions to this effect.33 While this may tackle part of the 
problem, it does not necessarily address some of the more fundamental 
questions raised by the 7-Eleven case – that is, whether the existing 
accessorial liability provisions are ‘fit for purpose’ in terms of achieving 
the broader policy objective of ensuring employers duly comply with 
the law, employees are properly paid, and lead firms adopt the necessary 
measures to make certain this occurs. 
In particular, when liability continues to turn on whether a lead firm 
was ‘knowingly concerned’ in a contravention committed by another 
(e.g.  an  employer entity), the regulatory framework may not properly 
address the risk of ‘counterproductive liability avoidance’.34 This is where 
firms seek to rework their contractual relationships to avoid being held 
liable for employment contraventions. This may involve reducing (rather 
than expanding) the extent to which they monitor and direct their 
contractors’ or franchisees’ compliance practices. 
30  7-Eleven Inquiry, above n 4, 71. 
31  Ibid. 72.
32  Ibid. An alternative way in which to address some of the evidentiary problems facing the FWO 
– particularly where employment records are absent or inaccurate – is to shift the onus of proof to the 
alleged wrongdoer. For further discussion, see Hardy, above n 5. 
33  Vulnerable Workers Bill Pt 4.
34  Cynthia Estlund, ‘Who Mops the Floor at the Fortune 500? Corporate Self-Regulation and the 
Low Wage Workplace’ (2008) 12(3) Lewis & Clark Law Review 671, 692.
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V. Possible Reform
In a separate article, I have surveyed some alternative statutory mechanisms 
for extending liability for employment contraventions beyond the direct 
employer entity to other individuals or entities.35 These third-party 
liability regimes have often been principally designed, or primarily 
used, to tactically target lead firms and combat some of the compliance 
problems raised by fragmented work structures, such as outsourcing, 
subcontracting and franchising. In comparison to some of the inherent 
limits of the accessorial liability provisions of the FW Act, these legislative 
alternatives are potentially more flexible, and more effective, in achieving 
the core policy objective of promoting and sustaining widespread 
workplace relations compliance. 
While there are obvious practical advantages and efficiency arguments 
which support the legal pursuit of lead firms, especially where the 
direct employer entity is judgment-proof,36 the ascription of liability to 
such firms can be normatively justified on a number of other grounds. 
For  instance, some of the existing literature suggests that making lead 
firms liable for employment contraventions is defensible where: 
a. the lead firm has caused the direct employer to contravene the law; 
b. the lead firm has, directly or indirectly, benefited from the 
contraventions;
c. the lead firm has power to prevent or deter workplace contraventions 
taking place; and/or
d. the behaviour of the lead firm increases social costs and invites moral 
sanction – this is especially relevant where the lead firm has made 
public representations that it is committed to ensuring workplace 
relations compliance throughout its business, supply chain or franchise 
network.37
The FWO’s findings in the 7-Eleven Inquiry lend weight to many of these 
normative justifications. For example, 7-Eleven Stores has vigorously denied 
that the viability of the 7-Eleven franchise system is (or was) dependent 
35  Hardy, above n 5. 
36  Brishen Rogers, ‘Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft’ (2010) Berkeley Journal of 
Employment and Labour Law 1.
37  See generally Guy Davidov, ‘Indirect Employment: Should Lead Companies Be Liable?’ (2015) 
37 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 5. 
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on franchisees underpaying their staff. The FWO also acknowledged that 
7-Eleven Stores ‘does not directly benefit when a franchisee underpays 
their workers’.38 However, the regulator went on to observe that the 
franchisor gains an indirect benefit from the (often misguided) perception 
of store profitability in so far as it allows the store to continue to trade and 
to generate revenue and other fees for 7-Eleven Stores.39 
In addition, the FWO noted, as part of its Inquiry, that 7-Eleven Stores 
was  in a position to prevent workplace contraventions amongst its 
franchisees, given that it ‘controlled the settings of the system in which 
the franchisee employers operated’40 and had the resources and capacity to 
detect and deter franchisee non-compliance. Indeed, the various changes 
adopted by 7-Eleven Stores in response to public scrutiny, including 
modifying its business model, enhancing its monitoring and payroll 
systems and terminating franchise agreements, highlight the regulatory 
power wielded by the franchisor in this context. 
In circumstances where lead firm liability is normatively appropriate, the 
next key question is an instrumental one: which legal mechanism can and 
should be used to ascribe liability to lead firms? A key challenge in devising 
a new model of liability is how best to ensure that it not only achieves the 
relevant policy objective, but that it remains workable in practice. Drawing 
on the disparate and distinctive liability models surveyed in my separate 
article,41 it seems that one of the most straightforward and promising 
ways to extend liability is to expand the current statutory definition of 
what it means to be ‘involved in’ a contravention under s  550 of the 
FW Act. For instance, a new limb could be added to the existing statutory 
provision which does not pivot on knowledge or control – rather, a person 
(including a lead firm) could be taken to be ‘involved in’ a contravention 
under s 550 if:
a. the person was in a position to prevent or deter the contravention; and 
b. that person has failed to take all reasonably practicable steps to prevent 
or deter the contravention.
38  7-Eleven Inquiry, above n 4, 38.
39  Ibid. 39.
40  Ibid. 67. 
41  Hardy, above n 5.
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In assessing the firm’s capacity for prevention and deterrence, the court 
could be required to have regard to the resources, market position and 
bureaucratic power held by the lead firm, as well as the nature and duration 
of the relationship between the lead firm and the direct employer. 
In determining whether the lead firm has satisfied the relevant statutory 
duty, the court may be required to take into account a non-exhaustive 
range of factors, such as whether the alleged accessory has: 
a. adopted rigorous and accountable monitoring practices;
b. engaged only reliable and well-capitalised contractors;
c. ensured that the relevant supply contract, labour hire agreement and/
or franchise model is financially viable;
d. otherwise facilitated or encouraged compliance through tailored 
financial incentives and commercial sanctions.
While I have used the 7-Eleven example to illustrate some of the regulatory 
challenges in this context, the proposal for reform outlined above is 
presented as more than a simple statutory fix for discrete issues raised in 
the public consciousness. Rather, it is aimed at regulating the foreseeable 
(and unforeseen) problems that may arise in a range of business networks.42 
Indeed, one of the most significant gaps in the Vulnerable Workers Bill is 
that it extends liability for employment contraventions only in franchise 
networks and corporate groups. Other organisational forms, such as 
labour hire arrangements and supply chains, are not captured by these 
provisions. 
While this Bill is not without some substantial weaknesses, it represents, 
and remains, a momentous step forward in enhancing compliance with 
employment standards regulation in this country.43 To a large extent, 
it addresses key points raised in this article and elsewhere. For example, 
the proposed provisions allow the court to take into account not only 
what the responsible franchisor entity (or one of its officers) ‘knew’ about 
the contravention of the franchisee entity, but also what it (or the officer) 
‘could reasonably be expected to have known’.44 In short, the provisions 
42  Hugh Collins, ‘Introduction’ in Gunter Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (Hart, 2011). 
43  For example, one critical issue identified in the submissions to the ongoing inquiry is the 
definition of ‘responsible franchisor entity’. See, for example, Tess Hardy and Joo-Cheong Tham, 
Submission to the Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee Inquiry into the Fair 
Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Bill 2017, 10 April 2017.
44  Vulnerable Workers Bill s 558B(1)(d)(i) and (ii).
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encompass both actual knowledge and constructive knowledge and, in 
doing so, potentially address one of the most challenging aspects of the 
accessorial liability provisions as they currently apply to fragmented work 
arrangements. 
Another critical feature of the Vulnerable Workers Bill is the statutory 
defence which is embedded in Pt 2. In brief, the Bill provides that the 
person (i.e. a franchisor, a holding company or a relevant officer) will 
not contravene the extended liability provisions if, at the time the 
contravention took place, the ‘person had taken reasonable steps to 
prevent a contravention by the franchisee entity or subsidiary of the 
same of similar character.’45 In determining whether a person has taken 
such ‘reasonable steps’, the court is directed to have regard to a range 
of relevant matters, including the size and resources of the franchise or 
body corporate, any action the person took to inform the employer of 
the relevant workplace laws and obligations, and any arrangements the 
person had in place for assessing the employer’s ensuing compliance with 
workplace obligations. Imposing reasonable standards of diligence not 
only allows the court to undertake a fact-sensitive analysis which takes 
into account the full range of circumstances, but also seeks to promote 
the right type of liability avoidance on the part of lead firms – that is, by 
encouraging franchisors and holding companies to do more (not less) to 
enhance compliance with workplace laws across their respective business 
networks. 
VI. Conclusion
The various practical and legal issues identified in the 7-Eleven case 
suggest that self-regulatory mechanisms are not sufficient, and the current 
accessorial liability provisions of the FW Act may be inadequate, in 
addressing some of the most profound problems raised by complex and 
integrated economic organisations. In seeking to ensure that employees 
are fully and properly paid in Australia, and in trying to promote lead 
firms to do more in this respect, it seems that the conception of legal 
responsibility for employment contraventions may need to be statutorily 
recalibrated. The Vulnerable Workers Bill represents the first (but, it is 
hoped, not the last) step in such a direction. 
45  Vulnerable Workers Bill s 558B(3). 
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The Australian House Party Has 
Been Glorious – But the Hangover 
May Be Severe: Reforms to 
Mitigate Some of the Risks 
Gill North1
I. Introduction
The scope and efficacy of regulation around mortgage lending in 
Australia  is critical, not just for the health of financial institutions and 
financial stability, but also for the financial position and wellbeing 
of Australian households. The biggest risk presently is complacency. 
Lending secured to residential properties (including to owner occupiers 
and investors) constitutes more than 65 per cent of the total lending 
of Australian financial institutions.2 Hence, the exposure of the finance 
sector to housing markets is large, both on an historical basis and relative 
to other jurisdictions.3 Similarly, levels of household debt to disposable 
income are  now at record  levels in Australia and residential property 
mortgage debt makes up more than 50 per cent of total household debt.4 
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Two-thirds of Australian households own a residential property, 
approximately half of these households have a residential property 
mortgage,5 and around 35 per cent of these mortgages are to investors.6 
Accordingly, it is vital that Australians fully comprehend the nature 
and risks of acquiring residential property, the risks of leveraging these 
assets, and the regulatory protection afforded when taking on credit and 
receiving credit assistance. The primary lesson from the global financial 
crisis is that housing cycles, like all asset classes, move downwards as well 
as upwards, and sometimes this movement is sudden and sharp. So any 
assumptions by households that the purchase of residential property 
funded by a mortgage secured on a residential property does not involve 
market exposure are flawed and dangerous for the nation. 
The housing party in Australia is likely to continue under existing policy 
settings, but like all asset cycles founded largely on credit, this party will 
eventually end and the subsequent hangover may be severe. The further 
house prices move beyond economic fundamentals and normal price 
trends, the more severe the likely corrections and adverse consequences, 
especially for highly indebted households that have minimal asset and 
income buffers. Policy intervention is needed to mitigate the growing 
exposures of households, financial institutions and the nation. Specific 
reforms are proposed in relation to the remuneration of mortgage 
intermediaries, responsible lending assessments and negative gearing 
concessions. 
The chapter is organised into five parts. Part 2 provides essential 
background on the macro risks around residential housing in Australia. 
Part 3 summarises the existing policy settings and potential exposures. 
Part 4 outlines proposed reforms to mitigate possible consumer losses and 
hardship. Part 5 concludes.
5  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Residential Property Price Indexes: Eight Capital Cities (December 
2015); Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), Prudential Practice Guide APG 223 – 
Residential Mortgage Lending (5 November 2014) 7.
6  Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Financial Aggregates (March 2016, released 29 April 2016).
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II. Background
Growth in residential property prices and mortgage lending in Australia 
has run at well above GDP growth levels over the last two decades, 
at around 7 per cent per annum.7 Moreover, the level of average household 
debt (including mortgage loans) to disposable income is at record levels, 
this ratio has almost tripled from 64 per cent in 1988 to 185 per cent in 
2015, the most leveraged Australia households (the top 10 per cent) have 
a debt to disposable income ratio of 6 times, and the top 10 per cent of 
the most indebted low-income households have a debt to income ratio 
of 10 times with debt repayments taking 60 per cent of their disposable 
income.8 Credit growth in Australia (including mortgage and other forms 
of credit) well above levels of economic growth and increases in household 
disposable income cannot continue indefinitely.9 A major factor driving 
higher levels of housing-related debt in Australia has been decreasing 
interest rates, which have made debt repayments appear more manageable. 
Nonetheless, more than 25 per cent of Australian households are already 
in some form of financial distress or stress,10 and should interest rates rise 
again these levels may escalate rapidly. 
The poorly diversified portfolios of Australian lenders as a whole, 
combined with the highly concentrated nature of the finance sector,11 
a heavy reliance on housing construction as a driver of economic activity,12 
a concentration of household wealth in residential property,13 and strong 
links between housing wealth and business and consumer confidence and 
spending,14 leave Australia highly vulnerable to any significant downturn 
7  RBA, Monthly D2 Lending and Credit Aggregates (March 2016, released 29 April 2016).
8  AMP.NATSEM, above n 4, 4, 13.
9  W Willits, ‘Australia Vulnerable to Debt Crisis, Says Forbes’, SMH.com (28 March 2016), 
www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/australia-vulnerable-to-debt-crisis-says-forbes-20160328-
gns1jn.html. M Phillips, ‘The World’s Debt is Alarmingly High. But is it Contagious?’, SMH.com 
(25 February 2016), www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/the-worlds-debt-is-alarmingly-high-
but-is-it-contagious-20160224-gn2baj.html.
10  Digital Finance Analytics, The Stressed Finance Landscape Data Analysis (October 2015); AMP.
NATSEM, above n 4, 15.
11  Financial Service Inquiry Interim Report (July 2014) (‘Interim Report’) xvii. See also S Rose and 
J Eyers, ‘Australia’s Banks Are “Too Big to Get Sick”: APRA’, SMH.com 4 April 2016, www.smh.com.
au/business/banking-and-finance/australias-banks-are-too-big-to-get-sick-apra-20160403-gnwztl.
html#ixzz44ndw9ZLl. 
12  RBA, Statement on Monetary Policy (May 2016) 44.
13  Jonathan Shapiro, ‘Exploring Australia’s “Wealth Effect”’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 
November 2014. Shapiro notes that 55 per cent of gross household assets in Australia are invested in 
housing while 27 per cent are in shares.
14  RBA, above n 12, 28.
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in the housing markets. Stress tests are carried out regularly by Australian 
lenders and the major banks suggest any concerns are unwarranted.15 
However, in an environment of record low interest rates and relatively 
stable unemployment levels in Australia, the financial positions of 
residential property lenders and borrowers have not yet been fully tested. 
The true position and exposure of individual banks, households, and the 
nation will only be revealed during the next financial crisis or economic 
recession. And, as noted in the Financial Sector Inquiry reports, adverse 
effects from high levels of interconnectedness across a finance sector and 
contagion are often underestimated.16 
Some housing-related policy adjustments have been made over the last 
year, but further action is called for. 
III. Policy Settings and Exposures
Australian households with a residential mortgage have various protections 
under law. The most important of these are the responsible lending 
obligations in the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) 
(NCCP) which are intended to limit lending to amounts that borrowers 
can afford.17 These provisions are supported by additional protections 
within the National Credit Code (NCC) in Sch 1 of the NCCP, including 
default notice requirements and hardship provisions. ASIC is responsible 
for administering both the NCCP and the NCC.18
In an industry survey in 2014, the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) found there were wide differences in how lenders 
assessed the risk of a given borrower.19 Significant factors leading to 
these differences included the assessments of borrower’s living expenses, 
15  Byres, above n 2, 2.
16  Interim Report, above n 11, 2–57; Financial System Inquiry Final Report (November 2014) 
43–44, 47. See also Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bulletin Vol 79, No 12 (July 2016). 
17  Parts 3.1 and 3.2 of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) impose responsible 
lending obligations on all participants involved in the provision of housing credit, including licensees 
that provide credit assistance in relation to credit contracts and credit providers. The responsible 
lending obligations apply to existing consumer credit contracts when consumers apply for an increase 
in a credit limit, and to the provision of new credit to consumers. These obligations are intended to 
introduce standards of conduct to encourage prudent lending; curtail undesirable market practices, 
particularly where intermediaries are involved in lending; and impose sanctions for irresponsible 
lending and leasing.
18  Consumer Credit and Corporations Legislation Amendment (Enhancements) Act 2012 (Cth). 
19  Byres, above n 2, 3.
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the treatment of ‘other income sources’, the discount applied to declared 
rental income, the size of interest rate buffers allowed, and the service 
period allowed for repayment of the loan principal on interest only loans.20 
In  a  letter to lenders, it highlighted the high growth rate of mortgage 
lending to investors and ‘encouraged’ them to limit the amount of new 
lending to this segment to 10 per cent per annum. It also recommended 
they apply an interest rate buffer of at least 2 per cent and a minimum rate 
of at least 7 per cent to the mortgage serviceability assessments.21
Further, at the end of 2014, ASIC indicated that demand for interest only 
loans had grown 80 per cent since 2012 and the average value of these 
loans was substantially higher than principal and interest home loans.22 
ASIC conducted a survey of lenders of these loans (including the big 
four banks) to assess their compliance with the responsible lending laws, 
and concluded that lending standards required lifting to meet important 
consumer protection laws.23 It found that many lenders were failing to 
consider whether this type of loan satisfied consumer needs, particularly 
in the medium to longer term. Specific issues included the time period 
allowed for repayment of the principal of the loan, a lack of evidence 
about the borrower’s requirements and a failure to consider the borrower’s 
actual living expenses. ASIC also expressed concerns about the ability 
of borrowers to afford the loans if interest rates were to rise.24 
There is some evidence that Australian lenders have tightened their 
mortgage serviceability criteria over the last year.25 However, mortgages 
with a loan-to-valuation ratio (LVR) of 95 per cent are still available 
from mainstream lenders, and borrowers can find mortgages with LVRs 
above this level if parents or family members are willing to be guarantors 
and offer their own property as security if the original owner defaults on 
their loan.26 
20  Ibid. 2–5.
21  APRA, ‘APRA Outlines Further Steps to Reinforce Sound Residential Mortgage Lending 
Practices’ (Media Release, 9 December 2014).
22  The Australian and Securities Investment Commission (ASIC) noted the vulnerability of these 
loans to credit losses.
23  ASIC, ‘Lenders to Improve Standards Following Interest-Only Loan Review’ (Media release 15-
220MR, 20 August 2015).
24  Ibid. See also ASIC, Report 445: Interest-Only Home Loan Review (August 2015). 
25  APRA, Insight, Issue One, 2016.
26 See, for example, Finder.com, ‘100% Home Loans: Borrow 100% of the Property Value’, 
at www.finder.com.au/100-percent-home-loans. 
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Lenders naturally seek to protect their commercial position. A mortgage 
on residential property allows the institution to ultimately sell the 
property and use the proceeds to repay debts owing if the borrower 
defaults. Additionally, borrowers seeking a mortgage with an LVR above 
80 per cent are generally required to purchase lenders mortgage insurance. 
These policies are used when a borrower fails to repay the mortgage and 
the combined proceeds from sale of the mortgaged property and other 
personal assets of the borrower are insufficient to cover debts owing. 
Australian households are now highly exposed to the housing cycle. Many 
Australians may see housing as a ‘safe haven’ given the strong performance 
of house prices over the last 20 years, but this is a fallacy with potentially 
catastrophic consequences. Should the housing market decline sharply, 
some borrower households will likely fall into a negative equity position 
on mortgaged residential property, even though they can repay their 
mortgages. Some of these borrowers may be forced to sell the property while 
house prices remain depressed and may lose any personal equity invested. 
In extreme circumstances, where the sale of a residential property or shares 
does not cover the full extent of the mortgage or margin loan and accrued 
interest, individuals may be personally liable for any outstanding debts. 
Consequently, all consumers who purchase residential property, especially 
those who borrow heavily to purchase a property, should understand that 
this involves significant risks, including possible temporary or permanent 
capital losses, foreclosure, and loss of the property. Household borrowers 
that present with one or more of the following characteristics are most 
exposed: borrowings on one or more residential properties with high 
loan-to-valuation levels, minimal or nil net equity in the properties, and 
significant changes in the personal circumstances of the borrower. 
IV. Proposed Reforms
The family home is the most important asset of most Australians and 
a mortgage on residential property is the most significant credit product 
in Australia; hence the need for sound housing-related policy and 
consumer protection are difficult to overstate. Policy reforms to mitigate 
possible future consumer losses and hardship are proposed across three 
areas: the remuneration of mortgage intermediaries, responsible lending 
assessments, and restrictions on negative gearing.
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A. The remuneration of mortgage intermediaries
For credit assistance and advice to be trustworthy and competitive in 
Australia, the legal frameworks need to include remuneration structures 
for mortgage providers and intermediaries with appropriate incentives.27 
Close to 48 per cent of all mortgages in Australia are arranged through 
intermediaries, while the remainder are sought directly from credit entities 
that provide home loans.28 Yet current rules concerning the remuneration 
received by credit providers or assisters are limited to a general 
disclosure obligation.29 Under existing law, mortgage intermediaries may 
recommend or provide a mortgage that is most lucrative for the provider 
or assister, provided the recommended credit product is ‘not unsuitable’ 
and it satisfies the consumer’s objectives and requirements.30
Notably, the customer suitability, client duties, and remuneration 
provisions across the credit and financial advisory schemes differ 
significantly. A person who provides personal financial advice to a retail 
client and recommends investment in a financial product using borrowed 
money is bound by the best interest provisions in Pt 7.7A of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and is prohibited from receiving commissions 
on the borrowed amount. However, reasonable consumers are unlikely to 
understand the legal distinction between credit and financial products, 
would likely assume credit products are financial in nature, and would 
expect mortgage brokers to recommend a mortgage product that is suitable 
for their needs and serves their best interests (rather than a product that 
is most profitable for the intermediary). 
B. Responsible lending assessments
Credit providers and assisters must comply with the responsible lending 
provisions under the NCCP when consumers purchase residential 
properties funded by a mortgage for leasing purposes. Additional 
protection is also afforded under the NCC (including through default 
27  See C Yeates, ‘Mortgage Brokers to Remain in Spotlight after ASIC Review’, SMH.com, 8 May 
2016, www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/mortgage-brokers-to-remain-in-spotlight-after-
asic-review-20160506-goo666.
28  APRA, Quarterly Authorised Deposit-taking Institution Property Exposures – December 2015 
(issued 23 February 2016).
29  NCCP s 121(2).
30  For further details, see G North, ‘Regulation Governing the Provision of Credit Assistance and 
Financial Advice in Australia: A Consumer’s Perspective’ (2015) 43 Federal Law Review 369, 382–83.
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
90
notices and hardship provisions). These provisions are sound, but 
empirical evidence from APRA and ASIC suggests there are significant 
practical issues and additional consumer protection is required given the 
high levels of exposure to residential property by Australian financial 
institutions and households. 
There is some international evidence suggesting mortgages to investors 
are higher risk than loans to owner occupiers.31 However, there is no legal 
requirement in Australia for credit providers and assisters to adjust their 
assessment of a borrower’s ability to repay a mortgage when it is used for 
investment rather than residential purposes. More critically, there is no 
APRA or ASIC guidance suggesting a consumer’s ability or willingness to 
bear temporary or permanent capital losses during periods of significant 
house price declines and/or economic weakness should be considered 
by lenders, and discussed with borrowers. 
The author’s proposed reforms include: 
• Regulatory guidance from APRA and ASIC to mortgage lenders 
suggesting the responsible lending assessments should be scalable and 
should take into account: i) the state of the economy and housing 
and credit markets; ii) the potential impact on borrowers should 
interest rates rise or the price of residential property decline; and iii) 
the impact on borrowers should their personal circumstances change. 
Lenders should allow pro-cyclical buffers depending on the levels of 
risk in the economy, housing and credit markets, and should consider 
a consumer’s ability to repay a mortgage over the long term, including 
during periods of cyclical change. 
• Mortgage lenders and intermediaries should provide: i) online warnings 
that interest rates may rise and housing prices may decline significantly; 
and ii) online sensitivity calculators that enable consumers to assess the 
impacts of adverse economic, housing and personal factors (including 
the cumulative effect of a number of changes) on the ability to repay 
the mortgage. 
31  See Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Summary of Submissions and Final Policy Position on the Review 
of the Asset Class Treatment of Residential Property Investment Loans in BS2A and BS2B (29 May 2015).
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C. Restrictions on negative gearing concessions
Some policy restrictions on the form and level of concessionary negative 
gearing would mitigate the increasingly significant housing and debt-
related risks in Australia, would allow housing demand to moderate earlier 
than otherwise, and may shift capital to more productive uses. While the 
existing policy settings remain, many Australians will likely continue to 
invest (or speculate) in housing, without sufficient regard to the pending 
risks involved. And given tight federal budgetary constraints and high 
levels of personal indebtedness, our ability as a nation to respond to future 
adverse events will be limited. 
V. Conclusion: Everybody is at the Party
APRA acknowledges the increasing proportion of lending attributable 
to housing over the last decade32 and suggests that ‘if all our eggs are 
increasingly being placed in one basket, we need to make sure the basket 
isn’t dropped’.33 Further, its chairman stated in 2015 that: 
the current economic environment for housing lenders is characterised 
by heightened levels of risk, reflecting a combination of historically 
low interest rates, high household debt, subdued income growth, 
unemployment that has drifted higher, significant house price growth, 
and strong competitive pressures. 
Notably, though, APRA suggests that house prices and the levels 
of household debt are beyond its mandate.34 The RBA is also aware of 
the risks but nonetheless suggests housing credit growth of 7 per cent 
per annum is likely to continue.35 The Coalition Government concedes 
that Australia’s economy is heavily reliant on housing-related activity 
and prefers not to dampen this activity and consumer confidence in the 
near term. 
In the marketplace, banks are likely to continue to lend to residential 
property owners because the existing capital rules and returns to date 
encourage it. Similarly, Australians are likely to continue to invest 
in housing, with tax incentives to do so and a dearth of other savings 
32  Ibid. 1–2, 5–6.
33  Ibid. 8.
34  Ibid. 2.
35  RBA, above n 6, 2.
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opportunities that provide a reasonable return. However, the housing 
party in Australia will inevitably end at some point and the severity of 
the hangover will depend on the nature and scale of advance action taken 
by lawmakers and regulators. The further house prices rise above normal 
trend lines and economic fundamentals, the more severe the potential 
corrections and adverse consequences are likely to be, particularly 
on highly indebted households. 
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2  Other examples include the Amcor and Visy Industry’s cardboard box price-fixing racket 
(unveiled in an earlier iteration by an aggrieved Visy executive); and the personal misbehaviour 
allegations that led to the resignation of David Jones CEO Mark McInnes.
Back to Basics: Reforming 
Australia’s Private Sector 
Whistleblowing Laws
Kath Hall and Heather Cork1
I. Introduction
The important role that whistleblowers play in exposing corporate 
misconduct in Australia has been highlighted by a number of recent 
scandals. Whistleblowers have been central to uncovering impropriety in 
leading Australian companies including the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Note Printing Australia, Leighton Holdings, Tabcorp, the Commonwealth 
Bank, the NAB, CommInsure and 7-Eleven.2 Many of the whistleblowers 
involved in these cases experienced retaliation, redundancy, dismissal, 
workplace ostracism and negative publicity as a result. Regrettably these 
consequences are not unusual, and have led to pressure for reform of 
Australia’s private sector whistleblowing laws, contained in Pt 9.4AAA of 
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the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).3 While most of the calls for reform have 
focused on the narrow definitions of ‘discloser’ and ‘wrongdoing’, the lack 
of protection for anonymous disclosures and disclosures to third parties, 
and the lack of incentives or compensation for reporting in the Act, no-
one has so far asked: do we have the basic framework right for regulating 
whistleblowing?
This chapter answers that question by focusing on two fundamental 
assumptions underlying the research and the regulation of whistleblowing: 
that whistleblowing involves a person making an identifiable disclosure 
of wrongdoing. These assumptions – that whistleblowers act alone and 
that reporting involves one identifiable act of disclosure – remain largely 
unchallenged in the dominant narrative on whistleblowing. As a result, 
the reality that whistleblowing often involves more than one person 
engaged in multiple acts of disclosure is not reflected in the current policy 
or legislative suggestions for reform.
Embracing the factual complexity of whistleblowing could improve 
corporate and regulatory responses in a number of ways. First, debunking 
the myth that whistleblowing involves one person reporting misconduct 
could improve the way that corporate whistleblowing systems and policies 
are framed and implemented. Psychological research confirms that group 
membership is important, particularly in the work context; encouraging 
employees to discuss wrongdoing concerns with others and make group 
reports could increase the rate of reporting and reduce the likelihood and/
or severity of retaliation.4 Second, expanding the legislative definition of a 
‘disclosure’ could result in employees qualifying for protection earlier and 
enable different types of discussions on wrongdoing (including seeking 
advice). Finally, challenging the dominant narrative that whistleblowers 
act alone in making formal reports on wrongdoing could lead to new 
research questions and better answers on how to encourage, manage and 
support whistleblowing.
3  In 2016 this pressure increased significantly as a result of the passage of the Registered 
Organisations (Fair Work) Amendment Act 2016. Two government inquiries were established; the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Inquiry into Whistleblower 
Protections in the Corporate, Public and Not-For-Profit Sectors for reporting by 30 June 2017 and the 
Treasury Review of Tax and Corporate Whistleblower Protections in Australia.
4  See generally Solomon Asch, ‘Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One 
Against a Unanimous Majority’ (1956) 70 Psychological Monographs 1; Maureen Scully and Mary 
Rowe, ‘Bystander Training Within Organizations’ (2009) 2 Journal of the International Ombudsman 
Association 1; Frances J Milliken, Elizabeth W Morrison and Patricia F Hewlin, ‘An Exploratory Study 
of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees don’t Communicate Upward and Why’ (2003) 40 Journal 
of Management Studies 1453.
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II. The Importance of Whistleblowing
It is widely understood that employees play a key role in detecting and 
reporting corporate misconduct. In the private sector, wrongdoing is 
often difficult to uncover because it occurs away from the public eye, and 
can involve multiple actors and events over an extended period of time.5 
Given employees’ access to information and knowledge on organisational 
behaviour, they are best placed to detect and report misconduct.6 
As Pascoe and Welsh note, ‘providing a workable framework to encourage 
and protect whistleblowers is a vital aspect of companies’ corporate 
governance and risk management strategies’ and provides ‘assistance to 
regulators in the detection and enforcement of corporate crimes’.7
Numerous surveys have qualitatively demonstrated the value of 
whistleblowing. In a 2008 Australian public sector survey, managers rated 
employee reporting as the most important means of bringing wrongdoing 
to light.8 The survey confirmed that ‘the unique position of employees 
within organisations gives them a strategic role as quality information 
sources’.9 Similarly, PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 2010 report on public 
sector fraud found that 31 per cent of cases detected in the previous 
12 months were reported internally by employees,10 and 5 per cent were 
reported using formal internal whistleblowing systems.11 In the private 
sector, PricewaterhouseCoopers’ 2016 Global Economic Crime Survey 
reported that 54 per cent of respondents used management reporting 
to ensure compliance with their programs and that 42 per cent had 
whistleblowing hotlines.12
International support for protecting and supporting whistleblowers has 
also grown significantly. Since 2012, the OECD has published five guides to 
assist governments and corporates to facilitate whistleblowing. In 2015, 
the UN published a comprehensive Resource Guide on Good Practices in 
5  Janine Pascoe and Michelle Welsh ‘Whistleblowing, Ethics and Corporate Culture: Theory and 
Practice in Australia’ (2011) 40 Common Law World Review 144, 146 (footnotes omitted).
6  Sulette Lombard and Vivienne Brand, ‘Corporate Whistleblowing: Public Lessons for Private 
Disclosure’ (2014) 42 Australian Business Law Review 351, 352.
7  Pascoe and Welsh, above n 5, 148.
8  A J Brown, Evalynn Mazurski and Jane Olsen, ‘The Incidence and Significance of Whistleblowing’ 
in A J Brown (ed), Whistleblowing in the Public Sector (ANU E Press, 2008) 25, 44–45.
9  Ibid. 44.
10  PricewaterhouseCoopers, Fighting Fraud in the Public Sector (Research Report, 2010) 13.
11  Ibid.
12  Ibid. 36.
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the Protection of Reporting Persons.13 Furthermore, the 2013–14 G20 Anti-
Corruption Action Plan now requires G20 countries that do not already 
have whistleblower protections to enact and implement whistleblower 
protection rules and to take specific actions ‘to ensure that those reporting 
on corruption can exercise their function without fear of any harassment 
or threat or of private or government legal action’.14 
III. Challenging the ‘One Whistleblower’ 
Narrative
Despite these developments, almost every discussion of whistleblowing, 
whether by government, academics, the media or corporates, assumes that 
whistleblowers act alone. In Australia, the main provisions dealing with 
private sector whistleblowing contained in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
contemplate a single ‘discloser’ of information.15 Similarly, the US Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 protects ‘an employee’ of a private company who reports 
suspected violations of federal law,16 and the UK Public Interest Disclosure 
Act 1998 entitles ‘a worker’ to make a protected disclosure.17 
The assumption that whistleblowers are alone in raising concerns within 
organisations is also prevalent in social science research. Vandekerckhove, 
one of the leading researchers on whistleblowing, uncritically comments 
that ‘what is common to all possible definitions … is that whistleblowing 
is always about individuals disclosing information’.18 Similarly, Gundlach, 
Douglas and Martinko note that ‘there are two primary parties involved 
in whistle-blowing: the wrongdoer and the whistle-blower’.19 Miceli and 
Near, in their famous 1992 book Blowing the Whistle, asked research 
questions such as: Who is the whistleblower? What are their individual 
13  The United Nations Convention against Corruption, Resource Guide on Good Practices in the 
Protection of Reporting Persons, United Nations, August 2015, www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/
Publications/2015/15-04741_Person_Guide_eBook.pdf.
14  G20, Anti-Corruption Action Plan (2013–2014) 2, www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/
G20_Anti-Corruption_Action_Plan_%282013-2014%29.pdf. The G20 acknowledges that 
corruption increases business costs and is responsible for billions of dollars of losses annually and that 
whistleblowing is one of the most effective means of exposing it.
15  Part 9.4AAA s 1317AA.
16  S 806 18 U.S. Code § 1514A.
17  Part IVA s 43A.
18  Wim Vandekerckhove and David Crowther, Whistleblowing and Organisational Social 
Responsibility (Ashgate e-Books, 2006) 92.
19  M J Gundlach, S C Douglas and M J Martinko, ‘The Decision to Blow the Whistle: A Social 
Information Processing Framework’ (2003) 28 Academy of Management Review 107-23, 108.
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characteristics? What are the costs and benefits to the whistleblower? 
And is motive relevant?20 Since then, behavioural research has continued 
to focus on the effect of personal factors such as gender, age, education, 
religiosity and ethics on a person’s likelihood to report.21 None of this 
research, however, has considered the possibility of groups of persons 
blowing the whistle.
Basic research, however, reveals that many famous whistleblowers were 
not alone in raising concerns within their organisations. For example, 
in the Enron collapse, Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate 
Development, is credited with having blown the whistle when she wrote 
a letter to senior management warning of improper accounting practices.22 
Watkins later assisted investigators, testified before Congressional 
Committees, and in 2008 was named one of Time Magazine’s Persons 
of the Year.23 However, evidence shows that other Enron employees also 
took steps to raise their concerns: Cliff Baxter, a senior Enron employee, 
complained to Enron’s President and CEO and ‘all who would listen’ 
about the company’s inappropriate transactions;24 Margaret Ceconi, an 
employee of Enron Energy Services, wrote a 10-page letter to the board 
warning of excessive spending and the prospect of customer lawsuits;25 
and Vince Kaminski, head of Enron’s Research Group, raised concerns 
about corporate dealings.26 Yet subsequent discussions of Enron’s collapse 
rarely acknowledge the actions of these individuals, and focus almost 
exclusively on Watkins.
Similarly, in the famous Challenger Shuttle Disaster, Roger Boisjoly, 
a  mechanical engineer, is credited with being ‘the whistleblower’ after 
he tried to alert NASA executives of design faults in the Shuttle the day 
20  Marcia Miceli and Janet Near, Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications 
for Companies and Employees (Lexington Press, 1992).
21  Muel Kaptein, ‘From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence of the Ethical 
Culture of Organizations on Employee Responses to Observed Wrongdoing’ (2011) 98 Journal 
of Business Ethics 513; Janet Near and Marcia Miceli, ‘Effective Whistleblowing’ (1995) 20 Academy 
of Management Review 679; Tim Barnett, Ken Bass and Gene Brown, ‘Religiosity, Ethical Ideology, 
and Intentions to Report a Peer’s Wrongdoing’ (1996) 15 Journal of Business Ethics 1161.
22 Lesley Curwen, ‘The Corporate Conscience’, The Guardian (online) 21 June 2003, 
www.theguardian.com/business/2003/jun/21/corporatefraud.enron.
23  Dan Ackman, ‘Sherron Watkins Had Whistle, But Blew it’, Forbes (online), 14 February 2002, 
www.forbes.com/2002/02/14/0214watkins.html.
24  Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room (Penguin Books, 2004) 356.
25  Ibid. 358–59.
26  Ibid. 192, 305.
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before the launch took place.27 However, again, Boisjoly was not the only 
employee who voiced such concerns: Joe Kilminster, Vice President of 
the Space Booster Program, and George Hardy, a NASA employee, both 
recommended that the launch not go ahead, and another engineer, Arnie 
Thompson, tried to explain the structural defects.28 Allan MacDonald, 
who was at the Kennedy Space Center, argued for delay even after the 
decision was made, saying that if the mission failed he would not know 
how to explain to a board of inquiry the decision to launch. Yet only 
Boisjoly was awarded the Prize for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility 
by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.29 Only he 
is was recognised as ‘the whistleblower’ in this case.
Closer to home, in 2013, three senior Australian employees exposed 
serious misconduct in the financial planning unit of the Commonwealth 
Bank.30 These employees used the pseudonym ‘The Three Ferrets’;31 
however, only one, Jeff Morris, is consistently identified as the 
whistleblower in this case.32 
These cases echo psychological research that suggests that people 
prefer to act as part of a group than alone, and that unethical conduct 
rarely goes unnoticed. Research indicates that even when a majority of 
people acquiesce to misconduct, there will still be a minority who are 
concerned enough to complain or question the behaviour.33 Research 
on whistleblowing also shows that co-workers’ opinions are paramount 
in a whistleblower’s decision to report. According to Noelle-Neumann, 
27  See generally Barbara Romzek and Melvin Dubnick, ‘Accountability in the Public Sector: 
Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy’ (1987) 47 Public Administration Review 227.
28  Roger Boisjoly, ‘Telecon Meeting’ in Ethical Decisions – Morton Thiokol and the Challenger 
Disaster, 15 May 2006, www.onlineethics.org/Topics/ProfPractice/PPEssays/thiokolshuttle/shuttle_
telecon.aspx.
29  Douglas Martin, ‘Roger Boisjoly, 73, Dies; Warned of Shuttle Danger’, The New York Times 
(online), 3 February 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/us/roger-boisjoly-73-dies-warned-of-shuttle 
-danger.html?_r=0.
30  See generally James Eyers, ‘The Man Who Blew the Whistle on CBA’, Financial Review (online), 
28 June 2014, www.afr.com/business/banking-and-finance/financial-services/the-man-who-blew-
the-whistle-on-cba-20140627-je1mp; Jeffrey Morris, Submission No 421 to the Senate Economics 
Reference Inquiry, The Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.
31  Jeffrey Morris, Submission No 421 to the Senate Economics Reference Inquiry, The Performance 
of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.
32  Possibly because he was the only member of the group willing to be named. The other Ferrets’ 
names are redacted from Morris’s publicly available submission to the Senate Enquiry into the 
performance of ASIC.
33  See, for example, Milgram, Stanley ‘Behavioral Study of Obedience’ (1963) 67 Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology 371 and subsequent research.
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employees test their interpretation of the situation against others’ and, 
if theirs is not met with approval, often remain silent.34 Milliken et al 
suggest that employees mentally ‘test out’ certain behaviours by either 
imagining their co-workers’ responses or discussing courses of action with 
colleagues.35 Yet corporate or regulatory policies on whistleblowing fail 
to recognise that employees may feel more confident in acting as part 
of a group in speaking up than acting alone.
IV. Challenging the ‘One Disclosure’ 
Narrative
The idea that there is a single act of disclosure by a whistleblower is also 
included in most legislative and scholarly discussions on whistleblowing. 
Section 1317AA of the Corporations Act confers protection on an 
individual who makes ‘a disclosure’. Similarly, s 10 of the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) protects employees who make ‘a public interest 
disclosure’, while s 337A of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 
2009 (Cth) protects an officer, member or employee of a trade union who 
makes ‘a disclosure of information’. 
The dominant narrative surrounding whistleblowing also contains 
the language of one disclosure. Jubb characterises whistleblowing as 
‘a dissenting act of public accusation’36 and ‘a deliberate, non-obligatory 
act of disclosure’.37 Miceli and Near consider whistleblowing involves 
‘the disclosure … of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices’,38 while 
Vandekerckhove suggests that a key element of whistleblowing is always 
‘the act of … disclosure’.39 
34  Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ‘The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion’ (1974) 24 
Journal of Communication 24.
35  Frances Milliken, Elizabeth Morrison and Patricia Hewlin, ‘An Exploratory Study of 
Employee Silence: Issues that Employees don’t Communicate Upward and Why’ (2003) 40 Journal 
of Management Studies 1453.
36  Peter Jubb, ‘Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation’ (1999) 21 Journal 
of Business Ethics 77, 77.
37  Ibid. 78.
38  Janet Near and Marcia Miceli, ‘Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing’ 
(1985) 4 Journal of Business Ethics 1, 4.
39 Wim Vandekerckhove, Whistleblowing and Organizational Social Responsibility: A Global 
Assessment (Ashgate Publishing, 2006) 23.
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However, case studies reveal that whistleblowers often make multiple 
disclosures. Brian Hood, who publicly exposed improper payments 
made to foreign agents by subsidiaries of the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) stated that, ‘[w]hile there were one or two key events, lots of things 
happened over quite a period of time’.40 Hood reported his concerns 
about the payments at least five times, including to one of the subsidiary’s 
boards, the Deputy Governor of the RBA, the media and ASIC. Similarly, 
in the Commonwealth Bank case referred to above, the ‘Three Ferrets’ 
made six disclosures to the media, the regulator and the company.
These cases are consistent with research that suggests that employees 
frequently raise concerns internally before reporting externally.41 
Moreover, they accord with an emerging body of research that suggests 
that reporting wrongdoing involves an ongoing decision-making process, 
with whistleblowers often vacillating between action and inaction. 
As Blenkinsopp and Edwards note, deciding to report requires ‘an iterative 
process shaped by multiple factors, including events unfolding in real-
time’ in a complex and ever changing employment environment.42
The process of reporting may be protracted, as evidence is often obtained 
over a period of time. Employees can face challenges determining whether 
they have actually observed wrongdoing,43 and cultural attitudes may 
conflict with an employee’s sense of what amounts to impropriety.44 
Further, misconduct that is seemingly endorsed by management can 
become ‘normalised’ as standard organisational practice, challenging 
a whistleblower’s perception that something is wrong.45 Research also 
indicates that employees’ responses to wrongdoing are influenced by their 
perception of the causal link between the wrongdoer and the outcome 
40  Evidence to Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement 
Integrity: Integrity of Overseas Commonwealth Law Enforcement Operations, Senate, Sydney, 
4 October 2012, 10 (Brian Hood).
41 Marcia Miceli and Janet Near, Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications 
for Companies and Employees (Lexington Books, 1992) 13.
42  Jon Blenkinsopp and Marissa Edwards, ‘On Not Blowing the Whistle: Quiescent Silence as an 
Emotion Episode’ in Neal Ashkanasy, Wilfred Zerbe and Charmine Härtel (eds), Emotions, Ethics and 
Decision-Making (Emerald Publishing, 2008) 186.
43  For example, witnesses of sexual harassment sometimes harbour concerns that they are reading 
too much into the situation. Ibid. 184.
44  Wim Vandekerckhove, ‘The Perception of Whistleblowing Worldwide’ in Richard Calland and 
Guy Dehn (eds), Whistleblowing Around the World: Law, Culture and Practice (ODAC and PCaW 
in partnership with the British Council, 2004).
45  Vikas Anand, Blake Ashforth and Mahendra Joshi, ‘Business as Usual: The Acceptance and 
Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations’ (2004) 18 Academy of Management Executive 39.
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of the wrongdoing.46 It usually takes time for a whistleblower to gather 
sufficient information to properly evaluate blame attributions, which 
explains why whistleblowers often act gradually.
V. Where to from Here
There is currently considerable momentum, both nationally and globally, 
to improve processes and protection for people who report corporate 
misconduct. Acknowledging the reality that there may often be more than 
one employee willing to raise concerns within an organisation can influence 
both the narrative about, and the strategies that support, whistleblowing. 
Because individuals experience safety in numbers, encouraging employees 
to work with others, and ensuring they are protected when they do, 
may increase rates of whistleblowing and reduce negative consequences, 
including isolation and retaliation. Express recognition that group 
reporting may make the process easier can also encourage and improve 
corporate reporting. 
Further, legislative reform can remove the need to identify a single 
disclosure, and ensure that protection is available from the start of the 
reporting process. A broader definition of ‘reporting’ in the Corporations 
Act is required to cover both disclosure to a supervisor and reporting to 
the media. The Act should also provide protection for whistleblowers who 
seek advice from the regulator, regardless of whether a formal disclosure 
of information is subsequently made. Currently, to qualify for protection, 
a person must make an official report to ASIC. However, employees should 
be able to contact ASIC for advice on the strength of their information, 
and protection from retaliation should be available from that point. 
This chapter argues that the dominant narrative on whistleblowing is 
currently limiting the discussion and research on reform. There is value in 
getting back to basics when it comes to designing improvements to law 
and practices in this context, and making sure that we appreciate that the 
process of whistleblowing is not as simple as is often assumed.
46  See, for example, Linn Van Dyne, Soon Ang and Isabel Botero, ‘Conceptualizing Employee 
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Lawyers as Whistleblowers: 
The Need for a Gatekeeper 
of Justice Whistleblowing 
Obligation/Exception
Suzanne Le Mire and Christine Parker1
In 2006 Christopher Dale, a partner in large Australian commercial law 
firm Clayton Utz, leaked internal law firm documents. He believed those 
documents showed that his own firm had assisted its tobacco company 
client to commit a ‘fraud on justice’2 while defending a prominent case 
brought by Rolah McCabe, who was suffering from terminal cancer.3 
The  Dale case brought the possibility of lawyer whistleblowing to 
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our front pages, but the appropriateness of Dale’s leak has remained 
unresolved since emerging into the public sphere. More recently, another 
whistleblower has exposed the way Mossack Fonseca, a Panama law firm, 
aided aggressive tax planning. 4 It is not known whether the anonymous 
‘Panama papers’ whistleblower is a lawyer with the firm but, like Dale, 
he or she had access to confidential lawyer–client information and blew 
the whistle with the intention of exposing a series of global injustices 
perpetrated by lawyers helping clients abuse the legal system.5 
Under professional conduct rules and conventional codes of ethics, the 
breach of client confidence by a lawyer is prohibited unless it falls within 
certain limited exceptions. These exceptions apply in situations where 
a client is about to commit a serious criminal offence or is in imminent 
danger of serious physical harm to him or herself or another person.6 
In this chapter we argue that lawyers should be permitted to whistleblow 
where they have information about clients or other lawyers using legal 
services to subvert the administration of justice in circumstances where 
there is misconduct analogous to situations where courts or regulatory 
authorities would refuse to uphold client legal privilege on the basis of the 
crime/fraud exception.7  
First, we briefly illustrate the potential significance of lawyer whistleblowing 
in the justice system by describing the Dale case. Second, we argue that 
there is a strong ethical need for lawyers to be allowed to whistleblow 
in order to fulfil their obligations to act as ‘gatekeepers’ of the justice 
system when they are privy to wrongdoing that is likely to harm the 
justice system. The lawyer’s role as gatekeeper builds on the conventional 
view that lawyers’ duties to the court, the law and the administration of 
justice override their duties to clients, colleagues and third parties, and 
that lawyers’ professional reputation is based on the assumption that they 
4  Luke Harding, ‘Panama Papers Source Breaks Silence over “Scale of Injustices”’, Saturday 7 May 
2016, The Guardian (online), www.theguardian.com/news/2016/may/06/panama-papers-source-
breaks-silence-over-scale-of-injustices.
5  Ibid.
6  See Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 9.2.4 and 9.2.5; and Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, 
Inside Lawyers Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 2014) 110–30.
7  For examples of this exception to privilege, see Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 
CLR 510, 514 (Gibbs CJ); R v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141, 156 (Stephen J). The iniquity 
rule defence to breach of confidentiality would also apply in such situations: see Kaaren Koomen, 
‘Breach of Confidence and the Public Interest Defence: Is it in the Public Interest? A Review of 
the English Public Interest Defence and the Options for Australia’ (1994) 10 Queensland University 
of Technology Law Journal 56.
105
8 . LAWyERS AS WHISTLEBLOWERS
will not assist clients to breach the law or breach their duties to the court 
to serve clients’ or colleagues’ interests.8 We go on to suggest three guiding 
principles for appropriate lawyer whistleblowing relating to the nature 
of the relationship between the lawyer and the wrongdoer, the nature of 
the wrongdoing itself, and the process used to disclose the wrongdoing. 
The  chapter suggests reforms to the law to permit and encourage 
appropriate lawyer whistleblowing in line with these principles.
I. The Dale Case
It is now well known that tobacco products kill up to one half of all 
their users, around 6 million people per year. The harm is seriously 
compounded by the highly addictive nature of cigarette smoking and the 
fact that many users start young.9 Serious global efforts are underway to 
restrict the marketing and sale of cigarettes, especially to children; to avoid 
others being exposed to second-hand smoke; and to implement various 
other measures under the auspices of the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, a treaty that has been 
signed by 180 parties representing 90 per cent of the world’s population.10 
Yet there is a long history of lawyers assisting tobacco companies to avoid 
public and legal scrutiny of their responsibility and culpability in relation 
to the marketing of cigarettes, their addictiveness and harm. In the 1990s, 
it was revealed that tobacco companies in the UK and US had, with the 
help of their lawyers, hidden or destroyed many relevant documents about 
the health effects of smoking.11 In 2006, the NSW Dust Diseases Tribunal 
heard evidence from Mr Gulston, former Company Secretary and in-
house solicitor for British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited 
(BATAS), and a whistleblower. His evidence was that as early as 1985 
Australian law firm Clayton Utz was ‘warehousing’12 230,000 documents 
8  The paramount duty to the court is set out in the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules, r 3. See also 
John C Coffee Jr, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 
2006) 2; John C Coffee Jr, ‘Can Lawyers Wear Blinders? Gatekeepers and Third Party Opinions’ 
(2005) 84 Texas Law Review 59, 67–68. See ASIC v Somerville [2009] NSWSC 934 for a case where 
a lawyer was sanctioned for being involved in his client’s strategy to avoid paying tax debts.
9  See World Health Organization, Tobacco Fact Sheet No. 339, 6 July 2015.
10  Ibid.
11  Stanton Glantz et al (eds), The Cigarette Papers (University of California Press, 1998). 
12  ‘Warehousing’ is a term describing the transfer of the custody of documents to third parties, in 
order to avoid the disclosure under discovery: McCabe [328]; Camille Cameron, ‘Case Note. Hired 
Guns and Smoking Guns: McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Ltd’ (2002) 25(3) UNSW 
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and claiming privilege over them, thus avoiding its exposure in any legal 
proceedings.13 The copies had been given to Clayton Utz ostensibly for 
legal advice and the originals at BATAS destroyed.14 
The McCabe case brought the ethics of tobacco company litigation tactics 
to a head in Australia. Rolah McCabe sued BATAS for her terminal lung 
cancer on the basis that she had become addicted to cigarettes as a young 
teenager.15 Documentary evidence showing what the tobacco company 
knew about the harm of its products, and how they were marketed, was 
clearly critical to the case. Yet few internal documents were uncovered in the 
usual processes of discovery because of their destruction or ‘warehousing’. 
In 2002 Justice Eames struck out BATAS’s defence on the basis that the 
tobacco company had ‘followed a strategy designed to deny to any litigant 
access to documents to which the litigant would have been entitled and 
which would be of importance to the outcome of such proceedings’.16 
Some eight months later the Victorian Court of Appeal reversed a number 
of Eames J’s findings, restored the defence’s pleadings and remitted the 
case for trial.17 Rolah McCabe died before the appeal decision was handed 
down and the full case was never heard. 
The litigation tactics of BATAS and its lawyers were controversial, and 
were the subject of internal review by Clayton Utz and investigations by 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, legal profession 
regulators and the Victorian Department of Public Prosecutions.18 New 
legislation that criminalised the destruction of material relevant to 
litigation was also created in direct response to the case.19
Christopher Dale had been involved in an internal Clayton Utz review 
of the lawyers’ conduct in the case. He believed that this review had 
shown that senior Clayton Utz lawyers had assisted BATAS in misleading 
Law Journal 768, 784.
13  Re Mowbray: Brambles Australia Ltd v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2006] 
NSWDDT 15, [19]. See also, Cameron, above n 12, 781–83.
14  Susannah Moran, ‘Cloaks of Privilege and Smoking Guns’, The Australian Financial Review 
(Sydney) 19 May 2006, 57.
15  McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited [2002] VSC 73, [7] (‘McCabe’).
16  McCabe [13].
17  British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197, [191].
18  See Parker and Evans, Inside Lawyers Ethics, above n 6, 119–20.
19  Crimes (Document Destruction) Act 2006 (Vic); Evidence (Document Unavailability) Act 2006 
(Vic). See Suzanne Le Mire, ‘Document Destruction and Corporate Culture: A Victorian Initiative’ 
(2006) 19 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 304, 308.
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the court and perverting the course of justice by destroying scientific 
documents that would have been relevant to litigation, hiding the 
extent and purpose of the destruction, and avoiding discovery of certain 
documents without adequate grounds.20 In late 2006, after his partnership 
had been terminated by the firm, Mr Dale leaked documents from the 
review to the McCabe family’s lawyer, Peter Gordon, and through him 
to William Birnbauer, a journalist.21 Birnbauer published a series of 
newspaper articles in The Sunday Age alleging that the internal review had 
found evidence of lawyer misconduct.22 
BATAS claimed confidentiality over the leaked documents and initiated 
a  number of legal actions to prevent their further use.23 Dale was 
subjected to considerable pressure: Clayton Utz made a disciplinary 
complaint about him24  and BATAS sued under the general law of 
confidentiality.25 Despite these events, there has been no legal decision as 
to the appropriateness or otherwise of Dale’s leak.26
20  Dale v Clayton Utz [93]–[95]. 
21  Ibid. [110].
22  William Birnbauer, ‘Cheated by the Law. Exclusive – Exposed: Dirty Tricks Behind Top 
Lawyers’ Plot to Deny Justice to Cancer Victims’ and ‘Justice Denied: How Lawyers Set Out to 
Defeat a Dying Woman’, The Age (online), 29 October 2006; William Birnbauer, ‘Lawyer Revealed 
as Smoking Source’, The Age (online), 28 January 2007.
23  See n 24 below.
24  Reportedly Clayton Utz made a complaint about breach of confidence to the professional 
disciplinary authority, although no outcome has been reported. See William Birnbauer, ‘Thrust, Parry 
as Law Firm Slams Ex-partner’, The Age (Victoria), 4 February 2007.
25  Between November 2006 and March 2007 two British American Tobacco companies in Australia 
sought restraining orders and injunctions against further use of the leaked material against Fairfax 
Publications, Slater and Gordon and Peter Gordon (the McCabe lawyers), Mrs Cowell (McCabe’s 
executor) and Christopher Dale. These proceedings all settled with a number of restraining orders 
made by consent. Mrs Cowell was (reportedly) the last to settle in March 2011: see Richard Ackland, 
‘McCabe Litigation Took 10 Years in Two States’, Justinian, 2 April 2011. See British American 
Tobacco Australia Ltd v Peter Gordon [2009] VSC 619; British American Tobacco Australia Services 
Ltd v John Fairfax Publications [2006] NSWSC 1197; British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd 
v John Fairfax Publications [2006] NSWSC 1175; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Fairfax 
[2006] NSWSC 1328; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Peter Gordon [2006] NSWSC 1473; 
British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Peter Gordon [2007] NSWSC 109; British American Tobacco 
Australia Ltd v Peter Gordon [2007] NSWSC 230; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Peter 
Gordon [2007] NSWSC 292; McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2007] VSC 
216; Cowell v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2007] VSCA 301; British American 
Tobacco Australia Ltd v Peter Gordon [2009] VSC 77; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Peter 
Gordon [2009] VSC 619.
26  The possibility that Dale’s leak might be justified under rules of professional conduct or general 
laws of confidentiality was considered by the Victorian Supreme Court in interlocutory proceedings 
concerning an action brought by BATAS against Mrs Cowell (McCabe’s executor) to restrain her 
from further disclosing the internal Clayton Utz documents Dale had leaked: ibid. The case was 
settled before any final authoritative determination of the issues was made. See above n 25.
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While the work of lawyers can ensure ‘law is still the most powerful 
instrument for creating and maintaining a world that is free, rational and 
just’,27 it can also have a dark side. Global tobacco companies, with the 
help of their lawyers, continue their fight against tobacco control measures 
such as bans on advertising and plain packaging. Indeed, a recent decision 
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration found Philip Morris Asia’s 
challenge to Australia’s plain packaging laws to be an ‘abuse of rights’, 
essentially because it amounted to impermissible forum shopping.28 
Other revelations, such as the Panama Papers leak, show that there is also 
a broader need to examine, debate and change the way in which lawyers 
work with powerful and rich clients to avoid legal scrutiny, undermine the 
purposes of law and regulation and thus inhibit justice. 
II. Whistleblowing
Lawyers have explicit duties to the law, the court and the administration 
of justice, which are considered to be paramount over duties to clients, 
colleagues and the firm.29 As John Coffee Jr explains in his influential 
book on professionals as gatekeepers, lawyers and other professionals 
lend their corporate clients their ‘reputational capital’ and thus encourage 
investors, the market, other parties and indeed courts to rely on the clients’ 
disclosures and assurances in a way that they might not if the lawyer was 
not involved.30 It follows that the market, the justice system, and all the 
parties who take part in them, rely on lawyers to act as gatekeepers and 
not use their reputation to assist clients who act dishonestly or illegally. 
Moreover it is in lawyers’ own interests, as individuals and as a whole 
profession, to preserve their own reputation for ensuring duties to the 
court, the law and the administration of justice are upheld. It is therefore 
well established that a lawyer should be neither an instigator of, nor 
a party  to, any breach of the law, duty to the court or abuse of justice 
27  Sir Daryl Dawson, ‘Legal Services Market’ (1996) 5 Journal of Judicial Administration 147, 153.
28  Philip Morris Asia v Australia PCA Case no. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
17 December 2015. 
29  Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules, r 3.
30  John C Coffee Jr, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 2.
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by his or her clients or colleagues, and that they should act as gatekeeper 
at  least in the sense of actively advising clients and colleagues against 
such breaches.31 
We suggest that this ‘gatekeeper of justice’ role should extend to 
justify lawyer whistleblowing in certain circumstances (outlined in the 
sections below). The literature on gatekeeping generally stops short of 
advocating whistleblowing. Yet the gatekeeper of justice obligation is 
meaningless without the possibility of whistleblowing. Without that the 
lawyer gatekeeper is constrained to persuasion or withdrawal of services, 
neither of which may be effective. In effect these actions may simply 
defer the problem, and even render it less likely that it will be resolved in 
a satisfactory way. As Waters suggests, ‘[a]ll a silent withdrawal does is pass 
the problem along to another securities lawyer, possibly one who is not as 
concerned with ethics and professional responsibility’.32 
Currently lawyer whistleblowing is strongly discouraged by lawyers’ 
confidentiality obligations. These are enshrined in the professional 
conduct rules enforced by the disciplinary system, implied into the terms 
of every lawyer–client contract, and enforceable under equitable principles 
of confidentiality.33 Client legal privilege, which protects lawyer–
client confidentiality from enforced disclosure by courts and various 
enforcement authorities, has been recognised as a fundamental common 
law principle.34 This privilege covers information communicated from 
the client to the lawyer for the purposes of legal advice, and information 
communicated to the lawyer by third party experts for the purposes of 
preparation for litigation. There are even obligations of confidentiality, 
akin to the privilege, owed to opposing parties for material disclosed 
for the purposes of litigation, and equity can enforce confidentiality in 
any situation where information was communicated confidentially with 
31  See, for example, ‘Law Society of NSW v Dennis’ (1981) 7 Family Law Review 417; ACCC v Real 
Estate Institute of Western Australia Inc [1999] FCA 18. See also Gino Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional 
Responsibility (Thomson Reuters, 5th edn, 2012) 615 (citations omitted): ‘Lawyers must not engage 
in conduct that is dishonest, illegal, unprofessional, that may otherwise bring the profession into 
disrepute or that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Lawyers must not therefore seek to 
advance their client’s causes by unfair or dishonest means.’
32  David Waters, ‘The Wisdom of Whistleblowing: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the 
“Noisy Withdrawal” Provision’ (2010) 34 Journal of the Legal Profession 411, 423.
33  See Parker and Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics, above n 6, 110–13.
34  Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52.
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an expectation that confidentiality would be maintained.35 The justice 
system would not operate effectively if parties could not freely disclose 
information in litigation without the understanding that it will not be 
used for purposes other than the resolution of the dispute.36
If lawyer whistleblowing were over-encouraged, clients might lose faith in 
lawyer confidentiality, undermining frankness between lawyer and client 
and thus detracting from the administration of justice. However, the 
justice system is not just if lawyers see wrongdoing by clients or colleagues 
that amounts to a fraud on justice, are unable to prevent it via confidential 
advice, and have only the option of silent withdrawal or resignation in 
response. We argue that it is crucial to the administration of justice that 
professional conduct regulation sets out clear guidance and protection for 
appropriate whistleblowing by lawyers. This is only likely to be necessary 
and appropriate in certain circumstances, and there are three elements 
that must be considered: 
• the relationship between the lawyer whistleblower and the wrongdoer 
– whistleblowing protection is necessary for some relationships more 
than others;
• only certain types of wrongdoing are serious enough to be disclosed; 
and 
• a lawyer whistleblower faced with misconduct must use an appropriate 
process to seek to prevent the wrongdoing before blowing the whistle 
and to blow the whistle as quietly as possible consistent with effectively 
addressing the wrongdoing. 
The remainder of the chapter discusses these three elements.
A. Relationship
The potential for lawyers to whistleblow and their vulnerability to 
reprisals will vary depending on the relationship between the lawyer and 
the wrongdoer. We canvas four possible situations below. We suggest 
35  Matthew Groves, ‘The Implied Undertaking Restricting the Use of Material Obtained during 
Legal Proceedings’ (2003) 23(3) Australian Bar Review 314–44.
36  See discussion of the implied undertaking in British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd 
v Cowell (as representing the estate of Rolah Ann McCabe, deceased) [2003] VSCA 43, [19–20].
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that lawyers in each of the situations should be permitted to blow the 
whistle and given protection from retaliation if they do so via changes to 
professional conduct rules and legal profession regulation.
Lawyers in an internal or employment relationship with the wrongdoer 
are most likely to hold information ‘worthy of disclosure’ (the criteria for 
what should be disclosed are addressed in the next subsection).37 External 
lawyers directly briefed by the wrongdoing organisation may also identify 
wrongdoing, although in such a case the client can tailor information 
to obscure it. Lawyers in both these situations may be able to prevent 
wrongdoing through their advice to the client. However, if that advice is 
ignored and the client persists with the wrongdoing, then the lawyer should 
whistleblow. In such a situation, the strength of the duty of confidentiality 
and loyalty to the client, and the vulnerability to retaliation through loss 
of employment, disciplinary complaint or lawsuit, is currently high. 
Professional conduct rules should set out when whistleblowing should be 
allowed and provide protection from retaliation similar to that provided 
to public sector employees under the Public Interest Disclosure Act.
Lawyers may also discover wrongdoing involving their colleagues in 
the firm and the clients of their colleagues. All partners in a firm have 
an obligation to ensure ethical conduct in the firm.38 But there are 
significant disincentives for whistleblowing within a law firm if and when 
counselling and persuasion fail. If one lawyer in a firm owes obligations of 
confidentiality to a client or in relation to information communicated by 
a third party, then all lawyers in the firm will be bound. Thus, in the Dale 
case, even though Dale did not himself act for the tobacco company, as 
a partner in the firm he owed obligations of confidentiality to all his firm’s 
clients as if he was their own lawyer. He would also have owed obligations 
of confidentiality in equity and contract to his fellow partners in his 
firm about internal operations of the firm. This situation should also be 
covered by whistleblowing exceptions to confidentiality and protection 
of the lawyer whistleblower.
Lawyers might discover the wrongdoing of those on the other side in 
a transaction or in litigation. For these lawyers, their duty and vulnerability 
to retaliation and discipline will depend in part on the attitude of their 
37  Paul Latimer and A J Brown, ‘Whistleblower Laws: International Best Practice’ (2008) 31 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 766, 775.
38  This flows from the vicarious liability of partners: for example, Partnership Act 1891 (SA) s 10. 
See also, for example, obligations to supervise, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (ACSR) r 37.
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own client to the disclosure. So, for example, clients may retaliate if the 
disclosure is not in their interests by lodging a complaint (which may or 
may not be successful), or curtailing work. A second layer of confidentiality 
may exist if the lawyer has come across the information in a context where 
there has been an undertaking to preserve confidence, such as in a due 
diligence or discovery process.39
The final relationship within which a lawyer could be a whistleblower 
concerns those lawyers who discover wrongdoing through their personal 
or professional networks. The lawyer’s power to intervene is less obvious 
in this context, and the whistleblowing might simply take the form of 
a disciplinary complaint about the wrongdoer.
It is plausible that reforms to support whistleblowing explicitly would assist 
those considering their response to wrongdoing. So, for example, changes 
to the professional conduct rules and other legislative whistleblower 
protections (including, for example, Pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 
and the Commonwealth Public Interest Disclosure Act) could assist in 
building a culture of permission for appropriate lawyer whistleblowing, 
while also addressing the possibility of reprisals.
B. Wrongdoing
We suggest that where misconduct is analogous to conduct that would 
fall within the crime/fraud exception to lawyer client privilege, then 
gatekeeper of justice obligations are triggered and external whistleblowing 
may be permitted if other measures to address the misconduct fail 
(as discussed in the next section). The crime/fraud exception to privilege 
covers information about the commission of a crime, fraud or civil 
offence,40 and extends to ‘communications made with the intention of 
frustrating the processes of law, and which may be described as a “fraud 
on justice”’.41 The courts already recognise that the privilege should not 
apply in such circumstances because clients should not be able to rely on 
lawyer confidentiality where that would conflict with the lawyers’ role as 
an officer of the court. The ‘iniquity rule’ defence to breach of confidence 
39  See, for example, The Solicitor-General v Miss Alice [2007] 2 NZLR 783.
40  R v Cox & Railton (1884) 10 QBD 153 [158].
41  Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 510, 514 (Gibbs CJ); R v Bell; Ex parte Lees 
(1980) 146 CLR 141, 156 (Stephen J); British American Tobacco Australia Limited v Peter Gordon 
[2009] VSC 619 [158].
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at equity would also apply in such situations.42 Professional conduct 
rules should also be changed to recognise that whistleblowing can be 
appropriate where the crime/fraud exception would apply (provided an 
appropriate process is followed).
Examples of the kind of wrongdoing that could justify whistleblowing 
on the part of the lawyer under this exception include situations where 
the courts or other regulatory authorities have been misled or deceived 
by either the lawyer’s own client or a lawyer or client on the other side, 
or indeed anyone else. This is the situation alleged by Dale. Dale stated 
that he was motivated by the belief that ‘there may have been a fraud 
committed on the Supreme Court of Victoria and that a full investigation 
was required.’43 His leaks were aimed at providing further evidence that 
the client and the law firm acted in violation of the applicable norms 
by concealing evidence of the intentionally manipulative or negligent 
marketing of a product known to be harmful, and subverting the judicial 
process to avoid scrutiny and liability for its own harmful conduct.
Another example would be the Australian Wheat Board’s subversion of 
the UN’s ‘Oil for Food’ program to illegally channel funds to Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.44 In such a situation the lawyer would have a clear 
duty not to counsel or assist in illegal conduct.45 However, should the 
client persist with the wrongdoing, the pressure on the lawyer to conceal 
the wrongdoing is likely to be high. Moreover the client may embroil 
the lawyer in its illegal purpose by expecting the lawyer to defend and 
even further the client’s purpose. This type of wrongdoing furthers the 
organisation’s purpose, yet falls within the crime/fraud exception, and 
42  The iniquity rule defence to breach of confidence at general law covers ‘crimes, frauds and 
misdeeds’ including civil wrongs: Initial Services v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396; see also Kaaren Koomen, 
‘Breach of Confidence and the Public Interest Defence: Is it in the Public Interest? A Review of the 
English Public Interest Defence and the Options for Australia’ (1994) 10 Queensland University of 
Technology Law Journal 56, 58.
43  William Birnbauer, ‘Lawyer Revealed as Smoking Source’, The Sunday Age 28 January 2007. 
Quoted in Dale v Clayton Utz [101]. Dale repeated the substance of this account in his evidence to 
the court in Dale v Clayton Utz: see [101]. 
44  Caroline Overington, Kickback: Inside the Australian Wheat Board Scandal (Allen and Unwin, 
2007).
45  See, for example, ‘Law Society of NSW v Dennis’ (1981) 7 Family Law Review 417; ACCC v Real 
Estate Institute of Western Australia Inc [1999] FCA 18. See also Gino Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional 
Responsibility (Thomson Reuters, 5th edn, 2012) 615 (citations omitted): ‘Lawyers must not engage 
in conduct that is dishonest, illegal, unprofessional, that may otherwise bring the profession into 
disrepute or that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Lawyers must not therefore seek to 
advance their client’s causes by unfair or dishonest means.’
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thus it is desirable to make the conduct rules clear about when and how 
lawyers can whistleblow externally in such a situation and provide them 
with protection from retaliation if they do so.
C. The process
Whistleblowing is ethically problematic because it breaches shared 
understandings of loyalty and confidentiality within a relationship or 
organisation.46 It is, therefore, important that lawyer whistleblowers leak 
confidential information only when it is ethically justified to do so and 
do  not unnecessarily breach other ethical obligations in the process.47 
In  order to encourage appropriate use of a whistleblowing exception, 
the conduct rules should set out the circumstances when whistleblowing 
is permissible and the process that should be followed.
First, the conduct rules should require lawyer whistleblowers to use 
judgment and ensure they are accurate in their assessment of any 
wrongdoing. That is, they should verify that they have accurate and 
sufficient evidence to at least prompt a further investigation by a regulatory 
authority before whistleblowing.
Second, the rules should ensure the breach of loyalty is minimised by 
directing lawyer whistleblowers to explore appropriate alternative options 
for preventing wrongdoing (such as strong advice and persuasion) 
before sounding the alarm. Other reasonable options for addressing the 
wrongdoing should be exhausted before whistleblowing. This also means 
that any disclosure should be as narrow as possible and directed to the 
appropriate party who can rectify or prevent the wrong – usually, first, 
an authoritative figure within the firm or company, and then a regulatory 
authority or court. Public disclosure, such as via the media in the Dale 
case, should generally be a last resort as it carries with it a complete loss of 
control over the information in ways that do not necessarily occur when 
information is disclosed to regulators or courts.
Third, the rules should encourage lawyer whistleblowers to disclose 
sufficient information but only that which is necessary to address the 
wrongdoing. They should not, for example, disclose extraneous personal 
46  Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (Vintage Books, 1989) 120. 
47  Based on Bok, ibid, 219ff.
115
8 . LAWyERS AS WHISTLEBLOWERS
matters or hide what evidence they have. Rather, the whistleblowing should 
put matters of significance to an appropriate forum for investigation and 
accountability.
Changes such as these to the professional conduct rules, coupled with 
education by legal profession regulators and appropriate protections for 
lawyer whistleblowers in legislation, would provide guidance to potential 
whistleblowers faced with difficult choices. Once appropriate changes are 
made to the professional conduct rules, lawyers could draw on existing 
ethical guidance hotlines for advice about the appropriateness and process 
for whistleblowing, and should be protected from disciplinary action 
if they seek and follow such advice. Ultimately this could enhance the 
possibility that wrongdoing that impacts the justice system would be 
confidentially investigated and, where appropriate, brought into public 
discussion and accountability.
III. Concluding Remarks
Lawyer whistleblowing has the potential to address specific occasions 
of  harm to the administration of justice. It has barely, however, been 
addressed by professional conduct rules and professional regulators. 
Our  chapter suggests how to begin to address this issue in the legal 
profession. The changes we have proposed could assist practitioners as 
well as provide a welcome demonstration of the profession’s commitment 
to justice.
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Criminal Justice Law Reform 
Challenges for the Future: 




This chapter will examine Australia’s addiction to prison. It will 
commence by examining where we have arrived at in relation to our use 
of imprisonment, and why we must turn this around. In particular, it will 
consider the monetary and non-monetary costs of imprisonment, and 
the evidence on the crime prevention effects of prison. It will then posit 
what a new future in criminal justice might look like, drawing inspiration 
from recent development in the United States (US) and United Kingdom 
(UK). The role of the media, research on sentencing and public opinion, 
impact on victims, and the emerging case for justice reinvestment will also 
be considered.
The chapter concludes by arguing that all policy should henceforth be 
focused around the central issue of whether any proposed reform will 
increase or decrease our prison population. If it appears that the former 
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is likely to occur, then the proposal should not proceed. In making this 
shift, it is acknowledged that the imprisonment rate is influenced by both 
substantive laws, such as the creation of new offences, and changes to 
procedure, such as reforms to bail, as well as reforms in other contexts, such 
as housing. All initiatives should be immediately off the policy-making 
table if they are likely to significantly increase our prison population. There 
must be particular scrutiny if the proposed initiative is likely to impact 
disproportionately on Indigenous people. If it appears that the proposal 
will reduce the prison population (e.g. by making sentencing laws less 
punitive), then this should in the first instance be licence to proceed, 
but the inquiry must not be left there. All initiatives must be subject 
to adequately funded independent evaluation to determine if they have 
actually had this desired impact. Adopting this approach would require 
courage and commitment from politicians, policymakers, the media and 
the public. The chapter ends by demonstrating what law reform might 
look like if we went down this path.
II. Australia’s Prison Addiction
The chapter will commence with figures that contextualise the debate 
and make the case that Australia has become addicted to prison.2 As of 
December 2016, we had 39,568 people in our prisons.3 Only three years 
earlier, the prison population was less than 30,000,4 but at the current rate 
of increase – exceeding 7 per cent a year5 – we will reach 40,000 prisoners in 
2017. Our imprisonment rate is now just over 200 per 100,000.6 It should 
be noted that this masks some significant variation, with Tasmania and the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) the lowest imprisoning jurisdictions, 
at around 141 per 100,000, while the Northern Territory now incarcerates 
2  This section draws on the data and rhetoric respectively of the following recent papers: Don 
Weatherburn, ‘“Rack ‘Em, Pack ‘Em and Stack ‘Em”: Decarceration in an Age of Zero Tolerance’ 
(2016) 28 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 137; Andrew Leigh, ‘Prisons Dilemma: An Economist’s 
Perspective on Incarceration’, Paper presented at the Justice Connections 4 Symposium, November 
2015, Canberra. Discussions with Don Weatherburn in particular have informed the development 
of this chapter.
3  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), ‘Corrective Services, Australia – December 2016 Quarter’ 
(Cat No 4512.0, ABS, 2017).
4  ABS, ‘Corrective Services, Australia – December 2013 Quarter’ (Cat No 4512.0, ABS, 2014).
5  ABS (2017), above n 3.
6  Ibid.
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a staggering 891 people per 100,000 in December 2016, although this 
had fallen from a peak of 968 in January 2016.7 However, all jurisdictions 
have increased their imprisonment rates over the last 15 years.
Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, our high imprisonment rate 
is a  relatively recent phenomenon.8 As set out in Figure 9.1, the 
imprisonment rate fell steadily from 1900 to 1920, from 126 to 52 per 
100,000. It generally stayed around this level for the next 30 years, before 
starting to climb, from 52 in 1950 to 81 in 1970. It then fell again, to 
62–66 in 1975 to 1985. Since then, it has risen steadily between 1950 
and 1980. It then climbed, but only fairly gradually, increasing to 66 in 
1985. Over the 30 years that followed, however, it increased by nearly 





























Figure 9.1: Australia’s imprisonment rate (per 100,000), 1900–2015
Source: Adapted from Graycar (2001); ABS (various years)
7  Ibid.
8  See Adam Graycar, ‘Crime in Twentieth Century Australia’ (Cat No 1301.1, ABS, 2001); 
ABS ‘Corrective Services, Australia – December 2001 Quarter’ (Cat No 4512.0, ABS, 2002); 
ABS ‘Corrective Services, Australia – December 2005 Quarter’ (Cat No 4512.0, ABS, 2006); ABS 
‘Corrective Services, Australia – December 2010 Quarter’ (Cat No 4512.0, ABS, 2011); ABS, ibid.
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To place this in an international context, Canada’s imprisonment rate 
is 106.9 The imprisonment rate in England and Wales, the highest in 
Western Europe, is 147.10 A number of European countries have rates well 
under 100 per 100,000, while Iceland’s is only 45.11 Of course, we’re not 
doing as badly as the US, where the rate is just under 700 per 100,000,12 
but their rate is declining slowly,13 while ours is on a steady upwards 
trajectory. 
When we examine the situation for Indigenous people, it is obviously 
much worse. In spite of only accounting for 3 per cent of the Australian 
population, Indigenous people make up 27 per cent of the national 
prison population, and reached 10,000 prisoners for the first time in 
the December  2015 quarter.14 Worse still, a third of the adult female 
population15 and over half of the juvenile detention population are 
Indigenous.16 The imprisonment rate17 tells the story in more detail. 
Overall, the Indigenous imprisonment rate in Australia in December 2016 
was 2,409 per 100,000. For men, it was 4,370. An oft-cited figure is that 
an Indigenous man is more likely to go to prison than university. For men 
in Western Australia, the imprisonment rate is 7,002 per 100,000. In other 
words, seven out of every 100 Indigenous men in Western Australia are in 
prison at any given time. This is the most imprisoned group of people in 
the world. Suddenly, the imprisonment rate in the US doesn’t look so bad.
A. The costs of prison
One context in which the US actually does better than Australia, if it 
can be termed such, is in relation to the cost of prison. Now, that itself 
comes at a price. For example, the US has much lower staff to inmate 
ratios than in Australia, and are generally far more punitive in their prison 
9  Ibid. It should be noted that the Institute of Criminal Policy Research (ICPR) places our 
imprisonment rate at 151 per 100,000, compared with the ABS figure of 196: Roy Walmsley, World 
Prison Population List (ICPR, 11th edn, 2016). The reasons for this discrepancy are not entirely clear, 




13  Lauren Glaze et al, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2014 (NCJ 249513, US Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, 2015).
14  ABS, above n 3.
15  Ibid.
16 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), Youth Detention Population in Australia 
2016 (AIHW, 2016). 
17  ABS, above n 3.
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administration. Nevertheless, imprisonment costs around $45,000 per 
prisoner, per year in the US.18 In Australia, that figure is over $110,000, 
including capital costs.19 In the ACT, which hosts Australia’s first ‘human 
rights prison’,20 the price tag exceeds $160,000 per year. Australia now 
spends more than $3.8 billion on prisons every year.21 
Then there are the non-monetary costs. In the recent guideline judgment 
of Boulton,22 the Victorian Court of Appeal acknowledged the limitations 
of prison, including loss of personal autonomy and privacy, the risk of 
violence, institutionalisation and exposure to more serious criminals. 
The impact on prisoners’ families is also a major concern, although poor 
data collection hampers our understanding in this context. In  2005, 
Quilty23 estimated that 5 per cent of all Australian children are affected 
by parental incarceration in any given year and this rose to 20 per cent 
for Indigenous children. Both of these figures are likely to have increased 
significantly in line with increased imprisonment rates. Parental 
incarceration has in turn been linked with adverse effects on children.24 
B. But don’t we need prison to keep us safe?
So, prison costs us a lot in a variety of ways. But don’t we need it to 
prevent crime? Well, the good news there is that crime is already well 
down. In fact, over the last 15 years, the national homicide rate has fallen 
by 32 per cent, and robbery and burglary rates have fallen by 66 per cent 
and 67 per cent respectively. In addition, motor vehicle theft has fallen 
by 71 per cent, while other forms of theft have fallen by a still impressive 
43 per cent.25 
18  Vera Institute of Justice, The Price of Prisons: What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers (2012).
19  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2016 (2016).
20  For comment, see Lorana Bartels, ‘The State of Imprisonment in Australia: Can the ACT 
Achieve a “Human Rights” Prison?’, The Conversation, 17 April 2015, theconversation.com/state-
of-imprisonment-can-act-achieve-a-human-rights-prison-39119; Lorana Bartels, ‘The ACT Prison: 
Human Rights Rhetoric Versus Crowded and Bored Reality’ (2015) 9 Court of Conscience 21; Lorana 
Bartels and Jeremy Boland, ‘Human rights and Prison: A Case Study from the Australian Capital 
Territory’, in Elaine Fishwick, Marinella Marmo and Leanne Weber (eds), Routledge International 
Handbook of Criminology and Human Rights (Routledge, 2016), 556–67. 
21  Productivity Commission, above n 19.
22  Boulton v The Queen [2014] VSCA 342. For discussion, see Lorana Bartels, ‘Sentencing Review 
2014–15’ (2015) 39 Criminal Law Journal 326.
23  Simon Quilty, ‘The Magnitude of Experience of Parental Incarceration in Australia’ (2005) 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 12(1), 256–57.
24  Weatherburn, above n 2.
25  Ibid.
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It may then be argued that our increased use of prison achieved these 
results. However, Australian data indicate little correlation between each 
jurisdiction’s crime and imprisonment rates.26 The international data tell 
a similar story.27 In any event, US28 and Australian29 research suggests 
that you would need to increase the prison population by 10 per cent 
to get a 1 to 2 per cent decrease, with changes in sentence length having 
no impact. That would generally be regarded as a pretty poor return on 
investment. 
Other research indicates that once a community gets past a certain point, 
rather than preventing crime, prison actually causes crime.30 Todd Clear’s31 
hypothesis for why this occurs is that rising prison rates take more and 
more  people out of certain highly disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
Past a  certain point, he argues, this leaves the community weakened, 
fragmented and unable to defend itself against crime. As Weatherburn32 
recently observed in the Australian context, this may well be what is 
happening with some Indigenous communities.
III. A New Future?
The foregoing is well known to criminologists, who do not need to be 
further convinced of the need for a different approach.33 What is required, 
however, is for this message to permeate through to politicians, in the 
first instance, and the media and public. What we need is support from 
26  For discussion, see Rick Sarre, ‘Social Innovation, Law and Justice’ (Paper presented at the 
History and Future of Social Innovation Conference, Adelaide, June 2008).
27  See Bronwyn Naylor, ‘The Evidence Is In: You Can’t Link Imprisonment to Crime  Rates’, 
The Conversation, 23 April 2015, theconversation.com/the-evidence-is-in-you-cant-link-imprisonment-
to-crime-rates-40074.
28  John Donahue, ‘Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: Overall Changes and the 
Benefits on the Margin’ in Steven Raphael and Michael Stoll (eds), Do Prisons Make Us Safer? 
The Benefits and Costs of the Prison Boom (Russell Sage Federation Press, 2009) 269–342.
29  Wai-Yin Wan et al, ‘The Effect of Arrest and Imprisonment on Crime’ (Crime and Justice Bulletin 
No 158, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR), 2012). See also Don Weatherburn, 
Jiuzhao Hua and Steve Moffatt, ‘How Much Crime Does Prison Stop? The Incapacitation Effect of 
Prison on Burglary’ (Crime and Justice Bulletin No 93, BOCSAR, 2006).
30  See Weatherburn, above n 2, for discussion.
31  Todd Clear, Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes Disadvantaged Neighborhoods 
Worse (Oxford University Press, 2007), as summarised in Weatherburn, ibid. See also Mark Kleiman, 
When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment (Princeton University Press, 2009).
32  Weatherburn, ibid.
33  See, for example, Weatherburn, ibid; Sarre, above n 26; Mirko Bagaric, ‘Prisons Policy Is Turning 
Australia into the Second Nation of Captives’, The Conversation, 10 April 2015, theconversation.com/
prisons-policy-is-turning-australia-into-the-second-nation-of-captives-38842.
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across the political spectrum to stop doing things the way we’ve been 
doing them for the last generation, and try a new way. That might sound 
laughable in a world of tabloid newspapers and talkback radio, but it 
is happening now in the US, which has seen small prison population 
reductions each year since 2012.34 In October 2015, over 130 senior police 
officers, prosecutors and sheriffs formed a group called ‘Law Enforcement 
Leaders to Reduce Crime and Incarceration’, which ‘represents an abrupt 
public shift in philosophy for dozens of law enforcement officials who 
have sustained careers based upon tough-on-crime strategies’.35 In January 
this year, a bipartisan task force appointed by Congress to suggest ways to 
reduce the federal prison population provided its final recommendations 
to the White House. The recommendations included sending fewer low-
level drug offenders to prison and imposing shorter sentences.36 In March 
2016, then President Barack Obama also asserted that drug addiction 
is a health issue, not a criminal justice problem, and committed over 
$150 million to drug treatment.37 
In the UK, David Cameron recently became the first prime minister to 
give a speech on prison reform in over 20 years, in which he acknowledged 
that ‘politicians from all sides of the political spectrum are starting to 
realise the diminishing returns from ever higher levels of incarceration’.38 
He spoke of the need for wholesale reform and explained that ‘the 
truth is that simply warehousing ever more prisoners is not financially 
sustainable, nor is it necessarily the most cost-effective way of cutting 
crime’.39 Furthermore, he recognised that prisons are ‘often miserable, 
34  Erica Good, ‘US Prison Populations Decline, Reflecting New Approach to Crime’, New York 
Times, 25 July 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/us-prison-populations-decline-reflecting-
new-approach-to-crime.html; Lauren Carroll, ‘Federal Prison Population Drops for First Time in 
3 Decades, Eric Holder Says’, Politifact, 23 February 2015, www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/
statements/2015/feb/23/eric-holder/federal-prison-population-drops-first-time-3-decad/.
35  Timothy Williams, ‘Police Leaders Join Call to Cut Prison Rosters’, New York Times, 20 October 
2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/us/police-leaders-join-call-to-cut-prison-rosters.html.
36  Charles Colson Taskforce on Corrections, Transforming Prisons, Restoring Lives: Final 
Recommendations of the Charles Colson Task Force on Federal Corrections (Urban Institute, 2016). For 
comment, see Eric Tucker, ‘A Bipartisan Task Force Is Suggesting a Policy Shift That Could Save 
the Federal Government $5 Billion’, Business Insider, 26 January 2016, www.businessinsider.com/
ap-task-force-recommends-how-to-cut-us-prisoner-count-by-60000-2016-1?IR=T. 
37  Timothy Pratt, ‘Obama: “Drug Addiction Is a Health Problem, Not a Criminal Problem”’, 
The Guardian, 30 March 2016, www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/29/barack-obama-drug-
addiction-health-problem-not-criminal-problem. 
38  David Cameron, ‘Cameron Prison Reform Speech in Full’, 8 February 2016, www.politics.
co.uk/comment-analysis/2016/02/08/cameron-prison-reform-speech-in-full.
39  Ibid.
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painful environments. Isolation. Mental anguish. Idleness. Bullying. 
Self-harm. Violence. Suicide … These establishments are full of damaged 
individuals’.40
If the US and UK – with respectively higher and lower imprisonment 
rates than Australia – can show signs of shifting their rhetoric, surely we 
can too. But it won’t be easy. A few years ago, the NSW Liberal Attorney-
General, Greg Smith SC, was very open, both before and after his election, 
about his commitment to reducing the prison population.41 Under his 
watch, the NSW prison population started falling. In 2012, he ordered 
three prisons to be closed. Unfortunately, this was all a bit too sensible 
for the rest of his party or the NSW shock jocks, and he lost his portfolio 
in 2014, having been lampooned in the tabloid media as ‘Marshmallow 
Smith’ for being soft on crime.42 Since then, the NSW prison population 
has been on the rise, hitting 12,000 for the first time recently.43 
The ACT recently had in Simon Corbell an Attorney-General who 
consistently refused to play the law and order game and pushed back 
against calls for mandatory sentences.44 The early indications about his 
successor, Gordon Ramsay, suggest he is no more likely to embrace the 
tough-on-crime rhetoric.45 We obviously need more politicians of courage, 
regardless of their political affiliation. At the federal level, Labor’s Shadow 
Assistant Treasurer, Andrew Leigh,46 has spoken about the need to reduce 
imprisonment rates. The Australian Greens’ justice policy aims include, 
inter alia:
40  Ibid.
41 Robert Milliken, ‘Ending Sydney’s Law-and-Order Auction’, Inside Story, 3 April 2012, 
insidestory.org.au/ending-sydneys-law-and-order-auction. 
42  For comment, see Milliken, ibid; David Brown, ‘Is Rational Law Reform Still Possible in a 
Shock-jock Tabloid World?’, The Conversation, 15 August 2014, theconversation.com/is-rational-law-
reform-still-possible-in-a-shock-jock-tabloid-world-30416; for comment, see David Brown, ‘State 
of Imprisonment: Prisoners of NSW Politics and  Perceptions’, The Conversation, 21 April 2015, 
theconversation.com/state-of-imprisonment-prisoners-of-nsw-politics-and-perceptions-38985; 
Jonathon Green, ‘Back to Prison’, ABC Background Briefing, 18 May 2014, www.abc.net.au/
radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/2014-05-18/5452044.
43  ABS, above n 3.
44 Michael Inman, ‘No One Punch Laws in ACT, Says Corbell’, Canberra Times, 4 February 2014, 
www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/no-onepunch-laws-in-act-says-corbell-20140203-31xpn.html; 
Alexandra Back, ‘Attorney-General Simon Corbell Stands Firm On One-punch Laws’, Canberra 
Times, 1 February 2016, www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/attorneygeneral-simon-corbell-stands-
firm-on-onepunch-laws-20160131-gmieeu.html.
45 Megan Gorrey, ‘Attorney-General Gordon Ramsay Says Legal Aid Critical to “Inclusive” 
Judiciary’, Canberra Times, 4 February 2017, www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/attorneygeneral-
gordon-ramsay-says-legal-aid-critical-to-inclusive-judiciary-20170131-gu2d8j.html.
46  Leigh, above n 2.
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• an end to politically-motivated law and order campaigns that exploit 
and fuel public anxieties;
• a comprehensive, multidisciplinary and evidence-based approach 
to reduce crime by addressing the underlying causes of crime and 
recidivism; 
• the implementation of alternatives to imprisonment where 
appropriate, including restorative justice, diversionary programs and 
justice reinvestment strategies; 
• action to address the continued overrepresentation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Peoples in the justice system.47
As others have repeatedly argued,48 we also need a sensible media. Again, 
we are quite lucky in the ACT, which, for the most part, has well-
informed journalists willing to listen to evidence, and generally more 
willing to inform than inflame. It is refreshing to see stories where the 
facts are allowed to speak for themselves.49 Other media outlets need to 
do this, too.
Sarre has called on the public to ‘challenge populism, and to tell 
governments that they can build long term social investment into criminal 
justice policy-making without risking electoral backlash’.50 For this to 
occur, we need to communicate honestly and effectively with the public. 
We need to get people to understand that prison is not a particularly 
effective crime reduction tool. People also need to understand that crime 
is decreasing, and has been doing so for some time.51 We need to ensure 
47  Australian Greens, Justice Policy, greens.org.au/policies/justice (viewed 16 April 2016).
48  See, for example, Russell Hogg and David Brown, Rethinking Law and Order (Pluto Press, 
1998); Nicholas Cowdery QC, Getting Justice Wrong: Myths, Media and Crime (Allen and Unwin, 
2001); Sarre, above n 26.
49  See, for example, Michael Inman, ‘Suspended Sentence For Shoe Store Manager Who Stole 
More Than $70,000’, Canberra Times, 12 November 2015, www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/
suspended-sentence-for-shoe-store-manager-who-stole-more-than-70000-20151112-gkx06r.html; 
Michael Inman, ‘Devout Christian Brenton Honeyman Gets Suspended Jail Sentence For Child Porn 
Possession’, Canberra Times, 6 January 2016, www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/devout-christian-
gets-suspended-jail-sentence-for-child-porn-possession-20160106-gm08h1.html.
50  Sarre, above n 26, 11–12.
51  See, for example, Don Weatherburn and David Indermaur, ‘Public Perceptions of Crime Trends 
in New South Wales and Western Australia’ (Crime and Justice Bulletin No 80, BOCSAR, 2004); 
Brent Davis and Kym Dossetor, ‘(Mis)perceptions of Crime in Australia’ (Trends and Issues in Crime 
and Criminal Justice No 396, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010).
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the public is well-informed. Research from both Australia52 and overseas53 
demonstrates that the more educated people are about crime, the less 
punitive they become. In addition, a national Australian study54 found 
that there were equal levels of satisfaction about sentencing across the 
country, even though we obviously have widely disparate sentencing 
patterns. Given people are not likely to become any more satisfied with 
sentencing if we increase penalties, we might as well cut them. They are 
certainly not likely to be any less pleased with the outcome. 
What about the victims? Research55 indicates that victims are no more 
punitive than others. Nevertheless, the media are often keen to sell the 
story that supposedly lenient penalties disadvantage victims.56 Again, 
the ACT provides something of an unusual case study, with a Victims 
of Crime Commissioner, John Hinchey, who readily acknowledges the 
crime prevention role of a range of strategies. For example, in the context 
of recent debate on one-punch assaults in the ACT, he pointed to the 
need for increased police powers and ‘reforms aimed at promoting long-
term cultural change related  to alcohol consumption, acceptability of 
violence and substance misuse’.57 He is to be commended for recognising 
that we can’t imprison our way out of crime, and it is of no benefit to 
victims to attempt to do so.
Victims – including the many offenders who are themselves victims58 – 
have legitimate physical, financial, emotional and psychological needs, 
and we need to attend to them. But tougher sentencing isn’t the answer. 
52  Kate Warner et al, ‘Public Judgement on Sentencing: Final Results from the Tasmanian Jury 
Sentencing Study’ (Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No 407, Australian Institute 
of Criminology, 2011).
53  See, for example, Tony Doob and Julian Roberts, An Analysis of the Public’s View of Sentencing: 
A  Report to the Department of Justice, Canada (1983). See also Karen Gelb, More Myths and 
Misconceptions (Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, 2008) for an overview.
54  Lynne Roberts et al, ‘A Country Not Divided: A Comparison of Public Punitiveness 
and Confidence in Sentencing across Australia (2011) 44 Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of Criminology 370.
55  Gelb, above n 53.
56  See, for example, Lisa Morrison, ‘Twenty-year Domestic Violence Victim Attacks “Lenient” 
Sentence for Ex-Partner’, The West Australian, 31 July 2015, au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/regional/
great-southern/a/29150713/twenty-year-domestic-violence-victim-attacks-lenient-sentence-for-ex-
partner/.
57  Megan Gorrey and Alexandra Back, ‘Man Charged Over Alleged One-punch Attack in Civic’, 
Canberra Times, 8 January 2016, www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/canberra-victim-of-new-
years-onepunch-attack-in-civic-surprised-hes-alive-20160108-gm1x8e.html.
58 Russell Marks, ‘Taking Victims Seriously’, The Monthly, 14 March 2015, www.themonthly.com.
au/blog/russell-marks/2015/14/2015/1426288245/taking-victims-seriously. 
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In fact, saving money on prisons will enable us to reallocate resources 
towards things that will help victims, such as counselling and financial 
support. If we cut our imprisonment rate in half, we’ll have an extra 
$1.7 billion per year to support victims, with money left over for a range 
of effective crime prevention measures.59 
IV. Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the challenge to which our criminal laws 
and our legal system more generally must be geared is curbing our 
addiction to prison. One means of doing so would be significant review 
of our sentencing laws; for example, the use of mandatory sentences.60 
However, the issue is much broader and deeper than this. From now on, 
every time a proposal is put forward, policymakers, politicians, the media 
and members of the public should have to ask themselves and each other 
one simple question: ‘Will this proposal drive the prison population up 
or down?’ It is conceded that it may at times be difficult to determine the 
ultimate impact of particular law reforms. There may also be good reasons 
for creating new offences; for example, where there is an identified gap, 
especially in the context of technological developments. However, it should 
equally be noted that there is a tendency to legislate in circumstances 
where there is a perceived gap, but existing laws could be used instead and 
the new offence may end up being only rarely prosecuted.61 In light of the 
far-reaching implications of policy in a range of portfolios outside of the 
criminal justice system and the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of current 
59  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore the concept of justice reinvestment in detail, but 
this seeks to allocate money that would have been spent on prisons on community-based initiatives that 
seek to address the causes of crime. For discussion, see, for example, Senate Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Value of a Justice Reinvestment Approach to Criminal Justice in Australia 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2013); Sarah Hopkins, ‘Justice Reinvestment Saves Huge Costs of Law-
and-Order Auctions’, The Conversation, 20 October 2014, theconversation.com/justice-reinvestment-
saves-huge-costs-of-law-and-order-auctions-33018. A pilot project is currently underway in Cowra, 
NSW: ‘Justice Reinvestment Program Reaches New Milestone’, Cowra Guardian, 8 January 2016, www.
cowraguardian.com.au/story/3649006/justice-reinvestment-program-reaches-new-milestone/?cs=593. 
The ACT Government has also committed to ‘the development of a whole of government justice 
reinvestment approach aimed at reducing recidivism and diverting offenders, and those at risk of 
becoming offenders, from the justice system’: ACT Justice and Community Safety Directorate, Justice 
Reinvestment Strategy (2015). The author is a member of the advisory group for this strategy.
60  For discussion, see, for example, Lorana Bartels and Rick Sarre, ‘Law Reform Targeting Crime 
and Disorder’, in Rick Sarre and Antje Deckert (eds), Australian and New Zealand Handbook 
of Criminology, Crime and Justice (Palgrave, forthcoming).
61  For discussion, see Arlie Loughnan, ‘Drink Spiking and Rock Throwing: The Creation and 
Construction of Criminal Offences in the Current Era’ (2010) 35 Alternative Law Journal 18.
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practices, it is further argued that this approach should apply not only to 
criminal justice, but all relevant policy; for example, housing, education, 
health and transport. If the answer is likely to be ‘up’, then that should be 
the end of that initiative.
For the reasons also set out above, particular scrutiny should be required 
as to the potential impact of any policy on Indigenous people. In addition, 
ongoing consultation and collaboration with Indigenous stakeholders 
is required to reduce the shameful rates of overrepresentation in our 
prisons.62 Opposition Leader Bill Shorten has committed to reinstating 
a justice target to achieve this,63 while the federal government has described 
such an approach as ‘foolish’, arguing that it had ‘no control’ over justice 
policy.64 The Red Cross65 recently recommended that all Australian 
governments commit to reducing Indigenous imprisonment rates by 
50  per cent over the next five years. This recommendation is sensible, 
given the overrepresentation of Indigenous people in the criminal justice 
system in all Australian jurisdictions, and the practical and normative 
impact of federal policy on state and territory criminal justice practices. 
The current inquiry by the Australian Law Reform Commission on the 
incarceration rates of Indigenous peoples66 may provide some impetus for 
change in this regard.
Even if a proposal appears to pass muster, the inquiry must not end there. 
Resources need to be allocated to ensure the initiative is independently 
evaluated for its outcomes, to determine whether it has actually had the 
desired results. If not, it must be determined why not and, in due course, 
that approach should also be abandoned in favour of one with a more 
62  See, for example, Michael Gordon, ‘Patrick Dodson Makes Impassioned Plea for “a Smarter 
Form of Justice”’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 April 2016, www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/
political-news/patrick-dodson-makes-emotional-plea-for-action-on-aboriginal-incarceration-
20160413-go52vi.html.
63  Anna Henderson, ‘Bill Shorten Pledges to End “National Shame” By Reviving Indigenous 
Imprisonment Reduction Targets’, ABC News, 19 November 2015, www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-
19/labor-pledges-to-revive-indigenous-justice-targets/6953032.
64  Calla Wahlquist, ‘Nigel Scullion Scoffs at Proposed National Target on Indigenous Jail Rates’, 
The Guardian, 12 February 2016, www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/feb/12/nigel-scullion-
scoffs-at-proposed-national-target-on-indigenous-jail-rates.
65 Australian Red Cross, Vulnerability Report 2016: Rethinking Justice (2016), www.redcross.org.au/
files/VulnerabilityReport2016.pdf.
66  Australian Law Reform Commission, Incarceration Rates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples, www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/indigenous-incarceration. Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Incarceration Rates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Discussion Paper No 84 (2017).
131
9 . CRIMINAL JUSTICE LAW REFORM CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
beneficial outcome. A genuine commitment to evidence-based practice is 
paramount in this endeavour, and all stakeholders must have the courage 
to constantly reevaluate their preconceptions about ‘what works’.
Others have likewise made this clarion call. Bagaric has called on 
Australian governments to ‘develop a strategy to reduce incarceration 
numbers to about 100 per 100,000’.67 Weatherburn recently pressed 
the case for a ‘complete overhaul of the way crime and imprisonment 
is addressed in NSW’.68 As noted above, the Red Cross has called for 
a 50 per cent reduction in Indigenous imprisonment rates over the next 
five years. In addition, it recommended a 10 per cent reduction in overall 
imprisonment rates over this timeframe.69 
Adopting this approach would clearly require a fundamental shift. 
It  would require the courage to abandon decades of tough on crime 
rhetoric. Political parties would no longer be able to criticise each other 
for being soft on crime, although being ‘stupid’ on crime would perhaps 
become a greater political risk. Over a decade ago, Weatherburn suggested 
that many politicians ‘would welcome an opportunity to stop beating the 
law and order drum, if one were provided that did not come at too high 
a political price’.70 Politicians who dare to speak the truth should not have 
to risk their political careers as Greg Smith did.71 
Fortunately, we have a model of what law-making might look like if there 
were the political will to adopt this approach. Sarre72 helpfully prepared 
the following hypothetical transcript:
THE PREMIER: Thank you Mr Speaker. I rise to announce a new 
goal that this government intends to meet in the next twelve months, 
that is, to reduce the imprisonment rate by 20 per cent … We do this 
because we recognise that higher rates of imprisonment have not made 
any difference to rates of violent crime over the last decade. We note the 
67  Bagaric, above n 33.
68  Rachel Olding, ‘BOCSAR Crime Stats Boss Don Weatherburn Calls for Lighter Prison 
Sentences’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February 2016, www.smh.com.au/nsw/weatherburn-
comes-out-swinging-20160216-gmvavn.html.
69  Australian Red Cross, above n 65. Somewhat remarkably, the Federal Justice Minister, Michael 
Keenan, responded to the Red Cross report by asserting that ‘[t]he idea that locking up bad people 
doesn’t work is not true. It does, we know that for a fact’: Sam Tomlin, ‘Locking Bad People 
Up “Works”: Minister for Justice Rejects Calls for Prison Overhaul’, ABC News, 31 March 2016, 
www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-31/federal-justice-minister-rejects-prison-criticism/7289038.
70  Don Weatherburn, Law and Order in Australia: Rhetoric and Reality (Federation Press, 2004) 47.
71  For comment, see Brown (2014) and Brown (2015), above n 42. 
72  Sarre, above n 26, 1.
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wildly disproportionate way in which Indigenous Australians are over-
represented … in prison in this state, and the drain on state resources 
…  We plan to make these reductions on the basis of the research 
evidence …
THE SPEAKER: I recognise the Honourable the Leader of the 
Opposition.
THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION: Thank you Mr Speaker. 
I applaud the Premier’s zeal on this matter but I argue that he is setting 
his sights far too low. The electorate deserves better than that. If elected, 
our party will drop imprisonment rates even further, to 50 per cent … 
We also plan to spend the money we save on custodial corrections on 
victim support services. The evidence, I might add, points to victims 
being far less vindictive than we might otherwise assume. Finally, we will 
also commission more research into the evaluation of existing and new 
initiatives to ensure that we get the best outcomes for the dollars we spend.
Hopefully, it is not too far-fetched to dream that we might one day see 
this in an Australian parliament.
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1  TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland. I would like to thank Michael Potts and 
Zoe Brereton for research assistance.
2  Under its parent Act, The Law Commission (England and Wales) was tasked with keeping 
the law under review ‘with a view to its systematic development and reform, including in particular 
the codification of law’: Law Commissions Act 1965 (UK) c 22, s 3.
3  The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, Consultation Paper No 177 
(1989) Vols 1 and 2.
Is Criminal Law Reform 
a Lost Cause?
Simon Bronitt1
I. Introduction: The Agendas of Criminal Law 
Reform in the 1990s
In the 1990s, criminal law reform in Australia, as in the United Kingdom, 
was foremost a technical exercise in rationalising legal doctrine (found in 
common law and statutes) in order to resolve ambiguity and modernise 
the law.2 More progressively, law reform commissions, in ongoing 
partnership with the legal academy, set about devising new templates for 
the criminal law founded on codification. In the United Kingdom, this 
work by The Law Commission resulted in the Draft Criminal Code for 
England and Wales in 1989.3 In Australia, criminal law reform followed 
a similar path, beginning with a review of federal criminal law in 1989, 
subsequently spawning a program of national harmonisation in the Model 
Criminal Code (MCC) project, and the enactment of Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth). 
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The reform programs in the United Kingdom and Australia adhered to 
similar formats. The normative resources for criminal law reform were 
limited to a narrow set of guiding principles promoting the liberal values 
of certainty, coherence, and fairness. Little, if any, thought was given to the 
criminal law as a tool of public policy or regulation, or even how criminal 
laws operated in practice; namely, how legal definitions, defences or rules 
of evidence and procedure were mediated, and sometimes even subverted, 
by police culture, prosecutorial and trial practice, or jury directions. 
Empirical perspectives on the operation of the law were gleaned only 
incidentally through the public submission processes, which solicited ‘real 
world’ experiences from professional experts and interest groups. 
Institutional law reform in the 1990s, reflecting the professional 
backgrounds and skills of the judges and legal academics involved, 
tended to focus narrowly on ‘lawyers’ law’, disregarding broader issues 
of empiricism which had animated the legal realism and sociolegal studies 
movement a century earlier: the questions of why, when and how the 
‘law in books’ diverged from the ‘law in action’.4 Without addressing such 
critical contextual questions, insights from social science, psychology 
or criminology rarely informed recommendations about the proper 
direction of reform. As a result, key questions related to regulatory 
effectiveness were rarely addressed, namely whether criminalisation would 
produce the aims of policymakers, or conversely result in unintended 
(even counterproductive) consequences. 
For the purposes of institutional law reform, the guiding normative 
resources were based on three perspectives or sub-disciplines:
• Comparative law, for reflecting on progress made in similar ‘advanced’ 
common law jurisdictions;5
• Legal history, for tracing the genealogy of common law doctrine, 
legislative reform and learned academic writings in a particular field;6
4  A gap first identified by Roscoe Pound in his influential article, ‘Law in Books and Law in 
Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Reports 12.
5  In the UK, comparative research rarely ventured beyond surveys of other comparable ‘developed’ 
common law systems of Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
6  Legal history rarely ventured beyond examining formal sources of law, ignoring the wider 
sociocultural, political and economic influences shaping legal development. Cf A Norrie, Crime, 
Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 
2001); L Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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• Legal theory, for invoking philosophical ideas, values and principles 
(with primacy accorded to liberal values) to underpin or undermine 
specific reform proposals.7 
This failure to engage with external, contextual perspectives on  the 
criminal  law – to move beyond what Nicola Lacey has termed 
the ‘immanent’ or internal critiques of legal doctrine8 – severely limited 
the capacity of law reform commissions to drive significant legal change.9 
There are some notable exceptions where law reform inquiries did venture 
beyond its disciplinary boundaries. For example, in its review of homicide 
law, The Law Commission of England and Wales funded an empirical 
study investigating public opinion relating to homicide severity. This 
groundbreaking research revealed the extent to which moral intuitions 
about offence seriousness in the general public did not always match 
the view of criminal law theorists, or indeed law reformers, especially 
in relation to felony murder.10 But fundamentally, criminal law reform 
remained a liberal enterprise, a technical job for legal scholars and 
academically-minded judges committed to rationalising, simplifying and 
modernising the tangled mess of common law and ad hoc statutes. 
In his millennial essay, the distinguished legal scholar Professor Andrew 
Ashworth posed the question whether ‘criminal law is a lost cause’.11 
His  conclusion then, as now, is that the quest for a more principled 
criminal law, one achieving better conformity between principles and legal 
doctrine, has proven highly elusive. Ashworth’s assessment would equally 
apply to Australia, and to the impact of law reform. But this essay poses 
the question in a different form – whether criminal law reform is a lost 
cause – and, more significantly, draws different conclusions. The essay asks 
whether the ‘liberal promise’ of a more principled and codified criminal 
law should be exhaustive of our aspirations for criminal law reform.
7  See, for example, The Law Commission, Consent in the Criminal Law: A Consultation Paper, 
Consultation Paper No 139 (1995), app C.
8  N Lacey, ‘Legal Constructions of Crime’, in M Maguire, R Morgan and R Reiner (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford University Press, 4th edn, 2007) 192.
9  See discussion in S Bronitt and McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Lawbook Co, 4th edn, 
2017), [1.185]ff.
10  B Mitchell, ‘Public Perceptions of Homicide and Criminal Justice’ (1998) 38(3) British Journal 
of Criminology 453, 459; see also B Mitchell, ‘Further Evidence of the Relationship between Legal and 
Public Opinion on the Law of Homicide’ [2000] Criminal Law Review 814.
11  A Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 225, 232.
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Part II provides a reflection on the impact of institutional law reform over 
the past quarter-century upon the criminal law in Australia, assessing the 
reasons for the prevailing ‘parochial codiphobia’ which resists codification, 
uniformity or even harmonisation at the national level.12 Freed from the 
present obsession with general principles and codification,13 criminal law 
reform needs to be re-formed, drawing upon a broader array of resources 
– disciplinary and methodological as well as financial – than are typically 
available to existing institutional law reform bodies. Part III provides an 
overview of the ad hoc bodies also engaged in law reform, examining the 
reform agenda of the current Royal Commission into Institutional Child 
Sexual Abuse. The essay assesses whether these new agents of law reform, 
although not without limitations, are better positioned to tackle reform 
in a more systemic, holistic and contextual manner, harnessing relevant 
disciplinary and empirical knowledge to produce better policy outcomes. 
II. Model Criminal Laws and the False 
Promise of Codification?
As noted above, the approach to criminal law reform in Australia in the 
1980s and 1990s was not dissimilar to that in the United Kingdom, 
codification being the main priority in both jurisdictions. In the United 
Kingdom, The Law Commission, assisted by a ‘Dream Team’ of leading 
criminal law scholars,14 was tasked to prepare a draft Criminal Code for 
England and Wales. Contemporaneously in Australia, the federal Attorney-
General commissioned former High Court Justice Sir Harry Gibbs to lead 
the Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law, with a view to codifying 
its general principles.15 While the Gibbs Review laid the foundations 
for the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), the proposal for codification in 
the United Kingdom encountered stronger opposition when published 
12  The term ‘codiphobia’ was first coined in the 1850s by Professor Amos to describe the legislative 
hostility to codification: discussed in A Hemming, ‘When Is a Code a Code?’ (2010) 15(1) Deakin Law 
Review 65, fn 9. My adaptation of this neologism is offered in the spirit of Jeremy Bentham, who first 
coined the term ‘codification’. See discussion in S Bronitt, ‘Towards a Universal Theory of Criminal 
Law: Rethinking the Comparative and International Project’ (2008) 27 Criminal Justice Ethics 53. 
13  See L Farmer, ‘The Obsession with Definition: The Nature of Crime and Critical Legal Theory’ 
(1996) 5 Social and Legal Studies 57.
14  The team comprised Sir John Smith, Edward Griew and Ian Dennis: P Roberts, ‘Philosophy, 
Feinberg, Codification, and Consent: A Progress Report on English Experiences of Criminal Law 
Reform’ (2001) 5 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 173, 194. 
15  H Gibbs, R Watson and A Menzies, Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law: Final Report 
(1991). 
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in 1989. Ultimately the draft was shelved as a legislative project, doomed 
to gather dust and haunt the footnotes of academic textbooks. Australia, 
by contrast, was more receptive to codification. This was unsurprising 
in light of the success of codification a century earlier, when Sir Samuel 
Griffith embarked on the modernisation of Queensland’s criminal law that 
led to the passage of the highly influential Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).16 
Building on the momentum following the completion of the Gibbs 
Review in 1988, the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) 
established an intergovernmental Model Criminal Code Officers 
Committee (MCCOC) to draft a Model Criminal Code (MCC) for 
Australia. The lack of uniformity in Australia’s criminal law in the late 
1980s became a focus of concern of these senior officials working in the 
Attorneys-Generals’ Departments of the Commonwealth, states and 
territories. Extending the federal ambition for codification of general 
principles to a national level was never going to be easy. The selling point 
for the MCC was framed in terms of traditional liberal rationale for 
codification: as one member of the MCCOC noted, codification would 
make the criminal law ‘easy to discover, easy to understand, cheap to buy, 
and democratically made and amended’.17 
Implementation, however, has proved to be a stumbling block, with 
selective and piecemeal uptake of the MCC.18 Even regarding the 
Commonwealth, Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory, the 
degree of uniformity achieved has been partial and approximate, focused 
primarily on implementation of the ‘general part’ of the MCC dealing 
with principles of responsibility. Notwithstanding the significant time, 
effort and costs devoted to the MCC project,19 as one commentator 
noted, ‘the political impetus to advance the unification of criminal law 
through a common code appears to have waned for the time being, and a 
profound divide between the two major worlds – the Griffith-based codes 
and the “common law states” – remains’.20
16  See R S O’Regan, ‘Sir Samuel Griffith’s Criminal Code’ (1991) 7(2) Australian Bar Review 141 
and D Wells, ‘“The Griffith Code” – Then and Now’ (1994) 3(2) Griffith Law Review 205.
17  M Goode, ‘Codification of the Australian Criminal Law’ (1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal 5, 8.
18  Ibid. 226, 234. 
19  M Goode, ‘Constructing Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (2002) 26 
Criminal Law Journal 152.
20  S Tarrant, ‘Building Bridges in Australian Criminal Law: Codification and the Common Law’ 
(2013) 39(3) Monash University Law Review 838, 840 (footnote omitted); see also S Bronitt and 
M Gani, ‘Criminal Codes in the 21st Century: The Paradox of the Liberal Promise’, in B McSherry, 
A Norrie and S Bronitt (eds), Regulating Deviance: The Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures 
of Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 235–60.
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Reform of Australia’s criminal law should neither be defined nor limited 
by the dual aims of codification and uniformity, which have proved elusive 
not only because of the ‘code’ and ‘non-code’ divide, but also because of 
the prevailing political discourse of sovereign states’ rights in the field 
of ‘law and order’. This has meant that, across many significant fields of 
the criminal law, law reform has occurred at variable speeds, sometimes 
separated by decades. For example, the ‘marital rape immunity’ was 
repealed by the New South Wales Parliament on 15 May 1981 through 
the enactment of the Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981 
(NSW), 11 years before its repeal in South Australia by way of the 
Criminal Law Consolidation (Rape) Amendment Act 1992 (SA). Similarly, 
the decriminalisation of same sex intercourse was first addressed by South 
Australia through The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Act 
1975 (SA), while Tasmania was the last jurisdiction to enact amending 
legislation in 1997.21
What causes ‘variable speed’ law reform? One cause undoubtedly relates 
to the fact that federal parliament does not possess plenary power vis-a-
vis criminal law, only having the power to enact offences ‘incidental’ to 
other heads of power under the Constitution. Consequently, criminal law 
remains the primary responsibility of each state and territory, rendering 
it especially vulnerable to local ‘law and order’ politics.22 Commonly 
heard claims of jurisdictional uniqueness, especially at election time, 
undoubtedly impede national consensus about the necessity, direction 
and pace of law reform. While in other fields ‘cooperative federalism’ has 
operated to forge national consensus and policy convergence between 
jurisdictions, a condition of ‘uncooperative federalism’ has prevailed.
Having identified the structural limitations facing institutional criminal 
law reform at national and local levels, I turn in Part III to whether ad hoc 
public inquiries – such as Royal Commissions – would be better equipped 
for this purpose.
21  Criminal Code Amendment Act 1997 (Tas).
22  R Hogg and D Brown, Rethinking Law and Order (Pluto Press, 1998), Ch 1; see also 
D Weatherburn, Law and Order in Australia: Rhetoric and Reality (Federation Press, 2004).
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III. Ad Hoc Law Reform: Royal Commissions 
and Other Public Inquiries
The Australian Law Reform Commission undertook an inquiry into the 
roles and functions of Royal Commissions and other public inquiries in 
2009.23 While the use of ad hoc public inquiries is longstanding, their 
purposes have changed over time. In the 19th century, for example, various 
criminal law commissions were established in the United Kingdom 
and its colonies to consider reform. Heavily influenced by Benthamite 
ideals,24 ad hoc commissions can be viewed as the embodiment of liberal 
modernity, aspiring to rationalise, consolidate, and, where possible, codify 
the tangled mess of common law and statutory modifications.
The advent of more investigative Royal Commissions in the 20th century 
had little in common with these earlier commissions. Beyond exercising 
wide inquisitorial fact-finding powers, these bodies were empowered to 
make recommendations for reform. Royal Commissions, however, have 
a somewhat mixed track-record in term of law reform. For example, the 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (1987–1991) placed 
a spotlight on the issue, and developed an ambitious program of national 
reform, though implementation over the subsequent decades has been 
painfully slow.25 More recently, the Royal Commission into Institutional 
Child Sexual Abuse (2013–present) has been highly successful in drawing 
attention to historic and ongoing abuse within institutional settings, with 
an investigative function matched by a significant agenda of national 
policy development and law reform.26 The merits of ad hoc commissions 
are that they are constituted for a specific purpose, undertake extensive 
fact-finding, garner expertise from wherever it exists, and demand more 
public and political attention than standing law reform bodies, which 
in the field of criminal law tend to generate reports that sit on shelves 
gathering dust. 
23  Australian Law Reform Commission, Making Inquiries – A New Statutory Framework, Report 
No 111 (2009).
24  See W Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th edn, 1971) Vol 13, 272.
25  See T Sansbury, ‘State and Territory Implementation of the Recommendations of the Royal 
Commission’ (2001) 5(8) Indigenous Law Bulletin 6.
26  See Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Terms of Reference 
(13 November 2014), www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/about-us/terms-of-reference.
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A strong contrary view has been put forward by the distinguished judge 
and jurist, Ron Sackville. Reviewing the relative merits of standing law 
reform bodies over ad hoc commissions or inquiries, Sackville pointed 
to the high degree of functional overlap, since both bodies: invite or 
seek input on policy through public consultation; maintain a degree of 
independence from the executive; confer democratic legitimacy since 
both are constituted by statute, and recommendations, if implemented, 
are done so by an elected parliament;27 and receive terms of reference from 
the executive, ensuring accountability to government.28 According to 
Sackville, the key difference between these two bodies relates to longevity: 
Royal Commissions are ad hoc and time-limited processes, while law 
reform bodies are permanent.29 The former are not dominated by lawyers, 
and often frequently inquire into areas that would not be viewed as within 
the remit of law reform, even in its broadest sense. Citing the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry (1987–1989) as an example, Sackville concluded that far-reaching 
reform in electoral matters and governmental transparency in Queensland 
would probably never have been addressed by a law reform agency. That 
said, he concluded the differences may not be as great as they first appear, 
with significant overlap in terms of the range of matters reviewed and 
recommendations made.30 
From a systemic perspective, Sackville concluded this functional overlap 
was duplicative and wasteful. Also, many of the issues tackled were 
ongoing, leading some ad hoc commissions to call for the establishment 
of standing bodies to govern the subject matter into which they are 
inquiring. Sackville concluded that standing law reform agencies, given 
their relative low cost and specialisation in undertaking inquiries, should 
assume (at least in part) the law reform functions of Royal Commissions.31 
I do not share Sackville’s assessment of comparative advantage for 
the following reasons. First, in terms of ‘value for money’, law reform 
agencies look much less impressive when implementation records are 
compared. Secondly, Sackville’s view of enhanced ‘specialisation’ within 
27  R Sackville, ‘Law Reform Agencies and Royal Commissions: Toiling in the Same Field?’ 
in B Opeskin and D Weisbrot (eds), The Promise of Law Reform (Federation Press, 2005) 274, 281.
28  This makes the timing and tailoring of such inquiries inherently political and vulnerable 
to misuse: ibid. 284. 
29  That said, Royal Commissions often examine matters not initially contemplated by the 
governments that established them: ibid. 281.
30  Ibid. 283.
31  For a similar viewpoint, see D Weisbrot, ‘The Future for Institutional Law Reform’, in B Opeskin 
and D Weisbrot (eds), The Promise of Law Reform (Federation Press, 2005) 18, 22.
141
10 . IS CRIMINAL LAW REFORM A LOST CAUSE?
standing law reform agencies is restricted to legal knowledge and research 
methods, overlooking broader interdisciplinary capabilities and resources 
potentially available to ad hoc bodies. Regarding the latter, ad hoc 
commissions are better placed to harness and coordinate a wider diversity 
of expertise and inputs into the policy change and law reform processes, 
and to approach the ‘problem’ in a more systemic, holistic and contextual 
manner. Importantly, ad hoc bodies are not limited to recommending 
legal solutions, but can examine a much wider range of policy options 
including, but not limited to, law reform. Another advantage is that the 
ad hoc model tends to attract more public and political attention than the 
work of standing agencies, which, though independent from government, 
receive less attention when their reports are released. Even with the 
advent of executive summaries and media releases, a technical law reform 
commission final report on the law of complicity, for example, is unlikely 
to attract much interest beyond a small group of practitioners, judges 
and academics. Finally, like a jury, which commands great power for only 
a brief moment in time, the ad hoc body may achieve a higher degree 
of  practical independence than a standing body, whose organisational 
culture and independence may ultimately be negatively affected by 
governmental clientelism and budgetary insecurity.32
IV. Conclusion
For much of the past two decades, criminal law reform has focused on 
the dual related agendas of codification and harmonisation, though 
the realisation of the liberal promise for the criminal law has been 
hampered by ‘parochial codiphobia’ and an ‘uncivil’ politics of law and 
order. As a  consequence, many carefully researched and considered 
recommendations of standing law reform bodies remain unimplemented. 
The precise extent of this ‘implementation deficit’ is unknown, which is 
surprising in the modern era of new public management with its emphasis 
on impact and performance measurement in the public sector. 
32  The erosion of funding and government support for institutional law reform is outlined in 
a Submission by former ALRC President, David Weisbrot, to the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Committee, 28 January 2011: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_
and_Constitutional_Affairs/Completed_inquiries/2010-13/lawreformcommission/submissions.
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
142
Perhaps it is time to return to investigate more fully the relationship 
between ad hoc and standing law reform bodies, and how the beneficial 
aspects these various bodies and processes can be harnessed and better 
coordinated. In my view, the benchmark for ‘good’ or ‘better’ criminal 
law reform should be the same that applies to public policy generally: 
is reform based on the best available evidence, and informed by expert 
opinion? Expertise in this context should not be limited to the judiciary, 
profession and legal academy. My contextual approach to reform requires 
a stronger commitment to empiricism, but also proactive engagement 
with the wider community. This will provide a better understanding of 
the complexity of the problem, as well as enhance the legitimacy of the 
reform process. The ad hoc model ultimately favoured in this essay does 
carry some risk of increased cost, delay and political misuse – though in 
this respect, the model is no different from those risks associated with the 
current ‘mixed’ system. 
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Rethinking Rape Law Reform: 
Challenges and Possibilities
Wendy Larcombe1
I. Rape Law Reform
Having been involved with rape law reform in different roles and capacities 
over the past 25 years, it is disappointing to be arguing that the main 
challenge to be addressed in this field of law in the future is the same 
as it was 25 and more years ago. That challenge is: the legal system, and 
in particular the criminal justice system, must better support the justice 
needs of sexual violence survivors. 
I want to make this argument with some care because Australian 
jurisdictions have now experienced more than 40 years of rape law reforms 
intended to:
• redress gender bias in the criminal law’s definition of and response 
to rape; 
• make the law more reflective of the ‘reality’ of sexual violence – who 
perpetrates it, against whom, in what circumstances and contexts; and
• improve the experience for complainants participating in criminal 
prosecutions.
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Those legislative reforms – to the substantive criminal law, to evidence law 
and court procedures – have been driven by the immense determination 
and intelligence of feminist activists and victim/survivor advocates. Every 
change has been hard-fought and hard-won.
And much has been achieved. As a feminist and queer scholar, I view it 
as a significant achievement that rape and other forms of sexual offending 
against male, trans and intersex people are now recognised, while only 
non-consensual (and not consensual) sexual activity within lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and queer communities is now prosecuted. Prior to the statutory 
reforms of recent decades this was not the case.
It is also highly significant that there is no longer legal immunity for 
husbands who rape their wives. Although the High Court told us in 2012 
that there was no such immunity under the common law in Australia 
during the 20th century,2 as no one had known that that was the case, the 
legislative reforms to criminalise rape in marriage from the mid-1980s 
onward were critically important.
Other significant advances include:
• that complainants can no longer be routinely cross-examined about 
their general sexual history;
• that a rape complaint is no longer disqualified if the victim/survivor 
cannot be sure whether it was a penis or a finger or an object that was 
inserted into their vagina or anus;
• that judges can no longer give routine warnings about the unreliability 
of the evidence that women and children provide in sexual matters 
and, hence, the need for corroboration;
• the development of affirmative, statutory definitions of consent as ‘free 
agreement’ and codification of circumstances that preclude consent;
• restrictions on the defence use of a complainant’s confidential 
counselling records; 
• provisions for vulnerable witnesses to give evidence remotely and/or 
have a support person sit with them; and
2  PGA v The Queen [2012] 245 CLR 355. See Wendy Larcombe and Mary Heath, ‘Developing 
the Common Law and Rewriting the History of Rape in Marriage in Australia: PGA v The Queen’ 
(2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 785.
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• specialist police units and specialist court lists for sexual offences in 
which investigators, judges, prosecutors and court personnel have 
undertaken training in the needs and experiences of sexual violence 
victims/survivors.
The list of positive reforms goes on. Much has been achieved. Yet, 
frustratingly, the primary challenge for law reform remains the same. 
To better support the justice needs of sexual violence survivors, two core 
problems must be addressed.
A. Problem 1: The criminal justice system does not 
provide an accessible, effective resolution to sexual 
offending for the vast majority of victims/survivors
The Australian Bureau of Statistics3 reports that 17 per cent of women and 
4 per cent of men have experienced sexual assault since the age of 15 years. 
In addition, 12 per cent of women and 4.5 per cent of men experienced 
sexual assault before the age of 15 years. It is estimated that fewer than 
one in five sexual assaults is reported to the police and that figure has not 
increased in response to reforms.4 Of those reported assaults, fewer than 
one in five will be prosecuted and approximately 10–15 per cent will 
register a conviction on any charge. This means that the overall conviction 
rate for sexual assaults in Australia is less than 5 per cent and, in some 
jurisdictions, less than 1 per cent.
Paradoxically, conviction rates for rape have fallen across the 40 years of 
feminist-inspired law reform. The (widely known) low conviction rate 
now contributes to low reporting. It also confirms the public perception 
that rape survivors are treated poorly and their claims not taken seriously 
3  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2012). Personal Safety Survey: 4906.0 (Canberra: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics).
4  Statistics on rape case attrition are reviewed at length in Wendy Larcombe, ‘Sex Offender Risk 
Assessment: The Need to Place Recidivism Research in the Context of Attrition in the Criminal Justice 
System’ (2012) 18(4) Violence Against Women 482; W Larcombe, ‘Falling Rape Conviction Rates: 
(Some) Feminist Aims and Measures for Rape Law’ (2011) 19(1) Feminist Legal Studies 27; Kathleen 
Daly and Brigitte Bouhours, ‘Rape and Attrition in the Legal Process: A Comparative Analysis of Five 
Countries’, in M Tonry (ed), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research (University of Chicago 
Press, 2010) Vol 39, 485–565.
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in the criminal justice process.5 As a result, more than 80 per cent of 
people who experience sexual violence do not engage with the criminal 
justice system.
B. Problem 2: Those convictions that are secured 
for sexual assault are unrepresentative of the most 
common forms of sexual violence experienced by 
women and children
Most sexual assaults are committed against women and children by known 
male family members, friends or acquaintances, in private homes, and in 
circumstances where force or violence are not necessary to effect the assault. 
In many instances, women and children are subjected to repeated offences 
by the same offender.6 ABS and police data show that young women aged 
16 to 24, Indigenous and Torres Strait Islander women, and people with 
cognitive impairments or intellectual disabilities are particularly vulnerable 
to sexual assault. It is this offending that victim advocates and feminist 
reformers have wanted recognised and criminalised through legislative 
amendments. That is why the focus has been on removing requirements 
for force and resistance, abolishing spousal immunity, and requiring free 
and voluntary consent (from a person who has the capacity at the time to 
provide such consent).
However, if we look at the outcomes of criminal prosecutions, rather 
than the statutory provisions, it is evident that the criminal justice 
process continues to reproduce what Susan Estrich called the ‘real rape’ 
stereotype.7 The cases that secure, and those that fail to secure, criminal 
convictions tell us that it is still very difficult to successfully prosecute rape 
or sexual assault when:
• the offender is a current or former intimate partner;
• no weapon or threats of physical violence were used;
• the victim did not sustain physical injury;
5  See especially Denise Lievore, Non-reporting and Hidden Recording of Sexual Assault: 
An  International Literature Review (Australian Institute of Criminology for the Commonwealth 
Office of the Status of Women, 2003); Haley Clark, ‘What is the Justice System Willing to Offer?: 
Understanding Sexual Assault Victim/Survivors’ Criminal Justice Needs’, Family Matters No 85 
(Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2010).
6  ABS, above n 3; Lievore, above n 5.
7  Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Harvard University Press, 1987).
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• the victim did not resist or protest;
• the victim was heavily intoxicated (by drugs or alcohol) but not 
unconscious;
• the victim has a history of mental health difficulties, has previously 
experienced or reported sexual assault, or has a criminal conviction.
In short, the stereotype of ‘real rape’ continues to disqualify the majority 
of women and many members of highly vulnerable groups who experience 
sexual assault from securing legal redress. Victims/survivors with 
particular attributes and capacities are still preferred in the criminal justice 
process.8 Just as problematic, rape case attrition is highly skewed in favour 
of prosecuting a small class of offenders. As I’ve argued elsewhere, those 
convicted of sex offences are not representative of those who commit sex 
offences, nor are they always representative of those who pose the most 
‘danger’ to women and children.9
A distorted idea of the sex offender who merits criminal punishment 
has only been exacerbated in recent years by (non-feminist) criminal law 
reform that has introduced measures such as post-sentence detention, 
ongoing supervision and registration of ‘serious’ sex offenders. These 
provisions perpetuate (false) beliefs that sexual offenders are a small group 
of deviant psychopaths, with unique characteristics who pose a distinct 
risk to the community. This ‘myth’ undermines attempts to criminalise 
commonplace sexual offending. 
In sum, the criminal law, in practice, is not providing an effective, accessible 
justice option for victims/survivors and, by not being able to prosecute 
the most common forms of sexual offending practised in the community, 
it is actively contributing to the minimisation and normalisation of such 
violence, while reproducing a distorted idea of ‘real rape’ and deviant 
‘sexual offenders’. 
8  Wendy Larcombe, ‘The Ideal Victim v Successful Rape Complainants: Not What You Might 
Expect’ (2002) 10(2) Feminist Legal Studies 131.
9  Larcombe, ‘Sex Offender Risk Assessment’, above n 4.
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II. What Should the Legal and Policy 
Responses Be, and Why?
The following three proposals are my priorities for further law reform. 
Note that these are in the ‘blue sky’ domain of what is needed, not necessarily 
the domain of ‘what is immediately feasible’, or ‘politically realistic’. 
A. Proposal 1: Judge-alone trials
In line with practice in Canada, and with calls from commentators 
and service providers in New Zealand and England and Wales, I would 
advocate that trials for sexual offences should be heard by judge alone. I know 
this proposal will be contentious, but I believe that removing the jury 
is the single measure most likely to improve criminal prosecutions and 
outcomes for sexual offences. More particularly, I believe it is a necessary 
step for rebuilding victims/survivors’ confidence in the criminal justice 
system, and ensuring convictions in ‘ordinary’ cases of sexual offending.
The jury is currently perceived by various stakeholders as the ‘weakest link’ 
in the criminal prosecution of sexual offences.10 Much of the attrition 
that marks sexual cases in the criminal process is attributable to the fact 
that decision-makers at each stage anticipate (correctly) that at least 
some jurors on any panel will endorse so-called ‘rape myths’ and ‘victim-
blaming attitudes’. Such beliefs and attitudes are known to be widely held 
and to predetermine interpretations of evidence and fact-finding in rape 
cases. This is why we have already created specialised courts (or court lists) 
for sexual offences in which judges, prosecutors and other court personnel 
have received training in the distinct features and diverse forms of sexual 
offending. The average person simply does not have a sound understanding 
of when or how sexual offending occurs, how it is effected by perpetrators, 
and how survivors may respond. This makes sexual offending ill-suited to 
jury determination. 
A range of measures have been developed or proposed in recent years to 
try to educate criminal juries about sexual assault and to correct common 
misconceptions. Why is jury education not preferable to judge-only 
trials? First, we cannot know whether jury education works to remediate 
10  Wendy Larcombe et al,  ‘“I Think It’s Rape and I Think He Would Be Found Not Guilty”: Focus 
Group Perceptions of (un)Reasonable Belief in Consent in Rape Law’ (2016) 25(5) Social & Legal 
Studies 611–629. 
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misconceptions and flawed decision-making (decision-making based 
on false assumptions and stereotypes). We cannot eavesdrop on jury 
deliberations and the verdict does not reveal the reasoning. In any event, 
jury education cannot be done efficiently. If an expert has to be sworn in 
for every sexual offence trial in the county or district courts, experts will 
be spending most of their time in court speaking to juries about sexual 
offending. It is simply more efficient to educate the judiciary and allow 
them to determine the questions of fact as well as those of law.
Other potential benefits of judge-alone trials discussed in the literature 
include that they:
• ensure decision-making based on legally relevant factors and evidence;
• mean that published reasons are available – everyone can know where 
or why a prosecution or defence failed (or succeeded);
• solve problems with jury understanding of the proper uses (and 
limitations) of tendency or context evidence, forensic evidence 
and expert witness testimony;
• eliminate appeals based on inadequate or inaccurate jury directions;
• may be fairer to defendants who fit negative stereotypes or who are 
charged with highly stigmatised offences;
• afford the court greater flexibility in management of trials;
• may enable prosecutors and defence to focus more on testing 
of evidence and less on jury understanding and persuasion;
• may assist to secure community and professional confidence in 
criminal prosecutions and outcomes – undermined currently by the 
expectation that criminal prosecutions will be determined by jury 
members’ beliefs and attitudes.
Note that I do not imagine that judge-alone trials will be a silver bullet 
that solves all the issues that have been identified with rape trials. And I do 
not for a minute think that all judges, even if they have been selected and 
trained to sit on sexual offences lists, will have a sensitive understanding 
of sexual offending and survivor responses. But we would be able to 
identify ongoing issues and problems through the published reasons. 
And  wrongful acquittals will be potentially correctable by an appeal 
court.11 Jury education does not enable such review.
11  See, for example, the decision of the Court of Appeal of Alberta on an appeal against acquittal 
in R v Wagar, 2015 ABCA 327 (CanLII).
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B. Proposal 2: Promote alternative justice options 
utilising civil law and civil society
While it is essential that the criminal justice response to sexual offending 
is improved, in order to offer effective forms of redress to all survivors 
of sexual violence, the criminal law’s monopoly on sexual assault must 
be broken. Rape and sexual assault cannot always, and perhaps should 
not always, be criminally prosecuted. Depending on the context and 
the victim/survivor’s wishes, it may be more appropriate to respond to 
sexual assault as a tortious wrong, or through the frameworks providing 
protection against sexual harassment and discrimination, or through 
family violence protection orders, or through family conferencing or 
mediation, or through ‘restorative justice’ conferencing – via public 
funded or private services. 
Until relatively recently, the criminal law’s monopoly on rape and sexual 
assault has been supported by feminist efforts to ensure that sexual violence 
is formally treated as criminal conduct, not merely as ‘bad’ or ‘unwanted 
sex’. However, the rise and rise of ‘tough on crime’ politics and, with it, 
the increasing stigma associated with sexual offending have changed the 
politics of this field. Those changes have not been positive – especially 
considering that many victims/survivors do not want to bring the shame 
and stigma of identifying a ‘sex offender’ in their immediate social or 
family circle. As a result, ‘ordinary’ forms of sexual assault may now be 
more readily acknowledged and redressed if they are not prosecuted 
as a crime. 
And we may do less harm to complainants in the process. Sexual assault 
is a violation of a person’s autonomy and integrity. That injury has been 
compounded in traditional criminal justice processes by the victim/
survivor being re-placed in a powerless position as a witness for the 
prosecution, often feeling that they are again being used instrumentally 
to advance others’ interests (society’s this time), while their choices and 
needs are disregarded or belittled. This positioning of the survivor echoes 
and triggers elements of the original assault, generating distress and often 
prolonging recovery.12
12  Clark, above n 5.
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These shortcomings of ‘conventional criminal’ processes have led to 
a recent wave of interest and investment in ‘innovative’ and ‘restorative’ 
justice alternatives for sexual violence. It is critical that, as alternative justice 
processes or pathways are promoted and hopefully better coordinated, 
victim/survivors are given greater say about what they would like to 
happen, as well as information and advice about which justice pathways 
or options may best suit their needs. Indeed, affording the survivor some 
agency in decisions about processes and forms of redress will be critical to 
these being genuine ‘alternatives’ to the criminal justice response. 
C. Proposal 3: A national legal response
Sexual violence is a pervasive and wicked social problem. It is not caused 
by, but it is not helped by, divergent legal provisions and inconsistent legal 
enforcement across the different Australian jurisdictions. There has been 
a strong degree of convergence in the criminal provisions governing sexual 
offences in the various Australian jurisdictions over the past 10–20 years, 
so the call for consistency may seem less urgent now than it was when 
model criminal codes were being developed in the 1990s. But there are 
still problems at the borders (literally) in terms of different investigation 
and charging practices on either side of state lines, problems for the public 
in understanding the different terms used to label offences in different 
jurisdictions, and problems in the differential treatment of offenders 
and victims depending on the prosecuting jurisdiction. For victims and 
offenders, a postcode lottery should not determine the services, programs 
and choices available. 
To address similar problems in relation to family violence, the Australian 
Law Reform Commission13 has called for development of ‘a common 
interpretative framework’, to be applied across relevant state, territory 
and Commonwealth legislation, that establishes a shared understanding 
of: the nature, features and dynamics of family violence; core purposes 
of legislative schemes; and guiding principles for equality of treatment of 
family violence victims, with coordinated responses administered (for all 
intents and purposes) through a ‘single court’. Hopefully, the current 
pressure to integrate (or at least coordinate) family violence and sexual 
assault responses – which have historically been handled within civil and 
criminal frameworks respectively – will mean that sexual assault is also 
13  ALRC, Family Violence: A National Legal Response (Report 114, 2010).
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understood to require a consistent national response. If the justice needs 
of victims/survivors are to be appropriately supported, strategies, services 
and responses to sexual violence must be consistent and coordinated, 
nationally.
III. Conclusion
To ensure that the law provides and supports effective redress for sexual 
violence victims/survivors, law reform should:
• institute judge-alone trials for common sexual offences;
• promote civil law and civil-society ‘alternatives’ to criminal prosecution;
• develop a national legal response that promotes consistency in 
approach, and equality in treatment and service access, across the 
jurisdictions.
I hope it will not take another 25 years to see these proposals realised.
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1  Associate Professor, Newcastle Law School, University of Newcastle.
2  Murdoch v The Queen [2013] VSCA 272, [92]–[93] (Priest JA).
The Fraught Dichotomy between 
Context and Tendency Evidence 
in Sexual Assault Cases – 
Suggestions for Reform
John Anderson1
These distinctions [between tendency and relationship/context evidence] 
– somewhat fine – are productive of much uncertainty, and therefore 
much difficulty for trial judges. In a trial for a sexual offence, where many 
of these concepts may intersect, the task of a trial judge in explaining 
coherently the use (and non-misuse) of evidence falling within the different 
categories is an unenviable one, as is the task of a jury of lay persons in 
comprehending and faithfully applying the required directions. In my 
opinion, relationship evidence – including context evidence – should be 
seen for what it is. It is tendency evidence.2
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I. Background: Characterisation of Evidence 
as Tendency or Relationship/Context
Evidence to establish a relationship between the defendant and complainant 
in a trial involving allegations of sexual assault or to provide a contextual 
background to those allegations has been held to be relevant for a variety 
of reasons,3 although they can be summed up as going to the credibility 
of the complainant by assisting to explain what the tribunal of fact often 
perceives to be their counterintuitive behaviours. Relevance will depend 
on the nature of the defence case, as relationship evidence can place the 
complainant’s account of events in its realistic context, thus providing 
the capacity to answer questions which ‘may fairly be expected to arise 
in the minds of the jury were they limited to a consideration of evidence 
of the offences charged’.4 Accordingly, on those bases such evidence 
will ordinarily reach the threshold of a minimal logical connection to 
‘the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding’, 5 
usually whether the sexual conduct took place at all. As Howie J usefully 
observed, it is evidence that ‘may allow the jury to infer some aspect of 
the complainant’s conduct but it does not give rise to any inference about 
the accused’s conduct’.6
Importantly, context evidence cannot be used for a tendency purpose, that 
is, to establish that any of the charged offences occurred or as tending to 
show the defendant had wrongful sexual feelings towards the complainant 
and it was more likely they committed those offences.7 In practice, the 
nature of context evidence is finely distinguished from tendency evidence 
particularly where it involves uncharged sexual acts of the same general 
nature as the sexual assault charges in the indictment. There is clear 
potential for overlap, which results in significant complexity in properly 
categorising the evidence. Priest JA was driven to the conclusion that 
‘relationship evidence – including context evidence – should be seen for 
3  For example, it may be relevant to explain why a complainant feared the defendant (R v AH 
(1997) 42 NSWLR 702; R v WJT [2001] NSWCCA 405), or why there was a failure to show 
distress or complain: KTR v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 271, [99]–[101]; FH v The Queen [2014] 
NSWCCA 231, [49]–[50].
4  HML v The Queen (2008) 235 CLR 334, 397 (Kiefel J). See also Steadman v The Queen (No 2) 
[2013] NSWCCA 56, [13].
5  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 55. The Evidence Acts in NSW, Victoria, Tasmania, ACT and NT are 
modelled on the Commonwealth Act and are substantially uniform in their construction. 
6  Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A Crim R 463, 494.
7  Rodden v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 53, [48].
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what it is … tendency evidence’. 8 Although the other two judges didn’t 
join in this opinion,9 the correct characterisation of the ‘true relevance’ 
of the evidence is a most important concern of the courts as they must 
ensure that relationship evidence is not simply ‘tendency evidence 
admitted by the back door’.10 In the interests of a fair trial, the existence 
of this complex dichotomy is such that the court must either exclude 
relationship/context evidence entirely or properly limit its use through 
precise guidance. Specific examples of evidence that may not be admissible 
if relationship/context evidence was treated as if it were tendency evidence 
include: multiple huggings by an adult of a child by bringing their whole 
bodies into contact for an extended period,11 being very ‘touchy feely’ 
with a young child by having an arm constantly around her and kissing 
her on the cheek,12 and multiple acts of a sexual nature such as being 
naked and masturbating in the presence of a child, walking in while the 
child is showering, trying to get into the child’s bed and demanding she 
take off her clothes.13 
There are important procedural distinctions in the admissibility of these 
two subtly different types of evidence. Relationship/context evidence 
doesn’t fall within the s 97 exclusionary rule or the further admissibility 
restriction in s 101(2). After meeting the relevance threshold, it becomes 
subject only to judicial exclusion through ss 135 or 137. As such evidence 
is invariably adduced by the prosecution in sexual assault cases, the 
defendant seeking exclusion under s 137 must persuade14 the court that 
the ‘probative value15 is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 
to the defendant’.16 This onus is directly opposed to ss 97 and 101(2) 
which makes tendency evidence inadmissible unless the prosecution 
8  Murdoch v The Queen, above n 2.
9  Observing at [11] it was ‘not the occasion … to explore context or relationship evidence’ in the 
specific circumstances of the case.
10  RWC v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 332, [115]; Steadman v The Queen (No 2) [2013] 
NSWCCA 56, [11]–[18].
11  See R v Landmeter [2015] SASCFC 3.
12  See R v Zappavigna [2015] SASCFC 8.
13  Steadman v The Queen [No 1] [2013] NSWCCA 55 and Steadman v The Queen [No 2] [2013] 
NSWCCA 56.
14  R v DG [2010] VSCA 173, [54].
15  Probative value is taken ‘at its highest’: see IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14, [44]–[58]. 
16  That is, a real risk that the evidence will be misused in some unfair way: see R v Lisoff [1999] 
NSWCCA 364.
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persuades the court that the evidence is of ‘significant probative value’17 
and it  substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on 
the defendant. 
Therefore, rather than relationship/context evidence being excluded 
under s 137, it is often admitted as relevant subject to the need for careful 
judicial directions about its limited use in jury deliberations, particularly 
that ‘the relationship evidence cannot be regarded as a substitute for the 
evidence that the accused committed the charged sexual acts, or for the 
purpose of showing that the accused is “the kind of person” likely to have 
committed that offence’.18 As Priest JA observed, this is an ‘unenviable 
task’,19 which assumes juror comprehension of using the evidence for 
a purpose that has been otherwise described as ‘contrary to ordinary human 
experience’20 and counterintuitive to the ordinary reasoning processes of 
lay fact-finders about human behaviour. The directions are supposed to be 
capable of ameliorating the potential prejudicial effect to the defendant; 
however, various jury studies indicate the assumption of courts that 
directions are effective may be misplaced in certain circumstances.21  
17  The divergent Victorian and NSW judicial approaches to the interpretation of the phrase 
‘significant probative value’ in s 97 evident when comparing Velkoski v The Queen [2014] VSCA 
121 with Hughes v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 330 were resolved by a 4:3 majority decision of 
the High Court in Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20. The broader NSW approach was adopted 
by the High Court in holding that similarity between the tendency evidence and facts in issue of 
the charged offence is not a pre-requisite to a finding of ‘significant probative value’. The tendency 
evidence should make more likely, to a significant extent, the facts that make up the elements of the 
offence charged either by itself or together with other evidence adduced or to be adduced in the case. 
This does not include a requirement for ‘similarity or … of “underlying unity”, “pattern of conduct” 
or “modus operandi”’(per Keifel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ at [34]).
18  Benson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 51, [30] (Neave JA).
19  Murdoch v The Queen, above n 2.
20  DJV v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 272, [31]. See also Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 171 A 
Crim R 463 where the court referred to the NSW Judicial Commission Criminal Trial Courts Bench 
Book model direction on relationship evidence ([4-215]) with approval.
21  See, for example, Wissler and Saks, ‘On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions’ (1985) 9 Law 
and Human Behaviour 37; Lloyd-Bostock, ‘The Effects on Juries of Hearing about the Defendant’s 
Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study’ (2000) Criminal Law Review 734; Schaefer and 
Hansen, ‘Similar Fact Evidence and Limited Use Instructions: An Empirical Investigation’ (1990) 14 
Criminal Law Journal 157; Cush and Goodman-Delahunty, ‘The Influence of Limiting Instructions 
on Processing and Judgments of Emotionally Evocative Evidence’ (2006) 13(1) Psychiatry, Psychology 
and Law 110. Compare Trimboli, ‘Juror Understanding of Judicial Instructions in Criminal Trials’ 
(2008) NSW BOCSAR Crime and Justice Bulletin No 119.
157
12 . THE FRAUGHT DICHOTOMy BETWEEN CONTExT AND TENDENCy EVIDENCE
II. The Problem
The upshot of experiences in criminal trials and appeals involving sexual 
assault offences is a fraught dichotomy between relationship/context 
and tendency evidence. The essential problem is whether priority should 
be given to admitting all probative evidence or to minimising the risk 
of wrongful convictions. 
Policy arguments to accommodate admissibility of relationship/context 
evidence focus on facilitating the successful prosecution of sexual assault 
charges, particularly cases where the perceived counterintuitive behaviours 
revealed in testimony requiring some form of explanation may be most 
evident. Arguments include that the entire law enforcement and court 
process makes it difficult for complainants, particularly children, to be 
encouraged to report sexual assaults and then give evidence in court, the 
low rate of convictions where such cases proceed to trial, and the serious 
nature of the problem in society where it is perceived as abhorrent but 
that most perpetrators ‘get away with it’. The arguments for more liberal 
admissibility of ‘discreditable’ forms of evidence extend to lowering the 
threshold of admissibility of tendency evidence because of courts ‘placing 
unwarranted obstacles in the path of efforts to prosecute child sexual 
offenders’.22 The trial spotlight is on the ‘battle of credibility between the 
complainant and the defendant’ where the presumption of innocence 
and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt are viewed as 
strongly favouring the defendant such that the stringent operation of the 
exclusionary rule is challenged and it is contended that other probative 
misconduct evidence should be more readily admissible.23 
Contrary to these arguments, the overriding requirement of a fair trial 
for a defendant who is presumed innocent and the highly prejudicial 
nature of most relationship/context evidence, particularly uncharged 
sexual acts, raises counter-arguments that there must be closer analysis 
of the relevance of context evidence and a transparent balancing of the 
important factors in deciding its admissibility to ensure a conviction is 
not on the basis of suspicion and unfair preconceptions of a defendant’s 
22  Hamer, ‘Proof of Serial Child Sexual Abuse: Case-law Developments and Recidivism Data’ 
in Crofts and Loughnan (eds), Criminalisation and Criminal Responsibility in Australia (2015), 
247, 250–51. See also Cossins, ‘The Behaviour of Serial Child Sex Offenders; Implications for the 
Prosecution of Child Sex Offences in Joint Trials’ (2011) 35(3) Melbourne University Law Review 821.
23  Hamer, above n 22, 244, 260.
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‘character’. The frequency and likeness of the ‘discreditable’ conduct can 
ultimately lead to a blurring of the incidents and preemptive judgment 
of guilt without the ordinary procedural safeguards that apply to proof 
of a criminal offence. That does not necessarily mean there will be fewer 
convictions in these cases; rather, due process and fairness are placed at the 
forefront of procedural and evidentiary considerations.
III. Suggestions for Reform
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) considered a proposal 
for broadening the scope of s 101 to encompass all evidence that tends to 
reveal the past disreputable conduct of a defendant.24 There were strongly 
opposing views: concern that such dangerous evidence was currently 
too readily admitted into evidence against the concern that important 
probative evidence would be excluded leading to inconsistent outcomes.25 
The three procedural safeguards which apply to tendency evidence in 
relation to the party bearing the onus of proof, the heightened barrier 
for admissibility requiring significant probative value, and the evidence 
having ‘any prejudicial effect’ as opposed to a ‘danger of unfair prejudice’ 
were examined for extension to context evidence. Ultimately, though, 
the ALRC view was that the prosecution would be likely in practice to 
‘disavow any attempt to use the evidence for a propensity purpose and 
concede the need for a warning that the evidence not be used for that 
purpose’26 thereby providing a strong argument that the probative value 
for a context purpose substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect on the 
defendant. This approach takes advantage of the court’s firm assumption 
that limiting directions are capable of alleviating prejudice, making 
it difficult for the defence to challenge admissibility on the basis that 
directions would be inadequate. Overall, the benefits were found to be 
inconclusive and, as extending the scope of s 101 was unlikely to have 
a practical impact, it was better not to do so. This reasoning was largely 
speculative and not persuasive.
24  Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Uniform Evidence Law, Report 102 (2005), 
[11.76].
25  Ibid. [11.80]–[11.81].
26  Ibid. [11.87].
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South Australia, a common law jurisdiction, inserted s 34P into their 
Evidence Act 1929,27 which makes evidence of all ‘discreditable conduct’, 
including uncharged sexual acts, presumptively inadmissible. The 
prosecution must persuade the judge that the probative value of such 
evidence, which relies on a particular disposition of the defendant as 
circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue, is strong having regard to the 
particular issue/s arising at trial and must substantially outweigh any 
prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant before it is admissible. When 
determining the balance between probative value and prejudicial effect 
the judge must consider whether the permissible use of the discreditable 
conduct evidence can be kept sufficiently separate and distinct so as to 
remove any appreciable risk of it being used impermissibly to prove that 
the defendant is more likely to have committed the offence. The legislative 
intention is to ensure that the trial judge engages in a transparent balancing 
task to reflect the more burdensome threshold for admissibility of this 
potentially dangerous evidence. Further, s 34R requires the trial judge to 
identify and explain to the jury the purposes for which the discreditable 
conduct evidence may and may not be used. This is to compel judges 
to carefully consider the nature and utility of directions. The genuine 
effectiveness of such directions is not directly addressed by the legislation 
and can only be urged in defence arguments using relevant studies and 
empirical evidence. 
The practical effect of these provisions can be gauged through their 
interpretation and application in the cases. Largely, the ALRC prediction 
in relation to extending the scope of s 101 has been realised through 
the practical operation of s 34P. Judges continue to rely heavily on the 
utility of directions to ameliorate the prejudicial effect of relationship/
context evidence and have continued to admit such evidence as relevant 
and probative28 or have characterised it as forming part of the proof of 
elements of generalised charges, such as ‘persistent sexual exploitation of 
a child’.29 If the courts continue to make the assumption that directions 
are effective in restricting prejudice, the legislative efforts through 
the transparent balancing test with the prosecution onus to persuade the 
27  Evidence (Discreditable Conduct) Amendment Act 2011 (SA) commenced 1 June 2012. 
An important catalyst was the confusing aftermath of the High Court decision in HML v The Queen 
(2008) 235 CLR 334.
28  See, for example, R v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1; R v C, CN [2013] SASCFC 44; R v 
Zappavigna [2015] SASCFC 8, [34]–[60]; R v F, AD [2015] SASCFC 130, [21]–[41]. 
29  See R v Landmeter [2015] SASCFC 3, [27] (Vanstone and Bampton JJ), [113]–[114] (Peek J 
dissenting).
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court that the ‘discreditable evidence’ should be admitted will come to 
nought. Arguably the intent and spirit of the legislation would support 
a more exacting application of the admissibility threshold with directions 
only available where they can effectively remove any appreciable risk of 
the evidence being used for the impermissible purpose.
If it is largely about maintaining the credibility of complainants because 
they appear to have behaved in a counterintuitive manner, then more liberal 
use of expert evidence to explain this behaviour may be preferable to the 
possibility of creating another statutory exclusionary rule. Alternatively, 
these reforms could operate to complement each other in practical 
operation and effect. The credibility of a complainant may be tainted to 
varying degrees by having to narrate isolated incidents, as the jury may find 
such a disjointed account to be ‘astonishing, and almost unbelievable’.30 
This reform suggestion raises the issue of whether expert evidence is an 
effective and less prejudicial alternative to the use of relationship/context 
evidence as a means of dispelling common misconceptions about how 
sexual assault complainants behave, both before and after sexual abuse, 
particularly where it has been systematic and sustained.
Sections 79(2) and 108C(2) specifically provide for the use of expert 
evidence in child sexual assault cases, allowing persons with specialised 
knowledge to testify on matters concerning child development and 
behaviour as an exception to the opinion and credibility rules.31 In MA v 
The Queen the prosecution led expert evidence at trial ‘with respect to the 
behavioural framework within which the evidence of the complainant’s 
reactions to the alleged abuse should be assessed and understood’. 
On appeal this was argued to be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, but 
the Court of Appeal ruled it was relevant and not so unfairly prejudicial 
that exclusion was warranted as it ‘could establish that the counter-
intuitive behaviour complained of was of neutral significance … [and] 
could not demonstrate that the behaviour rendered it more or less likely 
that offending had occurred as alleged’. 32 This case deals with the very 
situation contemplated by legislators and shows its successful use in 
practice to explain the counterintuitive behaviours of a complainant in a 
30  R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510, 515.
31  These provisions commenced 1 January 2009 to curb the judicial reluctance to allow such expert 
evidence because it wasn’t considered to be outside the ordinary experience of jurors – ALRC, above 
n 24, [9.156].
32  (2013) 226 A Crim R 575, [22]–[34].
161
12 . THE FRAUGHT DICHOTOMy BETWEEN CONTExT AND TENDENCy EVIDENCE
child sexual assault case. Overall, though, prosecutors don’t appear to have 
regularly invoked these provisions to evidence that psychological research 
doesn’t support many of the existing misconceptions.33 
One concern is the ‘white coat effect’: that undue weight will be given 
to this evidence because of the aura of scientific certainty surrounding 
expert testimony.34 Therefore, it is important to situate the role of this 
evidence and consider directions about its use. The court is ‘simply offered 
an alternative explanation for specific behaviour’, without being offered 
an opinion on the specific credibility of the complainant, so the jury is 
assisted not supplanted by the expert.35 Arguably an increased use of expert 
testimony in sexual assault cases would reduce the need for a complainant 
to recount a history of ‘grooming’ conduct by a defendant. This approach 
won’t be successful for all forms of relationship/context evidence but it 
may represent a more objective way of maintaining the complainant’s 
credibility without causing undue prejudice to the defendant. To obviate 
appeals about judicial directions it is contended that a standardised 
direction about psychological research into child development and 
behaviour during and following sexual abuse should be developed. This 
could be incorporated into legislation36 and Law Reform Commissions 
have recommended the development of model directions drawing on the 
expertise of relevant professional and research bodies.37 
IV. Conclusion
The dichotomy between tendency and relationship/context evidence in 
sexual assault cases cannot be logically sustained when the real relevance 
of relationship/context evidence is realised. First, given the prejudicial 
nature of most relationship/context evidence, it should be presumptively 
33  Arguably such experts are material witnesses and should be called by the prosecution: R v 
Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563. These provisions may also be used by the defence so there may be 
prosecutorial reluctance based on an expectation that the defence will counter with expert evidence 
to reinstate the misconceptions. Experience in practice, however, shows that such defence tactics are 
likely to meet with judicial resistance: see R v WR (No 3) [2010] ACTSC 89, [32]. 
34  Ward, ‘Usurping the Role of the Jury? Expert Evidence and Witness Credibility in English Trials’ 
(2009) 13 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 83, 88.
35  Ellison, ‘Closing the Credibility Gap: The Prosecutorial Use of Expert Witness Testimony in 
Sexual Assault Cases’ (2005) 9 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 239, 258.
36  See Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) ss 27, 29; and Evidence Regulation 2007 (NZ) cl 49.
37  Cossins for the National Child Sexual Assault Reform Committee, ‘Alternative Models for 
Prosecuting Child Sex Offences in Australia’ (2010), 233–35; ALRC, Family Violence, Report 114 
(2009) [27-11]–[27-12]; NSW Law Reform Commission, Jury Directions, Report 136 (2012) [5.5].
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inadmissible. The prosecution must persuade the court it is admissible 
through a transparent balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect. 
Judges must not simply rely on the outmoded notion that jury directions 
will ameliorate any prejudice to defendants. Second, the courts should 
move towards increased use of expert evidence to explain counterintuitive 
behaviours of complainants so that the prosecution can still present its case 
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Improving the Effectiveness 
of Corporate Criminal 




In 1842, in the middle of the Industrial Revolution, the Birmingham 
&  Gloucester Railway Co was convicted of failing to obey an order 
requiring it to construct arches over land severed by the railway.2 In 2008, 
the Industrial Revolution long overtaken by the digital revolution, 
German company Siemens AG pleaded guilty to breaches of the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and was ordered to pay a combined 
total of more than US$1.6 billion in fines, penalties and disgorgement 
of profits.3
Separated by over 160 years, these cases provide convenient bookends to 
the multivolume history of corporate criminal liability. While historically 
many countries, particularly civil law jurisdictions, did not recognise the 
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criminal liability of legal persons, the idea that a corporation could be 
criminally liable came to be widely accepted in common law countries. 
Today, driven in part by the need to comply with a number of international 
instruments, corporate criminal liability is widely accepted in a range 
of jurisdictions and legal systems.4
Recognition of corporate criminal liability and the effective prosecution 
of corporations are, however, quite distinct issues. While the United 
States has a history of successful corporate prosecutions, particularly for 
foreign corruption, this is not reflective of the wider story. Corporate 
prosecutions, where they occur, tend to be for relatively minor ‘regulatory 
offences’. Allegations of misconduct in the financial sector are, more 
commonly, dealt with by way of ‘civil penalties’, while the prosecution 
of corporations for homicide in relation to workplace deaths has been 
largely unsuccessful.5 Attempts to bring multinational corporations to 
account for alleged human rights violations typically result in protracted 
civil ligation.6 There is, understandably, a perception that if corporations 
are in fact subject to the threat of prosecution, it is an idle threat.
This is not to suggest that these are simple matters. The regulation of 
corporations is a complex issue requiring a range of responses. However, 
corporate regulation is not advanced if a crucial component of the 
regulatory response is ineffective. For corporate criminal liability to be 
a real possibility, it must be underpinned by legal structures that allow 
the culpability of a legal person to be determined and effective sanctions 
imposed. Further, given the ability of corporations to act transnationally, 
enforcement must be supported by mechanisms that allow for effective 
international cooperation.
Using bribery of foreign officials as an example,7 this chapter provides 
a snapshot of corporate criminal liability in Australia, and its capacity to 
operate effectively in a transnational world.8 It begins with a summary of 
the models of liability which may be applied to corporations, followed 
by a discussion of corporate sanctions, and finally measures which must 
4  For example, United Nations Convention against Corruption, A/58/422 (31 October 2003) 
UNTS Vol 2349, Art 26.
5  See, for example, R v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd (1995) 140 IR 243.
6  See, for example, Doe v Unocal, 395 F3d 932 (9th Cir, 2002).
7  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 70.2 (Criminal Code).
8  Although the focus of this chapter is on corporations, there are of course many other types 
of legal persons, including unincorporated associations, trusts, partnerships and trade unions.
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be adopted in order to enforce the criminal law against transnational 
corporations. It is argued that law reform is not only desirable, it can in 
most cases be easily implemented. Obstacles to transnational prosecutions 
are not insurmountable. This leaves the more challenging question 
of whether there are the resources to investigate and the will to prosecute.
II. Models of Liability
Even for those jurisdictions willing to recognise that a corporation may 
be a criminal, a fundamental challenge is to develop a model of liability 
that finds culpability in an artificial entity. This challenge has occupied 
courts and legislatures for over a century, with broadly speaking two 
models emerging.
The first is a ‘nominalist’ or ‘derivative’ theory of liability, where the 
liability of the legal person is ‘derived’ from the liability of an individual. 
For example, a company may be made liable for a criminal offence 
committed by an officer or employee of the corporation. The simplest 
form of derivative liability is ‘vicarious liability’ whereby a corporation is 
liable for the conduct of an individual employee or agent acting within the 
course or scope of his or her employment/agency, and at least in part for 
the benefit of the organisation. Although a simple form of liability, it does 
not necessarily reflect organisational fault. Nonetheless, it is applied in 
US federal law, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,9 which may go 
some way to explaining the relative success of US officials in prosecuting 
corporations for foreign bribery. 
Another form of derivative liability is the so-called ‘attribution’ or 
‘identification’ doctrine. In contrast to vicarious liability, the individual 
on whom liability is based must be of sufficient standing that they may be 
said to represent the entity; for example, the Board of Directors and other 
senior officers of a company such as the CEO, managing director, and 
the like. Because this person is said to be the company for these purposes, 
the company is said to be liable in its own right.10 
9  US Department of Justice and the US Securities and Exchange Commission, A Resource Guide 
to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2012) 27.
10  Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153.
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
166
Although applied in a number of common law countries, the identification 
doctrine has proved to be hopelessly inadequate in prosecuting medium 
to large corporations for serious crimes, particularly in the context of 
workplace deaths.11 In modern decentralised organisations senior officers 
may be removed from the relevant conduct, with considerable authority 
often vested in ‘middle-managers’. For this reason, some jurisdictions have 
defined the relevant person more broadly. For example, in Australia the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code provides for a form of attribution based 
on the conduct of a ‘high managerial agent’, defined as ‘an employee, 
agent or officer of the body corporate with duties of such responsibility 
that his or her conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the body 
corporate’s policy’.12 
Even if the scope of derivative liability is expanded, it is still dependent on 
individual liability. This is particularly problematic in large organisations 
where it may be difficult to prove individual responsibility. In contrast, 
‘realist’ or ‘organisational’ models of liability seek to reflect the culpability 
of the organisation itself; for example, by its policies and the way in which 
it is structured.
A particularly clear example is found in Pt 2.5 of the Criminal Code which 
applies to federal offences including bribery of foreign officials under 
s 70.2. In addition to liability based on attribution, it imposes liability on 
corporations based on the concept of ‘corporate culture’, defined to mean 
‘an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the 
body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which 
the relevant activities takes place’.13 Although an ambitious example of 
organisational liability, it has yet to be applied in practice. It may be that 
prosecutors are wary of basing prosecutions on such a novel and nebulous 
concept,14 and it is notable that there have been no successful prosecutions 
for foreign bribery in the 15 years since the current laws were enacted.15
11  See generally, Jonathan Clough, ‘A Glaring Omission? Corporate Liability for Negligent 
Manslaughter’ (2007) 20 Australian Journal of Labour Law 29, 32–33.
12  Criminal Code s 12.3(6).
13  Ibid.
14  Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 144.
15  Law Council of Australia, Submission to the Senate Economics Reference Committee Inquiry 
into Foreign Bribery, 24 August 2015.
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In contrast, one of the simplest and potentially most effective forms 
of organisational liability is liability for omissions. That is, where a legal 
person is under a legal obligation to act, its failure to discharge that 
obligation can be established without finding fault in an individual. This 
may then be combined with a fault element such as negligence, or a defence 
of due diligence to reflect organisational fault. For example, under s 7 of 
the Bribery Act 2010 (UK), where an associated person engages in bribery, 
the organisation is liable for failing to prevent it. However, this liability 
is subject to a defence where the company can prove that it had in place 
adequate procedures designed to prevent such conduct.
The above discussion provides only a brief summary of the various 
ways in which criminal liability may be imposed on corporations. From 
a reform perspective, the challenge is not so much finding new models 
of liability, it is applying those models consistently and appropriately. 
For  example, although Pt 2.5 of the Criminal Code provides a default 
model of liability for federal offences, no such state provision exists, 
leaving them to rely on the demonstrably inadequate common law.16 
If a particular model is found to be ineffective, it may be amended. Pt 2.5, 
for example, is excluded from some competition law provisions in favour 
of other models of liability.17
III. Sanctions
Although criminal liability without an effective sanction is largely 
a  symbolic gesture, the sentencing of corporations has typically been 
neglected in law reform. While a corporation cannot be rehabilitated 
or deterred in the same way as a person, it does not mean that these 
concepts do not apply to corporations.18 For example, an emphasis on 
organisational fault provides a means by which change can be brought 
about at an organisational level.
However, in all Australian jurisdictions the sentencing options that may 
be imposed on a corporate defendant are determined by the relevant 
offence, typically a fine. While a financial penalty may be an appropriate 
sanction in many cases, the sentencing judge has limited ability to tailor 
16  See, for example, ABC Developmental Learning Centres Pty Ltd v Wallace [2007] VSCA 138.
17  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 6AA.
18  Clough and Mulhern, above n 14, 186–87.
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the penalty to achieve sentencing outcomes. In this respect, Australian 
legislation falls behind some international examples. The French Penal 
Code, for example, makes provision for a range of sanctions applicable to 
legal persons.19 Similarly, the United States Sentencing Guidelines contain 
sophisticated guidance for trial judges in sentencing organisations.20 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss them in detail, 
it is important to give some sense of the range of sanctions that may be 
applied to legal persons. 
A. Monetary penalties
Fines are a common form of sanction against legal persons, and may 
provide an effective deterrent. In many cases the fine to be imposed is 
set as a multiple of that applicable to a natural person. Although in some 
cases a fine may simply be absorbed as a business cost, the impact of 
a monetary penalty may also be felt by ‘innocent’ third parties such as 
employees, shareholders and consumers. A challenge is therefore to set 
the appropriate level of penalty to be applied. For example, s 70.2 of 
the Criminal Code provides that where a body corporate is found guilty 
of bribing a foreign official, the maximum penalty to be imposed is the 
greatest of 100,000 penalty units, three times the value of the benefit 
obtained, or 10 per cent of the annual turnover of the body corporate 
during the relevant period. 
B. Adverse publicity
For corporations with a significant reputation, publicising its offending 
may have a significant deterrent impact both on the organisation itself 
and others. It may also have an important educative effect, making other 
entities, stakeholders and the community aware of the illegality of the 
relevant conduct. 
C. Probation
As part of its sentence, a corporation may agree to comply with certain 
undertakings and to be subject to a period of supervision. Such conditions 
may be remedial, aimed at making good the harm caused by the 
19  Articles 131–39.
20  United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Ch 8.
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commission of the offence, or rehabilitative; that is, requiring steps to be 
taken in order to ensure organisational change. As such conditions would 
generally be subject to the supervision of the court or regulator, they are 
potentially a powerful mechanism for achieving organisational change. 
D. Disqualification or disestablishment
A legal person that has committed an offence can be disqualified from 
engaging in certain activities, or can be disqualified from government 
contracts or funding. At the most extreme end, a corporation may be 
disestablished; the equivalent of capital punishment. Given the serious 
secondary impacts of such a sanction, it is likely to be applied rarely; 
for example, to organisations with no legitimate purpose.
As with models of liability, the reform challenge in relation to corporate 
sanctions is less to do with available options, and more to do with 
consistency and availability. Many of the sanctions outlined above are 
found in various pieces of legislation, but their availability is limited to 
contraventions of those acts.21 
IV. Transnational Crime
A crucial feature of the success of modern corporations is their ability 
to operate transnationally, with companies in one jurisdiction operating 
in other jurisdictions through subsidiaries or other related entities. 
Combined with the doctrine of separate legal personality, this has 
allowed corporations to derive global profits while distributing corporate 
risk. For example, in 2016 German company Siemens AG employed 
approximately 351,000 people, in over 200 countries, generating revenues 
of €79.6 billion.22 Imposing criminal liability on such corporations 
presents considerable legal challenges. In addition to ensuring that 
local corporations may be prosecuted for conduct occurring outside the 
jurisdiction, it is also important that law enforcement agencies are able to 
cooperate effectively to investigate and prosecute transnational corporate 
crime. Three particular issues that should be considered are jurisdiction, 
the liability of corporate groups, and mutual assistance.
21  See, for example, Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 49E; Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 86C.
22  Siemens AG, About Siemens, www.siemens.com/about/en/.
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A. Jurisdiction
Although criminal law is typically local in operation, extraterritorial 
liability may be imposed on corporations for conduct occurring outside 
the jurisdiction. Typically this is based on the ‘nationality principle’ where 
liability is imposed on a corporation incorporated in the jurisdiction for 
conduct occurring anywhere in the world. For example, an Australian 
corporation may be convicted of bribery even if the conduct constituting 
the offence occurred wholly outside Australia.23 
B. Corporate groups
In many cases, legal persons will act through subsidiaries or other 
related entities. It may therefore be necessary to consider whether one 
organisation may be made liable for the conduct of other organisations. 
For example, a parent company may be made liable for bribery by 
a subsidiary incorporated in another jurisdiction. 
In some cases it may be possible to impose liability on the parent for 
being an accessory to the offence, or for conspiring to commit the offence. 
Alternatively, liability may be imposed where a corporation can be shown 
to have exercised control over another entity,24 or for failing to prevent the 
commission of an offence by an associated entity.25
C. Mutual legal assistance
Effective prosecution of transnational crime often requires significant 
international cooperation. However, challenges may arise where, for 
example, a country does not recognise the criminal liability of corporations, 
but chooses to impose administrative liability. In such cases, a request for 
assistance may be refused in the absence of dual criminality. It is therefore 
important for countries to consider the extent to which they are able 
to provide assistance in relation to civil and administrative proceedings 
where this is consistent with their domestic legal system.26 
23  Criminal Code s 70.5. See also Bribery Act 2010 (UK) s 7(5). 
24  For example, US Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USC § 623(h)).
25  For example, Bribery Act 2010 (UK) s 7(5).
26  UN General Assembly, United Nations Convention against Corruption, A/58/422 (31 October 
2003) UNTS Vol 2349, Art 43(1).
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V. Conclusion
This chapter began with two events illustrating the arc of corporate 
criminal liability over the past century and a half. The use of bookends as 
a metaphor was, to some extent, inapposite if it suggests that the evolution 
of corporate criminal liability is over. Such liability will continue to 
evolve, particularly in its application to transnational criminal activity. 
In other respects the metaphor is apt as the prosecution of Siemens, and 
others like it, illustrate that with appropriate structures in place even large 
transnational corporations can be effectively prosecuted.
Law reform should focus on ensuring that these mechanisms are in place 
across the range of corporate activity, including transnational operations, 
so that the focus can move from whether it can happen, to whether it 
should. In the Australian context, there is a need for a review of models 
of corporate criminal liability. The corporate liability provisions of Pt 2.5 
of the Criminal Code provide a sophisticated default model of liability that 
is rarely used. This would be an ideal starting point for considering the 
impediments to its use, and whether alternative forms of liability should 
be imposed in specific areas of corporate activity. Such a review could also 
consider whether extraterritorial legislation is appropriate in certain cases, 
and the mechanisms by which liability could be imposed on corporate 
groups. The importance of such reforms is equally applicable to the states, 
where corporate criminal liability is often dependent on the inadequacies 
of the common law. In the context of sentencing reform, a simple and 
potentially highly effective reform would be for each jurisdiction to 
provide for a separate section of their sentencing legislation dedicated 
to corporate offenders, outlining the sanctions available and principles to 
be applied.  
Not surprisingly, political interest in corporate criminal liability ebbs 
and  flows as a result of specific concerns such as workplace deaths,27 
cartel behaviour28 and, most recently, foreign corruption.29 While this can 
produce important reform outcomes, there is the danger of a piecemeal 
approach and a missed opportunity to look at corporations as a class of 
27  Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 (ACT).
28  Trade Practices Act Review Committee, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices 
Act (January 2003).
29  Attorney-General’s Department, Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Bribery Offence in the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Public Consultation Paper, April 2017).
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offender across a range of offences. Ensuring that all corporate offences 
are supported by an effective model of liability, backed by appropriate 
sanctions, would provide the essential foundation for effective 
prosecutions, and clarity for business as to the basis on which they are 
to be held liable. Australia has been a leader in this field in the past. 
Reform of corporate criminal liability would not only improve the quality 
of corporate regulation domestically, it would allow Australia to play 
a  leading role in international efforts to tackle the use of legal persons 
in the commission of transnational crimes.
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2  Shelly Chaiken, ‘Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source 
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Stereotypes in the Courtroom
Blake M McKimmie1
Stereotypes have a functional, relatively automatic, and pervasive influence 
on how we form impressions of other people. As an extra-legal factor, 
stereotypes are an undesirable influence on decisions, but their use does 
not represent a failing on the part of jurors. This chapter explores how 
stereotypes influence jurors in a number of domains – expert testimony, 
sexual assault, and perceptions of dangerousness of criminal defendants. 
By understanding how and why jurors are influenced by stereotypes, we 
are better placed to identify strategies to reduce the effect of stereotypes on 
jurors’ decisions. The possible avenues for law reform include changes to 
the way expert evidence is admitted, changes to how evidence is presented, 
changes to the design of the courtroom, and changes to how jurors are 
instructed by judges.
One useful way to think about a criminal trial is as a series of persuasive 
messages directed at the jury. The research on persuasion generally agrees 
that there are two ways in which persuasive messages can influence. 
These processes are described in the dual process models, specifically the 
heuristic systematic2 and the elaboration likelihood3 models. According to 
these models there are two modes of thinking. The central or systematic 
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route involves more careful deliberative thought while the peripheral 
or heuristic route relies more on short cuts and pre-existing knowledge 
such as schemas and stereotypes. For example, if we are using the central 
route, we might think carefully about the prosecution’s case against the 
defendant, weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence. If we 
are using the peripheral route, we might decide that we do not like the 
look of the defendant, or decide that a witness seems credible because 
they have an honest face. While the central systematic route sounds like 
the best way of making decisions, perceivers can only engage in effortful 
thinking when they have the motivation and ability to do so. When 
information becomes too complex or ambiguous, it is not possible for 
perceivers to successfully evaluate a persuasive message using central or 
systematic processing. 
I. Stereotypes and Expert Evidence
Research has shown, despite jurors’ claims that they understand complex 
testimony,4 jurors are influenced by an expert’s characteristics and 
behaviour in addition to what that expert says. A good illustration of this 
is in a study5 in which participants watched a video of a trial recreation. 
The  plaintiff’s expert was presented as having either weak or strong 
credentials, and gave evidence using either simple or complex language. 
Consistent with the dual process models of persuasion, the expert’s 
credentials affected how much participants were influenced by the expert, 
but only when the testimony was complex and difficult to understand. 
Some of our research suggests that there are similar effects for expert 
gender.6 In our research we presented participants with a price-fixing case 
involving either a male or female expert. The businesses alleged to have 
been price-fixing were either involved in a male-oriented business domain 
or a female-oriented domain. We found that participants were more 
4  Brian H Bornstein and Edie Greene, ‘Jury Decision Making: Implications for and from 
Psychology’ (2011) 20(1) Current Directions in Psychological Science 63.
5  Joel Cooper, Elizabeth A Bennett, and Holly L Sukel, ‘Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do 
Jurors Make Decisions?’ (1996) 20(4) Law & Human Behavior 379.
6  Blake M McKimmie et al, ‘Jurors’ Responses to Expert Witness Testimony: The Effects of Gender 
Stereotypes’ (2004) 7(2) Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 131; Regina A Schuller, Deborah J 
Terry, and Blake M McKimmie, ‘The Impact of an Expert’s Gender on Jurors’ Decisions’ (2001) 25 
Law and Psychology Review 59; Regina A Schuller, Deborah J Terry, and Blake M McKimmie, ‘The 
Impact of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decisions: Gender of the Expert and Testimony Complexity’ 
(2005) 35(6) Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1266. 
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influenced by the expert when the expert’s gender matched the domain 
of the case, and that this effect was more pronounced when the expert’s 
testimony was complex compared to simple. This latter finding suggests 
that expert gender is used as a heuristic cue. 
To find out whether jurors are aware of the influence of these factors, 
my colleagues and I surveyed jurors, judges, lawyers, and experts about 
expert testimony in 55 criminal trials in Queensland, New South Wales, 
and Victoria.7 We found that while the vast majority of jurors thought 
that they understood the expert testimony, participants still identified 
a number of barriers to their complete comprehension of that testimony. 
These barriers were: overuse of technical language; the complexity of 
DNA evidence; the presentation style of the expert; and presentations of 
evidence that were too lengthy. Jurors in this study were still influenced 
by a range of features associated with the expert testimony beyond the 
content of that testimony. The results even suggested that jurors were 
using the complexity of the testimony as a cue to its correctness, even 
though complexity was seen as a barrier to comprehension. This may 
have occurred because expert testimony is stereotypically expected to be 
complex (this is, after all, the definition of expert testimony).
II. Stereotypes and Sexual Assault
Another area in which stereotypes influence jurors is in relation to victim 
blaming in cases of sexual assault. Reporting, prosecution and conviction 
rates for sexual assault remain disproportionately low in Australia,8 and 
around the world.9 Convictions for sexual assault are often dependent on 
circumstantial evidence, as there is typically little corroborating evidence.10 
7  Ian Freckelton, Jane Delahunty, Jacqueline Horan, and Blake M McKimmie, Expert Evidence 
and Criminal Jury Trials (Oxford University Press, 2016).
8  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2005.
9  Kathleen Daly and Brigitte Bouhours, ‘Rape and Attrition in the Legal Process: A Comparative 
Analysis of Five Countries’ (2010) 39 Crime and Justice 565.
10  Mark R Kebbell and Nina J Westera, ‘Promoting Pre-recorded Complainant Evidence in Rape 
Trials: Psychology and Practice Perspectives’ (2011) 35 Criminal Law Journal 376.
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Because of this, jurors in rape or sexual assault cases are likely to draw on 
their existing knowledge or cognitive schemas and stereotypes to interpret 
what happened and how blame should be apportioned.11
Our research suggests that if an assault is judged as stereotypical (for 
example, when the perpetrator and victim are strangers to each other), 
then perceivers are more likely to believe the victim, blame her less, and 
convict the defendant. When the offence is not stereotypical, however, 
perceivers turn to other stereotypes to give meaning to the events 
presented to them.12 In particular, perceivers are influenced by whether 
the victim appears to act in ways that are inconsistent with the consent 
script. For  example, does she physically and verbally resist the assault? 
Or, does she behave in ways that are stereotypically consistent with being 
a genuine victim, such as being emotional? If she does, then again she is 
seen as more credible and less to blame for the assault, and consequently 
the defendant is seen as being more likely to be guilty.
Our most recent data indicates that there are a small number of central 
cues that are seen as prototypical of consent, and which allow perceivers 
to infer the presence of a range of other features associated with sexual 
assault. Typically, events preceding an acquaintance assault (the most 
common type of sexual assault) match the consent script reasonably well 
as they often involve a certain degree of social interaction between the 
victim and the alleged perpetrator. If, however, the victim’s account begins 
with the assault itself, there is little opportunity for jurors to form a story 
about the events based on the consent script, and so they appear more 
likely to interpret events as being sexual assault. 
11  Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro, ‘A Stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in the Room? 
Critical Reflections upon Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Jury Study’ 
(2010) 13(4) New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal 781; Nancy 
Pennington and Reid Hastie, ‘Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision 
Making’ (1992) 62(2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 189. 
12  Blake M McKimmie, Barbara M Masser and Renata Bongiorno, ‘What Counts as Rape? 
The  Effect of Offence Prototypes, Victim Stereotypes and Participant Gender on How the 
Complainant and Defendant Are Perceived’ (2014) 29(1) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 2273.
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III. Stereotypes and Defendants
There is a reasonable amount of evidence that jurors are often influenced 
by the characteristics of defendants, such as their attractiveness,13 race,14 
and socioeconomic status.15 Defendants are seen as being more likely to 
be guilty when they come from social categories that are stereotypically 
linked to the features of the particular crime they are alleged to have 
committed.16
However, are stereotypes just a decision cue? One assumption is that 
perceivers use the least mental effort possible and so use stereotypes to 
reduce the amount of effort required.17 However, there is some evidence 
that perceivers think more carefully about unexpected, or stereotype 
inconsistent, information.18 Our research19 suggests that stereotypes can be 
used to maximise the amount of information that can be evaluated under 
taxing conditions. Stereotypes help us encode some of the information in 
an efficient manner, thus freeing up our capacity to attend to other parts 
of the evidence to extract the maximum amount of information.20
In one study, participants read a 12-page summary describing an armed 
robbery case. In this summary, the defendant was either a man or a woman, 
and the strength of the forensic evidence against the defendant was either 
weak or strong. Consistent with a cognitive optimiser perspective, the 
13  R L Michelini and S R Snodgrass, ‘Defendant Characteristics and Juridic Decisions’ (1980) 
14(3) Journal of Research in Personality 340.
14  R Mazzella and A Feingold, ‘The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race, Socioeconomic Status, 
and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors: A Meta-Analysis’ (1994) 
24(15) Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1315. 
15  C W Esqueda, R K E Espinoza and S E Culhane, ‘The Effects of Ethnicity, SES, and Crime 
Status on Juror Decision Making: A Cross-Cultural Examination of European American and Mexican 
American Mock Jurors’ (2008) 30(2) Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 181.
16  R A Gordon et al, ‘Perceptions of Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The Effect of Defendant 
Race on Simulated Juror Decisions’ (1988) 128(2) The Journal of Social Psychology 191. 
17  S T Fiske and S E Taylor, Social Cognition: Topics in Social Psychology (New York: Random 
House, 1984); D T Gilbert, and J G Hixon, ‘The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and Application 
of Stereotypic Beliefs’ (1991) 60(4) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 509. 
18  L D Stern et al, ‘Processing Time and the Recall of Inconsistent and Consistent Behaviors of 
Individuals and Groups’ (1984) 47(2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 253.
19  Blake M McKimmie et al, ‘Stereotypical and Counterstereotypical Defendants: Who Is He and 
What Was the Case Against Her?’ (2013) 19(3) Psychology, Public Policy and Law 343.
20  C N Macrae, A B Milne, and G V Bodenhausen, ‘Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices: 
A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox’ (1994) 66(1) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37; 
J W Sherman, F R Conrey, and C J Groom, ‘Encoding Flexibility Revisited: Evidence for Enhanced 
Encoding of Stereotype-Inconsistent Information Under Cognitive Load’ (2004) 22(2) Social 
Cognition 214.
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strength of the evidence only influenced mock jurors’ verdicts when 
the defendant was male and therefore consistent with the stereotypical 
offender for this type of offence. When the defendant was a woman, the 
verdicts returned did not differ as a function of the strength of the case 
presented. 
A second study, this time using a summary of a case involving the murder 
of a child, showed that participants remembered more of the case-related 
evidence when the defendant was male compared to female. However, 
participants were more accurate in identifying who the defendant was 
when the defendant was female compared to male. Both of these findings 
are consistent with the idea that a stereotypical defendant frees up the 
perceivers’ attention to allow more thorough encoding of the evidence 
(at the expense of the defendant’s characteristics), whereas a counter-
stereotypical defendant is attention-grabbing and so the evidence is not 
processed as thoroughly.
IV. Stereotypes and Courtroom Design
In contrast to person-centred stereotypes that are associated with the 
attributes and behaviours of those people and are therefore less open 
to direct manipulation, one cue that is relatively easily changeable and 
appears to have an effect on how jurors rely on stereotypes is the design of 
the courtroom. My colleagues and I21 have conducted a series of studies 
on how courtroom design influences jurors.
Our initial study22 asked 275 community members to look at one of 
four images featuring a defendant in a criminal trial sitting at the bar 
table, in an open dock, in an open dock with a correctional officer nearby, 
or in a glass dock. These latter three images are more representative 
of courtrooms in Australia. We found that participants were more likely 
to say the defendant had committed a crime involving violence when 
the defendant was depicted as sitting inside a glass dock compared to the 
other courtroom configurations.
21  David Tait et al, Towards a Distributed Courtroom (Western Sydney University, 2015).
22  Blake M McKimmie, Jillian M Hays and David Tait, ‘Just Spaces: Does Courtroom Design 
Affect How the Defendant is Perceived? (2016) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, dx.doi.org/10.1080/1
3218719.2016.1174054.
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Another as yet unpublished study involved 215 community members in 
a series of trial recreations held in an active courtroom with professional 
actors. The trial involved allegations that the defendant was involved in 
a plot to commit a terrorist act. For some of the recreations, the defendant 
sat at the bar table with his lawyer; in others he sat either in an open dock 
or a glass dock at the side of the courtroom. Participants then deliberated 
as a group to arrive at a verdict. The initial findings of this study suggest 
that there was no difference in verdicts for both of the dock conditions, 
but that participants were more likely to acquit in the bar table condition 
compared to the two dock conditions. 
V. Conclusions
The research reviewed highlights a variety of ways that stereotypes 
influence how jurors make decisions. However, we have not argued that 
jurors are inherently biased and should be replaced with another fact 
finder. Attempting to replace jurors with another fact finder serves only 
to displace the challenge posed by stereotypes, and research suggests 
that even highly trained legal decision-makers, such as judges, are just as 
vulnerable to the effects of stereotypes.23
So if we accept that stereotypes exert a pervasive influence on fact finders, 
what changes can we make to reduce the negative effects of stereotypes? 
One possibility is to set up the juror’s task so that they have less need to 
rely on stereotypes in their role. As we have seen, two of the factors that 
increase the use of stereotypes by jurors are ambiguity and complexity. 
If the juror’s task is changed from a single decision about guilt or innocence 
into a series of discrete factual questions about the events at issue, then 
jurors will be more able to think carefully about each smaller decision. 
This is the approach of using question trails to instruct jurors rather than 
traditional verbal instructions24 and it has the potential to reduce the use 
of stereotypes by jurors. However, more research is needed to establish 
whether this is in fact the case.
23  A J Wistrich, C Guthrie, and J J Rachlinski, ‘Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The 
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding’ (2005) 153(4) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1251; 
J J Rachlinski et al, ‘Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?’ (2008) 84 Notre Dame Law 
Review 1195.
24  J Clough, ‘The Role of Question Trails in Assisting Juror Comprehension’ (Presentation at the 10th 
Annual Jury Research and Practice Conference, The Australian National University, 8 February 2013).
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Another possible avenue for intervention is to redesign courtrooms to 
minimise jurors’ awareness of negative stereotypes about the defendant. 
While having the defendant seated at the bar table is common in some 
jurisdictions, there may be security concerns with this configuration. 
An  alternative is to use technology to reconfigure the courtroom, 
a possibility recently piloted by David Tait and his colleagues.25
In terms of stereotypes that influence how expert testimony is perceived, 
one possibility is to ensure that the task of evaluating the quality of 
the expert’s evidence is carried out before the evidence is admitted. For 
example, decisions about admissibility could be based more clearly on 
the underlying scientific merit or accuracy of that type of testimony 
in general, rather than this specific expert’s credentials or evidence.26
Finally, advocates can alter the order in which they present the evidence 
to reduce the negative effect of stereotypes about victims. For example, in 
a case involving allegations of sexual assault, rather than starting with a 
chronological presentation of evidence, it might be more effective for the 
prosecution to start with the victim’s retelling of the assault itself, before 
moving to the context around the assault. This may help to reduce the 
ambiguity in how the events are defined in jurors’ minds.
By understanding when and how stereotypes influence fact finders, we 
are able to suggest a number of different ways in which the effect of 
stereotypes can be reduced. Some of these strategies can be used without 
any changes to existing practices. Although there is good empirical 
evidence for many of these suggestions, more research is needed to fully 
test their effectiveness. Using empirical behavioural science research to 
inform law reform increases the chances that any particular reform will 
improve the fairness of the criminal justice system.
25  See above n 21.
26  See above n 6.
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The Justice Motive: Psychological 
Research on Perceptions of 
Justice in Criminal Law
Diane Sivasubramaniam1
Psychological research demonstrates that people’s intuitive judgments of 
justice differ from legal notions of justice. While several principles guide 
the determination of just outcomes in criminal law, psychological research 
indicates the existence of a retributive impulse that can dominate people’s 
justice reasoning. To what extent will this mismatch between legal and 
human notions of justice affect the acceptability of criminal law reforms 
in the community and, ultimately, the viability of those reforms? In this 
chapter, I address this question in relation to restorative justice (RJ) and 
preventive detention. The psychological literature sheds light on the 
fundamental motivations driving people’s decision-making about RJ 
and preventive detention. Understanding the factors driving community 
perceptions of justice is crucial in managing the long-term viability of 
criminal law reform.
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I. Divergence of Legal and Community 
Notions of Justice
The production of a ‘just outcome’ in a criminal case, according to the 
process of the law, is a complex and deliberative event. When judges 
determine a sentence in response to a criminal offence, they are guided 
by several sentencing principles.2 Judges may be advised or required 
to consider aggravating and mitigating factors, and must also consider 
the common law as developed by appellate courts. Judges then engage 
in what the High Court terms an ‘intuitive synthesis’ – an exercise in 
which all relevant considerations are simultaneously unified and weighed, 
and translated into an appropriate sentence. In addition, judges must 
balance individualised justice (ensuring a sentence is appropriate for the 
individual case) and consistency across similar types of cases.3 Moreover, 
judges are highly specialised individuals, capable of complex cognitive 
undertakings, and accustomed to the particular synthesis required in 
sentencing according to the law.
These characteristics of judicial reasoning contrast with laypeople’s 
decision-making about ‘just outcomes’. To understand how just 
outcomes are conceptualised in the broader community, we can turn to 
recent psychological research on distributive justice, which divides the 
human response to justice-related events into two channels: heuristic and 
systematic processing.4
When a person considers an emotionally engaging and serious injustice, 
like a criminal offence, this prompts the heuristic response. The heuristic 
response is quick to occur, automatic and intuitive. Once a person 
becomes aware of an injustice, the heuristic response basically consists of 
an appraisal of who or what is to blame, and an underlying imperative to 
re-establish justice, with little or no further consideration of circumstances. 
2  ‘Sentencing Bench Book’ ([2-200] Purposes of Sentencing), www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/
benchbks/sentencing/purposes_of_sentencing.html; ‘Victorian Sentencing Manual’ (7.1 Sentencing 
purposes generally), www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/eManuals/VSM/index.htm#15298.htm.
3  Sarah Krasnostein and Arie Freiberg, ‘Pursuing Consistency in an Individualistic Sentencing 
Framework: If You Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got There’ (2013) 
76 Law & Contemporary Problems 265.
4  Shelly Chaiken and Yaacov Trope, Dual-process Theories in Social Psychology (Guilford Press, 
1999); Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Macmillan, 2011); Melvin J Lerner, ‘The Justice 
Motive: Where Social Psychologists Found It, How They Lost It, and Why They May Not Find It 
Again’ (2003) 7(4) Personality and Social Psychology Review 388.
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When the observer is seeing harm done to one person by another, this 
immediate motivation to restore justice equates to a desire for retribution: 
the bad person, the offender, deserves punishment. Effectively, cognitions 
and emotions in the heuristic response appear as a scripted package 
typically involving anger and the desire to punish. It often consists of 
simple associations of outcomes, personal characteristics, emotions, and 
restorative acts (e.g. bad people deserve bad outcomes). Over time, the 
emotions of the heuristic response dissipate to make way for a second type 
of processing.
The systematic response follows thoughtful consideration of the relevant 
circumstances of an event. This consideration is slower to occur, and 
includes assessments of what a person deserves, attributions of the 
person’s responsibility and the culpability of various possible agents of the 
injustice, and consideration of various courses of action. The systematic 
response is deliberative, so it requires cognitive resources. However, 
cognitive resources can be limited by the situation (e.g. a person may not 
have the time or cognitive capacity to consider all of the circumstances), 
or they can be limited by the disposition of the observer in question 
(e.g. preference for intuitive versus deliberative reasoning is a personality 
dimension that varies across individuals, and shapes the degree to which 
people voluntarily engage in deliberative reasoning about an event).5
While judges therefore engage in a careful synthesis of factors, ensuring 
the systematic response supersedes the heuristic response in the 
determination of a just outcome in the law, the conditions to support the 
systematic response are by no means guaranteed when laypeople consider 
a just outcome outside the structures of judicial reasoning. To the extent 
that people do not have the time, opportunity, preference, or capacity for 
deliberation (or to the extent that avenues of popular discourse, such as 
press reporting, promote quick, emotive processing of information), the 
heuristic response (the initial, retributive impulse) will dominate people’s 
decisions about just outcomes, prompting a divergence between legal and 
lay notions of justice.
5  Juliette Richetin et al, ‘The Moderator Role of Intuitive Versus Deliberative Decision Making 
For the Predictive Validity of Implicit and Explicit Measures’ (2007) 21(4) European Journal of 
Personality 529.
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There is certainly evidence that community sentiment about crime is 
dominated by retributive notions, with public demands for harsher 
sentences common in many parts of the world6 (though the use, effects and 
acceptability of various forms of punishment may vary across cultures7). 
Research shows that we feel an emotional impulse to punish an offender 
when we witness an injustice,8 even when doing so will be costly to us.9 
This retributive impulse fulfils several important social needs; for example, 
it levels the power imbalance caused by a transgression.10 Punishment 
also serves an instrumental purpose – people are concerned about 
becoming victims of crime in future and look to punishment to reduce 
the likelihood of future harm11 – but research shows that retribution, not 
behaviour control, is the dominant motivation underlying people’s calls 
for sanctions,12 and people choose to administer punishment even when 
they know it has limited ability to prevent future offences.13  
Thus, there is often a discrepancy between the deliberative, legal notions 
of just outcomes formed through judicial reasoning, and the more 
often heuristic, retributive notions of just outcomes that dominate in 
the community. Whether or not we endorse it, widespread punitive 
sentiment can shape the design of crime control policy and the operation 
6  Monica M Gerber and Jonathan Jackson, ‘Authority and Punishment: On the Ideological Basis 
of Punitive Attitudes towards Criminals’ (2016) 23(1) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 113.
7  Huesmann and Podolski, ‘Punishment: A Psychological Perspective’ in McConville and Devon 
(eds), The Use of Punishment (Willan Publishing, 2003) 55–88.
8  Kevin M Carlsmith and John M Darley, ‘Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice’ (2008) 
40 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 193; John Darley, ‘Just Punishments: Research on 
Retributional Justice’ in M Ross and D T Miller (eds), The Justice Motive in Everyday Life (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 314; Norman T Feather, Values, Achievement, and Justice: Studies in the 
Psychology of Deservingness (Springer Science & Business Media, 2006); Neil Vidmar and Dale T 
Miller, ‘Social Psychological Processes Underlying Attitudes toward Legal Punishment’ (1980) Law 
and Society Review 565.
9  Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, ‘Third-party Punishment and Social Norms’ (Pt Elsevier 
Science) (2004) 25(2) Evolution and Human Behavior 63; Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter, ‘Altruistic 
Punishment in Humans’ (Pt Nature Publishing Group) (2002) 415(6868) Nature 137.
10  Jeffrie G Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge University Press, 
1990); Vidmar and Miller, above n 8, 571.
11  Gerber and Jackson, above n 6.
12  Kevin M Carlsmith, John M Darley And Paul H Robinson, ‘Why Do We Punish?: Deterrence 
And Just Deserts As Motives For Punishment’ (2002) 83(2) Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology 
284; John M Darley, Kevin M Carlsmith And Paul H Robinson, ‘Incapacitation And Just Deserts As 
Motives For Punishment’ (2000) 24(6) Law And Human Behavior 659; Robert M Mcfatter, ‘Purposes 
Of Punishment: Effects of Utilities of Criminal Sanctions on Perceived Appropriateness’ (1982) 67(3) 
Journal of Applied Psychology 255.
13  Robert J MacCoun, ‘Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition’ (1993) 
113(3) Psychological Bulletin 497; Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press, 
2006).
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of legal institutions.14 In this chapter, I consider this divergence of legal 
and community notions of justice in light of two recent legal reforms: 
restorative justice and preventive detention. While each of these new 
paradigms changes the way in which a just outcome is determined in 
the law, they may not actually reduce the divergence between legal and 
community notions of justice.
II. Restorative Justice (RJ)
RJ is an alternative response to crime, now integral in several legal systems 
worldwide.15 RJ scholars assert that the traditional criminal justice system 
is primarily retributive, in that its central objective is to assess culpability 
for a crime and, if necessary, apply proportional punishment.16 This 
justice model has been critiqued by RJ theorists for failing to address a 
broader range of concerns following a crime – in particular, restoration of 
harmed parties. RJ is fundamentally concerned with harm reparation,17 
and challenges the assumption underlying the traditional criminal justice 
system that punishment is necessary to restore justice after a crime has 
occurred.18 
RJ is typically enacted by involving the affected parties (victims, offenders 
and supporters) in an interactive process. Restorative outcomes to address 
the harm can include compensation to the victim or sanctions that are 
meaningful to the offender and also benefit the victim, community or 
offender.19 While punishing the offender can be part of a RJ outcome, it 
is not fundamental. Rather, what is central to RJ is the interactive process 
emphasising healing of stakeholders.20 
14  David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (Oxford University 
Press, 1990); David Garland, Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences (Sage, 2001); 
David Garland, ‘The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society’ (2001); 
Nicola Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008).
15  Alana Saulnier and Diane Sivasubramaniam, ‘Restorative Justice: Underlying Mechanisms and 
Future Directions’ (2015) 18(4) New Criminal Law Review 510.
16  Howard Zehr, Harry Mika and Mark Umbreit, ‘Restorative Justice: The Concept’ (1997) 59 
Corrections Today 68.
17  Saulnier and Sivasubramaniam, above n 15.
18  Michael Wenzel et al, ‘Retributive and Restorative Justice’ (2008) 32(5) Law and Human 
Behavior 375.
19  Gordon Bazemore, ‘Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption: Communities, Victims, and 
Offender Reintegration’ (1998) 41(6) American Behavioral Scientist 768.
20  John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2002).
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The RJ approach poses an interesting challenge: as noted above, the 
research indicates that punishment is a prime mechanism for justice 
restoration in response to transgressions.21 In designating punishment 
as a (potentially) unnecessary goal of the restorative outcome, RJ clearly 
deviates even further from the retributive impulse than the traditional 
justice system, which recognises punishment as one of several core goals 
to be balanced in sentencing. 
We may question how RJ can serve a sense of justice if it does not centralise 
the imposition of punishment on the offender. Overall, the research 
suggests that support for RJ results from a complex array of factors: the 
existence of some motivation to punish an offender does not necessarily 
preclude people’s endorsements of restorative procedures22 (though 
people view RJ as a more appropriate response to serious crime when it 
involves the possibility of retributive sanctions).23 There are several aspects 
of RJ that generate strong support for the approach; for example, the 
opportunity for stakeholders, especially victims, to voice their concerns.24 
Overall, it is likely that the interactive process undertaken by participants 
will itself engage systematic, deliberative reasoning that will temper the 
retributive response.
A problem arises, however, if an individual’s retributive impulse is 
not tempered by systematic processing, and is left unaddressed and 
unacknowledged; if this occurs, the retributive impulse may impact 
particular RJ processes as well as the broader viability of RJ as a legal 
reform. If the individual in question is a stakeholder in a conference (e.g. 
a victim or their supporter), then the person’s retributive impulse may 
play a subtle, implicit role in the outcomes they advocate to resolve the 
RJ process, or in some cases may even lead to an unsuccessful process 
(in which an outcome cannot be agreed by all parties). If the individual 
in question is a community member considering the suitability of RJ as 
a response to crime, the retributive impulse, untempered by systematic 
reasoning, could lead to scepticism, reducing the likelihood that the 
person will participate in RJ if invited in future, as well as reducing overall 
support for the restorative approach in the community. 
21  Carlsmith, Darley and Robinson, above n 12.
22  Saulnier and Sivasubramaniam, above n 15; Wenzel et al, above n 18. 
23  Dena M Gromet and John M Darley, ‘Restoration and Retribution: How Including Retributive 
Components Affects the Acceptability of Restorative Justice Procedures’ (2006) 19(4) Social Justice 
Research 395.
24  Elizabeth Moore, Crime and Justice Statistics: Bureau Brief, No 77 (BOCSAR, February, 2012).
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III. Preventive Detention
Preventive detention schemes targeting sex offenders have operated in 
Australia since 2003, with legislation allowing community supervision or 
ongoing detention of offenders following the completion of their original 
sentences.25 Generally a court decides whether to impose conditions 
for the supervision or detention of the offender, though there is some 
variation in the exact mechanisms by which this is accomplished across 
jurisdictions.
The primary goal of preventive detention is utilitarian: it is justified in 
terms of the broader interests of the community and the long-term interests 
of the offender. This is specifically articulated; for example, the Victorian 
Act states that its aim is to enhance the protection of the community 
and facilitate offender rehabilitation.26 However, some scholars have 
raised concerns that imposing supervision or detention on an offender 
(without a fresh conviction) amounts to additional punishment.27 In a 
case in the United States addressing civil commitment, the mechanism 
of preventive detention is referred to as ‘a thinly veiled attempt to seek 
an additional term of incarceration’.28 The key question, therefore, turns 
on the motivations driving preventive detention decisions in practice – is 
preventive detention actually based on utilitarian motives (community 
protection and offender rehabilitation) or retributive motives (additional 
punishment)?
Psychological research supports these concerns, indicating that the 
retributive impulse impacts decision-making in preventive detention. 
In one study on civil commitment in the United States,29 researchers 
presented participants with a case study describing a serious sex offender, 
and varied two factors in the description. The first factor, risk of 
recidivism, was manipulated by telling participants that an expert assessed 
the offender’s risk of reoffence as either high or low. (Note that this is a 
25  Mickael N Bojczenko and Diane Sivasubramaniam, ‘A Psychological Perspective on Preventive 
Detention Decisions’ (2016) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 1.
26  Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009 (Victoria).
27  Bernadette McSherry, Managing Fear: The Law and Ethics of Preventive Detention and Risk 
Assessment (Routledge, 2013).
28  Kansas v Hendricks (US, 1997) 117 S. Ct. 2072, Brief for Respondent and Cross Petitioner at 
21–22.
29  Kevin M Carlsmith, John Monahan and Alison Evans, ‘The Function of Punishment in the 
“Civil” Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators’ (2007) 25(4) Behavioral Sciences & the Law 437.
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criterion on which preventive detention should be administered – when 
risk to the community is high, preventive detention is warranted under 
the legislation.) The second factor manipulated was the original sentence 
– participants were told that the offender had already served either a 
short or long sentence for his original offence. (This is not a criterion on 
which preventive detention should be administered – when the previous 
sanction is insufficient, preventive detention is not justified as a means 
of administering additional punishment.) After reading the description, 
participants were asked whether they would support civil commitment 
for the perpetrator. A higher risk of recidivism increased support for civil 
commitment; this is warranted, and aligns with the utilitarian principle 
that should drive preventive detention. Disturbingly, however, previous 
punishment also affected support for civil commitment: when the previous 
punishment was insufficient (a short, rather than long, sentence), support 
for civil commitment increased. The authors suggest that participants used 
civil commitment as a mechanism to correct the injustice, administering 
additional punishment via ongoing detention. This is not justified under 
the utilitarian principles of preventive detention, and appears to reflect a 
retributive impulse.
The conditions of Carlsmith et al’s study do not replicate judicial decision-
making; judges would undertake far more systematic, deliberative 
processing than participants in this study. But this study illuminates how 
people in the broader community might determine their support for 
preventive detention. These findings suggest the operation of a retributive 
impulse, and, in conjunction with the justice literature reviewed earlier, 
we could conclude that the less systematic processing people engage 
in, the more that retributive impulse will shape support for preventive 
detention. To the extent that retribution operates in people’s reasoning 
about preventive detention, support for the legislation deviates from its 
intended, utilitarian purpose. 
IV. Conclusions
Neither RJ nor preventive detention acknowledges the retributive notions 
of justice people can hold. While both legal reforms uphold worthy 
justice goals (restoration of harmed parties in RJ and utilitarian motives 
to protect communities in preventive detention), failure to recognise an 
intuitive, retributive impulse means that this impulse may play a subtle 
and insidious role in the implementation of these reforms. Whether or 
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not it should be indulged, the retributive impulse is a human response 
we must study and acknowledge to ensure it is managed and tempered 
by deliberative reasoning, not only among legal decision-makers, but 
in the broader community. Contextual cues impact people’s reasoning 
about specific situations,30 suggesting that when laypeople do engage 
systematic reasoning to process accurate information about a particular 
case, their assessment of justice outcomes align more closely with those of 
judges; however, as noted above, the conditions to support the systematic 
response are by no means guaranteed when laypeople consider a just 
outcome outside the structures of judicial reasoning. While we need not 
advocate retribution in the content of legal reforms, we must recognise 
the retributive impulse in the process of implementing legal reforms 
and communicating them to the public. Failure to address this would 
undermine legal reforms that deviate from retributive notions.





1  Forensic Phonetics Australia, forensicphonetics.com.au.
How Interpretation of Indistinct 
Covert Recordings Can Lead 
to Wrongful Conviction: A Case 
Study and Recommendations for 
Reform
Helen Fraser1
I. Introduction and Overview
Covert recording (‘bugging’) is now authorised in almost every major police 
investigation. Unfortunately, because the need for secrecy compromises 
control over recording conditions, the audio is often indistinct. Legal 
practice regarding the use of indistinct covert recordings in trials has 
evolved haphazardly over the past 30 years, with no consultation of 
phonetic science. This has resulted in a number of anomalies, notably 
the fact that detectives are allowed (as ‘ad hoc experts’) to present their 
own transcripts of indistinct audio to ‘assist’ the jury in interpreting the 
audio evidence.
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This chapter2 highlights problems with this practice via a case study 
of a murder conviction obtained on the basis of a demonstrably inaccurate 
police transcript, then suggests directions for reform.
II. What Are Covert Recordings?
Covert recordings are conversations recorded secretly, without the 
knowledge of one or more of the speakers, via telephone intercept, hidden 
listening device or similar means. Legally obtained covert recordings can 
provide powerful evidence in criminal cases, capturing speakers giving 
information or making admissions they might not be willing to reveal 
openly in court.
While covert recordings are highly useful, they have a major drawback. Since 
it is difficult to control the recording conditions, the audio is frequently 
of extremely poor quality, to the extent it is impossible to make out what 
is said on one hearing. Several examples are given at forensictranscription.
com.au, including an excerpt from a recording used in a murder trial that 
forms the basis of an extensive case study summarised briefly here.
This excerpt features a whispered conversation evidently about a pact 
related to the murder. The issue to be resolved by the trial was whether this 
was a pact to conceal the murder (making the speaker an accessory after 
the fact, a crime to which the defendant admitted) or a pact to commit 
the murder (making the speaker an accessory before the fact, which he 
denied).
This recording was the only direct evidence bearing on this issue, all the 
other evidence being described by the judge as circumstantial. The problem 
is that, on one or even several hearings, the audio is indecipherable. This is 
a common occurrence, that the law has had to deal with since covert 
recordings started to be used routinely by police in the 1980s. 
2 This chapter summarises material from several previous publications. The following in particular 
contains extensive background references: H Fraser, ‘Transcription of Indistinct Covert Recordings 
Used as Evidence in Criminal Trials’ in H Selby and I Freckelton (eds), Expert Evidence (Thomson 
Reuters, 2015).
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III. Standard Practice
Following Butera (1987),3 a range of practices have been standardised 
in relation to indistinct covert recordings.
First, since it is clearly not convenient to play audio repeatedly in court, 
the judge can allow a transcript to assist the jury in making out what is 
said in the recording. Second, the transcript can be prepared by detectives 
working on the case. Many citizens are surprised or even alarmed to find 
that police transcripts are used in this way. However, when the reasons are 
explained, they are found to have a certain logic.
Indistinct audio is too hard for regular transcription agencies. However, 
since most covert recordings are obtained on behalf of police, detectives 
create their own transcripts as part of their investigations. When lawyers 
listen to an indistinct recording with the aid of a police transcript, it seems 
evident that the transcript is at least largely accurate. It appears that police 
transcribers, by listening many times to the indistinct audio, have been 
able to make out the words, and that their transcript is able to help 
listeners, saving them the trouble of repeated listening.
Of course it is clear that there are some risks in allowing police transcripts 
to assist in this way. In legal contexts, transcripts are often used as 
a convenient replacement for the audio itself. This makes some sense for 
reliable transcripts of overt recordings, such as court proceedings or police 
interviews, but it is essential that a jury should not be allowed simply to 
read a (possibly misleading) police transcript as a factual representation 
of audio used in evidence.
To avoid this, legal practice has developed a number of checks and balances. 
First, the defence is expected to scrutinise police transcripts thoroughly. 
In the event of disagreement over particular words or sections, the judge 
is expected to listen personally and make a ruling. Most commonly, this 
results in the decision being deemed ‘a matter for the jury’ – though 
it is open for the judge to exclude the police transcript, and there are 
precedents for this.
3  Butera v DPP (1987) 164 CLR 180.
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In addition, the law insists the judge should carefully instruct the jury that 
the evidence is the audio, not the transcript. The transcript is provided 
only to assist them in hearing the recording, not as a replacement for it. 
After the audio has been played once in open court, it is given to the jury, 
who are encouraged to listen carefully in their own time, and form their 
own opinion as to what is said.
In essence, the transcript is provided, not as a factual representation 
of the recording, but as an opinion about its contents, for evaluation 
by the jury. In order to be allowed to offer an opinion (as opposed to 
factual evidence) in court, detectives provide transcripts in the role of 
so-called ‘ad hoc expert’.4 An ‘ad hoc expert’ is someone who, though 
lacking genuine expertise in a particular discipline, is deemed to have 
‘specialised knowledge’5 in relation to a particular trial. With indistinct 
covert recordings, the specialised knowledge is understood to emerge 
from repeated listening to the audio.
IV. Spurious Reasoning
This explanation usually eases the qualms of those who are initially 
uncomfortable with the concept of police transcripts being used to assist 
with the interpretation of indistinct audio. However, although its logic 
may seem plausible on the basis of common knowledge, from the point 
of view of phonetic science it is entirely spurious. Indeed the potential 
for injustice is far greater than recognised by those with general unease 
regarding use of police transcripts.
Phonetics (the science of speech) is a little known and much misunderstood 
subject, even among scientists from other disciplines. Many assume it 
simply adds technical detail to facts already widely known through 
general education. The reality is that the findings of phonetic science 
overturn many apparent truisms of everyday knowledge. In particular, 
ideas underpinning the legal practice just described, widely accepted as 
self-evidently true, turn out to be fallacies.
4  G Edmond and M San Roque, ‘Quasi-Justice: Ad Hoc Expertise and Identification Evidence’ 
(2009) 33 Criminal Law Journal 8.
5  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79.
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A. Fallacy: Transcription is a mere ‘secretarial skill’
Transcripts are used frequently in legal contexts, where transcription 
is deemed a simple process of writing down what was said, the main 
requirement being an ability to spell. This view has limited validity for 
transcription of clear, overt recordings. However, in relation to covert 
recordings it is straightforwardly fallacious. Both determining what was 
said, and rendering it in an appropriate format, require complex, high-
level skills. As is well known in the language sciences, a transcript is never 
‘the’ transcript. It can only ever be ‘a’ transcript.6
B. Fallacy: The more you listen the more accurately 
you hear
Listening many times is essential for creating a reliable transcript of 
indistinct audio. However, it is far from being sufficient. It is quite possible 
to listen many times and be wrong every time. Indeed, depending on the 
circumstances, listening repeatedly is more likely to entrench inaccurate 
perception than correct it.
C. Fallacy: It is easy to pick up errors by checking 
the transcript against the audio
When we listen to audio first without a transcript and then with 
a transcript, it seems that the transcript is aiding our perception. In fact 
it is creating our perception (as explained further below). Surprising as 
it may seem, the easiest way to change listeners’ perception of indistinct 
audio is not to tamper with the audio itself, but simply to provide 
a different transcript. It is impossible to convey this effect adequately on 
paper (see examples at forensictranscription.com.au) but what it means is 
that errors are unlikely to be detected through normal ‘checking’.
6  H Fraser, ‘Transcription of Indistinct Forensic Recordings: Problems and Solutions from the 
Perspective of Phonetic Science’ (2014) 1 Language and Law/Linguagem e Direito 5, ler.letras.up.pt/
site/default.aspx?qry=id05id1444id2692&sum=sim.
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V. The Fascinating Role of Expectation 
in Speech Perception
Demonstrations of these fallacies, though well known in phonetic science, 
are generally found ‘amazing’ and ‘fascinating’ by those who first encounter 
them. ‘Common knowledge’ asserts that hearing is a straightforward 
process of picking up ‘what is there to be heard’. However, the reality is 
that listeners’ unconscious expectations play an enormous role in shaping 
speech perception. This is similar to the general phenomenon of cognitive 
bias, or suggestibility,7 but plays out rather differently with speech than 
with other kinds of perception. 
In fact, the ability of expectation to mislead speech perception is not 
unknown in everyday life. It forms the basis of entertainment based on 
misheard song lyrics and other kinds of humour. However, it has a darker 
side in criminal law. In particular, it means all the checks and balances 
intended to ensure that a police transcript assists, rather than misleads, 
the jury are ineffective.
The ‘pact’ case study discussed earlier makes a good example. Experimental 
studies8 show that listeners who are given the excerpt ‘cold’ never hear 
anything about a pact. Only when they are led by context to understand 
that the conversation relates to some kind of pact, do they hear the word 
‘pact’, and even then no one hears the exact words of the police transcript 
(‘at the start we made a pact’). However, once the police transcript is 
shown, the interpretation ‘at the start we made a pact’ is readily accepted 
by a majority of listeners – who are then willing to offer an opinion as to 
whether the covert recording suggests the pact was to commit or conceal 
murder.
This could be interpreted, and indeed is often experienced by those going 
through the perceptual stages just described, as the transcript ‘assisting’ 
perception. This interpretation, however, is contradicted by the fact 
that phonetic analysis demonstrates ‘at the start we made a pact’ is an 
inaccurate transcription. Unfortunately, it is not so easy to state with 
7  A M Ridley, F Gabbert and D J La Rooy, Suggestibility in Legal Contexts (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) 
254.
8  H Fraser and B Stevenson, ‘The Power and Persistence of Contextual Priming: More Risks in 
Using Police Transcripts to Aid Jurors’ Perception of Poor Quality Covert Recordings’ (2014) 18 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 205.
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certainty exactly what was said, but it is something with the rhythmic 
structure of ‘it’s fucking payback’ – quite different from that of ‘at the start 
we made a pact’.
This demonstrates how expectations created by viewing a transcript 
can influence perception even when the transcript is manifestly wrong. 
The experience of being assisted by a reliable transcript is indistinguishable 
from the experience of being misled by an unreliable one. 
As discussed above, this is a major problem for the standard legal concept 
that inaccuracies in a police transcript will be detected by ensuring it is 
checked against the audio by the defence, the judge, and the jury. A further 
finding of phonetic science creates even bigger problems for that concept. 
When participants are told that expert analysis reveals a transcript to be 
inaccurate, many still prefer the version they now seem to ‘hear with their 
own ears’, forgetting that it was only after being ‘assisted’ by the transcript 
that ‘their own ears’ heard anything remotely like the words it contains.
In considering the relevance of findings like these, it is worth recalling 
that juries evaluate police transcripts under conditions far less favourable 
for detection of inaccuracy than do participants in these experiments. 
Among other factors, participants hear the audio in short, carefully 
prepared sections, which they play repeatedly under a range of conditions 
deliberately constructed to reduce the influence of the transcript. Juries 
have neither the means nor the time to experience this. 
Most importantly, participants first hear the audio ‘cold’, while a jury 
knows the content of the transcript in advance. This means a jury never 
has the experience of being ‘unable to hear a word’ before the transcript 
is presented, an important (though not always effective) factor in raising 
awareness that the transcript has influenced perception.
VI. A Flawed Process
All this means the likelihood of misleading errors or omissions in police 
transcripts being detected is very low, as first prosecutors, then defence, 
then the judge, and ultimately the jury, are deeply but unwittingly 
influenced by what they see on the page.
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It also means the likelihood of police transcripts containing misleading 
errors or omissions is very high. What helps police hear indistinct 
audio that is opaque to others is not their repeated listening. It is their 
knowledge and assumptions about the context of the recording. To the 
extent such knowledge and assumptions are valid, they can indeed give 
valuable insight into the content of an indistinct recording. However, 
they are a double edged sword, which can mislead as easily as help.9
The potential for injustice is evident, and I am personally aware of an 
alarming number of cases where demonstrably inaccurate and misleading 
transcripts have been admitted as ‘assistance’ to the court. The case study 
described earlier recounts one of the most troubling.
In this trial, the defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to 
30 years in prison, largely on the basis that a covert recording revealed him 
saying ‘at the start we made a pact’. However, as discussed above, phonetic 
analysis makes clear that these words were not actually spoken. 
In considering the import of this finding, it is useful to know that the 
murder was actually committed by this man’s son (who confessed and 
was convicted and sentenced in a separate trial), at a time when the father 
had a solid alibi. The whole idea that the father was involved in any way 
arose through a detective erroneously believing he heard words which he 
interpreted as an admission that the father had masterminded the murder. 
Of course, once this idea had arisen, a good deal of ‘circumstantial’ 
evidence was able to be accumulated to support it. However, it is an 
open question how much might or might not have been made of that 
evidence without the (inaccurate) transcript to filter the interpretation of, 
first, investigators, and finally the jury. Recent demonstration in a very 
thorough, large-scale study10 of the role of ‘tunnel vision’ as a factor 
increasing the risk of wrongful conviction is surely relevant.
Unfortunately, expert analysis of the audio in this case occurred only 
after the defence had exhausted all avenues of appeal (none related to the 
transcript). The only recourse was to seek to have the case reopened via an 
application to review the conviction. This application has recently been 
9  H Fraser, ‘Issues in Transcription: Factors Affecting the Reliability of Transcripts as Evidence 
in Legal Cases’ (2003) 10 International Journal of Speech Language and the Law 203.
10  J B Gould et al, Predicting Erroneous Convictions: A Social Science Approach to Miscarriages 
of Justice (National Institute of Justice, 2012).
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rejected in a ruling that disappointingly upholds fallacious ideas about 
speech and speech perception such as those discussed above (see case 
study at forensictranscription.com.au).
VII. The Problem and the Solution
The law’s aim of maximising the assistance juries can derive from police 
insights about the content of covert recordings, while minimising the effect 
of transcript inaccuracies, is entirely reasonable, and one that phonetic 
science can assist with. Unfortunately, the practices the law has so far 
developed to achieve this aim are ineffective. Essentially they bring back 
‘verballing’11 on a grand scale, without requiring conscious intention on 
the part of police,12 creating substantial problems of actual and potential 
injustice.
The most important step in solving any problem is to a gain good 
understanding of its causes. Otherwise attempted solutions simply create 
new problems.
Here, it is clear that the problems are caused by the law taking phonetic 
science into its own hands, unaware of how many ideas about speech 
and speech perception, still accepted as ‘common knowledge’, have been 
shown to be false. Equally clearly, then, a good solution is unlikely to 
be found by continuing the process of developing practice for handling 
speech evidence by creating and applying legal precedents. Even if the 
original judgment is valid, its application in subsequent cases may not be, 
as seen in the less-than-optimal response in the UK to a useful judgment13 
criticising ‘ad hoc expert’ speaker identification evidence.
11  ‘Verballing’ is claiming someone said something when in fact they didn’t, notably in fabricated 
confessions. Evidence of verballing being used to obtain convictions was an important element in 
findings of police corruption in the 1990s (e.g. Wood, J R T (1997), Royal Commission into the New 
South Wales Police Service, Volume 1: Corruption (Sydney: Government of NSW).
12  H Fraser, ‘Covert Recordings as Evidence in Court: The Return of Police “Verballing”?’ [2013] 
The Conversation, theconversation.com/covert-recordings-as-evidence-in-court-the-return-of-police-
verballing-14072.
13  See R v Flynn [2008] 2 Cr App R 266.
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What is needed is wholesale reform14 of legal practice around the handling 
and admission of indistinct covert recordings. To quickly forestall 
a common kneejerk excuse for avoiding the issue, such a system would 
certainly not involve having every covert recording transcribed by an 
expert in phonetic science. 
Rather it would involve designing a system that ensures transcripts are 
reliable before covert recordings enter the legal process. Deciding the exact 
nature of such a system requires discussion and research conducted in 
close collaboration between phonetic science and the law. However, once 
the will is in place, it need not be overly difficult. An excellent precedent 
is seen in the highly practical and universally appreciated system for 
creating and using recorded police interviews, implemented to prevent 
police ‘verballing’.
14  Perhaps more accurately undoing of the unfortunate effects of reforms introduced by Butera.
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1  Professor, La Trobe University Law School.
2  Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2016 (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2016) Table 7A.1.
3  Ibid. 7.16.
Australia’s Lower-level Criminal 
Courts: Tackling 21st Century 




Australia’s courts have been significantly impacted by change over the past 
30 years. They have, to some extent, modernised their procedures and 
practices, but are caught very much in a period of transition: between 
approaches to dealing with criminal cases that would be familiar to 19th 
century lawyers, and are focused on efficiency and volume, to those 
that require greater engagement with the needs of court users. This is 
particularly the case in the high-volume magistrates’ courts that deal with 
most of the criminal caseload. 
Magistrates’ courts are characterised by high judicial workloads. They have 
accounted for most of the rise in criminal caseload over the past five years2 
and, in 2014–15, accounted for nearly 97 per cent of all matters finalised.3 
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In a 2007 survey of Australian magistrates, three-quarters of respondents 
agreed that ‘The volume of cases is unrelenting’.4 Notwithstanding, 
most of these courts have maintained positive clearance rates,5 with the 
same, or, in some cases, fewer, magistrates,6 and backlogs have remained 
relatively constant.7 
A 2004 National Court Observation Study found that the average time 
taken to dispose of a criminal matter in magistrates’ courts was 4 minutes 
and 13 seconds.8 Recent research commissioned by the Victorian Royal 
Commission into Family Violence (VRCFV) found that the average 
duration of family violence matters observed across eight court locations 
varied from 3 minutes 34 seconds to 10 minutes 17 seconds.9 However, 
there are no established benchmarks for disposals of matters in any 
Australian criminal court. 
II. Current Practice
The only measures for assessing the institutional performance of 
Australian criminal courts are those used by the Commonwealth 
Government Productivity Commission’s annual ‘Report on Government 
Services’ (RoGS) – on backlogs and clearance rates, and judicial officers 
per finalisation.10 These have been the focus of much debate,11 and the 
absence of any more sophisticated methods of performance measurement 
arguably disadvantages courts in making the case for additional resources.
It is also arguable that focusing limited court resources on collecting RoGS 
data impedes courts’ ability to collect and analyse data that assist their 
workforce planning. Research into caseload allocation found very few 
lower courts keep records of allocations, so that while all aim to equalise 
4  Kathy Mack, Anne Wallace and Sharyn Roach Anleu, Judicial Workload: Time, Tasks and Work 
Organisation (Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2013) 31–32.
5  That is, an excess of finalisations over lodgements: Productivity Commission, above n 2, 7.36.
6  Ibid. Table 7A.28.
7  Ibid. Table 7A.19; Table 7A.21.
8  Mack, Wallace and Roach Anleu, above n 4, 52–53.
9  Karen Gelb, Understanding Family Violence Court Proceedings: The Impact of Family Violence on 
the Magistrates Court of Victoria (March 2016) 54.
10  Productivity Commission, above n 2.
11  Brian Opeskin, ‘The State of the Judicature: A Statistical Profile of Australian Courts and Judges’ 
(2013) 35(3) Sydney Law Review 489, 491–92; J J Spigelman, ‘Measuring Court Performance’ (2006) 
16(2) Journal of Judicial Administration 69.
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the volume of judicial workload over time, and to deploy specialist 
judicial skills most effectively, they are unable to track whether or not 
these outcomes are achieved.12
The focus on RoGS data has also not assisted courts to identify and service 
the needs of court users, first identified as a pressing issue in 1998.13 
For example, despite widespread perceptions of an increase in numbers 
of unrepresented persons appearing before them in recent decades, 
most courts do not collect data about this, or do so only minimally 
or sporadically.14 
An ‘increasing diversity amongst court users, especially in terms of ethnic 
and cultural background and capacity to understand the language and 
procedures of courts’15 was also identified in 1998. There are ongoing 
attempts, including Indigenous sentencing courts16 and cultural awareness 
training for judicial officers,17 to improve court outcomes for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) Australians and their communities. 
However, there is little data available on ATSI populations in courts, 
or the cultural and linguistic background of any court users. 
In 2015, the newly-formed Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity 
(JCCD) conducted consultations to assess the capacity of the courts to 
provide access to justice for women from both groups. The subsequent 
reports identified a number of issues that impede effective communication 
with and participation at court by these vulnerable groups.18 Previously 
12  Mack, Wallace and Roach Anleu, above n 4, 9, 66, 73–74, 95–96, 99–100.
13  Stephen Parker, Courts and the Public (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 1998) 
159–60.
14  Tania Sourdin, Elizabeth Richardson and Nerida Wallace, Self-represented Litigants: Literature 
Review (Monash University, 2012) 23.
15  Parker, above n 13, 159.
16  Michael King et al, Non-Adversarial Justice (The Federation Press, 2nd edn, 2014) 207–15.
17  Anne Wallace, Australia’s Indigenous People – A Curriculum Framework for Professional 
Development Programs for Australian Judicial Officers (National Judicial College of Australia, 2013).
18  Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity, The Path to Justice: Migrant and Refugee Women’s 
Experience of the Courts: A Report Prepared for the Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity (2016, Judicial 
Council on Cultural Diversity) 7 (‘JCCD Migrant Refugee Report’).
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documented language and communication issues for ATSI populations19 
were confirmed as ongoing problems.20 The reports also documented 
serious concerns about the provision of interpreters in courts.21  
The JCCD and the VRCFV reported a range of other concerns about the 
court experience of vulnerable women:
• inadequate, out of date and unsafe court buildings;22
• lack of safe waiting spaces;
• lengthy, and indeterminate, waiting periods;23
• lack of understanding of court processes;24
• difficulty understanding forms, charges, orders, or judgments;25 and
• courtroom dynamics, including the impact of actions and attitudes 
of judicial officers.26
The JCCD and VRCFV’s emphasis on user-focused court services is a key 
feature of therapeutic and restorative theories of justice that have informed 
the development of new approaches to criminal cases over recent decades. 
These approaches feature direct engagement with offenders by judicial 
officers, multidisciplinary collaborative processes between the courts and 
service providers, less-adversarial paradigms, and outcomes that address 
community needs as well as those of victims.27 
19  See, for example, Diana Eades, ‘Judicial Understandings of Aboriginality and Language Use in 
Criminal Cases’ in Peter Toner (ed), Strings of Connectedness: Essays in Honour of Ian Keen (ANU Press, 
2015) 27–51.
20  Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity, The Path to Justice: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Women’s Experience of the Courts: A Report Prepared for the Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity (2016, 
Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity) 23–24 (‘JCCD ATSI Report’).
21  JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 24–25; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, above n 18, 16, 29.
22  Victoria, Royal Commission into Family Violence, Report and Recommendations Volume III 
(March 2016) 130–32, 138; JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 28; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, above 
n 18, 37–39.
23  Ibid.
24  Victoria, above n 22, 129–30; JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 28–29; JCCD Migrant Refugee 
Report, above n 18, 39.
25  Victoria, above n 22, 137; JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 29; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, 
above n 18, 39.
26  Victoria, above n 22, 132–33; JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 30–32; JCCD Migrant Refugee 
Report, above n 18, 40–44.
27  King et al, above n 16, 241–45.
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In contrast to the development of more engaged and therapeutic styles 
of  judging, modern magistrates’ courts also feature increasing use of 
audio-visual (video) links. Prison videolinks are now the presumed 
form of court appearance for defendants in custody in less formal court 
proceedings (variously categorised) across most jurisdictions.28 Although 
the exact extent of their use is difficult to quantify,29 well over half 
(57 per cent) of all court appearances by defendants in custody in New 
South Wales during 2013–14 were made by audio-visual link. 30
Videolinks are thought to provide a more cost-effective and efficient, 
safer and less disruptive means of bringing prisoners to the court than 
physically transporting them.31 There has also been a trend to provide 
interpreting services by telephone or videolink in the interests of saving 
costs.32 Videolinks or CCTV are now used extensively to take evidence 
from vulnerable witnesses,33 and the JCCD and the VRCFV recommended 
expanding this use.34 Overseas, a recent review of efficiency in the criminal 
courts of England and Wales also recommended giving priority to audio 
and videolink hearings.35
Yet, while vulnerable witnesses generally experience a technology-
mediated court appearance favourably, there has been little research about 
its impact on defendants,36 including those who are unrepresented, or on 
interpreting. Research has found that the way that videolinks are used can 
impact on the ability to achieve effective engagement.37 
28  Emma Rowden et al, Gateways to Justice: Design and Operational Guidelines for Remote 
Participation in Court Proceedings (2013, University of Western Sydney) 27, 95–102.
29  Ibid. 22–23.
30  Department of Police and Justice, Government of New South Wales, Department of Police 
and Justice 2013–14 Annual Report (2014) 82, www.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Annual%20
Reports/2013-14_Annual_Report.pdf.
31  Rowden et al, above n 28, 21.
32  See, for example, Department of the Attorney-General, Government of Western Australia, 
Videolinks, www.courts.dotag.wa.gov.au/V/video_link.aspx?uid=3226-3984-5962-8567.
33  Rowden et al, above n 28.
34  Victoria, above n 22, 173; JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 40; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, 
above n 18, 53.
35  Sir Brian Leveson, Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings (Judiciary of England and Wales, 
January 2015) 17.
36  Carolyn McKay, ‘Video Links from Prison: Permeability and the Carceral World’ (2016) 5(1) 
International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 21, 22–23.
37  Rowden et al, above n 28, 68–73.
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
206
III. The Future
The only recent systematic attention given to the operation of lower-level 
criminal courts in Australia has been as part of the VRCFV’s investigation, 
and the increasing impact of family violence on the workload of these 
courts38 also suggests that its findings bear close examination. The JCCD 
recommendations and academic research also identify ways in which these 
courts can complete their transition to a 21st century operating paradigm.
First, there is a need to recognise that the skills required for judicial work 
in these courts have changed. While magistrates have always needed to 
communicate effectively with self-represented parties, increasingly they 
need to be able to engage with individuals from diverse cultural and 
linguistic backgrounds and to work effectively with interpreters.39 They 
also need to engage effectively with increasing numbers of people who will 
appear before them ‘virtually’ rather than physically.  
There is also an increasing need for specialisation: in therapeutic courts, 
which require particular types of judicial skills, and to manage particular 
lists where other special expertise and knowledge is required.40 Those 
allocating caseload to judicial officers already take into account a range of 
special skills and differential expertise.41 However, in most of the courts 
studied in the research, there are no formal mechanisms available for 
identifying and developing specialist skills and expertise.42 There would 
be merit in courts making more transparent the process by which the 
qualities and skills required for specialist judicial work are identified, 
fostered, and supported.43 
The VRCFV called for investigation into which matters need to come 
before a court, and which do not, and, of those that do, which need to 
be dealt with by a judicial officer. It noted that the time taken to deal 
with ‘straightforward or procedural matters’44 including ‘adjudication 
38  Victoria, above n 22, 148.
39  JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 9; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, above n 18, 9.
40  Anne Wallace, Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, ‘Judicial Caseload Allocation and 
Specialisation: Finding the “Right Judge”?’ (December 2012) International Journal for Court 
Administration 68, 69.
41  Mack, Wallace and Roach Anleu, above n 4, 102.
42  Wallace, Mack and Roach Anleu, above n 40, 79.
43  Ibid. 79–80.
44  Victoria, above n 22, 148.
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and administration of traffic matters, including low-level offences such 
as driving a vehicle in a toll zone without registration’45 can constitute 
‘a significant proportion of court business’. 46 
The VRCFV and the JCCD focused on the need for courts to develop 
the role of court staff, to encourage and deploy specialist skills. To free up 
resources and improve services to court users, the VRCFV recommended 
that courts move away from inefficient manual and paper-based processes 
towards electronic and online processes, to enable the use of staff such 
as registrars as ‘highly skilled and proactive … case and list managers’.47 
The JCCD called for the introduction of Court Cultural Liaison and 
Indigenous Court Liaison officers in all courts.48 
The VRCFV drew attention to the current system of case-listing which 
requires parties to turn up at fixed times (usually 10 am) to wait for an 
indeterminate period for their matter to be dealt with.49 This system was 
also highlighted in a recent review of efficiency in UK criminal courts, 
which called for a review of court opening hours.50
The VRCFV recommended staggered listings and benchmarking waiting 
time to provide greater guidance to parties as to when their cases would be 
heard and how long they should have to wait.51 It noted that ‘Effective use 
of benchmarks necessitates data-collection practices that allow courts to 
reliably measure performance’. It recommended capping family violence 
lists ‘at a level that allows magistrates sufficient time to hear each matter’,52 
an exercise that also requires attention to benchmarking. 
The JCCD and the VRCFV recommended improvements to court 
buildings, including waiting areas, security, support services and signage.53 
The VRCFV noted the importance of courts working in therapeutic mode 
being able to work in partnership with relevant court-based professionals 
and services.54 The JCCD reports emphasised the importance of building 




48  JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 9; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, above n 18, 9.
49  Victoria, above n 22, 167.
50  Leveson, above n 35, 42 [146].
51  Victoria, above n 22, 167–68.
52  Ibid. 168.
53  Ibid. 172; JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 39; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, above n 18, 53.
54  Victoria, above n 22, 181.
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collaborative efforts to educate and improve understanding of court 
processes.55 They also recommended clear court policies in relation to 
identifying the need for, engaging with and using interpreters.56 
The VRCFV found the information technology (IT) infrastructure 
in Victoria’s magistrates’ courts was inadequate and that: ‘An upgraded, 
fit-for-purpose IT system is an essential precursor to change’.57 
It  recommended freeing-up resources by creating an online electronic 
court registry to allow registry-related inquiries to be centralised and 
carried out by a specialist workforce58 and IT upgrades to enable the court 
to better receive and share information. The JCCD called for improved 
data collection by courts about the cultural, linguistic and gender diversity 
of their users.59 Research suggests that diary and calendaring systems 
also require updating from the manual and stand-alone systems used in 
most courts.60 
The VRCFV also noted the potential for newer smart, agile, technology 
solutions to craft user-centric services, such as a case management system 
using ‘a real-time airport-style electronic display of listed matters, and 
alerts transmitted to parties’ mobile phones, [to enable] parties … to 
observe their place in the order of matters being heard on a given day’,61 
alleviate the anxieties of indeterminate waiting and enable those attending 
court to more effectively structure their time.62
A further step might be the development of guided online resolution 
systems for minor or quasi-criminal offences, such as traffic matters. 
In addition to saving costs, this might appeal to a newer generation who 
are familiar with online dispute resolution systems in contexts such as 
eBay. The resource savings could be used to provide support to court users 
who are not digitally empowered and whose matters are more serious 
or complex.
55  JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 38; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, above n 18, 8.
56  JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 39; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, above n 18, 53.
57  Victoria, above n 22, 162.
58  Ibid. 163.
59  JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 9; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, above n 18, 9.
60  Mack, Wallace and Roach Anleu, above n 4, 66–67.
61  Victoria, above n 22, 168.
62  Ibid.
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Courts can improve their use of existing technology. Research has shown 
that court videolinks could be considerably enhanced by greater attention 
to configuration, supporting environment, protocols, procedures, 
and training.63 
It is clear from the JCCD and VRCFV reports that assessment of court 
performance needs to move beyond the focus of the RoGS data to a 
greater emphasis on assessing whether courts are meeting the needs of their 
users. Both JCCD reports call for the establishment of key performance 
indicators to measure progress against their recommendations,64 and, as 
noted, a number of the VRCFV’s recommendations require benchmarking.
The JCCD now provides resources and support to courts to deliver services 
to a culturally diverse community.65 As it has noted, the International 
Court Excellence Framework, to which a number of Australian courts 
subscribe, could also serve as a forum for standard-setting and performance 
measurement with a focus on client perspectives and  access to justice.66 
It has already been used, for example, by the Victorian courts to establish 
key performance indicators for use in the budgeting process.67 
IV. Conclusion
Australia’s first-instance criminal courts are moving from an outdated 
paradigm – an operational environment focused on the convenience of 
the court and the professional participants – to one that is user-centric 
and places greater value on engagement with court users. But progress 
has been slow. Solutions designed to increase efficiency still often focus 
on ‘throughput’ and cost-savings for executive government. Many staff 
still operate largely in a transactional mindset, with the imperative of the 
yearly RoGS data collection hanging over them.
There have been significant pulls in the other direction – the development 
of therapeutic and problem solving approaches, methods of taking evidence 
to reduce trauma for children and victim witnesses, and greater awareness 
63  Rowden et al, above n 28, 45–79.
64  JCCD ATSI Report, above n 20, 41; JCCD Migrant Refugee Report, above n 18, 55.
65  Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity, Cultural Diversity within the Judicial Context: Existing Court 
Resources (15 February 2016, Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity), www.jccd.org.au/publications/.
66  Ibid. 7.
67  Court Services Victoria, Court Services Victoria Annual Report 2015–16, 22 (November 2016, 
Court Services Victoria).
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of the needs of unrepresented parties, of Indigenous Australians and those 
from migrant and refugee backgrounds. There has been strong judicial 
leadership for these developments, including the recent establishment of 
the JCCD. The current priority given to family violence at government 
level and the attention to court reform given by the VRCFV may provide 







1  Research Professor of Law, University of South Australia. I acknowledge the support of an ARC 
Indigenous Discovery Award which enabled me to work on the project Indigenous Knowledges: Law, 
Society and the State. I also acknowledge the research assistance of Jo Bird and Emily Collins.
2  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
3  Ibid. 30.
4  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). For a discussion of the limitations of this Act, see Irene Watson, 
‘Sovereign Spaces, Caring for Country and the Homeless Position of Aboriginal Peoples’ (2009) 108 
South Atlantic Quarterly 27; Irene Watson, Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law: Raw 
Law (Routledge, 2015).
5  On genocide, see Watson, Aboriginal Peoples, above n 4, 109–44.
What is the Mainstream? The 
Laws of First Nations Peoples 
Irene Watson1
I. Introduction
The business of colonialism is not yet finished; it rolls on relentlessly. 
This fact presents us with certain challenges. For Australia, the legal limit 
in dealing with the fact of First Nations Peoples’ existence was reiterated 
by the High Court in Mabo (No 2).2 It determined that the extent of 
recognition of First Nations cannot move beyond the ‘skeletal’ principle 
which is the foundation of the colonial state.3
As a result of this position taken by the High Court, one that has been 
restricted even further by the Australian state,4 the genocide of First 
Nations is able to continue.5 As a parallel, but as part of the same project, 
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Australia still holds records for animal and plant extinctions and our 
territories are threatened with ecocide with each new and damaging 
development proposal.6
While this chapter sits within an environment stream, which includes 
resources, Indigenous relationships to the environment and property, 
my call for reform crosses all areas of the law, so the cast of the chapter 
is much broader. Western legal systems are segmented and categorised 
into property, contract, torts and so on; First Nations’ legal systems are 
relational. This chapter will embrace the complexity of First Nations’ legal 
systems and the problem of having to fit Aboriginal laws within colonial 
foundations. In the near future the challenges will be immense and those 
formulating the legal and policy responses should be aware of  those 
complexities. So where to begin?
II. Where to Begin
We need to move beyond the politics of recognition: politics which are 
limited by the colonial foundations of the state.7 These foundations pass as 
law, but it is military power and colonial violence that are the foundations 
of the colonising project called Australia, a project which continues to 
this day. The urgency of our time calls for law, certainly, but my argument 
is not so much for the reform of Euro-centric law, because its colonial 
foundation is unlawful, but instead for the re-emergence of the ancient 
laws of this continent now called Australia.8
6  For example, Australia has the highest rate of mammal extinction in the world. Globally, 
over the past 400 years, one in three mammal extinctions have occurred in Australia. A 2015 review 
of the literature indicates that since 1788, 28 species of Australian land mammals have become 
extinct. Compare this with post-invasion North America, in which only one mammal species has 
become extinct over more than 400 years. See John Woinarski, Andrew Burbidge and Peter Harrison, 
‘Ongoing Unravelling of a Continental Fauna: Decline and Extinction of Australian Mammals since 
European Settlement’ (2015) 112 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 4531. For information 
on flora both extinct and threatened, see Department of the Environment and Energy, EPBC 
Act List of Threatened Flora, www.environment.gov.au/cgi-bin/sprat/public/publicthreatenedlist.
pl?wanted=flora; and, for a comparison with international data, see ‘Fact Check: Does Australia Have 
One of the “Highest Loss of Species Anywhere in the World”?’, ABC News, 4 March 2016, www.abc.
net.au/news/2015-08-19/fact-check-does-australia-have-one-of-the-highest-extinction/6691026.
7  I discuss the politics of recognition in Watson, Aboriginal Peoples, above n 4, 18.
8  For further discussion see ibid.
215
18 . WHAT IS THE MAINSTREAM?
The Australian state continues to run on an unlawful foundation; the 
opportunity to review this position was presented in Mabo (No 2), but 
the High Court decided there was no possibility other than to retain the 
skeleton principle of colonial Australia’s foundation. So are we stuck with 
this, an unlawful foundation that, regardless of Mabo (No 2)’s rejection of 
terra nullius, also rejects the continuity of Aboriginal laws? We now have 
affirmed the unlawfulness of the terra nullius state, but with no alternative 
in its place.
I propose another truth, another way of knowing law, a way which was the 
‘mainstream law’ for this continent for millennia, since the first sunrise, 
a way which still lives as the laws of the land to this day. The laws of 
the land are ancient and as old as the continent itself; they continue to 
exist. The laws of the land cannot be finished, other than perhaps in the 
minds of those humans who proclaim their ending. But law continues, 
just as the natural world continues, regardless of how it may be denied 
by humans. For that is the law.
The reform I advocate is that the colonial settler society should better 
see and know this law, so that it becomes visible to those who cannot see 
it beneath the continuing cover of terra nullius. It is a radical call, one 
which calls for us to begin again. It may be an impossible call, but not to 
respond to it and to do nothing presages an impossible future, not only 
for humans, but for all life on earth.
At this stage some readers may be thinking ‘Can’t we have our cake and 
eat it?’, but we can’t do that anymore. The dire consequences if we do have 
been pointed out many times.
III. Beyond the Politics of Recognition
Kombu-Merri and Waka Waka elder and philosopher Mary Graham has 
argued that First Nations have managed this country forever and that we 
still have the authority to do so today.9 Clearly we do not have the power 
beyond the ‘recognition’ politics of the colonial state but we do still hold 
the lawful authority to carry out ancient obligations to care for country.
9  Mary Graham, ‘Some Thoughts about the Philosophical Underpinnings of Aboriginal 
Worldviews’ (2008) 45 Australian Humanities Review 181, www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/
archive/Issue-November-2008/graham.html.
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Many First Nations share the obligation to care for country; it is in our 
laws to ensure that future generations – not only human but all species, 
including our ngaitji10 relations – have a sustainable future. Many First 
Nations understand that this is law which is core to our being and hold 
this core even in the face of the colonial assimilation policies that were 
intended to destroy our connections to law.
The challenge for non-Indigenous Australians is to see First Nations 
Peoples and the laws of the land from another horizon, one of law outside 
and beyond the continuing terra nullius cover of the colonial project. 
That is to see beyond the commodification of land and the constructions 
of Aboriginality as backward and savage.
The dialogue we need to have must move beyond the current trajectory 
emanating from a politics of recognition to become one which listens 
to the laws of the land and acts lawfully in response. We need to move 
beyond pragmatism, short-term solutions, and political and economic 
gains and embrace the truth of the natural world and its ancient laws. 
IV. International Law
International law concepts such as self-determination, territorial integrity, 
and free, prior and informed consent have all been considered possible 
tools to transform coloniality. From within a critical First Nations’ lens, 
concepts of self-determination, territorial integrity, and free, prior and 
informed consent have been considered for the possibility of coexistence 
beyond the current assimilationist framework we are subjected to.
Across my work I have considered the limitations of Euro-centred 
international and domestic laws on ‘Indigenous recognition’. I have 
considered the illusion of recognition and have advocated for the real 
possibility of an ongoing existence based on Aboriginal laws and their 
inherent philosophy of relationality.
To continue the current ‘progress and development’ agenda is to ensure 
the decline of life on earth, and the death of many species. The possibility 
of our survival is enmeshed in relationships with all life forms and requires 
respect for Aboriginal laws and their core philosophies of relationality. 
10  Our ngaitji represents the relationship or kinship we share with our surrounding natural world. 
It is a relationship that teaches us about the unity we share with all natural things.
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As I oppose the fracking and other developments of ancestral lands which 
I am related to and obliged to care for, the greater part of humanity is also 
tied to the matrix of like connections.11 We are all dependent upon air and 
water, and our airs and waters flow together and are connected.
The maintenance and centring of First Nations epistemologies is essential 
to survival. Is it then possible to reconstruct international law so that it is 
liberated from its colonial origins, and is replaced with or at least inclusive 
of First Nations laws, philosophies and knowledges?
V. First Nations Epistemologies
If First Nations are not positioned to reframe the dialogue (as we are not 
currently), then coloniality will continue and with it the same old destructive 
development agenda. A horizontal dialogue between colonialist interests 
and First Nations-centred epistemologies is essential to human survival. 
We must put the discussion of Indigenous rights at the centre of the 
debate, moving beyond the literature on colonially constructed identities. 
Current human-rights frameworks ignore our core role as carers for the 
land for future generations; the fullness of Indigenous epistemologies 
is misunderstood and also ignored. Our inherent connectedness to the 
natural world is ignored and remains largely unfathomable to the non-
Indigenous world. The critical need for another way of being law-full 
is not known or is currently incapable of being seen. Opening our eyes 
widely and seeing and knowing law is critical.
VI. Recognition: The Mainstream Context
Aboriginal law has run and continues to run across Aboriginal lands; 
it remains the invisible mainstream law. But it continues to be rendered 
invisible by the colonial project, which continues today even though its 
existence is denied.
11  Irene Watson and Kungari Aboriginal Heritage Association, Submission No 103 to Parliament 
of South Australia Natural Resources Committee, Inquiry into Unconventional Gas (Fracking) in 
the South East of South Australia, 29 January 2015; Irene Watson and Kungari Aboriginal Heritage 
Association, submission in response to Nora Creina Golf Course and Tourism Resort: Major Project 
Public Environmental Report, January 2016.
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The law is the law is the law. It just is, and no amount of violence and no 
colonial system established by force and constructing itself as ‘law’ will 
override or extinguish it. While the colonial legal system has constructed 
myths which emanate from terra nullius, they are just that – myths of non-
existence constructed for the purpose of enabling an unlawful foundation. 
Aboriginal laws remain the mainstream and, while First Nations are 
deemed peoples without law and merely objects of the colonial law, this 
is not the truth.
The colonial project posits and constructs rules which overlay the law 
of the land, rules which reject First Nations’ laws as Aboriginal oral stories, 
and represent their reliance upon the memory of elders as mere myth and 
fable. While science is only now catching up with many of our stories 
and songs (as noted in a recent example concerning the rising waters 
which resulted in the Great Barrier Reef12), they are too often fobbed 
off as childlike, and their ancient coded knowledge of the codependence 
between humans and their environments remains unexamined.
Eurocentric law postures as being secular, and holds that the central 
position of spirituality and relationality in First Nations’ laws means that 
they are not real law. But this position denies that the origins of Western 
Eurocentric legal systems were and remain founded upon religious law. 
Christianity both annihilated and excluded the ‘heathen’ because they 
were not Christians.
VII. Possibilities for Common Ground: What 
will Happen if We do Nothing?
Critical sociologist and legal theorist Boaventura de Sousa Santos reminds 
us of our obligations beyond critical discourse and of the need for talk 
about the unspeakable when he warns of the risk of an epistemicide, the 
murder of knowledge, if the exclusion of ‘different’ voices continues.13 
Although as I have said above the law is the law – it just is and it cannot 
be extinguished – the potential for juricide also looms if Aboriginal 
12  Nick Reid and Patrick Nunn, ‘Aboriginal Memories of Inundation of the Australian Coast 
Dating from More than 7000 Years Ago’ (2016) 47 Australian Geographer 11.
13  Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide (Paradigm 
Publishers, 2014).
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legal systems continue to be ignored. Perhaps it is more accurate to say 
that there is the potential for a death of knowledge of the law and its 
connection to the First Nations carriers of law.
Is there a possibility for common ground, or even a dialogue on these 
concerns, beyond the dominance of a Western-centric universalism and 
incommensurability between cultures?14 An equality of power relations, 
that is, relations of shared authority which could fit the purposes of 
intercultural translations, is the necessary precursor, since only then can 
reciprocity among social groups or movements be obtained.15
In thinking through this terrain, First Nations’ critical approaches to 
vague and loaded concepts such as ‘equality’ remain essential. They are 
essential to the possibility of First Nations’ voices being heard and not 
suppressed so as not even to register.16
I consider that the following questions and comments raised by Santos 
contribute to the possibility of our voices being heard by dominant 
colonial states: 
• How do the power relations between First Nations and states translate 
into Western law?
• What place or space is there to speak of coloniality, for where is the 
world free of colonialism? 
• Opening up the space is more than an intellectual process.
• Inter-cultural translation is an instrument for mediation and 
negotiation and can only flourish where there is a commitment to 
decolonising power relations. 
What are the possibilities for First Nations’ laws? How can we re-centre 
them and the natural world? First Nations’ perspectives on authority and 
power should be central to any intercultural dialogue.
In understanding that the natural world holds authority, it would follow 
then that all places and spaces are open to being contact zones. We need 
to listen about climate change. We need to listen about coal mining and 
fracking, and to all events which affect our natural ecosystems.
14  Ibid. 212.
15  Ibid. 214.
16  Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford University Press, 
2007).
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Our natural world is in crisis which makes the need for translation ever 
more urgent.17 The West has reached the end point of project progress, 
and does not have the solutions to the crisis. It has no other lands to 
invade and colonise beyond leaving our mother Earth and searching for 
other planets. Current regimes of recognition and protection do not work. 
We are on the brink of sacrificing our waters, our oceans and our lands 
which provide for an overpopulated planet. Recognition laws in respect 
of First Nations come in the form of native title laws18 and Aboriginal 
heritage protection,19 and they are accompanied by named environmental 
laws,20 but none of them have the capacity to protect the environments 
which are vital to our survival. We are on a trajectory which it appears 
could sacrifice all life forms, but we still have the capacity for ongoing 
life. Cycles do return, to begin again. Aboriginal law is an ongoing cycle; 
it is the law.
17  Santos, above n 13, 233.
18  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth); Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth).
19  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth).
20  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), among other Australian 
state and Commonwealth laws.
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Overturning Aqua Nullius: 
Pathways to National Law Reform
Virginia Marshall1
I. Background and Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and propose new pathways to 
reform legal issues affecting Indigenous people in the exercise of their 
traditional and revitalised rights and interests in water within national 
and state water regimes. I argue that the exercise of traditional and 
revitalised laws as expressed in Art 11 of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) should be incorporated into 
Australia’s water laws and policies, in addition to other articles of the 
Declaration, for example Art 20, for Indigenous peoples to develop 
economic opportunities in water. These and other relevant international 
instruments incorporated into Australian law would give expression to 
the exercise and enjoyment of traditional and revitalised rights to water, 
economic and cultural property rights and interests, to create substantive 
pathways for Indigenous First Peoples of Australia.
The colonisation of Australia into existing states and territories was 
staggered over temporal phases, and the nation state progressively 
excluded, controlled and marginalised Indigenous communities’ cultural 
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and economic water rights and interests. Pathways to water reform must 
acknowledge that there have been few opportunities for Indigenous 
communities in Australia to advance and strengthen their own economy:
The boundaries to the ownership and control of water and other resources 
inherent to Indigenous peoples have been defined by the Crown. The 
Commonwealth water legislation has clearly defined the parameters of the 
rights and interests of Indigenous peoples’ water resources. The exercise 
of water rights in Australia by Aboriginal communities historically turns 
on ‘government political will’ to include Aboriginal peoples in policy and 
legislative development.2
Private property rights lie at the heart of Western market-based economies 
such as Australia, where alienable freehold land and tradeable water rights 
generate wealth, and prevail over native title rights and interests. Although 
the concept of private property rights in water is not new, as ‘the Romans 
legislated individual property rights to regulate water use’,3 it is new for 
Indigenous peoples of Australia.
There is a need to create new concepts of water tenure and property 
models which do not leave Indigenous communities vulnerable to forfeit 
on default in failing to meet their legal obligations. Any proposed reform 
to the Australian Government’s water policy and laws requires the full 
review of the National Water Initiative which should be subject to the 
scrutiny of human rights principles such as UNDRIP. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) baseline 
projection is that 3.9 billion people will be subject to severe water stress by 
2050.4 The OECD Taskforce on Water Security and Sustainable Growth 
states that:
the goal of improving material wealth of societies must be negotiated 
within the boundaries imposed by the availability and sustainability of 
the water resource, and balanced with the cultural and spiritual values 
of water.5
2  Virginia Marshall, A Web of Aboriginal Water Rights: Examining the Competing Aboriginal Claim 
for Water Property Rights and Interests in Australia (PhD Thesis, Macquarie University, 2014) 225.
3  Joshua Getzler, A History of Water Rights at Common Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 11.
4  C W Saddoff et al, ‘Securing Water, Sustaining Growth: Report of the GWP/OECD Task Force 
on Water Security and Sustainable Growth’ (2015) 30.
5  Ibid. 39.
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The creation of Australian property rights in water was enacted by the 
statutory separation of water from land. National Water Reform was 
‘intended to create effective water management and certainty for business 
and industry’ including ‘investment in water trading’.6 Indigenous peoples 
were afforded the incorporation of discretionary Indigenous Clauses in the 
‘blueprint for national water reform’ under the National Water Initiative, 
which relegated the status of Indigenous peoples to one of many minority 
interests in water. The recent progress for Aboriginal peoples’ water 
interests in the Murray–Darling Basin was a result of the parliament’s 
amendment of s 202(5)(c) of the Water Act 2007 (Cth) to include ‘at least 
2 Indigenous persons with expertise in Indigenous matters relevant to the 
Basin’s water resources’.7 Such amendments are inadequate.
The background to the exploration of an Indigenous water discourse 
should acknowledge that water resources are framed by a Western 
postcolonial legacy which ‘built’ Australia’s wealth by fortifying control 
through state and federal constitutions to secure rights to water and land 
tenure. Observations by settlers and the establishment were cognisant of 
the presence of Indigenous peoples, their laws, customs and practices, often 
tolerating coexisting water use in the expectation that it would not impede 
Western modes of economic development. Australian governments have 
‘historically given water entitlements to farmers for free and encouraged 
them to utilize available water’.8
On the one hand Australian water management by the colonial founders 
estranged Indigenous communities from continuing to participate in their 
historic Indigenous economies. On the other hand those same colonial 
constructs were apparent during the government’s national water reform 
process with the lack of inclusion of Indigenous rights and interests and 
offering limited scope in this process to address repugnant historical water 
policies such as the treatment of Indigenous water rights as aqua nullius 
and ‘belonging to no one’.9
6  Marshall, above n 2, 323. Citing the National Water Commission, ‘Australian Water Reform 
2009: Second Biennial Assessment of Progress in Implementation of the National Water Initiative’ 
(‘Report’, Australian Government, 2010) 104. See also Dr Virginia Marshall, Submission No 21 
to Australian Government, Productivity Commission, National Water Reform, 18 April 2017.
7  See Virginia Marshall, ‘The Progress of Aboriginal Water Rights in the Murray–Darling Basin 
in NSW: An Essential Element of Culture’ (2015) Australian Environment Review 158.
8  Seamus Parker and Robert Speed, ‘Agricultural Water Pricing: Australia’ (Background Report, 
to the OECD Study ‘Sustainable Management of Water Resources’, 2010) 7.
9  Dr Virginia Marshall, Overturning Aqua Nullius: Securing Aboriginal Water Rights (Aboriginal 
Studies Press, 2017). 
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II. Indigenous Water Rights as ‘First Rights’
National water reforms have failed to recognise Indigenous peoples ‘first 
rights’ in Australia’s water use timeline. The concept of first rights is to 
clearly express that Indigenous people of Australia were, and continue 
to be, the ‘first right’ water users; a concept drawn from water concepts 
recognised for native peoples in the US as either ‘prior appropriation’ for 
beneficial water use or ‘first in time’ use for riparian water right use.10 
Indigenous peoples of Australia seek to exercise their legal and cultural 
rights for economic development as well as a sui generis use of water 
resources; for example, through native title, water trading, cultural 
heritage protection and cultural activities; in conjunction with the exercise 
of other statutory and common law land rights regimes established for 
Indigenous peoples. 
The Crown’s treatment of any purported continuing existence of 
Aboriginal people’s rights to land and waters, prior to the High Court 
decision in Mabo v Queensland (No 2),11 concurred that such rights did 
not survive annexation, based upon the doctrine of terra nullius. Similarly 
the concept of aqua nullius, that is, ‘water that belongs to no other’, raises 
important questions that align equally with discourse on Indigenous land 
rights and are generally ignored in the broader discussion on property 
rights in water. Pre-colonial Indigenous tenure is expressed in Mabo 
(No 2) as ‘special collective rights vested in an Aboriginal group by virtue 
of its long residence and communal use of land or its resources’.12
The Mabo (No 2) decision highlights the importance of incorporating 
international law into Australia’s water law. The majority in the High Court 
Mabo (No 2) decision concluded that s 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cth) (RDA) referred to ‘the enjoyment or exercise of fundamental 
freedoms’ from Art 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) but found it did not 
10  See Michael C Blumm, ‘Federal Reserved Water Rights as a Rule of Law’ (2016) 52 Idaho Law 
Review 369. See also Robert T Anderson, ‘Water Rights, Water Quality, and Regulatory Jurisdiction 
in Indian Country’ (2015) 34(2) Stanford Environmental Law Journal 195.
11  (1992) 175 CLR 1.
12  Ibid. 33, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) HC judgement.
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contravene ‘the enjoyment of the applicant’s traditional title’.13 The court 
then turned its mind to RDA s 10 which referred to Art 5 that ‘the right 
to be immune from arbitrary deprivation of property is a human right’.14
The incorporation of CERD and UNDRIP into Australia’s water policies 
and laws would enshrine water as a human right and, as in Mabo (No 2), 
‘draw upon international law and concepts of equality and social justice’ 
to consider whether Australia has met its legal obligations. First Peoples’ 
rights in water should be exercised as human rights. The Australian Law 
Reform Commission (ALRC) identified that the UNDRIP principles 
represent a ‘principled way of moving forward’ in the recognition and 
protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights and interests.15
The ALRC proposes the concept of ‘moving forward’ as a ‘platform for 
engagement on Indigenous issues’.16 However, in relation to Indigenous 
water rights and interests, there is a conceptual national framework for 
Australia’s water resources which should have prioritised Indigenous 
peoples as First Peoples in the hierarchy of water users, and not as 
a  stakeholder. It is a matter of urgency that Indigenous water rights 
and interests require governments and other sector interests in water to 
recognise Indigenous communities as ‘first use’ rights and not a minority 
interest stakeholder in the consumptive and non-consumptive pools. 
The centrality of First Nation water use, ownership and management of 
water operates under the Indigenous rule of laws,17 and the framework to 
understanding the use, management and ownership of water, collectively 
or otherwise.
13  Mabo (No 2) v Queensland 175 CLR 1.
14  Ibid.
15  Australian Law Reform Commission, Connection to Country: Review of the Native Title Act 1993 
(Cth), Final Report No 126 (2015) 82–85.
16  Ibid. 85.
17  The Indigenous ontological understanding of the Indigenous rule of laws is not singular. 
See Dr Virginia Marshall, ‘Deconstructing Aqua Nullius: Reclaiming Aboriginal Water Rights and 
Communal Identity in Australia’ (2016) 8/26 Indigenous Law Bulletin.
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III. The Indigenous Rule of Law and Rights 
to Water
The communal nature of Indigenous water rights, or land rights, as 
a property right is not a contested concept among Indigenous communities 
in Australia; for example, the permission or denial of entering ‘country’ 
underpinned by Indigenous laws has clear consequences far more severe 
than Australia’s breach of trespass law. Unlike Western property rights, 
Indigenous property rights are connected to ‘country and place’ by 
birth and death in familial connection,18 in a gendered environment19 
and defined by ancient boundaries.20 The ‘territorial association and 
ceremonial relationships’ to country is tenure, and Indigenous laws that 
provide for the rules of succession enable the Indigenous rule of law 
to survive.
Michael Kirby noted in his paper ‘The Rule of Law beyond the Law of 
Rules’ that ‘compliance with the letter of the law is an idea that lies at 
the very heart of the purpose of law in every society’.21 Further, Kirby 
argues that we should be ‘concerned with the content of the rule of law 
and procedures’ to mitigate against ‘prejudice and unequal treatment’.22 
Indigenous laws ‘are at the heart’ of Indigenous culture, its communities 
and social order.
In Australian society Western interpretations of Indigenous laws were 
poorly conceptualised, for example, into categories of culture, spirituality, 
mythology, knowledge and heritage, wherein the treatment of Indigenous 
language, painting, ceremony, sites and familial relationships are 
considered somehow divisible parts of Indigenous laws. The Indigenous 
rule of law over water rights ‘lies within an Aboriginal concept where 
Aboriginal laws determine that water is inseparable from the land’.23
18  Marshall, above n 2, 163–64.
19  Ibid. 165.
20  Ibid. 187.
21  Michael Kirby, ‘The Rule of Law beyond the Law of Rules’ (2010) 33(3) Australian Bar Review 
197.
22  Ibid. 210.
23  Dr Virginia Marshall, ‘The Progress of Aboriginal Water Rights and Interests in the Murray–
Darling Basin in NSW: An Essential Element of Culture’ (2015) Australian Environment Review 158.
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Indigenous water knowledge and the laws which connect to the creation 
story establish the permissible use of water, the types of activities and 
purposes for water use and the obligations to maintain the health and 
quality of water, among other things.24 Article 34 of the UNDRIP 
expresses the ‘rights to promote, develop and maintain their institutional 
structures, customs, procedures, among other things’. The recognition of 
the Indigenous rule of law into Australian water laws and policies elevates 
the status of Indigenous peoples as ‘First Peoples’ and not stakeholders.
IV. Northern Australian Development and the 
Tenure Reform
The Australian Government’s proposal to develop northern Australia ‘as 
a trade gateway’25 set out in ‘Our North, Our Future: White Paper on 
Developing Northern Australia’ (2015) raises significant issues in regards 
to water, and land use. The development proposal is based upon ‘five 
pillars’ to realise growth: food and agribusiness, resources and energy, 
tourism and hospitality, international education, healthcare, medical 
research and aged care.26 All of the government’s ‘five pillars’ require access 
to water and high abstraction levels, with the highest water abstractions 
sought by food, agribusiness, resources and energy. The government 
points out that ‘without secure, tradeable titles to land and water’27 
it flounders, as the majority of land is held under ‘pastoral leases and 
exclusive native title’.28 The government requires unlimited ‘groundwater 
and surface water’ to ‘attract investors to build water infrastructure’ and 
‘access’.29 Such plans include amending the definition of native title rights 
to include ‘commercial use where exclusive native title rights are held’.30 
To date, native title rights have been deemed solely for traditional non-
economic purposes; however, the recent High Court decision in Akiba 
v Commonwealth [2013] HCA 33 recognised ‘commercial purposes’. 
The Australian Government recognises that any development of northern 
24  Ibid. 12, citing Walmajarri Senior Lawman Joe Brown describing laws for water.
25  Australian Government, ‘Our North, Our Future: White Paper on Developing Northern 
Australia’ (White Paper, Australian Government, 2015) 2.
26  Ibid. 3.
27  Ibid. 5.
28  Ibid. 5–6.
29  Ibid. 6.
30  Ibid. 11.
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Australia ‘needs to be done in full partnership with Indigenous peoples’31 
and ‘access to water is a key constraint to develop the north’,32 where 
northern lands and waters are largely exclusive rights held by Indigenous 
native title holders. The Australian Law Reform Commission inquiry into 
a review of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) highlighted that Australia has 
not met its international obligations for Indigenous peoples of Australia; 
the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Committee noted concerns on the ‘high cost, 
complexity and strict rules regulating native title claims and the inadequate 
protection of Indigenous cultural and intellectual property’. However, the 
government’s proposal to ‘streamline the process’ and ‘remove red tape’ 
to provide ‘long term water security for farmers and investors’33 is highly 
problematic because of the absence of independent evidence on the long-
term impacts for Aboriginal water use and upon Aboriginal lands, waters 
and resources, as well as the cultural and heritage impact.
The consideration of the Australian Government reforms would create 
a  substantive move away from the narrow sui generis interpretation of 
the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) as expressed in s 223(1) which defines 
native title and the rights and interests comprised in s 223(2). The key 
aspects of the Australian Government’s ‘White Paper’ directly affect the 
security of Indigenous water rights and it will have direct implications for 
Indigenous communities across Australia, including the impact of water 
reform.
V. Expanding the Concept of Cultural 
Water Use
In terms of Western policy concepts these ‘customs and practices’ are 
often couched in expressions of culture such as ‘cultural flows’34 and 
‘cultural licences’ that extend to beneficial water use. The complex legal 
interpretation of native title rights to water under s 211 of the Native Title 
31  Ibid. 4.
32  Ibid. 50.
33  Ibid. 11–12.
34  Cultural flows are by application for approval for water supply works, and/or water use under 
s 92 of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).
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Act 1993 (Cth) for usufructuary rights and the type of activities that are 
permitted in personal, domestic and non-economic use35 limit the full 
expression of Indigenous water rights and interests. 
The Aboriginal concept of cultural water use is ‘bound to Aboriginal 
peoples’ relationship with the Aboriginal environment (lands and waters 
of Australia) based upon the founding Aboriginal principle of the 
inseparability of land from water’.36 The Commonwealth water legislation 
such as the Water Act 2007 (Cth)37 ‘decouples Aboriginal ontological 
water concepts (Aboriginal norms) from its statutory provisions’.38 
Aboriginal water values, law and cultural expressions are not separate 
from environmental water flows; in fact, Aboriginal cultural flows and 
Aboriginal cultural activities in water inform on maintaining the health 
of Australia’s Aboriginal environment.
The statutory cultural flows for communal and cultural activities are 
restrictive and conditional; for example, for a specific purpose water access 
licence (WAL) up to 10 megalitres per year under s 61(1)(a) of the Water 
Management Act 2000 (NSW), subject to the Water Management (General) 
Regulation 2004, the licence can be made under the water sharing plan. 
However, if there are low or no flows identified in the water sharing plan, 
a WAL will not be granted.39 These types of licences provide limited 
opportunities for Indigenous peoples to exercise their laws, customs 
and practices.
A study undertaken by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
in 2016, in relation to Indigenous peoples of the Pacific, sought that 
policy and legislative measures be implemented to protect and maintain 
the traditional knowledge of Indigenous peoples and their relationships 
35  Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 211.
36  Dr Virginia Marshall, Overturning Aqua Nullius: Securing Aboriginal Water Rights (Aboriginal 
Studies Press, 2017) 145.
37  Ibid. Marshall raises the inconsistency in s 20(b) of the Water Act 2007 (Cth) which refers to 
the ‘purpose of the Murray–Darling Basin Plan’ to set ‘environmental limits’ to ‘protect land and 
waters valued by Aboriginal peoples’. However, the water legislation does not elaborate on what 
compliance mechanisms could enforce the protection of Aboriginal cultural water values or the 
role of engagement for Aboriginal communities in the Murray–Darling Basin region and to inform 
governments on the ‘environmental sustainability’ through Aboriginal water knowledge.
38  Ibid.
39 NSW Office of Water, www.water.nsw.gov.au/water-management/water-sharing; www.water.
nsw.gov.au/water-licensing/about-licences/new-access-licences.
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within their constitutions.40 The Australian Constitution does not 
include provisions to protect and maintain traditional knowledge regimes 
of Indigenous peoples and this should be considered in any review of 
issues relating to water, land and resources. It has been suggested that 
the current Australian debate on Indigenous Constitutional Recognition 
should include the Aboriginal recognition in water law.41
This national dialogue has failed to include substantive issues to address 
Indigenous water rights and interests such as perpetual water allocations 
outside the consumptive pool, a Reserved Indigenous Water Rights42 
regime on a ‘first rights user’ basis, the exclusion of caps on native 
title water rights and an Aboriginal Water Holder model to facilitate 
intergenerational equity for Indigenous peoples. Defining the parameters 
of Indigenous water rights and interests as either cultural or economic 
concepts applies a rigidity which narrows future opportunities for 
Indigenous communities to adapt to the challenges of changing climatic 
conditions and global water scarcity.
VI. Conclusion
The principles of human rights are instrumental in achieving the full 
participation of Indigenous water rights and interests in Australia, and 
the language of UNDRIP provides formative instruments to incorporate 
into Australia’s domestic law and policy on water. Australia’s water 
policy has advantaged sectional stakeholders and disadvantaged First 
Peoples, securing a tranche of water reform for themselves and merely 
discretionary provisions for Indigenous peoples. While Australia delays 
the legal recognition of equitable water reforms, the potential prospects 
for Indigenous ownership continue to diminish.
40  V Toki, Study on the Relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the Pacific Ocean, UN ESC, 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Agenda Item 3, E/C.19/2016/3 (19 February 2016) 6.
41  Environmental Justice Australia, ‘Aboriginal Water Rights: Legal analysis of Submissions to 
the Review of the Commonwealth Water Act’ (Submission, Environmental Justice Australia, 
20 November 2014) 7.
42  See the recommendations proposed by the author in Overturning Aqua Nullius: Securing 
Aboriginal Water Rights (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2017) 216–24.
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1  Professor Stoianoff is the Director of the Intellectual Property Program in the Faculty of Law 
at the University of Technology Sydney and Chair of the Indigenous Knowledge Forum Committee.
2  Commonwealth of Australia, Caring for Our Country – Outcomes 2008–2013 (2013), 21, 31, 
36–37, 39.
A Governance Framework for 




Indigenous communities hold knowledge critical to the conservation of 
biological diversity and natural resource management. This Indigenous 
ecological knowledge (IEK) is increasingly recognised as a more effective 
means of managing the Australian landscape given the holistic approach 
of understanding the seasons, biodiversity, land and water.2 The threat 
of intergenerational loss of such knowledge about Country is a well-
recognised issue creating cause for concern for the knowledge holders, 
their communities and the whole of humanity. Protecting IEK benefits 
not only Indigenous Australian and local communities but also the long-
term economic security and sustainable development of Australia. 
Despite numerous consultations, reports, landmark cases, suggested 
protocols, models and draft legislation, Australia has been slow to meet 
international expectations in providing an effective mechanism for 
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recognising and protecting Indigenous knowledge and culture.3 Confusion 
as to whether intellectual property law (federal law) or environmental 
law (state law) provides the appropriate mechanism for such protection 
is a contributing factor.
The legislative solution proposed by the 2014 White Paper, Recognising 
and Protecting Aboriginal Knowledge associated with Natural Resource 
Management, prepared for the Office of Environment and Heritage New 
South Wales (NSW) (the NSW White Paper)4, provides a solution that 
may operate at state level or be adopted federally. It establishes a competent 
authority and governance framework to administer a protection, access 
and benefit sharing regime. It recognises concerns that community 
consultation has raised about the form such an authority would take, its 
independence from government, how it would be funded and wound up, 
local Aboriginal representation and engagement. This chapter reports on 
the making of such a governance framework.
II. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this chapter is drawn from the principles 
established in the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) (CBD)5, 
expanded in the Nagoya Protocol (2011)6, and reinforced in the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) 
(UNDRIP)7. These principles provide Indigenous knowledge holders 
with a right to share in the benefits obtained from the use of their 
knowledge, emphasising the need for free prior informed consent to be 
given by the knowledge holders prior to access and use of that knowledge 
on mutually agreed terms. Action research and Indigenous research 
3  Natalie Stoianoff and Alpana Roy, ‘Indigenous Knowledge and Culture in Australia – The Case 
For Sui Generis Legislation’, Monash University Law Review (Vol 41, No 3) 745–46.
4  UTS Indigenous Knowledge Forum and North West Local Land Services (2014), Recognising 
and Protecting Aboriginal Knowledge Associated with Natural Resource Management, White Paper for 
the Office of Environment and Heritage NSW, indigenousknowledgeforum.org/components/com_
content/models/forms/white_paper.pdf.
5  Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered 
into force 29 December 1993) (‘CBD’).
6  Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 
2 February 2011 (entered into force 12 October 2014) (‘Nagoya Protocol’).
7  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 
61st sess, 107th plen mtg, Agenda Item 68, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 
2007).
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paradigm methodologies were utilised by the author and her research 
team in developing the legal framework for a regime that encapsulates 
these principles.
The focus was on the Aboriginal communities of Northwest NSW and 
accordingly reflects the concerns and interests of those communities while 
incorporating the international law principles described above. This was 
achieved through an initial comparative analysis of regimes existing in 
other nations, the establishment of a highly skilled and multidisciplinary 
Working Party of Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals and 
stakeholders, and finally through Aboriginal community consultation.
III. Principles for a Governance Framework 
of Recognition and Protection
Several international instruments recognise the significance of traditional 
and Indigenous knowledge and cultural expressions, and emphasise 
the need to respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and 
practices of Indigenous and local communities.8 For example, the CBD 
provides member nations with the opportunity to establish regimes that 
regulate foreign and domestic access to valuable genetic resources and 
traditional and Indigenous knowledge while enabling benefit-sharing 
mechanisms for such access.9
This has led to significant international debate on the interrelationship 
between IEK and intellectual property rights, particularly patents and 
plant breeders’ rights developed from genetic resources. The role of IEK 
in this context is significant as it brings into the equation the broader 
cultural property of Indigenous and local communities. Meanwhile, 
Art 11 of UNDRIP recognises the right of Indigenous people ‘to practise 
and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs’ and extends to ‘the 
right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future 
manifestations of their cultures’. The state is expected to develop with 
Indigenous peoples effective compensation mechanisms ‘with respect to 
their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without 
their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, 
traditions and customs’.10 
8  See Stoianoff and Roy, above n 3, 753–68.
9  CBD, Arts 8j, 10(c) and 18(4).
10  UNDRIP, Art 11.
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Many nations and regions have adopted legal instruments covering such 
rights. Nations utilising sui generis legislation11 to do so include Brazil,12 
Peru,13 Panama14 and the Philippines,15 requiring the establishment 
of registers or databases and a representative authority. Some of these 
legal instruments are based on the WIPO-UNESCO Model Provisions,16 
containing intellectual property type provisions. At the same time, the 
Pacific Regional Framework for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and 
Expressions of Culture (2002) provides the Model Law for the Protection 
of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Culture 2002 which sets 
out cultural rights and moral rights over traditional knowledge and 
expressions, the need for prior informed consent, a mechanism establishing 
applications for use and identifying the traditional owners, authorised 
user agreements, civil and criminal enforcement including defences, and 
a cultural authority to oversee the regime. Other regional solutions are 
found in Africa,17 the Andean Community of Nations,18 and ASEAN.19
The CBD provides that alternative mechanisms (guidelines, sui generis 
systems or ethical codes of conduct) can be utilised for respecting, 
preserving and maintaining Indigenous or traditional knowledge.20 
Some Australian jurisdictions have their own approach to dealing with 
11  Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore (2012), Glossary of Key Terms Related to Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions, Twenty-Second Session, Geneva 
(July 9 to 13, 2012).
12  Law No 13.123 of May 20, 2015 (Access and Benefits Sharing of Genetic Resources and Associated 
Traditional Knowledge) (Brazil).
13  Law No 27,811 of 2002 Introducing a Protection Regime for the Collective Knowledge of Indigenous 
People Derived from Biological Resources (Peru).
14  Law No 20 of June 26, 2000, on Special System for the Collective Intellectual Property Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples for the Protection and Defense of their Cultural Identity and their Traditional 
Knowledge (Panama).
15  Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (Philippines).
16  Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit 
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Action (UNESCO and WIPO, 1982).
17  See the Organisation of African Unity, Model Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local 
Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Resources, 2000; and 
the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization, Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Folklore (2010).
18  Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources, Decision 391, 2 July 1996, Official Gazette 17 
July 1996.
19  ASEAN Framework Agreement on Access to Biological and Genetic Resources, 24 February 2000 
(draft).
20  See COP 5 Decision V/16, www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=7158.
235
20 . A GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR INDIGENOUS ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
IEK using voluntary protocols rather than mandatory obligations,21 with 
varying degrees of success. The Australian Government has said that its 
domestic measures are consistent with the Nagoya Protocol.22 This may 
be true of protecting Australia’s genetic resources but is questionable in 
the case of associated IEK. The Nagoya Protocol requires that where 
‘Indigenous traditional knowledge [is utilised] countries have to make 
sure that the knowledge was acquired in accordance with the rules of 
the country where those Indigenous people live’.23 This requires the prior 
informed consent of the Indigenous community that is providing the 
knowledge, on mutually agreed terms, an element that some Australian 
jurisdictions fail to include in their access and benefit-sharing legislation 
for genetic resources.24
Collaboration between the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), responsible for the introduction of the CBD, and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) resulted in the WIPO General 
Assembly establishing the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(IGC) in 2000.25 This committee has been negotiating international 
instruments for the protection of traditional or Indigenous knowledge 
and culture from an intellectual property perspective, and has produced 
three draft international instruments. 
Adjei and Stoianoff point out that there are eight key elements to 
a framework of protection for traditional knowledge:
1. The meaning of traditional knowledge and its scope.
2. The identification of beneficiaries.
21  See, for example, the Queensland Code of Ethical Practice for Biotechnology 2001 superseded by 
the Queensland Biotechnology Code of Ethics (updated 2006) which applies to organisations conducting 
biotechnology research with Queensland Government funding, www.qld.gov.au/dsiti/assets/documents/
qld-biotechnology-code-of-ethics.pdf. See also the Indigenous Ecological Knowledge Manual by Territory 
Natural Resource Management, media.wix.com/ugd/da28f0_624bf834d6ef4672b98820bac2b77283.
pdf. For a more local example, see the draft Blue Mountains City Council’s Aboriginal Cultural Protocols 
2010 which applies to councillors and council staff.
22 Australian Government, ‘The Nagoya Protocol in Australia’ (2015), www.environment.gov.au/
system/files/pages/9fc06ac0-f5af-4b47-a80f-d9378088d743/files/nagoya-factsheet_1.pdf.
23  Ibid.
24  For example, Biodiscovery Act 2004 (Qld).
25  UNEP and WIPO jointly commissioned a study on the issue of how intellectual property rights 
can support the objectives of the CBD, in particular, what role such rights can play in the process 
of benefit sharing: WO/GA/26/6, WIPO General Assembly, Twenty-Sixth (12th Extraordinary) 
Session, Geneva, September 25 to October 3, 2000, Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 2.
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3. The scope of protection: elements of confidentiality and moral rights, 
protecting against misappropriation and misuse.
4. Sanctions and remedies emulating those used in intellectual property 
law.
5. The need for disclosure in existing patent and plant variety rights 
regimes.
6. The establishment of a competent authority to manage the data, rights 
conferred, enforcement, dispute resolution and national treatment.
7. The creation of databases.
8. Accommodating trans-boundary cooperations where knowledge 
and biodiversity extend across national borders.26
The IGC is exploring a sui generis (stand alone) model for the protection 
of  traditional knowledge, recognising that protecting such knowledge 
does not fit into the existing intellectual property paradigm due to the 
need for protection in perpetuity in accordance with cultural norms, 
the difficulty of identifying the ‘author’ or ‘creator’ of the knowledge, and 
the failure of conventional intellectual property to recognise communal 
rights over that knowledge. Consequently, the IGC embarked on 
a process of developing a protection model that will accommodate the 
peculiarities of Indigenous knowledge. The NSW White Paper27 took 
a similar approach and developed such a sui generis model law. 
The arguments for and against a sui generis law were acknowledged.28 
International support for a sui generis regime was evident from WIPO, 
UNEP and the Conference of the Parties for the CBD.29 Customary laws 
could be incorporated into such a regime taking ‘into account needs and 
expectations of Indigenous and local Communities, [enabling] protect[ion 
of the] integrity of traditional knowledge and [punishing] use that offends 
Indigenous and local Communities while encouraging acceptable use by 
third parties’.30 If IEK is to be recognised as part of a living culture that 
requires access to Country for it be preserved, maintained, respected and 
developed in accordance with customary laws, crossing the thresholds of 
26  Patricia Adjei and Natalie P Stoianoff (2013), ‘The World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) and the Intergovernmental Committee: Developments on Traditional Knowledge and 
Cultural Expressions’, Intellectual Property Forum, Issue 92, March 2013, 37–48.
27  UTS (2014), above n 4.
28  Ibid
29  Ibid
30  Ibid. 15.
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intellectual property type rights and environmental responsibilities, then 
the legal framework must be inevitably unique, hence the need for a sui 
generis law.31 
IV. Method and Methodology
The inaugural Indigenous Knowledge Forum held at the University 
of Technology, Sydney, (UTS) in August 2012 inspired the design of 
the NSW White Paper project which engaged the Namoi Catchment 
Aboriginal Community in developing a model of involvement in natural 
resource management and access to Country.32 The project was funded by 
the Aboriginal Communities Funding Scheme of the Namoi Catchment 
Management Authority (now North West Local Land Services (NWLLS)) 
with the advice of the Aboriginal Officer and the Namoi Aboriginal 
Advisory Committee (NAAC). It was carried out in three stages, 
commencing with development of a comparative framework, followed by 
drafting of the sui generis regime, and Aboriginal community consultation 
to refine the regime. The first stage involved a doctrinal comparative study, 
analysing legislative and policy regimes operating around the world. Key 
criteria in each regime were identified and then compared to international 
obligations. This comparative analysis provided the framework on which 
a model could be developed to ensure the recognition and protection 
of IEK. 
In stage two, a working party was formed to assist in developing a sui 
generis regime, comprising Indigenous and non-Indigenous members 
from the UTS Indigenous Knowledge Forum committees,33 participants 
from the 2012 Indigenous Knowledge Forum, and key personnel from 
the NWLLS and the NAAC.
A Discussion Paper incorporating the Comparative Study Report and 
Draft Regime was prepared, and in stage three it was distributed through 
the NWLLS to the Namoi Catchment Aboriginal Communities and other 
interested parties. Consultation sessions were conducted on Country 
according to relevant cultural norms and protocols in key locations in 
31  Chidi Oguamanam, International Law and Indigenous Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Plant 
Biodiversity and Traditional Medicine (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006) 217–19.
32  Indigenous Knowledge Forum Report (2012), indigenousknowledgeforum.org/images/ikf-report.
pdf.
33  The Organising Committee and the Advisory Board.
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the region. The consultations tested the draft legal framework against 
Aboriginal community concerns and expectations, thereby enabling 
it to be refined into a culturally acceptable model which was set out in 
the NSW White Paper and presented to the Office of Environment and 
Heritage.
The project addressed the need for recognition and protection of IEK 
by engaging the local, grassroots level, employing variations of an action 
research methodology coupled with an Indigenous research paradigm 
at both stages two and three of the project. Indigenous Australians were 
given an opportunity to actively participate in the process of formulating 
legislation for their benefit. The action research methodology emphasises 
cooperative or collaborative inquiry34 whereby all active participants, 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous, are fully involved in research decisions as 
co-researchers.35 Through the internet, the project provided all interested 
parties with access to analysis of current models for, and outcomes of 
implementing, similar legislation in other countries. This assisted in the 
process of identifying how best to accommodate unique aspects of IEK 
and culture as they relate to the interests of Indigenous Australians.
Participation assisted in generating Indigenous ownership of the 
outcomes, understanding of any resulting legislation and its intent, and an 
opportunity to deliver robust legislation that meets Australia’s international 
obligations and effectively protects the interests of an important sector 
of the Australian community. During stage two the Indigenous research 
paradigm was important in engaging all participants in the collection of 
research data through the method of storytelling by Indigenous Elders 
in the group, exploring meaning and working through issues together 
to ensure accurate interpretation of language.36 This process was then 
adopted during consultations on Country, being mindful of the culture 
of place and the privilege of sharing in the flow of cultural knowledge.
34  John Heron, Co-operative Inquiry: Research into the Human Condition  (Sage, London, 1996).
35  Peter Reason and Hilary Bradbury, Handbook of Action Research (Sage, London, 2nd edn, 2007).
36  Ewa Czaykowska-Higgins, ‘Research Models, Community Engagement, and Linguistic Fieldwork: 
Reflections on Working within Canadian Indigenous Communities’, Language Documentation & 
Conservation 3(1), June 2009.
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V. Results and Conclusions
The key outcome of this project was the development of a legislative 
regime that facilitates the recognition, preservation and protection of 
IEK, enabling its custodians to share in the benefits of its use. The resulting 
draft legislation, explained in the NSW White Paper,37 sets out key 
principles rather than detailed prescriptive provisions which are left to 
regulations that would need to be implemented. 
The preamble of the draft legislation recognises the impact of European 
arrival on IEK and connection to Country of Aboriginal peoples, and 
sets out the aims of the legislation. Section 1 establishes the rights of 
Aboriginal communities over their knowledge. Key terms are defined 
in s 2 and the beneficiaries under the legislation are identified in s 3. 
The process of access to the knowledge is described in s 4, and guidelines 
for benefit-sharing are set out in s 5. Sanctions and remedies for breaches 
of the legislation are provided for in s 6, emulating remedies available 
for infringement of intellectual property rights with penalties ranging 
from fines to imprisonment. Section 7 requires the establishment of 
a  Competent Authority to administer this regime including managing 
databases to enable the access process to operate. Section 8 provides 
for dispute resolution where there are multiple communities claiming 
‘ownership’ of the same or similar knowledge. Every regime requires a set 
of express exceptions and s 9 provides for that eventuality. The nature of 
the three types of databases and the obligations regarding disclosure are 
dealt with in s 10. The remaining three provisions are general in nature, 
dealing with interaction between existing laws (s 11), mutual recognition 
of rights and compliance (s 12), and transitional provisions (s 13).
Although the NSW White Paper38 provides a fictitious case study to 
demonstrate the operation of the draft regime, it does not claim to provide 
a complete solution for recognition and protection of IEK. Shortcomings 
include the need to clarify the form and nature of the Competent 
Authority and governance processes; the way the databases are to be 
formed, funded and managed from community level to state and national 
levels; and the administration processes for access and benefit-sharing, 
including guidance on mutually beneficial terms, model agreements and 
processes for negotiation. 
37  UTS, above n 4, Ch 7.
38  Ibid. Ch 8.
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Introducing such a regime has beneficial flow-on effects including:
a. Recognition that IEK is part of a living culture that requires access to 
Country for it to be preserved, maintained respected and developed;
b. A mechanism for documenting, recording and recovering IEK for 
future generations of Indigenous Australians;
c. A response to intergenerational loss of knowledge about Country 
(land and water) by encouraging younger generations to spend time 
on Country with their Elders to regain their traditional language and 
oral tradition through which culture and knowledge are maintained;
d. Improved natural resource management by facilitating access to 
Country, aimed at both Indigenous engagement and sustainable use 
of IEK; and 
e. Recognition that IEK is to be valued and utilised in accordance 
with Indigenous protocols that govern use and dissemination of 
this knowledge, including the need for prior informed consent and 
the establishment of an appropriate benefit sharing arrangement on 
mutually agreed terms.
IEK is of significant spiritual, cultural and economic value not only to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities but also to society 
at large, including governments, research institutions and commercial 
interests.39 As Australia moves towards ratification of the Nagoya 
Protocol, two main measures require implementation: ensuring (i) that 
prior informed consent of Indigenous communities is obtained for 
access to their traditional knowledge, and (ii) that fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing mechanisms are agreed on for the use of that knowledge, 
consistent with community laws and procedures as well as customary use 
and exchange.40 The governance framework espoused in the NSW White 
Paper addresses these expectations. The journey continues towards the 
goal of determining the nature of the Competent Authority required to 
administer the framework. The author and her research team has been 
awarded an ARC Linkage grant for the project, Garuwanga: Forming 
a Competent Authority to Protect Indigenous Knowledge, and will work 
towards achieving that goal over the next three years. 
39  Susette Biber-Klemm and Danuta Szymura Berglas, ‘Problems and Goals’ in Susette Biber-
Klemm, Thomas Cottier and Danuta Szymura Berglas (eds), Rights to Plant Genetic Resources and 
Traditional Knowledge: Basic Issues and Perspectives (CAB International, 2006) 3, 21.
40  Nagoya Protocol, Arts 7 and 12.
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While New South Wales has made little progress on implementing 
a  regime along the lines recommended by the White Paper, the State 
of Victoria has recently amended its Aboriginal Heritage legislation to 
establish a database system to protect Aboriginal intangible heritage,41 
which is another way of describing Indigenous knowledge or IEK. 
Further, IP Australia invited the submission of the NSW White Paper 
to the Indigenous Knowledge Consultation which is about to move to 
the next stage of preparing a discussion paper. We are hopeful that the 
model provided by the NSW White Paper may encourage the creation 
of a national scheme of protection of IEK.




1  Professor, Faculty of Law, Centre for Marine Socioecology and Institute for the Study of Social 
Change, University of Tasmania.
2  J Rockström et al, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity’ 
(2009) 14(2) Ecology and Society 32.
3  Ibid.
Reforming Environmental Law 
for Responsiveness to Change
Jan McDonald1
I. Introduction
Law reform is about change. This contribution argues that such 
change needs to be about change itself. The earth’s life support systems 
are experiencing profound and potentially devastating change.2 
Anthropogenic interference with the earth’s atmosphere, nitrogen cycle, 
biodiversity, and water resources fundamentally challenge the adequacy of 
current environmental laws,3 but the forces of change in environmental 
law are not limited to environmental or climatic conditions. They are 
also influenced by the ways humans react to change, through large-
scale demographic shifts as well as through altering behaviour. Other 
significant changes either militate or facilitate environmental law reform. 
These include developments in our understanding of the environmental 
impacts of human activities and interactions and alterations to the impacts 
of particular activities when they are modified. Societal values relating to 
environmental and other priorities are also in a state of constant evolution. 
Public interest in issues such as climate change is cyclical, but there are also 
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slower, multi-decadal trends in public attitudes towards environmental 
protection. Lastly, technological innovation is occurring at an increasingly 
rapid rate, offering the potential for cheaper and improved monitoring 
of environmental performance and indicators and more nuanced and 
targeted regulatory measures.
The institutions of Western legal systems provide stability and 
predictability in the face of this pervasive and increasingly rapid change. 
The typical approach of environmental, planning, and more recently, 
climate law, is to endorse and protect existing rights.4 This takes the form 
of existing use rights in planning law that permit the continuation of 
activities that are inconsistent with new zoning requirements. Similarly, 
the grandfathering of environmental licences into new regulatory 
regimes or provisions that limit the application of new requirements to 
activities commenced after a certain date also allows existing operations 
to continue on the same terms. They represent another common way of 
insulating past activities from the influence of change. Providing legal 
rights of compensation when existing land uses are constrained by new 
environmental or planning regulation make it hard for the law to innovate 
and adapt as new circumstances demand.5
These constraints are also reflected in the organisational culture and 
practices of agencies charged with administering environmental laws. In an 
increasingly corporatised and risk-averse public service, experimentation 
is not encouraged. Tight agency budgets are likely to adopt fiscally 
conservative strategies that entrench current practices and punish efforts 
at adaptive management that are perceived to have ‘failed’.6
Far from equipping us to manage the impacts or seize the opportunities 
of future change, then, our current approach to environmental law and 
its governance institutions entrench maladaptive practices and increase 
4  A Macintosh, A Foerster and J McDonald (2014), ‘Policy Design, Spatial Planning and 
Climate  Change Adaptation: A Case Study from Australia’, Journal of Environmental Planning 
and Management 57, 1–22.
5  A Foerster, A Macintosh and J McDonald, ‘Trade-offs in Adaptation Planning: Protecting Public 
Interest Environmental Values’ (2015) 17 Journal of Environmental Law 1.
6  A Wiersema, ‘A Train without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental 
Law and Natural Resources Law’ (2008) 38 Environmental Law Journal 1239, 1250–52.
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our vulnerability.7 In the context of unprecedented and sustained rates of 
environmental and social change, it would be overly simplistic to suggest 
that there is a single suite of environmental law reforms that can improve 
conditions into the future.8 A new approach is needed that places system 
dynamism and ongoing change at the centre of law reform efforts.9 This 
chapter therefore argues that Australian environmental law requires 
ongoing reform in order to manage change itself. 
II. A Resilience Framing for Environmental 
Law Reform
Resilience thinking provides a useful framing for a more change-oriented 
environmental law regime.10 Rather than a theory, resilience thinking 
consists of a broad set of principles that are aimed at enhancing the capacity 
of social-ecological systems to withstand change without losing system 
function.11 Resilience thinking is premised upon social and ecological 
systems being complex and interconnected and in a process of constant 
adaptation.12 The value of resilience thinking lies in its recognition that 
systems are constantly changing, and that this change occurs through 
so-called adaptive cycles involving periods of growth or exploitation, 
conservation or consolidation, release or collapse, and reorganisation. 
7  H Doremus, ‘Adapting to Climate Change with Law that Bends without Breaking’ (2010) 2 San 
Diego Journal of Climate Energy Law 45; R K Craig, ‘Stationarity is Dead – Long Live Transformation: 
Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law’ (2010) 34 Harvard Environmental Law Review 
9; J B Ruhl, ‘Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law’ 
(2010) 40 Environmental Law 363.
8  Craig 2010, above n 7; Ruhl 2010, above n 7; C Arnold and L Gunderson, ‘Adaptive Law and 
Resilience’ (2013) 43 Environmental Law Reporter 10436–443; A Garmestani and C Allen, Social-
ecological Resilience and Law (Columbia University Press, 2013); O Odom Green et al, ‘Barriers and 
Bridges to the Integration of Social-Ecological Resilience and Law’ (2015) 13:6 Frontiers in Ecology 
and Environment 332–37.
9  J Adler, ‘Dynamic Environmentalism and Adaptive Management: Legal Obstacles and 
Opportunities’ (2015) 11 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 133. 
10  R K Craig and M Benson, ‘Replacing Sustainability’ (2013) 46 Akron Law Review 841–80; 
Odom Green et al, above n 8, Arnold and Gunderson, above n 8, Garmestani and Allen, above n 8.
11  F Berkes, J Colding and C Folke (eds), Navigating Social Ecological Systems: Building Resilience 
for Complexity and Change (Cambridge University Press, 2003); C Folke, ‘Resilience: The Emergence 
of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems’ (2006) 16:3 Global Environmental Change 2253–
267; D Nelson, N Adger and K Brown, ‘Adaptation to Environmental Change: Contributions of 
a Resilience Framework’ (2009) 32 Annual Review of Environment & Resources 395–419.
12  L Gunderson, C Allen and C S Holling (eds), Foundations of Ecological Resilience (Island Press, 
2009).
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These adaptive cycles occur within nested hierarchies of temporal, spatial 
and geopolitical subsystems, with each cycle influencing or influenced by 
those above and below it.13
By placing change and multi-scalar system dynamism at the centre of 
its approach, resilience thinking represents a radical departure from 
traditional resource management approaches.14 It also fundamentally 
challenges legal arrangements that are aimed at providing certainty, 
predictability and stability. Resilience thinking calls for the promotion 
of diversity and redundancy to enable system components to withstand 
shocks; the management of slow variables and feedback; ongoing learning; 
public participation and polycentric governance models. The focus of the 
following discussion is on how best to make environmental law responsive 
to change and promote learning.
III. Improving Responsiveness to Change
The precise modes by which environmental law might be reformed 
depend on the types of activities the law is intended to govern or manage. 
Activities occurring, or with impacts manifesting, over shorter timescales 
must account for different scenarios of future change than those with 
decisions that endure over decades or more. Governance arrangements 
for decision-making over the location of major public infrastructure, for 
example, must consider climate projections beyond 2100, whereas the 
development of a five or 10 year protected area management plan can 
afford to consider a narrower range of possible influences.15
The ways in which flexibility and responsiveness are built into new 
laws and legal instruments depend, not surprisingly, on their scope and 
purpose. The following section discusses the ways in which such reforms 
can be advanced in laws and regulations, management plans, operational 
decision-making, and environmental approvals and licensing.
13  L Gunderson and C S Holling (eds), Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and 
Natural Systems (Island Press, 2002).
14  Craig and Benson, above n 10; B Cosens, L Gunderson and B Chaffin, ‘The Adaptive Water 
Governance Project: Assessing Law, Resilience and Governance in Regional Socio-Ecological Water 
Systems Facing a Changing Climate’ (2014) 51 Idaho Law Review 1.
15  M Stafford Smith et al, ‘Rethinking Adaptation for a 4 Degree Centigrade World’ (2011) 369 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 196.
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A. Laws and regulations
Legislation itself should contain mechanisms by which to respond to 
change. These could take several forms.16 First, legislation and regulations 
themselves need mechanisms for review. The simplest approach would 
be to insert sunset clauses that set a predetermined date on which the 
legislative regime must be reviewed. Time-bound provisions of this 
sort, however, can come either too soon or too late. They may trigger 
review before it is required, and run the risk or of governments preferring 
to abandon a legislative regime rather than engage in costly review. 
Alternatively, they may set the review date too late to address changing 
conditions before damage is done. The preferable approach is to identify 
predefined thresholds of environmental or other change that will 
trigger either legislative review or the transition to a new predetermined 
regulatory phase. Event triggers are more nuanced and responsive, but 
also require that such triggers are capable of upfront identification and 
clear articulation. They may perform poorly in conditions of radical 
and volatile change and require political commitment to follow through 
on the shift when they are triggered, but nonetheless offer a preferable 
alternative to current static approaches. 
The second way in which responsiveness to change might be built in to 
laws and regulations is the inclusion of adaptation to future changes in 
the statutory objectives of environmental laws.17 A related mechanism is 
to require decision-makers to take the impacts of future environmental 
or climate change into account. For specific regimes, the objectives may 
be modified in more subject-specific ways. For example, in light of strong 
evidence that climate change will dramatically alter the range and habitat 
of many species, it may be necessary to modify our conservation objectives 
regarding in situ conservation or protection of species ‘in the wild’.18 
16  J McDonald and M Styles, ‘Legal Strategies for Adaptive Management under Climate Change’ 
(2014) 17 Journal of Environmental Law 1.
17  Ibid.
18  J McDonald et al, ‘Rethinking Legal Objectives for Climate-Adaptive Conservation’ (2016) 
Ecology and Society np.
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B. Management planning
With greater flexibility in legislative design, modification of statutory 
instruments should become easier. For example, the identification and 
designation of protected areas could become more agile, as existing areas 
become less valuable and sites currently outside the reserve network 
become more valuable. The management plans governing such areas also 
need to include adaptation and responsiveness to change as key objectives. 
The nascent application of dynamic ocean management techniques is 
worthy of further consideration. Currently used principally to manage 
by-catch and reduce conflict with fishers, dynamic ocean management 
uses new monitoring and detection technologies and short-term spatial 
closures to protect pelagic or migratory species as their location shifts.19 
The transferability of such approaches to a terrestrial context is yet to be 
fully explored. While there is a pressing need for resource, species and 
protected area management plans to adopt adaptive management, great 
care must be taken to ensure that adaptive management is not used to 
justify the lowering of standards or a random trial and error approach that 
could have irreversible impacts.20
C. Environmental approvals and EIA
A critical aspect of environmental regulation in need of reform is the 
environmental approvals and associated environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) processes.21 Recognition that both project plans and environmental 
conditions will change demands a fundamental shift away from the 
current front-end approach to environmental regulation. Existing EIA 
processes award approvals or licences with limited or no capacity to modify 
conditions should they prove to be inadequate. They assume that the 
environmental impact assessment process has adequately and accurately 
identified all potential impacts from a proposed development. This 
approach is theoretically flawed because it assumes that all future scenarios 
are capable of being anticipated and prepared for at the initial approval 
stage. In practice, the proponent-driven nature of EIA compromises its 
ability to provide an impartial and wide-ranging assessment of the risks. 
19  A Hobday et al, ‘Dynamic Ocean Management: Integrating Scientific and Technological 
Capacity with Law, Policy, and Management’ (2014) 33 Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 122.
20  J B Ruhl, ‘Regulation by Adaptive Management – Is It Possible?’ (2005–6) 7 Minnesota Journal 
of Law, Science, & Technology 72.
21  Ruhl 2010, above n 7.
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Changing the nature of development approvals so that they are either 
time-bound or limited by compliance with specified environmental 
performance measures would fundamentally alter this process.22 
An  adaptive management approach to approvals and licensing would 
enable projects and developments to proceed subject to stages or on the 
basis that approval could be modified or withdrawn if conditions changed. 
If proponents knew that their approval was only as good as the project’s 
subsequent environmental performance, they might be more willing to 
invest in high-quality assessment processes, and weigh more carefully 
the costs and benefits of investing in environmentally-risky projects. For 
example, the widespread practice of securing offset sites to compensate for 
unavoidable impacts on biodiversity offsetting may be far less attractive 
if there is the chance that additional sites will have to be acquired or 
restored in future should the initial offsets package fail to achieve a ‘no net 
loss’ target.
Like legislative triggers, adaptive management approaches of this 
kind require clear agreement about, and articulation of, overarching 
environmental standards/performance measures to be maintained.23 
This in turn requires more baseline information about environmental 
conditions and assumes we know or can know what standards must be 
met. It also requires monitoring and evaluation of both compliance with 
and effectiveness of requirements, and enforcement of the requirement 
that operations be modified or potentially discontinued when monitoring 
and evaluation shows that environmental standards cannot be maintained. 
IV. Risks, Constraints and Design 
Considerations
Reforming environmental laws so that managing for change is a key 
objective carries with it risks and constraints. The main risk associated 
with more adaptive approaches is that they may result in a gradual 
weakening of environmental standards over time, especially if adaptive 
approaches are not adequately funded. In some cases, agility may demand 
that choices be made between environmental values. In such cases, careful 
22  E Biber and J B Ruhl, ‘The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory 
Permits in the Administrative State’ (2014) 64 Duke Law Journal 133.
23  Macintosh, Foerster and McDonald (2013), above n 4.
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and transparent prioritisation of ecological values, safeguards regarding 
the maintenance of particular standards or performance-based measures, 
and a clearly articulated goal of ‘trading up’ will be required.
While most of these risks can be overcome through appropriate design, 
there are also some circumstances in which adaptive approaches are 
simply inappropriate. There is little scope, for example, for approving 
projects that have the potential for irreversible impacts using an adaptive 
management approach. Where a major project is an ‘all-or-nothing’ 
proposition, there is little scope for responsiveness.24 The need for laws to 
respond to change is not intended to supplant the precautionary principle. 
Rather, it should complement it, by providing options for enhancing the 
adaptiveness of law, either where circumstances mean that the option 
of not proceeding is  simply unavailable, or where there is minimal risk 
of serious or irreversible harm.
Adaptive laws face other constraints. As has been noted, they are likely to 
be expensive to implement because of the requirements for monitoring 
and evaluation, and the processes of modification. These costs may be 
reduced by technological advances in monitoring, and better citizen and 
stakeholder engagement at key phases of environmental regulation and 
management. The benefits of better environmental management should 
also offset the increased costs, though these benefits – both economically 
and ecologically valuable – are seldom accounted for in the same way 
as the economic costs. Responsive approaches require long-term 
institutional commitments to monitoring and evaluation programs which 
extend beyond political cycles. Given that increasing rates of change will 
impose their own costs on the administration of environmental laws and 
force the development of long-term goals and implementation plans, this 
constraint is not necessarily onerous.
The most common objection to more responsive and agile law-making 
is that it will undermine investor confidence by removing some of the 
law’s predictability and eroding the value of development ‘rights’. A key 
premise of this chapter, however, is that environmental degradation will 
make many current activities untenable in the future, and that better 
accounting for that prospect now is likely to enhance the long-term 
stability of development activity. A related objection is that such measures 
24  J McDonald, ‘The Role of Law in Adapting to Climate Change’ (2011) 2(2) WIREs: Climate 
Change 283; McDonald and Styles, above n 16; Cosens, Gunderson and Chaffin, above n 14.
251
21 . REFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR RESPONSIVENESS TO CHANGE
and decisions may be ruled invalid on grounds of uncertainty. These 
concerns can be allayed by ensuring that the environmental standards to 
be achieved are predetermined, with clearly defined parameters. 
Built-in triggers and staged approaches to regulation may limit some 
aspects of public participation. There may not be the same opportunity for 
consultation and input to approval conditions or alterations to management 
plans where activities follow the built-in trigger and staged approach. It may 
also be necessary to limit judicial review of adaptive management decision-
making to ensure that responsiveness is not lost by protracted litigation. 
Curtailing public participating runs counter to the principles of ecologically 
sustainable development and environmental good governance, as well as 
the key elements of Resilience Thinking. But this risk can be offset by 
facilitating meaningful public engagement at critical junctures.25
For the most part, these risks and constraints can be overcome with 
appropriate levels of funding and commitment. Indeed, they reduce 
significantly when compared to the risks of retaining the suite of 
inflexible, unresponsive laws, plans and processes that currently comprise 
the environmental law toolkit.
V. Conclusions
The legal and governance framework for environmental protection and 
biodiversity conservation that we have established over decades is poorly 
equipped to respond to changing conditions. Designed to offer legal 
certainty and stability, most regulatory frameworks are premised on 
notions of system stasis. This contribution has identified a reform agenda 
for environmental law, comprising techniques and tools for building-in 
flexibility to environmental decisions and environmental law-making 
processes more generally. Adoption of such approaches would go far, but 
there will be limits to what law can achieve. To meet future challenges, law 
reform must be part of a broader shift towards polycentric and adaptive 
governance26 that recognises system complexity and embraces an array of 
novel governance arrangements.
25  R K Craig and J B Ruhl, ‘Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management’ (2014) 67 
Vanderbilt Law Review 1.
26  C Folke et al, ‘Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems’ (2005) 30 Annual Review 
Environment & Resources 441; E Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
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Water is indispensable to our life, our economy, our food security and 
our environment.2 Ensuring its protection and sustainable use requires 
effective and efficient law and policy. Over the last 120 years, our water 
laws have been on a prolonged reform journey. Spurred by Australia’s 
water-scarce environment and ongoing overallocation challenges,3 
Australia’s water law system has progressed from common law rights, 
to state regulation, to intergovernmental action under the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) led National Competition Policy 
reforms and the National Water Initiative (NWI). The latter agreement, 
which embraced statutory-based collaborative water planning, cap and 
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trade markets, regulation and accounting, monitoring and review, has 
demarcated Australia as a leading laboratory of water governance.4 Even 
so, after such a long reform journey, fatigue and apathy are increasingly 
palpable in water policy.5 Notwithstanding recent emphasis on northern 
water resource development,6 this equivocation about continued national 
reforms is jeopardising Australia’s long-term water sustainability.7 
This chapter argues that entrenching and extending national reforms 
is vital to Australia’s future water security. It argues for four key broad 
reforms. The context and justification for each reform is given by briefly 
evaluating the performance of NWI planning, markets, regulation and 
monitoring. The discussion focuses particularly on non-urban water 
management. This is because agriculture is the largest consumer of 
Australia’s water, making it the area where some of the biggest gains can 
be made in securing sustainable water management.8
II. Four Fundamental Water Law and 
Policy Reforms
A. Prioritise integration and engagement in water 
planning 
Australia’s rivers and aquifers have different local ecologies and are used 
by many different agricultural communities. Collaborative water plans 
are the core mechanism for incorporating and managing these diverse 
contexts and users. While there has been substantial experimentation in 
4  Lee Godden and Anita Foerster ‘Introduction: Institutional Transitions and Water Law 
Governance’ (2011) 22(2/3) The Journal of Water Law 53–57.
5  Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair ‘Rethinking Australian Water Governance: Successes, 
Challenges and Future Directions’ (2016) 33(4) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 275; 
National Water Commission (NWC), Australia’s Water Blueprint: National Reform Assessment 2014 
(NWC 2014); Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists, Blueprint for a Healthy Environment and 
a Productive Economy (Wentworth Group, 2014).
6  Australian Government, Our North Our Future: White Paper on Developing Northern Australia 
(2015), northernaustralia.gov.au/files/files/NAWP-FullReport.pdf. 
7  NWC, above n 5, 4; Holley and Sinclair, above n 5. See also Productivity Commission (PC), 
Inquiry into Progress with the Reform of Australia’s Water Resources Sector (PC, April 2017), www.pc.gov.
au/inquiries/current/water-reform. 
8  In a paper of this size, the analysis is inevitably selective in its coverage. It does not cover for 
example, the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the Basin Plan 2012 (Cth) in detail. Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS), Water Account Australia 2012–13 (ABS, 2014); Wentworth Group, above n 5.
255
22 . FUTURE WATER
water planning across states and territories,9 most plans set environmental 
outcomes, rules for the allocation and trading of water for consumption, 
and monitoring and reporting requirements. Despite a slow start, there 
have been noted improvements in the quality and extent of planning 
across Australia, with some 170 finalised water plans now managing over 
80 per cent of Australia’s water use. 10 Despite this progress, water plans 
continue to suffer from fragmented coverage of uses and a history of poor 
community engagement. 
One of the most prominent examples of fragmentation is the water 
use of the mineral and petroleum sectors. Recognised as facing ‘special 
circumstances’ (e.g. short durations, isolation and difficulties accounting 
for water extraction), mineral and petroleum developments like coal seam 
gas were to be addressed outside of the NWI and its plans.11 However, 
these non-NWI regimes have not achieved the level of integration 
necessary to attend to the interdependencies between these developments 
and their impacts on water,12 not least reduced water availability and 
altered flows. Significant public concern about these failures13 led to 
a recent patchwork of federal and state reforms (e.g. the Commonwealth’s 
water trigger, bioregional assessments and NSW’s Aquifer Interference 
Policy). However, most of these remain ad hoc or partial, with industries’ 
water use not always well integrated with broader regional water planning 
processes, and various states continuing to allow industries to sit outside 
of NWI water plans (e.g. Queensland).14
In terms of community engagement, there are many instrumental 
reasons why community consultation in planning is pursued, including 
encouraging trust and buy-in,15 and developing effective responses to local 
9  Poh-Ling Tan, Kathleen Bowmer and John Mackenzie, ‘Deliberative Tools for Meeting the 
Challenges of Water Planning in Australia’ (2012) 474 Journal of Hydrology 2; NWC above n 5, 26.
10  National Water Commission (NWC), The National Water Planning Report Card 2013 (NWC, 
2013); NWC, above n 5, 26, 351.
11  NWI 2004, cl 34.
12  Karen Hussey, Jamie Pittock and Stephen Dovers, ‘Justifying, Extending and Applying ‘Nexus’ 
Thinking in the Quest for Sustainable Development’ in J Pittock, K Hussey and S Dovers (eds), 
Climate, Energy and Water (CUP, 2015); NWC above n 5. 
13  National Water Commission, ‘Coal Seam Gas and Water Position Statement’ (NWC, 2012); 
National Water Commission (NWC), Water for Mining and Unconventional Gas under the National 
Water Initiative (NWC, 2014) (hereinafter NWC, Water for Mining). 
14  NWC, Water for Mining, above n 13, 10; John Williams, Tim Stubbs and Ann Milligan, 
An Analysis of Coal Seam Gas Production and NRM in Australia (JWSS, 2012).
15  Tom Tyler, Readings in Procedural Justice (Ashgate, 2005). 
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problems (e.g. water cutbacks).16 However, government designed planning 
processes have tended to focus on traditional, quick and easy consultation 
methods (e.g. community meetings or panels), leading to Indigenous and 
many other interests (e.g. environmental and local farmers) being poorly 
engaged.17 While there are signs of improving consultation in more recent 
plans,18 these advances were arguably slow in coming and have produced 
profound legitimacy shortfalls and mistrust across affected communities.19 
As a recent survey revealed, the majority of respondents disagreed that 
their views about the Basin Plan (58 per cent, n 4,719) and coal seam gas 
(65 per cent, n 1,272) would be listened to.20 
To successfully resolve the above shortcomings, planning processes 
must prioritise integration and commitments to deeper stakeholder 
engagement. This will require new obligations to identify all beneficiaries 
and interests affected by planning up front (so as to ensure more widespread 
engagement and avoid sectoral fragmentation causing difficulties during 
implementation);21 joining up currently separate water planning processes 
and mining and gas development approval processes;22 and legislating 
commitments to create, sustain and fund deeper deliberative engagement 
across a broader range of interests.23 Pursuing such reforms will enhance 
opportunities for greater community ‘buy-in’ and produce more 
innovative, integrated and effective responses to local water problems.
16  Tan, Bowmer and Mackenzie, above n 9; Po-Ling Tan, Kathleen Bowmer and Claudia Baldwin, 
‘Continued Challenges in the Policy and Legal Framework for Collaborative Water Planning’ (2012) 
474 Journal of Hydrology 84; NWI 2004 cl 97.
17  Sue Jackson et al, ‘Meeting Indigenous peoples’ Objectives in Environmental Flow Assessments: 
Case Studies from an Australian Multi-Jurisdictional Water Sharing Initiative’ (2015) 522 Journal 
of Hydrology 141; Tan, Bowmer and Baldwin, above n 16.
18  NWC, above n 5, 27.
19  Bruce Lindsay, ‘Public Participation, Litigation and Adjudicative Procedure in Water Resources 
Management’ (2016) 33(4)  Environmental and Planning Law Journal 325; National Water 
Commission, The NWI – Securing Australia’s Water Future: 2011 Assessment (NWC 2011).
20  NWC, above n 5, 408–9.
21  Claudia Baldwin and Mark Hamstead, Integrated Water Resource Planning (Earthscan, 2015) 218.
22  NWC, Water for Mining, above n 13, 6; Poh-Ling Tan, David George and Maria Comino, 
‘Cumulative Risk Management, Coal Seam Gas, Sustainable Water, and Agriculture in Australia’ 
(2015) 31(4) International Journal of Water Resources Development 682.
23  See Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair, ‘Deliberative Participation, Environmental Law 
and Collaborative Governance: Insights from Surface and Groundwater Studies’ (2013)  30(1) 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 32; Mark Hamstead, Claudia Baldwin and Vanessa O’Keefe, 
‘Water Allocation Planning in Australia’, Waterlines (6) (NWC, 2008); Baldwin and Hamstead, 
above n 21.
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B. Embrace regulatory pluralism to address 
market failures
A cornerstone of Australia’s water reforms has been a cap and trade 
market-based system. Like market-based approaches in climate, pollution, 
biodiversity and fisheries contexts,24 Australia’s water market scheme is 
underpinned by a belief that environmental degradation occurs because of 
a failure to properly value environmental resources.25 By setting a cap on 
acceptable resource use levels, assigning rights to extractors and enabling 
those rights to be traded, governments seek to facilitate rational, self-
maximising individuals to promote ‘public interests’ by relocating natural 
resources to those who value them most highly in both the long and the 
short term.26 Over the last 20 years this approach has delivered important 
benefits, at least in the Murray Darling Basin where significant surface 
water trading is occurring. Trading has facilitated flexible responses to 
droughts,27 and produced economic benefits for individual farmers and 
regional communities (albeit selectively and relatively), by providing 
new sources of income, securities for loans and reinvestment on farms.28 
Moreover, these benefits appear likely to intensify, as there are encouraging 
signs that Australia’s water market is increasingly functioning at a more 
optimal and efficient level, as a result of ongoing facilitation of trade and 
diffusion of information.29 
Despite these benefits, Australia’s water markets confront many ongoing 
challenges, including limited trading outside of the Murray Darling Basin 
and perhaps most significantly the lack of universality of environmental 
impacts in the context of groundwater trades. The use of market trading 
as an environmental tool works best when there is universality of the 
environmental impact; however, in the case of discrete groundwater 
24  See Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair ‘Governing Water Markets – Achievements, 
Limitations and the Need for Regulatory Reform’ (2016) 33(4) Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 301.
25  Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1; Antonio 
Roma, ‘Energy, Money and Pollution’ (2006) 56 Ecological Economics 534.
26  Bradley Karkkainen, Archon Fung and Charles Sabel, ‘After Backyard Environmentalism’ 
(2000) 44 American Behavioural Scientist 692, 693; National Water Commission (NWC), Water 
Markets in Australia: A Short History (NWC, 2011) 8; Holley and Sinclair, above n 24, 302.
27  Sarah Wheeler et al, ‘Reviewing the Adoption and Impact of Water Markets in the Murray –
Darling Basin, Australia’ (2014) 518 Journal of Hydrology 28, 37.
28  NWC, above n 5, 358–59.
29  Sarah Wheeler, Alec Zuo and Neal Hughes, ‘The Impact of Water Ownership and Water Market 
Trade Strategy on Australian Irrigators’ Farm Viability’ (2014) 129 Agricultural Systems 81; Holley 
and Sinclair, above n 24, 321.
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aquifers, it is both environmentally undesirable to trade water in or out, 
and virtually physically impossible. To the extent that such situations 
prevail, the policy of water trading may be compromised. Indeed, despite 
making up around 21 per cent by volume of entitlements on issue in 
Australia, trading of groundwater entitlements is quite limited in most 
jurisdictions, accounting for around 12 per cent of total entitlement 
trading and only around 1 per cent of allocation trading (in NSW and 
Vic).30 The limited trading of groundwater means that the consequential 
economic efficiencies will likely be undermined.31 In light of this challenge, 
other complementary policy approaches are arguably needed to plug the 
gaps in market operation for groundwater.
As legal pluralist theories suggest, complementary mixes of instruments 
can often produce better outcomes than a reliance on a single instrument 
approach.32 To address the limitations of the market regarding groundwater, 
reforms should accordingly focus on utilising a more comprehensive 
and complementary suite of innovative regulatory approaches, such as 
prescription standards (e.g. requirements that regulated actors adopt 
particular technologies or best practice or equivalence provisions), process 
standards (e.g. regulated entities establish target, auditing and reporting 
processes particular to their circumstances)33 and perhaps more credibly 
the model of Audited Self-Management (ASM). I have argued elsewhere 
(with Sinclair) that the ASM model, which uses a mix of prescription, 
process and performance standards (e.g. setting and allocating an allowable 
water extraction or setting a particular level of pollutant), offers an 
innovative way to harness the benefits of flexibility (inherent to markets), 
while re-engaging and building trust with the agricultural community 
(an important issue given the weaknesses in planning discussed above).34 
Implementing ASM would involve establishing policy to support six 
30  Holley and Sinclair, above n 24, 316–17; National Water Commission, Australian Water 
Markets: Trends and Drivers 2007–08 to 2012–13 (Australian Government, 2011), 5, 37, www.nwc.
gov.au/publications/topic/water-industry/trends-and-drivers-2012-13.
31  GHD, Hamstead Consulting and Vanessa O’Keefe, A Framework for Managing and Developing 
Groundwater Trading (NWC, 2011) xii; Holley and Sinclair, above n 24, 316–17.
32  Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation (Oxford University 
Press, 1998).
33  For further discussion of these and other regulatory approaches, see Neil Gunningham and 
Cameron Holley, ‘Next Generation Environmental Regulation’ (2016) 12 Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science 273; Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair, ‘A New Water Policy Option for Australia? 
Collaborative Water Governance, Compliance and Enforcement and Audited Self-Management’ 
(2014) 17(2) Australasian Journal of National Resources Law and Policy 189, 195.
34  Holley and Sinclair, above n 24, 322–23.
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core ASM features, namely: enabling water users to form a legal entity 
or collective capable of managing the ASM program; allocating to the 
entity a collective water right (in effect, a bubble licence) covering all 
the ASM participating members; enabling participants to determine 
individual annual extractions as they see fit (effectively trading within the 
bubble licence); ensuring members have in place accurate metering that 
uses telemetry to generate real-time water extraction data; making the 
extraction data available to all participants (disaggregated to the individual 
level) and the government regulator (aggregated to the collective level); 
and putting in place, under the ASM program, appropriate integrity 
(e.g.  auditor) and enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance, 
including, if necessary, the capacity to draw on the support of the external 
government regulator.35
C. Support and implement water regulation
A core element of Australia’s water governance approach is traditional 
regulation, conducted primarily by state-based regulatory agencies. 
Effective regulation, compliance and enforcement is vital to the NWI. The 
entire edifice of the market can be undermined if caps set in collaborative 
water allocation plans are exceeded due to illegal water extraction; if the 
various licences, approvals and tradeable water rights (essential to efficient 
markets) are not adhered to; and if stakeholders lack confidence that 
there is an equitable sharing of water resources (particularly in periods of 
drought).36 While traditional regulatory arrangements vary between each 
state and territory, there are reasons to conclude that they remain less than 
ideal. In part this is because traditional regulation in the agricultural sector 
has proven complex and lagged other industries,37 but also because NWI 
policy attention has naturally focused on establishing plans, entitlements 
and markets, rather than their enforcement. In view of these challenges, 
significant federal government investment was committed to improve state 
water regulation across Australia.38 While NSW and a number of other 
35  Holley and Sinclair, above n 24, 323.
36 NSW Office of Water, ‘Compliance Policy’ (NSW DPI, May 2015), www.water.nsw.gov.
au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/560192/compliance_policy_2015.pdf; Cameron Holley and Darren 
Sinclair, ‘Compliance and Enforcement of Water Licences in NSW: Limitations in Law, Policy and 
Institutions’ (2013) 15 Australasian Journal of National Resources Law and Policy 149, 151–52.
37  Holley and Sinclair, above n 36.
38  Australian Government Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and 
Communities (DSEWPC), National Framework for Compliance and Enforcement Systems for Water 
Resource Management (Australian Government, 2012).
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states have demonstrated progress in meeting many of the framework’s 
milestones, completion rates across a number of issues (e.g. stakeholder 
education and monitoring) lag across many states, and federal funding 
is coming to an end.39 
More generally, a recent survey on water compliance and enforcement in 
NSW suggest that water regulation still requires substantial improvement. 
The findings indicate that only around 49 per cent of respondents (n 604) 
were confident that water users in their region complied with their 
licence conditions, with an almost equal amount (45 per cent) unsure.40 
These less than optimal levels of perceived compliance and high levels of 
uncertainty41 are causes for concern, as people who are regulated are less 
likely to comply with rules where norms of compliance are not widespread 
in practice.42 The risk of non-compliance only appears to be compounded 
by related results that suggest that very few respondents agreed that 
compliance officers regularly worked in their region (26 per cent, n 533) 
or that people illegally taking water will be caught (33 per cent, n 611).43
To the extent that such problems are reflected across Australia, fixing 
these challenges and enhancing compliance and enforcement will require 
increased and continued investment. Such investment will be vital to 
implementing fundamental regulatory activities, including enhancing 
public communication of government enforcement; increasing and 
publicising compliance officer activities (e.g. education and periodic 
targeting of regions/sectors); leveraging peers and third parties in 
promoting compliance; and utilising a more responsive regulatory regime 
that maintains the support of water users. 
39  NWC, above n 5, 353.
40  Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair, Water Extraction in NSW: Stakeholder Views and Experience 
of Compliance and Enforcement (UNSW CWI, Feb 2015), www.connectedwaters.unsw.edu.au/
sites/all/files/Water-extraction-in-NSW-stakeholder-views-of-compliance-and-enforcement-survey-
report.pdf; Holley and Sinclair, n 24, 315.
41  Moreover, 51 per cent (n 504) wanted more information about compliance and enforcement 
activities of the regulator. Holley and Sinclair, above n 40.
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid.; Holley and Sinclair, n 24, 315.
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D. Rebuild and intensify system-wide monitoring and 
benchmarking
Arguably one of the most successful features of the NWI is its system 
of monitoring and continuous improvement. Significant government 
funding was committed to monitoring, oversight and continual ‘learning 
by doing’ activities, including major investment in the Bureau of 
Meteorology (which gathered significant national water information); 
and financial backing for an independent National Water Commission 
(NWC) – a skills-based body whose tasks included conducting periodic 
assessments of the reforms and producing a series of related products, 
research studies, performance indicators and position statements. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of shortfalls in the NWI’s monitoring 
and continuous improvement systems. While monitoring of water plan 
outcomes is still impoverished,44 perhaps the biggest shortfall relates to 
oversight of the NWI system itself. As a tool for improving and progressing 
the NWI, the NWC assessments were arguably its most important product, 
helping to facilitate benchmarking of performance. The assessments also 
shed light on gaps in the agenda, and publicly ‘prodded’ governments 
when they were dragging the chain on water reform.45 This success 
is worth noting given that, subsequent to the National Competition 
Reforms and their incentive arrangements, there has been little funding to 
encourage state commitment to implementation (other than those tied to 
specific programs or places like the National Framework for Compliance 
and Enforcement and the Murray Darling Basin national partnership 
agreement payments). 
Despite the success of the NWC, it was abolished in 2015. This decision 
was based on the view that progress in implementing the NWI was such 
that monitoring of national reforms was no longer needed, with statutory 
functions to be transferred to existing Commonwealth agencies.46 With 
the government left to self-assess progress (albeit alongside ad hoc senate 
and independent inquiries), the disciplinary drivers that arose from the 
NWC’s public transparency and comparisons are likely to fall away. As the 
44  National Water Commission (NWC), Monitoring and Evaluation for Adaptive Water 
Management: Issues Paper (NWC 2013); NWC above n 5, 404.
45  David Rosalky, COAG Review of the National Water Commission (COAG, 2011) iii–iv.
46  P Hannam, ‘Parched NSW Seeks Help as National Water Commission Axed’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 13 May 2015, www.smh.com.au/environment/parched-nsw-seeks-help-as-national-
water-commission-axed-20150513-gh0ork.html.
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Commission itself noted before being disbanded, there is ‘little assurance 
against backsliding on previous gains’.47 This is particularly worrying given 
the substantial amount of work still to be completed on water, including 
recent federal proposals to develop Australia’s northern water resources, 
as well as addressing challenges of coal seam gas, mining, community 
engagement, regulation and monitoring (noted above).
At a minimum, improving the NWI’s commitment to monitoring and 
improvement goals requires increasing monitoring budgets (e.g. for water 
plans) and re-embracing an independent oversight body like the NWC. 
A more fundamental change would extend the NWI monitoring and 
improvement model so as to mirror the so-called experimentalist learning 
architecture,48 replete with new obligations for localised benchmarking 
of water plans, greater horizontal diffusion of information between water 
catchments (facilitated by an oversight body like the NWC), and setting 
and ratcheting up minimal standards of good performance and process. 
Doing so would enhance opportunities for sharing more detailed learning 
and innovation (such as how best to integrate gas and mining in water 
planning, or manage environmental assets) across contexts, as well as 
enhancing opportunities for peer-to-peer accountability.
III. Conclusion
Continuing to improve Australia’s national water law and policy will be 
central to future water security in an age of climate change. This chapter 
has surveyed non-urban water governance, identifying successes and 
several lingering shortfalls, including weak community engagement, 
gaps in integration, regulation and market trading, and limitations 
in continuous improvement caused by a dismantling of the NWC. 
Overcoming these weaknesses will require concerted efforts to continue 
the evolution and implementation of the NWI goals, such as the efforts 
canvassed in this chapter.
47  NWC, above n 5, 108.
48  Karkkainen, Fung and Sabel, above n 26. 
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Effective Law for Rural 
Environmental Governance: 
Meta-Governance Reform and 
Farm Stewardship
Paul Martin, Amanda Kennedy and Jacqueline Williams1
I. Introduction
Protection of biodiversity is principally concerned with the governance of 
rural lands and surface waters. This is because intact biodiversity is most 
likely to be found in rural areas that have not been converted to industry or 
urbanisation. But Australia’s biodiversity performance is not heartening, 
despite the existence of many legal and other instruments and programs.2 
Threatened species in particular have suffered, with 50 animal species and 
48 plant species listed as extinct since the passage of the Environment 
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Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act).3 Public 
funding for biodiversity protection is also insufficient and under threat,4 
while the complexity of the biodiversity challenge is increasing.
Biodiversity decline has continued despite the proliferation of governance 
programs and laws, suggesting a failure of implementation.5 There is 
support for this hypothesis.6 The Secretary General of the Chief of Staff 
of the Organization of American States has joined a growing cohort 
highlighting the implementation failings of environmental governance, 
calling the implementation of environmental law ‘the greatest challenge 
of our century’.7 Traditional legal instruments for rural environmental 
governance, and scholarly discussions of the issues, tend to emphasise 
individual stewardship by private landholders. They also tend to focus 
on specific governance instruments, rather than the determinants of the 
performance of the governance system as a whole. Many fundamental 
strategic challenges are overlooked. Current approaches do not generate 
the whole-of-landscape, socioeconomically realistic responses that are 
needed for increasingly complex systemic problems. This complexity stems 
from factors including diverse land uses and ownership; fundamental 
disagreements about the objectives and methods of protection and 
restoration; the proliferation of governance interventions; and the 
insufficient economic capacity of farmers and other rural people to 
implement law, compared to their urban counterparts. 
In this chapter we consider some less obvious systemic challenges and 
opportunities to overcome issues that limit conventional environmental 
governance approaches. We then propose some approaches to reform 
meta-governance processes – that is, to the governance of governance 
3  Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1301.0 – Year Book Australia, 2009–10: Australia’s Biodiversity 
(ABS, 2010), www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1301.0Feature%20Article 12009 
%E2% 80%9310?opendocument&tabname= Summary&prodno=1301.0&issue=2009% 9610& 
num=&view=.
4  The Australian budget released in May 2014 included significant cuts of funding to Landcare 
and Cooperative Research Centres, and the abolishment of the National Water Commission and the 
Biodiversity Fund. This was after significant cuts in 2013 to biodiversity and carbon farming futures 
programs for rural landholders. 
5  Euan Ritchie et al, ‘Continental-Scale Governance Failure Will Hasten Loss of Australia’s 
Biodiversity’ (2013) 27(6) Conservation Biology 1133; Department of the Environment, ‘Australia’s Fifth 
National Report under the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (Australian Government, 2014).
6  Ibid.
7  Organization of American States Secretary General Hugo De Zela, on the signing of the 
Agreement on Environmental Rule of Law and Sustainable Development, 19 November 2014, 
Washington DC; see IISD Reporting Services, above n 2. 
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frameworks themselves.8 These proposals concern the arrangements 
used to create, review, reform and implement governance instruments, 
rather than the content of legal instruments. It is at this level that the 
greatest challenges to legal effectiveness exist, and the most significant 
innovations are needed. The major innovation we propose is not a new 
instrument, though this will also be needed. Rather, we suggest reforms 
to meta-governance processes. These changes will be needed to ensure that 
instrumental innovations (i) can be effectively implemented by the people 
who are required to take action, (ii) are efficient in how they operate at 
the front line, and (iii) fairly allocate the costs and benefits of protecting 
biodiversity and of the governance system itself.
II. Conditions for Effective Environmental Law
We begin with a simple question: what are the conditions under which 
an environmental law is likely to be effective? For the past decade our 
research team has concentrated on rural legal governance as a systems 
issue. Our research suggests that there are three necessary conditions for 
the success of governance instruments:
1. Reliable policy concepts allow governance interventions precisely to 
address the problem. A misguided or incomplete understanding 
of the problem will increase the risk of failure.9
2. Efficient and effective instrument design creates effective interventions 
with a feasible strategy for implementation. This involves choosing the 
most appropriate instrument – regulation, market or social intervention 
– to encourage the behavioural change required, depending upon the 
characteristics of those being regulated, and the available resources 
and commitment to implementation.10 
8  See Jan Kooiman and Svein Jentoft, ‘Meta-governance: Values, Norms and Principles, and 
the Making of Hard Choices’ (2009) 87(4) Public Administration 818; Stephen Bell and Alex 
Park, ‘The Problematic Metagovernance of Networks: Water Reform in New South Wales’ (2006) 
26(1) Journal of Public Policy 63; Bob Jessop, ‘The Rise of Governance and the Risk of Failure: The 
Case of Economic Development’ (1998) 50(155) International Social Science Journal 29; Michael 
Lockwood et al, ‘Multi-level Environmental Governance: Lessons from Australian Natural Resource 
Management’ (2009) 40(2) Australian Geographer 169; Louis Meuleman, Public Management and 
the Metagovernance of Hierarchies, Networks and Markets: The Feasibility of Designing and Managing 
Governance Style Combinations (Springer Science & Business Media, 2008).
9  Paul Martin and Jacqueline Williams, ‘Policy Risk Assessment’ (CRC for Irrigation Futures 
Technical Report Series No 03/10, 2010).
10  Paul Martin and Jacqueline Williams, ‘Next Generation Rural Natural Resource Governance: 
A Careful Diagnosis’ in Volker Mauerhofer (ed), Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development (Springer 
International Publishing, 2016) 607.
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3. Community support makes the success of environmental law more 
likely. The intervention (the law) must reasonably align with self-
interest to encourage desired action (or at least not generate negative 
reaction). There should also be a social perception that the intervention 
is justified and fair, and that the implementing body has integrity. 
A  perception that an intervention is impractical or unfair can 
legitimate non-compliance and deprive the intervention of its social 
supports.11 
There are many aspects of the current system that do not adequately 
satisfy these preconditions for performance. Our research suggests that 
while positive farmer attitudes are always important, new challenges 
and socioeconomic and natural resource management realities mean 
that many conventional governance solutions face serious challenges of 
feasibility, and risk undesirable spillovers. We argue that significant change 
in how we approach the design and implementation of rural governance 
is needed if we are to improve biodiversity outcomes. Australia needs a far 
more systematic approach to creating, implementing and evaluating the 
instruments and strategies of rural governance. 
III. Challenges to Achieving Effective Rural 
Environmental Governance 
Environmental governance involves instruments to control, direct, and 
motivate behaviour to achieve public goals for the ever-changing state of 
the environment. Success requires a good ‘fit’ between the instruments, the 
context, resources and the capabilities and commitment of those charged 
with implementation.12 There are many aspects of the current system that 
do not adequately satisfy the necessary conditions for governance success.
Many conventional approaches to rural governance reflect a view of 
land use being principally agricultural, mainly broad-acre cropping and 
animal production. Readily identifiable on-farm environmental problems 
include soil erosion, land-clearing, wasteful use of water, excessive 
11  Paul Martin, Jacqueline Williams and Christopher Stone, ‘Transaction Costs and Water Reform: 
The Devils Hiding in the Details’ (Cooperative Research Centre for Irrigation Futures Technical 
Report No 08/08, 2008).
12 Paul Martin and Donna Craig, ‘Accelerating the Evolution of Environmental Law through 
Continuous Learning from Applied Experience’ in Paul Martin and Amanda Kennedy (eds), 
Implementing Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 27.
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chemical use and habitat destruction. The natural focus of governance is, 
therefore, on farmer stewardship within individual estates. Examples of 
egregious irresponsibility prosecuted or reported in the media lead many 
in society to associate stewardship failure with mala fides; however, this 
assumption overlooks the contextual socioeconomic factors that underlie 
environmental problems.13 
As many farmers argue, farm financial vulnerability and volatility, limited 
human resources and the relatively poor socioeconomic status of rural 
communities create conditions in which it is not feasible for them to 
meet the stewardship expectations that the law and (urban-based) public 
opinion place upon them. As a percentage of total population, Australia’s 
rural population is a little over 10 per cent, and spread thinly over an 
extensive landscape.14 Physical distance – both between citizens within 
rural communities, and between rural communities and (usually urban) 
centres of power and decision-making – creates spatial isolation which 
increases the transaction costs of governance. While rural and remote 
communities are not homogenous, the economic capacity of rural 
communities is also typically constrained in comparison to urban areas.15
Systemic issues, such as issues concerning biodiversity caused by climate 
change, and the need for habitat connectivity and control of invasive 
species to protect biodiversity, require coordinated action by landholders 
who operate diverse enterprises (with different incentives and concerns) 
and whose capacities vary. In general, coordinated action is impeded by 
fragmentation due to land titles and land use diversity. Homogenous 
farming landscapes are declining due to subdivision (including lifestyle 
farms) and ownership diversification (including Indigenous lands, 
corporate and international ownership). Coordinated action is further 
confounded by institutional fragmentation through an increasing number 
of private and public governance ‘silos’, and many laws and programs.16
13  Martin and Williams (2016), above n 10.
14  Bill Pritchard, Land of Discontent: The Dynamics of Change in Rural And Regional Australia 
(UNSW Press, 2000).
15  Vaughan Higgins and Stewart Lockie, ‘Re-discovering the Social: Neo-Liberalism and 
Hybrid Practices of Governing in Rural Natural Resource Management’ (2002) 18(4) Journal of Rural 
Studies 419.
16  Martin and Williams (2010), above n 9.
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The reality of conditions faced by those living in rural areas raises difficult 
policy questions including:
1. To what degree is it reasonable or fair to expect landholders to privately 
fund public-good investment where there is no private benefit, 
without a public contribution to that work? This is a particularly 
difficult question when episodic factors like drought prevent otherwise 
responsible landholders from carrying out essential environmental 
works.
2. To what degree is it sensible and in the public interest to impose 
economically or physically infeasible requirements? This problem 
is particularly pronounced when farmlands are marginal, where 
abandonment or chronic incapacity will lead to no environmental 
work being conducted (other than at the full cost to the public purse).
‘Public/private’ allocation approaches to social problems, which may 
make sense when both public and private resources are available,17 do not 
work well when the public or private purse is empty. Nor do approaches 
work when they oblige farmers to take stewardship actions beyond 
their traditional obligations. Rural governance arrangements must find 
ways that transcend private boundaries to share the load of biodiversity 
protection, and to provide resources and incentives to encourage action.
IV. Changing Meta-Governance
The discussion above suggests that Australia’s strategy for making and 
implementing legal arrangements must become far more nuanced. 
We propose four meta-governance reforms, which combine different 
governance mechanisms to achieve a more coordinated and effective rural 
environmental governance regime.18 The degree of change we recommend 
is radical, but if the present system is not working then radical change 
must be entertained.
17  For example, David Pannell, Pannell Discussions No. 80: Public Benefits, Private Benefits: 
The Final Framework (Pannell Discussions, 19 June 2006), www.pannelldiscussions.net/2006/06/80-
public-benefits-private-benefits-the-final-framework/.
18  Louis Meuleman and Ingeborg Niestroy, ‘Common but Differentiated Governance: 
A Metagovernance Approach to Make the SDGs Work’ (2015) 7(9) Sustainability 12295–321.
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1. A more systemic approach. Many rural natural resource governance 
problems are systemic in nature and laws need to reflect this to be 
more effective. This approach has three levels:19
a. A more sophisticated national approach to rural biodiversity 
protection and restoration that provides a comprehensive framework 
for governance. The approach needs to interweave biophysical and 
socioeconomic factors to address the implementation challenges. 
The approach should be coupled with ongoing performance reviews 
of governance to provide a ‘roadmap’ for continuing improvement 
in rural environmental governance including law reform.
b. Legal instruments need to more effectively address system 
protection and should have explicit implementation strategies, 
notably for whole-of-landscape action beyond individual farm 
boundaries. Often this will require interventions to align the 
socioeconomic context with the legal strategy in order to support 
change.
c. Governance is becoming less government centred, as citizen 
organisations and industry take an increasing role and as the limits 
to government power and capacity become more pronounced.20 
Industry self-regulation and co-regulation are already significant 
in farming, in the form of buyer-chain environmental and other 
requirements, industry standards and codes, and market-based 
standards.21 Still lacking are a strategy to harness this potential, 
and integrity mechanisms to ensure that such schemes are not 
de facto unjustifiable deregulation. 
2. Rural regulatory design and review processes.22 Current regulatory 
review is minimal and focused only on business cost. It does not 
address risks of implementation failure, nor of social spillovers. A 
more comprehensive approach is needed to:
19  For further details, see Paul Martin and Neil Gunningham, ‘Improving Regulatory Arrangements 
for Sustainable Agriculture: Groundwater as an Illustration’ (2014) 1(1) Australian Journal of 
Environmental Law 5; Mark Burgman et al, ‘Designing Regulation for Conservation and Biosecurity’ 
(2009) 13(1) Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 93.
20  C E Wilson, T H Morrison and J-A Everingham, ‘Linking the “Meta-Governance” Imperative 
to Regional Governance in Resource Communities’ (2017) 50 Journal of Rural Studies 188–97.
21  See Andrew Lawson, Farmers, Voluntary Stewardship Programs, and Collaborative Natural 
Resource Governance in Rural Australia (PhD thesis, University of New England, 2016). 
22  Paul Martin et al, Developing a Good Regulatory Practice Model for Environmental Regulations 
Impacting on Farmers (Australian Farm Institute and Land and Water Australia, 2007).
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a. objectively review plans for implementation, including 
consideration of commitments from government to funding and 
other implementation requirements for the laws that they propose 
to create;
b. consider the likely outcome effectiveness and distributional effects 
of proposed laws, and canvass how possible inadequacies and 
perverse impacts will be addressed.
3. An investment model is needed for the rural environment. This in 
turn has two levels:23
a. Our estimate is that landscape protection and restoration requires 
approximately 2 per cent of GDP,24 and others would argue that far 
more is needed.25 After extensive research we have been unable to 
identify how much is actually being invested and by whom. There 
is no institutional mechanism to coordinate potential streams of 
investment, nor to maximise that investment. Economic feasibility 
is fundamental to legal effectiveness, and the lack of an investment 
strategy for the environment suggests a fundamental weakness 
in Australia’s governance efforts.
b. Investment is needed to support coordinated action by landholders, 
particularly when action goes beyond their site-specific legal 
responsibilities, if stewardship is to be effective. New project-
specific funding streams are possible, but legal and institutional 
arrangements are needed to maximise and organise these 
opportunities. Organisational structures, and issues of contract 
and securitisation, are representative of issues where better legal 
arrangements are needed. Other law reforms such as changes to 
taxation may be needed to encourage private collective investment. 
23  Paul Martin and Kip Werren, ‘The Use of Taxation Incentives to Create New Eco-Service 
Markets: Critical Issues’ in Lin-Heng Lye and Janet E Milne (eds), Critical Issues in Environmental 
Taxation (Oxford University Press, 2009) Vol 7, 511; Paul Martin and Kip Werren, ‘Discussion Paper: 
An Industry Plan for the Victorian Environment?’ (Department of Sustainability and Environment, 
State Government of Victoria, 2009); Kip Werren, Utilising Taxation Incentives to Promote Private 
Sector Funded Conservation (PhD Thesis, University of Western Sydney, 2015).
24  Martin and Werren, above n 23. 
25  Marty Sammon and Mark Thomson, Land Stewardship: Private Investor Needs For Land 
Stewardship Investment (Department of Sustainability and Environment, State Government of 
Victoria, 2003); The Virtual Consulting Group and Griffin NRM Pty Ltd, ‘National Investment 
in Rural Landscapes: An Investment Scenario for NFF and ACF with the Assistance of LWRRDC’ 
(Australian Conservation Foundation and National Farmers Federation with assistance from Land 
& Water Resources Research & Development Corporation, 2000).
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4. Negotiated regionalism. Bioregional planning is possible under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, and could 
make a substantial contribution to improved biodiversity outcomes. 
From a socioeconomic perspective, this presents the opportunity to 
marry a science-based approach to a more community-based approach. 
V. Conclusion
Australia has a national biodiversity strategy,26 and provides a national 
assessment of its performance under that strategy when reporting 
on implementation of its international commitments to biodiversity 
protection.27 On a regular basis, independent scientists publish the 
Australian State of Environment Report, a review of the biophysical 
status of the environment. Australia also has institutional arrangements 
to ensure that the welfare of rural communities and the sustainability 
of rural landscapes are protected. What Australia has not yet done is tie 
these elements together in a process of continuous improvement in the 
effectiveness of our legal arrangements for rural biodiversity protection. 
Similarly, Australia has a tradition of regulatory review, but it has not 
extended that process to properly take into account the implementation 
requirements and social justice implications of laws. 
These are gaps in meta-governance which could be filled by an extension 
of existing rules and structures, potentially forming a basis for disciplined 
continuous improvement, based on sound empirical evidence of governance 
performance. Well-focused attention on the actual performance of legal 
arrangements, and the reasons for that performance, would be most likely 
to highlight the other issues we have discussed in this chapter, including 
the need for a viable investment base for sustainability, and the challenges 
of social justice embedded in the pursuit of this goal. Of all the possible 
changes that could improve the rural biodiversity outcomes for Australia, 
the most powerful would be reforming meta-governance in order to 
embed a process of empirically-based improvement in laws, other rules 
and institutions for implementation.
26  It is updated periodically; for the current strategy, see National Biodiversity Strategy Review Task 
Group, ‘Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 2010–2030’ (Natural Resource Management 
Ministerial Council, 2010).
27  Department of the Environment, ‘Australia’s Fifth National Report under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’ (Australian Government, 2014).
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Pitfalls of Statutory Reform in 
Private Law: Recipient Liability 
for Breach of Trust
Darryn Jensen1
I. Introduction
Statutory law reform in relation to private law obligations has, historically, 
been mostly a matter of piecemeal adjustment rather than radical 
reconstruction. The piecemeal approach recognises the value in structures 
that have emerged gradually from case law. It seeks to resolve ambiguities 
or address concerns which arise in localised areas of the larger structure. 
Nevertheless, piecemeal statutory reform involves two risks. First, if there 
is inadequate reflection upon how the localised area of concern fits into 
the larger structure, the result may be to create a disjuncture between 
adjoining parts of the structure. Second, subsequent developments in 
the case law may render what was enshrined in statute redundant or 
nonsensical. Statute law in Western Australia and Queensland that was 
enacted primarily to remedy certain problems raised by the Diplock 
litigation2 has turned out to be a mixed blessing. It will be argued that 
the rules about the order of enforcement of claims against the trustee and 
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recipients should be discarded and that case law developments in relation 
to the common law claim for money paid by mistake have resolved the 
central problem in the Diplock litigation.
II. Recipient Liability for Breach of Trust
Where someone receives a distribution of trust property and was not 
entitled to receive it, there are three types of equitable claim which the 
‘true’ beneficiaries of the trust may bring against the recipient. First, 
if misappropriated trust funds can be traced into an asset, the beneficiaries 
may claim the asset or a share of the asset which is proportionate to the 
trust fund’s contribution thereto. Whether the asset is legally owned by 
the trustee or a third party is irrelevant, except that a third party may 
be able to rely upon a defence of bona fide purchaser for value without 
notice. In Foskett v McKeown,3 Lord Millett observed that, in such a claim, 
the claimants ‘seek to vindicate their property rights, not to reverse 
unjust enrichment’.4 This stance has been rationalised on the basis that, 
if a trustee has the power to make an effective transfer of trust assets, then 
‘any assets received in exchange are made subject to the same equitable 
interests as bound the original trust assets’.5 
Second, if a trustee conveys trust assets to, or confers an interest in trust 
assets on, a third party and the third party receives those assets or that 
interest knowing of the breach of trust, the third party will be liable in 
every way that the trustee would have been liable had the trustee been 
sued.6 Knowing receipt opens up the possibility that the recipient will be 
personally liable to restore the trust estate, so is potentially a more exacting 
3  [2001] 1 AC 102.
4  [2001] 1 AC 102, 129. See also similar comments at 108 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) and 115 
(Lord Hoffmann).
5  R B Grantham and C E F Rickett, ‘Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event’ (2003) 62 
Cambridge Law Journal 717, 747. Contrast Scott v Scott (1963) 109 CLR 649, 660 in which it was 
said that the proprietary order made at first instance (and ultimately upheld by the High Court) was 
based on the liability of the trustee ‘to make good a breach of trust’ and ‘to account for a profit which 
accrued to him’. In Evans v European Bank Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 75, 103, the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal declined to clarify the basis for proprietary claims because it was not necessary to do 
so in order to decide the case before it.
6  The traditional formulation is that the recipient becomes a ‘constructive trustee’ (Barnes v Addy 
(1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 252). In Selangor United Rubber Estates Limited v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 
1 WLR 1555, 1582, Ungoed-Thomas J explained that the defendant is liable in equity ‘as though 
he were a trustee’. See also Lionel Smith, ‘Constructive Trusts and Constructive Trustees’ (1999) 58 
Cambridge Law Journal 294, 300. 
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form of recipient liability than that which results from a proprietary 
claim. Where a traceable asset in the recipient’s hands does not represent 
the full value of the misappropriated trust assets, the recipient merely has 
to transfer the asset. There is no liability to compensate the trust estate for 
any shortfall arising from a depreciation of the traceable asset.7 Knowing 
receipt liability, on the other hand, is a true substitute for the beneficiaries’ 
claim against the trustee.
Finally, it is conceivable that, where a trustee incorrectly distributes trust 
funds, a beneficiary or other person claiming through the trustee (such 
as a creditor of the trustee) ought to be able to recover from an innocent 
recipient the amount that the recipient received but should not have 
received. Equity is said to intervene in such a case because the recipient 
‘has received some share of the estate to which he was not entitled’.8 
Re Diplock was a case about a deceased estate. The House of Lords, in 
dismissing an appeal, reasoned on the basis that this equitable claim was 
available against persons who had received distributions from deceased 
estates.9 Accordingly, it has been uncertain whether distributees of funds 
from inter vivos trusts are similarly liable. Lord Nicholls (writing extra-
judicially) has suggested that a restriction to deceased estates, although 
explicable in historical terms, is irrational.10 In his Lordship’s opinion, 
a claim should be available against a recipient from either type of trust 
estate ‘to prevent what would otherwise be an unjust enrichment’.11 The 
recipient’s liability is to make restitution of what it received and nothing 
more. This is a significant limitation because the loss suffered by the trust 
estate by reason of an unauthorised distribution will often be greater than 
the amount received by the unauthorised recipient.12
7  Where, in relation to a particular transaction in breach of trust, the plaintiffs elect to take the 
traceable asset rather than make a personal claim against the trustee for restoration of the trust estate, 
the traceable asset will be ‘the full measure of relief available to them’ (Scott v Scott (1963) 109 CLR 
649, 660).
8  [1948] Ch 465, 503.
9  Ministry of Health v Simpson [1951] AC 251, 265. Lord Simonds remarked that ‘the particular 
branch of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery with which [the case was] concerned relates to 
the administration of assets of a deceased person’.
10  Lord Nicholls, ‘Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark’ in W R Cornish, Richard 
Nolan, Janet O’Sullivan and Graham Virgo (eds), Restitution Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour 
of Gareth Jones (Hart Publishing, 1998) 240–41.
11  Ibid. 237.
12  For example, as in Re Dawson [1966] 2 NSWR 211. See generally Jamie Glister, ‘Breach of trust 
and consequential loss’ (2014) 8 Journal of Equity 235.
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In Re Diplock, it was said that the amount recoverable was limited to 
the amount which could not be recovered from the trustee.13 In other 
words, the beneficiaries must recover what they can from the trustee 
before recovering any amount from the recipient. This restriction was 
supposed to be related to the equitable nature of the claim. The ‘absence 
or exhaustion’ of the beneficiaries’ claim against the trustee was taken 
to be ‘the justification for calling for equity to come to the aid of the 
law’. 14 In Re Diplock, where the trustee had made the payments under 
a mistaken belief that a will provision was legally enforceable, there was no 
common law claim for money had and received, but the rule is clearly not 
concerned with the absence or exhaustion of that claim. It is concerned 
with the exhaustion of the claim against the trustee for restoration of the 
trust estate, which is an equitable claim. As Lord Nicholls remarked, 
the problem is ‘internal to equity’.15
III. Statutory Reform
The Western Australian and Queensland statutory provisions do three 
things. First, they provide that a personal restitutionary claim of the 
Re Diplock type is available in all cases of incorrect distribution of trust 
property.16 Second, they create statutory change of position defences 
under which a recipient could, under certain conditions, be relieved of 
liability to repay the whole or part of what it received.17 These reforms were 
justified. There is nothing in the rationale of the personal restitutionary 
claim that demands that it be confined to cases involving deceased estates. 
The change of position defence is welcome because recipients who have 
disbursed the funds that they received may suffer hardship if required 
to repay. 
Third, and more contentiously, the statutes set down rules about the order 
of enforcement of claims against the trustee and claims against recipients. 
The Western Australian legislation reverses the Re Diplock order of 
enforcement. No remedy may be enforced against the trustee until the 
beneficiary has exhausted ‘all other remedies available to him, whether 
13  [1948] Ch 465, 503.
14  [1948] Ch 465, 503–4; see also Ministry of Health v Simpson [1951] AC 251, 266.
15  Lord Nicholls, above n 10, 241.
16  Trustees Act 1962 (WA) s 65(1); Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 113(1).
17  Trustees Act 1962 (WA) s 65(8); Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 113(3).
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under this section or in equity or otherwise’.18 This language clearly 
encompasses claims to traceable assets held by recipients, knowing receipt 
or assistance claims and personal restitutionary claims against recipients.19 
The Queensland Law Reform Commission took the view that there was 
‘no virtue whatever in placing the primary responsibility for a wrongful 
distribution on the distributee’.20 Accordingly, the Queensland legislation 
affirms the rule stated in Re Diplock,21 so that the personal restitutionary 
claim against the recipient cannot be enforced until all remedies, personal 
and proprietary, against the trustee have been exhausted.22 
IV. The Pitfalls of Reform
A. Order of enforcement of claims
The Queensland provision emphasises the trustee’s culpability in respect 
of the incorrect distribution. The trustee should be primarily responsible 
for putting things right. This premise is open to challenge. Certainly, 
the culpability of the executor in Re Diplock was of the slightest variety. 
The  executor had acted in accordance with the terms of the will. 
The executor’s mistake was simply to assume that the relevant clause of 
the will was legally enforceable when it was not. A conclusion that such 
a trustee should always bear the burden of restoring the trust estate ahead 
of a recipient who has made a windfall gain is questionable.
The greater difficulty is that recipients, unless they are knowing 
recipients, are not liable to restore the trust estate. Their liability is limited 
to the value of what they have received. Under the Queensland provision, 
the recipient is liable to give back only so much of what it received as is 
necessary to make up for the trustee’s inability to restore the trust estate 
in full. If, on the other hand, Lord Nicholls is correct is saying that the 
Re Diplock claim ‘presupposes that the recipient was enriched by a windfall 
18  Trustees Act 1962 (WA) s 65(7)(b).
19  Corporate Systems Publishing v Lingard (No 4) [2008] WASC 21, [184]. Beech J described the 
prerequisite to enforcement of a judgment against a trustee as ‘any judgment against the recipients or 
assisters is satisfied’. See also Peter Creighton and Elise Bant, ‘Recipient Liability in Western Australia’ 
(2000) 29 Western Australian Law Review 205, 229.
20  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law relating to Trusts, Trustees, Settled Land 
and Charities (QLRC 8) (1971) 74.
21  Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 113(2).
22  Ron Kingham Real Estate Pty Ltd v Edgar [1999] 2 QdR 439, 445 (McPherson JA).
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gain’,23 a requirement that claims against the trustee be exhausted first 
does not harmonise with the rationale for making the recipient liable. 
The recipient should be liable to give back what it received regardless of 
the trustee’s means to restore the trust estate. The rule that claims against 
the trustee must be exhausted first protects a recipient on the basis of 
the happy circumstance that the trustee has the resources to restore the 
trust estate. 
Equally, it is not clear that a trustee should be relieved of liability to the 
extent that the trust estate can be restored by recovering what has passed 
into the hands of third parties or, where there is a knowing recipient, by 
making the recipient personally liable to restore the trust estate. Under 
the Western Australian legislation, the difference between cases in which 
remedies can be enforced against trustees and those in which they cannot 
be is the happy circumstance that third parties have either traceable 
assets or sufficient monetary resources to pay back the amounts that they 
received. Where a third party is a knowing recipient, that third party is 
jointly and severally liable to restore the trust estate on account of the 
third party’s culpability in respect of the breach of trust being as great as 
that of the trustee, but the third party is not necessarily any more culpable 
than the trustee. Of course, it may be convenient for a plaintiff to enforce 
first any of the remedies against third party recipients on the basis that 
it is easy to do so compared to requiring the trustees to restore the trust 
estate using their own resources, but it is difficult to see any principled 
justification for requiring plaintiffs to do so. Creighton and Bant have 
remarked that it would be ‘preferable simply to eliminate any requirement 
for exhaustion of remedies’.24
B. Redundancy
In Re Diplock, the beneficiaries had to rely upon equity to found their 
restitutionary claim against the recipients because a common law claim 
would not have been available. At the time, it was generally believed that 
a common law action for money had and received was not available where 
the payer’s mistake was a mistake as to the law. The ‘mistake’ in Re Diplock 
23  Lord Nicholls, above n 10, 241.
24  Creighton and Bant, above n 19, 230. In 2013, the Queensland Law Reform Commission 
recommended that the requirement that remedies against the trustee should be exhausted before 
enforcing remedies against recipients should be removed (Queensland Law Reform Commission, 
Review of the Trusts Act 1973 (QLRC 71) (2013) 129). At the time of writing, subs 113(2) remained 
unamended.
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was an assumption that the provision of the will under which the payments 
were made was legally enforceable. The provision was unenforceable 
because the trustee’s discretion to choose recipients encompassed entities 
that did not have charitable purposes. This was a mistake as to law.
By the end of the 1990s, in both England and Australia, it had been 
recognised that money paid under a mistake of law is recoverable by way 
of a common law action.25 In so far as situations involving receipt of 
funds from trustees fall within the scope of a general common law rule 
that demands the restitution of mistaken payments, then the equitable 
claim would be redundant. Equity operates on the basis that the common 
law is inadequate to do justice, rather than on the basis that the payer 
is a trustee. The common law claim applies to all recipients. It is not 
restricted to funds received from deceased estates. A plaintiff who relies 
on the common law claim would not have to exhaust any remedies that 
are available against the trustee before enforcing the claim. It has become 
clear that a defendant recipient would, in appropriate cases, be able to 
invoke a common law change of position defence.26
The proper plaintiff in a claim for money had and received against the 
recipient of trust funds is the payer of the funds – that is, the trustee. 
A beneficiary is not normally entitled to bring an action in place of the 
trustee, but it is clear that a beneficiary could bring a derivative action 
against a debtor of the trustee if the action ‘is needed to avoid injustice’.27 
It has been argued that a beneficiary may bring a derivative action where 
the trustee ‘unjustifiably fails to bring an action to protect the trust’.28 
The trustee would be obliged to recover the incorrect distribution from 
the recipient. This would be an aspect of the trustee’s duty to restore the 
trust estate. Beneficiaries could compel the trustee to bring the action, 
so the derivative action simply aggregates the beneficiary’s action to 
compel the  trustees to recover the debt and the trustee’s action against 
the recipient.29 The cumulative effect of the abrogation of the fact/law 
25  David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353; Kleinwort 
Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349.
26  Port of Brisbane Corporation v ANZ Securities Limited [2002] QCA 158, [27]; Alpha Wealth 
Financial Services Pty Ltd v Frankland River Olive Company Limited [2008] WASC 119, [196]–[211]; 
Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Limited v Hills Industries Limited [2014] HCA 14.
27  Roberts v Gill & Co [2010] UKSC 22, [110] (Lord Collins).
28  Emma Hargreaves, ‘The Nature of Beneficiaries’ Rights under Trusts’ (2011) 25 Trust Law 
International 163, 178.
29  H A J Ford and W A Lee, Principles of the Law of Trusts (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 4th edn, 
2010) [17.4110].
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distinction and the availability of derivative actions is that beneficiaries 
can bring common law claims to recover the funds incorrectly distributed. 
Therefore, statutory provisions which entrench the Re Diplock claim as 
part of the law and set down prerequisites to its enforcement might be 
seen to be redundant.30 
V. Conclusion
To preserve the Western Australian and Queensland statutory provisions 
on recipient liability in their current form is to retain unnecessary 
complication and to invite confusion. It is time for the content and 
form of these provisions to be reconsidered. There should be a shift from 
prescribing the order of enforcement to allowing plaintiffs to choose the 
order in which remedies are enforced, subject to a provision that the 
total amount recovered by way of personal claims against the trustees 
and recipients should not exceed the total amount required to restore the 
trust estate. 
30  Ibid. [17.7010]. Ford and Lee observed that ‘these provisions, while they still may be of some 
procedural value, are no longer needed’.
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1  Melbourne Law School. My thanks to Ian Murray for characteristically perceptive comments 
on a draft.
2  There were, however, exceptions: see, for example, Extension of Charitable Purposes Act 2004 (Cth).




In Australia, until recently, the definition of charity for all legal purposes 
was drawn almost exclusively from judge-made law.2 Thus, whether the 
setting was an inquiry into the validity of a purpose trust or eligibility 
for a Commonwealth, state or territory tax concession available to 
charities, judge-made law typically supplied a complete answer to the 
definitional question. As a result of recent legislative reforms, this is no 
longer the case. The legal landscape in Australia is now one in which 
judge-made law supplies the definition of charity for some legal purposes, 
Commonwealth statutory law supplies it for others, and state and territory 
legislation supplies it for others still. The current picture is thus one of 
definitional proliferation.
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II. Commonwealth Reforms
At the Commonwealth level, the key reform is the Charities Act 2013. 
This  Act defines charity for the purposes of Commonwealth law 
including, crucially, the purposes of Div 50 of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1997 (which makes provision for income tax exemptions for charities). 
The Charities Act 2013 is not designed to operate as a code, departing 
radically from the judge-made law that preceded it; rather, the preamble 
to the Act states that it will ‘ensur[e] continuity by utilising familiar 
concepts from the common law’. However, many of the concepts in the 
Act, and much of the language in which the statutory text is expressed, 
are in fact foreign to judge-made charity law. Thus, for example, s 12 
identifies as charitable ‘the purpose of promoting reconciliation, mutual 
respect and tolerance between groups of individuals that are in Australia’ 
and ‘the purpose of promoting or protecting human rights’; one struggles 
to find statements in judge-made charity law to the effect that either type 
of purpose is charitable.3 And s 7 seems not only to reflect the judicial 
strategy of presuming the benefit of certain types of purpose; it seems also 
to presume that those types of purpose are public in character, a strategy 
that has never been deployed in judge-made charity law.4 The precise 
relation of the Charities Act 2013, and the judge-made charity law onto 
which it has been overlain, is thus unclear.
To what extent should decision-makers interpret the Charities Act 2013 
by drawing on antecedent judge-made law, and to what extent should they 
apply principles of statutory interpretation that demand departure from 
that judge-made law? This sort of question is not new in the history of 
charity law. It has arisen in cases where judges have been asked to interpret 
the term ‘charity’ (or one of its cognates) in the context of a tax statute. 
In Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel itself, the House 
of Lords had to determine whether references to ‘charitable’ purposes in 
the Income Tax Act 1842 were to be given the ‘technical legal’ meaning 
developed over centuries by judges in equity or some other meaning more 
in accord with contemporary understandings.5 And the High Court of 
Australia was asked, in Chesterman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 
3  Indeed, the judge-made law points the other way: McGovern v Attorney-General [1982] 1 
Ch 321 (Slade J).
4  For further analysis of the approach in judge-made law, see Matthew Harding, Charity Law and 
the Liberal State (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 25–29.
5  See [1891] AC 531 at 534–39 for a summary of counsel’s arguments.
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to rule on the question whether the word ‘charitable’ in the Estate Duty 
Assessment Act 1914–1916 (Cth) was to be given a  meaning drawn 
from judge-made law, or whether principles of statutory interpretation 
demanded that some different meaning be recognised.6
In both Pemsel and Chesterman, courts ultimately preferred interpretations 
that drew on antecedent judge-made law. But in neither case was this 
preference uncontested.7 And the basis for the preference, at least 
as expressed in Pemsel and Chesterman, is open to question in light of 
contemporary understandings of statutory interpretation. In Pemsel, Lord 
Macnaghten stated that ‘[i]n construing Acts of Parliament, it is a general 
rule … that words must be taken in their legal sense unless a contrary 
intention appears’.8 This principle has been endorsed by Australian cases 
of the highest authority.9 However, it seems, at least to some degree, at 
odds with other principles of statutory interpretation that have also been 
approved by the High Court of Australia, according to which interpreters 
must look to the ordinary meaning of the statutory text in context, and 
to relevant legislative purposes.10 This tension in the law of statutory 
interpretation, as it applies to the legal definition of charity, will not be 
manifested in a post–Charities Act 2013 world in quite the same way as 
it was in cases like Pemsel and Chesterman. Decision-makers called on 
to interpret references to ‘charity’ in Commonwealth tax statutes must 
now look to the Charities Act 2013 for guidance and to that extent need 
not make interpretive decisions. But in ascertaining the meaning of the 
Charities Act 2013 itself, so as to apply the definition of charity that the 
Act sets out, decision-makers may find that they are confronted with 
interpretive challenges of the type experienced in Pemsel and Chesterman, 
challenges that surround the interpretation of statutory terms with judge-
made histories. In the Charities Act 2013, these include key terms like 
‘advancing education’, ‘advancing religion’ and ‘public benefit’.11
6  (1923) 32 CLR 362.
7  Pemsel was a 3:2 decision. And in Chesterman, a majority of the High Court of Australia actually 
rejected an interpretation drawing on antecedent judge-made law; the case was subsequently appealed 
to the Privy Council, which overturned the decision of the High Court. I discuss the two cases in detail 
in Matthew Harding, ‘Equity and Statute in Charity Law’ (2015) 9 Journal of Equity 167, 173–75.
8  [1891] AC 534 at 580.
9  See the authorities discussed in D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia 
(LexisNexis, 8th edn, 2014) [4.13].
10  See Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; Lacey v Attorney-
General (QLD) (2011) 242 CLR 573. And note the judgment of Kirby J in Central Bayside General 
Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 228 CLR 168 [91]–[119].
11  Charities Act 2013 (Cth) ss 12(1)(b), 12(1)(d) and 6.
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Further interpretive challenges arise in relation to the numerous terms 
in the Charities Act 2013 that do not originate in judge-made law. For 
example, s 12(1)(c) of the Act refers to ‘the purpose of advancing social 
or public welfare’, a phrase that is not known to judge-made charity law. 
And s 12(1)(h) refers to ‘the purpose of advancing the security and safety 
of Australia or the Australian public’; the closest that judge-made law 
comes to this phrase is ‘the promotion of public defence and security’.12 
When it comes to provisions like these, the principle that words ‘must be 
taken in their legal sense unless a contrary intention appears’ cannot be 
applied because there is no legal sense in which to take them. Without 
that principle to guide them, decision-makers are likely to fall back on 
other principles of statutory interpretation, such that the definition of 
charity under the Charities Act 2013 may, over time, come to diverge in 
substantial ways from the definition of charity in antecedent judge-made 
law. This is hardly surprising; it seems a natural consequence of enacting 
a statute that is to a non-trivial degree couched in terms unknown to 
the judge-made charity law that preceded it. But it may nonetheless be 
a matter for concern, at least while the extent to which it is desirable for 
the Charities Act 2013 to innovate in relation to the definition of charity 
in Commonwealth law remains unclear.
III. State and Territory Reforms
Reforms in state and territory law have taken a different path. In 2012, 
the Western Australian State Administrative Tribunal determined that the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia was a charitable 
organisation for the purposes of that state’s Pay-Roll Tax Assessment Act 2002, 
notwithstanding that it was, to some degree, an organisation committed 
to serving members.13 Where judges have found that an organisation’s 
dominant purpose is to benefit members, they have refused to extend 
charity status to that organisation;14 in contrast, judges have recognised as 
charities organisations with a purpose of serving members, so long as their 
12  Downing v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 185 at 198 (Walsh J).
13  Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia Inc v Commissioner of State Revenue 
[2012] WASAT 146 (Justice J A Cheney).
14  See, for example, Inland Revenue Commissioners v City of Glasgow Police Athletics Association 
[1953] AC 380 (HL); and, perhaps more controversially, Law Institute of Victoria v Commissioner 
of State Revenue [2015] VSC 604 (Digby J).
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dominant purpose is to generate public benefit.15 The Western Australian 
Tribunal decision, when read in that light, is unremarkable. That is not, 
however, how it was read by the Western Australian legislature. In 2015, 
by the Taxation Legislation Amendment Act (No 2), that legislature sought 
to narrow the definition of charity for certain purposes of Western 
Australian law.
According to the Western Australian reforms, a range of member-serving 
organisations cannot be charities for the purposes of Western Australian 
tax law. And, crucially, the Western Australian reforms exclude from 
the definition of charity, for the purposes of Western Australian tax law, 
a ‘professional association’. ‘Professional association’ is, in turn, defined to 
mean an organisation ‘having as one of its objects or activities the promotion 
of the interests of its members in any profession’.16 That definition 
encompasses organisations with a dominant purpose of generating 
public benefit, and a subsidiary purpose or even a practice of benefiting 
a membership drawn from a particular profession. And the Western 
Australian reforms tighten the definition of charity for the purposes of 
Western Australian tax law in another way as well, by excluding from tax 
concessions an organisation that ‘promotes trade, industry or commerce’.17 
The promotion of trade, industry or commerce has long been recognised 
as a type of charitable purpose in judge-made law,18 and to the extent that 
the Western Australian reforms mean that for the purposes of Western 
Australian tax law this recognition has been withdrawn, the Western 
Australian reforms represent a significant departure from antecedent law.
The Western Australian reforms make provision for a professional 
member-serving or commerce-promoting organisation to apply to the 
Minister for Finance for a determination that the organisation is not 
in fact excluded from tax concessions despite the other provisions that 
the Western Australian reforms have brought into effect. The minister 
is empowered under the Western Australian reforms to make such 
a determination, with the concurrence of the state treasurer, and also to 
15  See, for example, Royal College of Surgeons of England v National Provincial Bank Ltd [1952] AC 
681 (HL).
16  Duties Act 2008 (WA) ss 3, 95, 96A; Land Tax Assessment Act 2002 (WA) ss 37, 38AA, Sch 1, 
Glossary; Pay-Roll Tax Assessment Act 2002 (WA) ss 41, 42A, Sch 1, Glossary. Emphasis added.
17  Ibid.
18  See Crystal Palace Trustees v Minister of Town and Country Planning [1950] 2 Ch 857 (Danckwerts 
J); Tasmanian Electronic Commerce Centre Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 142 FCR 
371 (Heerey J).
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revoke or amend the determination, again with the concurrence of the 
treasurer. The minister may make, revoke or amend a determination ‘only 
if the Minister is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so and 
after considering any information that the Minister considers relevant’.19 
No action may be brought in a court to compel the minister to make 
a determination, and the minister’s determination may not be reviewed 
or appealed in any way.20
The Western Australian reforms have been taken up elsewhere. In the 
Australian Capital Territory, by the Revenue (Charitable Organisations) 
Legislation Amendment Act 2015, the legislature has withdrawn charity 
status, for the purposes of tax law, from professional member-serving 
and commerce-promoting organisations.21 Like the Western Australian 
reforms, the ACT reforms enable excluded organisations to apply for a 
determination that they ought not to be excluded; but unlike the Western 
Australian reforms, the ACT reforms empower the Commissioner for 
ACT Revenue, rather than the relevant government minister, to make 
such a determination, and they spell out more clearly than the Western 
Australian reforms the grounds on which the determination may be 
made.22 Moreover, the ACT reforms provide that the Commissioner’s 
determinations and revocations of determinations are reviewable.23
In the Northern Territory, the Revenue and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act 2015 effects changes to that territory’s Payroll Tax Act similar to 
the Western Australian and ACT reforms. The Northern Territory 
reforms withdraw payroll tax exemptions from professional member-
serving and commerce-promoting organisations;24 at the same time the 
Northern Territory reforms empower the Commissioner of Territory 
Revenue, presumably following an application in the ordinary case, to 
make a determination that a member-serving or commerce-promoting 
organisation ought not to be excluded. The Northern Territory reforms 
make reference to considerations to which the Commissioner ‘may’ 
have regard when deciding whether to make such a determination, and 
19  Duties Act 2008 (WA) ss 95, 96B, 96C; Land Tax Assessment Act 2002 (WA) ss 37, 38AB, 38AC; 
Pay-Roll Tax Assessment Act 2002 (WA) ss 41, 42B, 42C, Sch 1.
20  Taxation Administration Act 2003 (WA) s 34A.
21  Taxation Administration Act 1999 (ACT) ss 18B and 18C.
22  Ibid. ss 18E, 18F and 18G.
23  Ibid. Sch 1, ss 1.2(b) and (c).
24  Payroll Tax Act (NT) ss 48, 48A and 48B.
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these considerations are similar to those set out in the ACT reforms.25 
Determinations of the Commissioner are reviewable under the Taxation 
Administration Act.26
These state and territory law reforms bring with them at least two 
challenges. The first challenge is in identifying a sound basis for excluding 
from the definition of charity, for certain purposes of state or territory 
law, organisations whose dominant purpose is to generate public benefit. 
One legacy of the great case of Morice v Bishop of Durham is that not all 
public benefit purposes are recognised in law as charitable;27 thus, a state 
or territory legislature that withdraws charitable status from organisations 
with certain public benefit purposes is not, to that extent, engaging in 
heterodoxy. Moreover, recent state and territory reforms to the legal 
definition of charity have been enacted in order to preserve government 
revenues against perceived threats. This is an entirely appropriate policy 
objective for the legislatures in those jurisdictions to form and pursue.28 
Perhaps more difficult to defend is the legislative choice to seek to preserve 
government revenues by modifying the legal definition of charity when 
different conceptual architecture could have been used. Recent state and 
territory reforms have created legislation that relies largely on traditional 
charity law criteria – the Pemsel taxonomy and a public benefit test – 
but at the same time denies charity status to certain purposes that meet 
those criteria, on the basis of considerations external to charity law as it 
has developed over the centuries. Should the legal definition of charity 
be affected by such external considerations, or are those considerations 
best reflected in legal rules that do not bear on the definition of charity 
but nonetheless affect the operation of charities?29 This is a large and 
fundamental question which requires careful consideration in light of the 
state and territory reforms of recent years.
A second challenge generated by state and territory law reforms is in 
keeping the operation of Australian charity law consistent with rule of law 
ideals. In each of the three reforming jurisdictions, charity status has been 
25  Ibid. s 48E.
26  Taxation Administration Act (NT) ss 107–15.
27  (1804) 9 Ves Jun 399 at 405 (Sir William Grant MR); (1805) 10 Ves Jun 522 at 541 (Lord 
Eldon). See also Joshua Getzler, ‘Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805)’ in Charles Mitchell and Paul 
Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in Equity (Hart, 2012) 157 at 196–97.
28  Whether or not it is a sound objective for courts to pursue is another matter: see generally AYSA 
Amateur Youth Soccer Association v Canada (Revenue Agency) [2007] 3 SCR 217.
29  For one view on this question, see Adam Parachin, ‘Legal Privilege as a Defining Characteristic 
of Charity’ (2009) 48 Canadian Business Law Journal 36.
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withdrawn from professional member-serving and commerce-promoting 
organisations, and such organisations have been enabled to apply to an 
officer of the executive branch of government for a determination that 
they ought not to be excluded. In antecedent law, a professional member-
serving or commerce-promoting organisation could rely on a tax official 
applying rules and principles of law in determining whether or not it 
was a charity; moreover, such an organisation could seek review of the 
tax official’s decision in a tribunal or court. Following the reforms, 
organisations must rely to a much greater extent on relatively unfettered 
executive discretion. This is clearest in the case of the Western Australian 
reforms, where determinations are to be made by the Minister of Finance 
taking into account vague criteria of ‘public interest’ and relevance, 
and where there is no right of review. But executive discretion is also 
pronounced in the ACT and Northern Territory reforms, notwithstanding 
that legislation in those jurisdictions articulates criteria that may be taken 
into account in the exercise of executive discretion and notwithstanding 
that determinations may be reviewed. If Australian charity law is to live 
up to rule of law ideals, this reliance on executive discretion as a means to 
determining charity status should be extended no further than is currently 
the case, and indeed should be abandoned in the jurisdictions in which it 
is now embedded.
IV. Conclusion
The reforms to Australian charity law that have been effected recently are 
of interest insofar as they alter a legal landscape formed and reformed 
over hundreds of years. However, they represent just the beginning of 
an even more interesting journey, as judges and other decision-makers 
work with the statute law that has brought about the reforms in question, 
interpreting that statute law and fashioning it with an eye to social, 
political and economic circumstances. In this regard, notwithstanding 
recent reforms, the future of Australian charity law may be viewed as the 
continuation of a tradition that began with early interpretations of the 
preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth.
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1  My thanks to Iain Field and Pauline Ridge for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
Any remaining errors are solely mine.
Consumer Protection, 
Recreational Activities and 
Personal Injury Compensation: 
Inconsistency in Need of Reform
Joachim Dietrich1
I. Introduction
Participation in sport and recreation is one of the most significant causes 
of personal injury in Australia, including many injuries of a serious nature. 
The relevant liability rules pursuant to contract, tort and statute therefore 
constitute a practically important area of law. Despite their importance, 
however, those rules are not uniform. They are also in parts complex and 
uncertain. This chapter highlights some of the key difficulties and suggests 
areas that are in need of reform. 
This chapter is mainly concerned with injuries resulting from activities 
undertaken pursuant to a contract for recreational services (e.g. a paid-
for activity such as trampolining). A person negligently injured in the 
course of the performance of a services contract may sue the defendant 
supplier of the services for failure to comply with statutory guarantees 
imposed by the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), among other possible 
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claims in contract or negligence. In the absence of a contract, an injured 
party may proceed only in negligence, against possible defendants such as 
supervisors of activities, occupiers of premises, etc. Different legal rules 
may apply accordingly.
Three sources of legal difficulties are highlighted in this chapter:
1. The lack of uniformity as to the available defences under the state and 
territory (‘state’) Civil Liability Acts (CLAs), dealing particularly with 
recreational activities.
2. The interaction between state CLAs laws on negligence and the 
ACL statutory guarantees in relation to services; and the fact that 
those different state negligence laws continue to operate despite the 
‘uniform’ ACL.
3. The uncertain legal effect of contract clauses that purport to exclude 
liability for negligently supplied recreational services.
II. Defences Relevant to Recreational 
Activities
As a result of the passage of the various, non-uniform, state CLAs,2 
we now have eight separate tort law regimes in Australia. There are many 
differences between the laws in each jurisdiction, but one area in which 
those regimes differ markedly is in their respective approaches to defences 
concerning recreational activities. 
In four states, plaintiffs engaged in a ‘dangerous recreational activity’ 
(DRA) are disentitled from bringing action for harm caused by the 
‘materialisation’ of an obvious risk of that activity.3 One focus of litigation 
has been on the meaning of the qualifying terms ‘dangerous recreational 
activity’ (e.g. s 5L CLA (NSW)). A recreational activity is dangerous if it 
involves a significant risk of harm (s 5K). Importantly, all of ‘the particular 
circumstances in which the activity was being undertaken’ are relevant in 
2  The titles of the various Acts, like their content, are not uniform. See, for example, Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic). 
3  See s 5L CLA (NSW), s 19 CLA (Qld), s 20 CLA (Tas), s 5H CLA (WA).
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determining its inherent dangerousness.4 It has been held that diving into 
water of uncertain depth is a DRA;5 as is riding a bike on a skate park;6 
but playing touch football7 and calm water cruising8 are not.
The term ‘obvious risk’ is defined broadly in the various provisions as any 
risks that in the circumstances would have been obvious to a ‘reasonable 
person in the position of ’ the plaintiff.9 There are, however, some differences 
in the details between jurisdictions. Although the test is objective, the 
issue is one of whether ‘the probability of [the risk’s] occurrence is or is not 
readily apparent to the reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff’.10 
The degree of precision or generality with which one states the ‘risk’ in 
question will impact on the conclusion.11 For example, what needs to 
be obvious is more than the end result of an activity – such as falling off 
a horse – but the manner in which the risk materialised, such as falling 
off a horse as a result of the saddle slipping.12 The courts have drawn 
subtle distinctions in the interpretation and application of the concepts 
of ‘obvious’ risks and ‘materialisation’ of such risk and the law is complex. 
Two jurisdictions only, NSW and WA, have provisions that excuse 
defendants for any liability arising from risks of recreational activities 
in respect of which the defendant has given a ‘risk warning’. Sections 
5M CLA (NSW) and 5I CLA (WA) (which are not identical) are fairly 
complex and long. Attempts by defendants to rely on them have met with 
mixed success.13 One reason why it may be difficult to rely successfully 
on these provisions is that a risk warning must be ‘given in a manner that 
is reasonably likely to result in people being warned of the risk before 
engaging in the recreational activity’: s 5M(3) CLA (NSW); s 5I(4) 
CLA (WA).
4  Smith v Perese [2006] NSWSC 288 [86].
5  Jaber v Rockdale City Council (2008) Aust Tort Reps 81-952 (Jaber).
6  Vreman and Morris v Albury City Council [2011] NSWSC 39 (Vreman).
7  Falvo v Australian Oztag Sports Association (2006) Aust Torts Reps 81-831.
8  Lormine Pty Ltd v Xuereb [2006] NSWCA 200.
9  See s 5F CLA (NSW), s 13 CLA (Qld), s 15 CLA (Tas), s 5F CLA (WA).
10  Jaber (2008) Aust Tort Reps 81-952 [35] (Tobias JA).
11  C G Maloney Pty Ltd v Hutton-Potts [2006] NSWCA 136 [174] (Bryson JA, McColl JA agreeing).
12  Compare Mikronis v Adams [2004] 1 DCLR (NSW) 369; see s 13(5) CLA (Qld) and s 53 
Wrongs Act (1958) (Vic), clarifying this point specifically.
13  See, for example, Vreman [2011] NSWSC 39 [107]–[114].
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The upshot of this is that the law that governs claims by persons injured in 
recreational activities in one jurisdiction will differ to that which applies 
to persons injured in another and will depend on difficult statutory 
interpretation issues in some jurisdictions.
But what of the situation where a person is injured as a result of 
a  negligently performed contract of recreational services, or indeed, 
services more generally, and therefore the ACL applies? 
III. ACL and Inconsistent Consumer 
Protection
The new ACL came into effect on 1 January 2011. Its stated aim was 
to ‘create a single national consumer law’.14 There are, however, exceptions 
to this uniformity. The ACL is the result of a complex exercise of cooperative 
federalism, with the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) 
inserting the ACL as Sch 2 of the CCA. Part XIAA of the CCA provides 
for the application of the ACL as a law of the states and territories.15 
Commonwealth jurisdiction applies (s 131 CCA) where a consumer enters 
into a contract with a ‘corporation’, as defined in s 4 and as extended by s 6 
to natural persons in certain defined contexts.16 Hence, if a ‘corporation’ 
(in its extended sense) supplies services in trade and commerce to 
a consumer, it is bound by the ACL as a law of the Commonwealth via 
s 131 and Pt XI of the CCA. In relation to natural persons, the applicable 
law is that of the relevant state jurisdiction in which the services were 
supplied. State provisions also apply to corporations, of course, so long 
as they are not inconsistent with Commonwealth law. If the ACL were 
truly uniform, it would not matter which jurisdiction, Commonwealth 
or state, applied or, in the latter case, which state law applied. However, 
the ACL is not uniform. Importantly, the ACL’s uniformity is seriously 
undermined in the context of a failure to comply with the guarantee that 
services are supplied with due care and skill, where such failure results in 
personal injury or property damage.
14  Commonwealth, Explanatory Memorandum to Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer 
Law) Bill No 2 (2010) 3.
15  All jurisdictions have applied the ACL under their relevant Fair Trading Acts. See, for example, 
Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) Pt 3, Div 2, inserted by the Fair Trading Amendment (Australian 
Consumer Law) Act 2010 (NSW).
16  See para 6(2)(c).
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Section 60 of the ACL provides: ‘If a person supplies, in trade or 
commerce, services to a consumer, there is a guarantee that the services 
will be rendered with due care and skill’. A consumer who suffers 
‘reasonably foreseeable’ personal injury or property damage as a result of 
a careless supply of services can seek damages under s 267. For example, 
if a climbing instructor fails properly to instruct the client on the use of 
safety gear so that the client falls and suffers injury or (to take a non-
recreational example) a mechanic carelessly repairs a car, causing brake 
failure, the client has a potential claim for damages under s 267.
Where a claim is brought under the ACL, the state CLAs continue to 
apply in relation to establishing the legal requirements for liability, any 
applicable defences, and the applicable principles for calculating damages 
(including the various limits contained in the CLAs). This is because, 
first, the CLAs set out general principles applying to claims arising from 
a failure to take reasonable care, irrespective of whether such claims are 
brought in tort, contract or under statute;17 and second, and importantly, 
s 275 ACL allows for the continued operation of state laws that apply to 
the careless supply of services under a contract.
Section 275 is a complex section, and all of the difficulties that it raises 
cannot be explored here. To simplify, the effect of the section appears 
to be to engage any law, of the state that is the relevant ‘proper law of 
the contract’,18 which law ‘applies to limit or preclude liability’ under 
a  claim on the contract. Consequently, provisions of the various CLAs 
that directly limit or preclude liability for careless conduct will be effective 
and applicable. According to the High Court in Insight Vacations Pty Ltd 
v Young,19 a case concerning the (almost identically worded)20 equivalent 
s 74(2a) under the previous Trade Practices Act (TPA), s 74(2A) operated 
to pick up and apply ‘as surrogate federal law’21 a state law that of itself 
17  See, for example, CLA (NSW) s 5A; CLA (Qld) Ch 2, Pt 1 (most sections apply to ‘breach 
of duty of care’, defined to include claims in contract or under statute, though Div 4 on dangerous 
recreational activities applies only to ‘negligence’, suggesting that breaches of contractual duties of care 
are not within the scope of the Division: see R J Douglas, G R Mullins and S R Grant, The Annotated 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) (LexisNexis, 3rd edn, 2012) [19.5]). 
18  One difficulty is that the proper law of the contract may not be the same as the place where 
the services are provided, but it is unlikely that the CLAs have extra-territorial operation: cf Insight 
Vacations Pty Ltd v Young (2011) 243 CLR 149 [35].
19  (2011) 243 CLR 149 (Insight).
20  This is apart from seemingly minor changes to the wording to reflect the change from implied 
terms to statutory guarantees.
21  Insight (2011) 243 CLR 149 [12].
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applies to limit or preclude liability.22 In other words, s 74(2A) allowed 
state laws to directly limit rights of consumers via the CLAs; that is, 
it picked up, for example, sections in some states that deal with DRAs.23
Assuming that s 275 ACL has a similar effect as s 74(2A) TPA, then 
important consequences follow for the overall scheme of the ACL. 
As  a  result of s 275, some differing state provisions that determine 
liability for personal injury suffered as a result of carelessness continue 
to operate in each jurisdiction. These would apply equally to corporate 
(defendant) suppliers. Some of the key inconsistencies arising between 
jurisdictions include:
1. Different state laws place different limitations on various heads of 
personal injury damages. This is a complex patchwork of rules that 
applies where state jurisdiction is activated; where Commonwealth 
jurisdiction applies, Pt VIB CCA has similar limitations.
2. Some specific defences adopted in some jurisdictions, including 
perhaps those dealing with recreational activities, continue to operate 
via s 275,24 as noted above. For example, if a consumer of a supplier 
of services is injured while engaged in a DRA, the supplier of such 
services can potentially defend such a claim on that basis in NSW, 
even where such a supplier was negligent,25 whereas a supplier in 
Victoria could not.
3. Apart from defences concerning recreation, other defences have been 
adopted in some jurisdictions and not others, such as those dealing 
with intoxicated plaintiffs.
The consistent treatment within states of all claims for carelessly caused 
injuries leads to inconsistency and lack of uniformity between different states. 
This lack of uniformity arises for some provisions even if Commonwealth 
22  Ibid. [12], [35]–[36] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
23  See for more detailed discussion of these issues, see J Dietrich, ‘Liability for Personal Injuries 
from Recreational Services and the New Australian Consumer Law’ (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 55; 
and ‘Service Guarantees and Consequential Loss under the ACL: The illusion of uniformity’ (2012) 
20 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 43.
24  Admittedly, however, restrictions on liability that are picked up by s 275 include even general 
defences, such as contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk, which are probably only 
effective as a result of s 275. 
25  The DRA defences are picked up because the provisions ‘limit’ liability. However, s 5M CLA 
(NSW) is not picked up, as it states that no duty arises at all (rather than limits liability for a duty that 
has been breached): see Motorcycling Events Group Australia Pty Ltd v Kelly [2013] NSWCA 361 [87]–
[96] (Motorcycling). This case also highlights numerous other complex issues, not herein considered, 
that arise from the interaction between state and Commonwealth law.
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jurisdiction applies. Why the legislatures have not considered uniformity 
to be desirable given such potentially serious consequences is puzzling. 
Ultimately, that lack of uniformity is a result of politics and the failure 
of the states to agree on a uniform CLA regime, and that was and remains 
a regrettable state of affairs. 
IV. Exclusion of Liability
A further area in which reform is needed concerns the law on exclusion of 
liability for failure to comply with the statutory guarantees. The statutory 
guarantees cannot generally26 be excluded by a supplier of services as 
a result of s 64 ACL: such a term is void if it seeks to exclude, restrict or 
modify the rights conferred and liabilities imposed under the consumer 
guarantees. Critically, however, it is possible under the CCA for a supplier 
to exclude liability for failure to comply with the guarantees in the supply 
of recreational services. Section 139A CCA replicates the previous s 68B 
TPA, which aimed to ‘permit self-assumption of risk by individuals who 
choose to participate in inherently risky activities’.27 A term excluding 
liability for breach of s 60 ACL guarantee is not void under s 64 if it 
‘excludes, restricts or modifies’ such a statutory guarantee (s 139A(1)), 
for death or physical or mental injury (and not for property damage, 
for example). The definition of recreational services is broad (and not 
identical to that in various state CLAs).
Importantly, s 139A(4) does not allow for the exclusion of liability for 
reckless conduct, defined in subs (5). If an exclusion clause effectively 
excludes liability for conduct contravening s 60, it will almost certainly 
also exclude liability for any negligence claims in tort as between the 
parties to the contract. If an exclusion clause is not effective in excluding 
liability for contravention of s 60, then a claim for damages for loss arising 
from contravention of s 60 (and presumably also in tort) will be available 
against a defendant service-provider.
Although the purpose of s 139A is clear enough, for a lawyer advising 
a client as to whether a clause effectively operates to exclude a claim the 
question is fraught with legal difficulties including:
26  Note, however, s 64A(2) ACL.
27  Explanatory Memorandum provided with the Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational 
Services) Bill 2002.
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
298
1. Section 139A does not set out how an exclusion clause is to be 
effectively worded and incorporated into a service contract. This 
means that the important question of the effectiveness of an attempted 
exclusion of liability is determined by the vagaries of the labyrinthine 
common law contract principles on the incorporation of terms and 
their interpretation.
2. An exclusion clause that purports to exclude liability in broader terms 
than is permitted under s 139A (e.g. for recklessness) may be void,28 
even if the injury sustained comes within the permitted exclusions 
(e.g. if caused by ordinary negligence).
3. Adding to the complexity, s 139A CCA introduces a new distinction, 
between ordinary negligence, which can be excluded, and ‘recklessness’, 
which cannot. Obviously, this restriction has merit, in that it precludes 
the most serious carelessness from going unremedied; but it adds 
a new complication to the law by creating degrees of negligence.
4. An exclusion clause that purports to exclude liability in wider terms 
than is permitted is void, but the presence of such a void clause may 
mislead consumers into thinking that their rights are more limited, 
and may thus amount to misleading conduct under s 18 ACL.29
5. Section 139A raises a nuanced question of possible inconsistency 
between state and Commonwealth law, since Victoria has legislated 
to allow for the exclusion of liability for non-compliance with the 
statutory guarantees30 in narrower terms, that is, that are more 
onerous in setting out how a supplier can exclude liability. Does s 275 
ACL pick up the Victorian legislation or is there an inconsistency such 
that s 139A will prevail?31
6. The legal effect of exclusion clauses that purport to bind minors 
is not adverted to in s 139A, yet the law on this is uncertain and 
in a confused state.32 This is so despite the widespread use of such 
clauses. The  confusion arises because of the fundamental common 
law principle that minors do not have contractual capacity, such 
28  Under the previous and differently worded s 68B TPA, such clause was void if it exceeded the 
permitted exclusions: see Motorcycling [2013] NSWCA 361. The different wording of s 139A CCA 
leaves the question in doubt.
29  And see s 29(1)(m) and (n) ACL.
30  See Dietrich, above n 23.
31  Insight (2011) 243 CLR 149 does not deal with this because it deals with the indirect exclusion 
of liability in broader circumstances than permitted by Commonwealth law. 
32  See generally, J Dietrich, ‘Minors and the Exclusion of Liability for Negligence’ (2007) 15 Torts 
Law Journal 87.
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that contracts entered into by minors, except for ‘necessaries’, are 
unenforceable against them; and nor do guardians have a general 
power to contract on minors’ behalf.
V. Reform
The hope of a simplified and uniform regime of liability for personal 
injuries sustained during performance of a service contract has not been 
achieved. Obviously, the best solution to this problem would be for the 
states to reach agreement on a uniform civil liability regime, but the 
likelihood of this occurring in the medium-term future appears remote 
given that the ACL process itself has not resulted in uniform solutions. 
At the very least, we need to reopen debate about our consumer protection 
laws and consider the competing policies that are at stake here. Key issues 
in this debate include: whether the desirability of uniformity is trumped 
by the desire (of some state legislatures) to enhance the assumption of 
‘self-responsibility’; the value of having a national injury compensation 
law; the need for clarity for consumers as to their rights (e.g. as to how and 
when exclusion clauses are effective); and, particularly, the need to protect 
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3  Australian Consumer Law (ACL) contained in Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(CCA, formerly the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA)). See also the equivalent provisions in the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) Div 2, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
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Statutory Interpretation and 
the Critical Role of Soft Law 
Guidelines in Developing 
a Coherent Law of Remedies 
in Australia
Elise Bant1 and Jeannie Paterson2
I. Introduction
This chapter considers three particular challenges faced by meta-
legislation such as the Australian Consumer Law (ACL).3 The first is 
to ensure coherent development of the law both within the legislative 
regime and also between that regime and the common law context in 
which it is squarely situated. The second, related challenge is to promote 
the principled and coherent development of an important legal regime in 
a context where its beneficiaries are unlikely to pursue their rights in court. 
This requires the regime effectively to be self-enforcing; directing parties 
to the appropriate standards of conduct and assisting them to resolve any 
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disputes that develop. A third challenge, which underpins the previous 
two, is the density and complexity of the legislation. This complexity 
impedes access to justice objectives and constitutes a significant hurdle 
to the statute being self-executing to any degree.
The chapter considers these challenges in regard to the remedial provisions 
responding to misleading conduct and unconscionable conduct under the 
ACL. It proposes two possible responses and also makes a law reform 
suggestion. First, it models an approach to statutory interpretation that 
both promotes the protective purpose of the statute and encourages 
coherent evolution of consumer law within and outside of the statutory 
context. Second, the chapter considers the potential value of problem-
based practice notes that model the application of key provisions 
against standard problem scenarios. Finally, the chapter suggests that an 
understanding of both the influence of the general context in which the 
legislation is sited, and the way in which consumers use the legislation to 
protect their rights, should influence statutory design and drafting.
II. The Principle of Coherence and Remedies 
under the ACL
The High Court has recently and repeatedly emphasised the principle 
of coherence as an overriding criterion in the application and development 
of the law.4 While its precise requirements are yet to be fully charted, 
the principle likely demands an integrated approach to the analysis and 
application of statutory and judge-made law.5 In the context of consumer 
protection law, which pervades most commercial and consumer disputes 
and overlaps considerably with the private law of contract, tort and equity, 
a major challenge is how to move beyond the traditional ‘oil and water’6 
approach to the relationship between general and statutory law. In this 
context, the principle of coherence entails an enquiry into the extent to 
4  Miller v Miller (2002) 242 CLR 446, 454 [15] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel 
and Bell JJ); Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498, 518 [34], 520 [38], 523 [35] (French 
CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
5  For example, Mark Leeming, ‘Theories and Principles Underlying the Development of the 
Common Law – The Statutory Elephant in the Room’ (2013) 36(3) UNSW Law Journal 1002; 
Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common Law’ (1992) 22 University of Western Australia Law Review 7; 
Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common Law: The Continuing Story’ in Suzanne Corcoran and Stephen 
Bottomley (eds), Interpreting Statutes (Federation Press, 2005) 52.
6  Jack Beatson, ‘Has the Common Law a Future?’ (1997) 56 Cambridge Law Journal 300.
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which cognate principles of general law remedies properly influence the 
interpretation and operation of remedial consumer protection provisions 
of the ACL and, conversely, whether the ACL itself exerts a ‘gravitational 
force’ on the continuing evolution of those general law principles.7
In approaching interpretation and application of the ACL, the starting 
point is that ‘[a]nalogy … is a servant not a master’.8 Primacy must 
be given to the words and purpose of the statute. On the other hand, 
while common law analogies ‘are not controlling … they represent an 
accumulation of valuable insight and experience which may be useful in 
applying the Act’.9 This chapter accordingly proposes a model of reasoning 
that starts with the words of the statute, interpreted in light of its purpose. 
However, common law and equitable principles and doctrines may then 
properly be drawn upon where they reflect and promote the aims of the 
statutory orders and are consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole. 
The chapter illustrates how this approach may promote a more coherent 
law of consumer remedies, using as examples the debated nature of loss 
under s 236 of the ACL and the award of rescission-like relief using 
a combination of s 243(a)(c) and (d).
A. Section 236: Actions for damages
The ACL does not define the meaning of ‘loss or damage’ that may be 
compensated through statutory damages. By contrast, the general law has 
developed highly sophisticated understandings of the roles and rationales 
of different conceptions of loss and damage. It seems highly unlikely that 
parliament chose these words intending that they should reflect entirely 
novel meanings, in the absence of any legislative definition. Courts have 
accordingly turned to the general law concepts of loss and damage for 
guidance. In that context, ‘[t]he task is to select a measure of damages 
which conforms to the remedial purpose of the statute and to the justice 
and equity of the case’.10 However, courts have vacillated over the relevant 
analogical source.11 
7  Elise Bant, ‘Statute and Common Law: Interaction and Influence in Light of the Principle 
of Coherence’ (2015) 38(1) UNSW Law Journal 362.
8  Marks v GIO Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494, 529 [103] (Gummow J).
9  Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459, 470 [18] (Gleeson CJ).
10  Ibid.
11  Compare Marks v GIO Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494 and Murphy v Overton Investments 
Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 388.
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The critical point is to draw upon common law concepts that are 
consistent with and promote the particular statutory words and their 
protective purpose. Not all common law conceptions of loss are, on that 
approach, relevant or appropriate sources of analogy. For example, it 
is well understood in the law of contract that expectation damages are 
a form of normative, not factual, loss.12 Expectation damages make sense 
in a context where the normative legal order demands contracts must 
be performed13 and a contract has been breached. A plaintiff’s dashed 
expectation of gain caused by proscribed conduct constitutes ‘loss’ because 
the plaintiff not only expected the profit but was entitled to it. 
By contrast, s 18 ACL does not require defendants to perform their 
promises or make true their representations. Rather, it requires that 
defendants do not engage in misleading or deceptive conduct. It follows 
that expectation damages are not an appropriate measure of loss in cases 
of misleading or deceptive conduct.
A more appropriate analogical source for s 236 damages, and one 
consistently identified by the courts, is the concept of reliance loss 
familiar from, for example, the tort of deceit.14 This measure supports 
and promotes the language of the statute, which directs courts to consider 
loss caused by misleading or deceptive conduct. This may require us 
to examine the plaintiff’s changes of position made in reliance on that 
conduct.15 Identifying loss flowing from or caused by acts of reliance is 
therefore a logical starting point for the statutory enquiry and makes deceit 
an apt analogical source. Likewise the law of negligent misstatement offers 
an appropriate source of guidance, a point perhaps under-appreciated in 
the statutory case law to date.16 On this approach, the disappointment 
of shattered hopes may be compensated as a type of distress damage.17
12  L Fuller and R Perdue, ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1’ (1936) 46 Yale Law 
Journal 52, 53.
13  Clark v Macourt (2013) 88 ALJR 190, 194 [11] (Hayne J).
14  See Kizbeau Pty Ltd v WG & B Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 281, 291 (Brennan, Deane, Dawson, 
Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413, 
460–61 [129] (Kirby and Callinan JJ).
15  Note Caffey v Leatt-hayter [No 3] [2013] WASC 348 (20 September 2013) [466]–[476] 
(Beech J).
16  Elise Bant and Jeannie Paterson, ‘Limitations on Defendant Liability for Misleading or 
Deceptive Conduct under Statute: Some Insights from Negligent Misstatement’ in Kit Barker, Ross 
Grantham and Warren Swan (eds), The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller 
(Bloomsbury, 2015) Ch 7.
17  New South Wales Lotteries Corporation Pty Ltd v Kuzmanovski (2011) 195 FCR 234. Cf 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 137C.
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B. Sections 237–39 and 243: Compensation 
orders etc.
Sections 237–239 provide courts with the discretion to make a wide range 
of creative orders, illustrations of which are set out in s 243,18 in response 
to contraventions of the ACL. None of the orders listed in s 243 adopt 
the language of rescission, nor do they refer to other related general law 
concepts such as counter-restitution or the requirement of restitutio in 
integrum. Further, s 237(2) of the ACL makes explicit that the remedial 
aim of the provisions is compensatory, not restitutionary.
Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly held that these provisions empower 
them to award rescission-like remedies which require restitution and 
counter-restitution of benefits transferred pursuant to the impugned 
transaction. In this context, the equitable remedy of rescission has been 
a powerful albeit not binding guide to the relevant considerations that 
inform the making of analogous orders under the provision.19  
Courts have married the restitutionary nature of rescission with the 
compensatory purpose of the statutory scheme by emphasising that 
the conception of loss under s 87 TPA, the precursor to s 237 ACL, is 
much broader than the traditional characterisations of loss the subject 
of compensation orders in tort and, indeed, those covered by the 
compensatory provisions in s 82 TPA (now s 236 ACL). In Demagogue 
Pty Ltd v Ramensky, Black CJ explained, ‘the loss or damage contemplated 
by s 87(1A) is not limited to loss or damage in the s 82 [s 236 ACL] sense 
but was intended to include the detriment suffered by being bound to 
a contract unconscionably induced’.20 The language and structure of the 
statute taken as a whole ‘emphasises that the phrase “the loss or damage”, 
at least in s 87, may be concerned with more than pecuniary recovery as 
understood in the law of damages in tort’ and may extend to entry into 
contractual obligations as a result of misleading or deceptive conduct.21 
18  For similar provisions to which this discussion can be extended, see, for example, Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 12GM, 12GNC; Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) s 1325; Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) s 7; National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 
(Cth) ss 179–80.
19  Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494, 535 (Gummow J). See also Tenji v 
Henneberry & Associates Pty Ltd (2000) 98 FCR 324, 329–30 [12] (French J).
20  Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31, 33.
21  Ibid. 43 (Gummow J).
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This broad, policy-driven conception of ‘loss or damage’ under the statute 
is evident in the orders made by courts effecting statutory rescission. 
Courts adopt a broad conception of detriment that considers whether the 
plaintiff would suffer detriment in the absence of, or indeed as a result of, 
the award. 22 The focus of the enquiry, as for equitable rescission, seems 
to be whether it is possible to return the parties to the status quo ante. 
To that end, courts routinely apply change of position–style considerations 
to protect rescinding plaintiffs from being placed in a worse position than 
they occupied prior to the impugned transaction.23 
This approach strongly echoes the evolving approach taken at general law 
to the change of position defence in claims for restitution of mistaken 
payments.24 The statute in this context provides a model of analogous 
principles that can and arguably should be drawn upon by courts seeking 
to further develop that defence, as well as when exercising the equitable 
doctrine of rescission. On this approach, the statutory jurisprudence 
would exert a ‘gravitational force’ on contested issues such as the proper 
treatment of non-reliance-based changes of position that may promote 
more coherent and integrated common law, equitable and statutory 
principles governing restitutionary liability.25
III. The Potential Role of ‘Soft Law’ 
Practice Notes
There is relatively little case law developing the more nuanced aspects 
of the remedial regime discussed above. What authority does exist rarely 
involves consumer–trader disputes, and almost none deals with the 
remedial responses to unconscionable conduct. This is because relatively 
few private litigants’ claims for relief from proscribed conduct under the 
ACL reach courts. Many disputes covered by the regime involve modest 
sums, and the value of the claim will not justify the expense of litigation. 
Many consumers, and some traders, will lack the resources, confidence or 
22  See, for example, Munchies Management Pty Ltd v Belperio (1988) 58 FCR 274, 287–89; Akron 
Securities Ltd v Iliffe (1997) 41 NSWLR 353, in particular the judgment of Mason P.
23  Munchies Management Pty Ltd v Belperio (1988) 58 FCR 274, 287–89; Akron Securities Ltd v 
Iliffe (1997) 41 NSWLR 353.
24  Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 560.
25  Cf Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (1995) 184 CLR 102, 115–16. See further E Bant, ‘Rescission, 
Restitution and Compensation’ in S Degeling and J Varuhas (eds), Equitable Compensation and 
Disgorgement (Hart Publishing, 2017) Ch 13.
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expertise to pursue such claims. Most disputes will be resolved informally, 
without input by lawyers or judges. If not resolved informally or through 
mediation, consumer–trader disputes under the ACL will usually be heard 
in small claims courts and consumer tribunals.
There is a delicate balance to maintain here. While consumers need access 
to low cost informal mechanisms to help them resolve disputes, if access 
to justice is not to be illusory, it is critically important that those disputes 
are resolved in accordance with the rights and responsibilities granted by 
the statutory regime. It is impossible for the regime to evolve and adapt 
to new conditions if the complex points of interpretation and principle it 
raises are not given an opportunity to be considered, analysed and debated 
as in a manner appropriate to any serious body of law.
In this context, the potential role of soft law guidance is significant.26 
The style of soft law practice notes envisioned would seek to encapsulate 
key legal principles in a straightforward and accessible format and then 
illustrate their operation by reference to a series of simple but realistic 
examples.27 The notes need not be exhaustive: the aim is to provide 
general guidance on the main rights and liabilities that arise under 
relevant provisions, accepting that exceptions and distinctions can arise 
which warrant different outcomes.
The potential attractions of this form of guidance include facilitating 
access to justice under the statute by enabling consumers and traders 
to better understand their rights and obligations under the law, and 
providing guidance to courts, tribunals and other decision-makers so as 
to promote a coherent, consistent rule of law. Practice notes can readily 
engage in important remedial enquiries that generally fall outside the 
enforcement action by a regulator and could serve to support and enforce 
broader legislative objectives beyond those held by the regulator. Practice 
notes potentially represent an objective snapshot of the law, drawing on 
a consensus of the views of invested and disinterested stakeholders alike, 
reflecting the body of case law and reality of common dispute patterns, 
to produce a guide to consistent dispute resolution that is not aligned to 
any particular stakeholder perspective. Courts would retain an important 
26  See generally R E Megarry, ‘Administrative Quasi-Legislation’ (1944) 60 Law Quarterly Review 
125; Greg Weeks, ‘The Use and Enforcement of Soft Law by Australian Public Authorities’ (2014) 42 
Federal Law Review 181.
27  For good examples of this style of guide, see ‘Guidance on the Consumer Protection 
(Amendment) Regulations’ (UK Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2014).
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role in this context by both drawing on the notes as a source of shared 
conceptions of the operation of the regime and also feeding back into the 
process, by correcting and rationalising the examples given in the practice 
notes as required and in light of the broader legal landscape.
IV. Statutory Design and Drafting
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the way in which decision-
makers interpret legislation is very much influenced by its structure and 
terms. We have seen that where the ACL uses language such as ‘loss or 
damage’ that echoes general law concepts, courts are encouraged to draw 
upon those concepts to interpret the legislation. Further, positioning that 
same phrase within separate sections can allow courts to distinguish its 
meaning and operation, enabling remedial diversity that promotes the 
statutory purpose. These are positive outcomes of statutory drafting 
and design.
However, the complex, convoluted and confusing structure of the ACL 
presents a major impediment to the orderly development of the law, the 
expressive role of the ACL and the access to justice objectives referred to 
above. For example, the ACL often requires users to connect provisions 
located in quite different sections of the same legislation (e.g. the statutory 
prohibition against misleading conduct in s 18 with the remedial options 
in ss 236–38 and 243 of the ACL) or within different legislation (e.g. the 
apportionment provisions found in s 137B CCA, relevant to liability under 
the ACL).28 These isolated but connected provisions are challenging to 
navigate for the legally trained, let alone for the lay stakeholders to whom 
the legislation is addressed. In this context, shorter and simpler legislation 
that deliberately invites the sort of interpretive process modelled earlier 
may be more effective in promoting the statutory purposes than a regime 
that attempts to be comprehensive.
28  See also Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 1028 
[947]–[949] (Rares J).
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V. Conclusion
This chapter has suggested a method for ensuring a dialogue between the 
legislative regime and the common law context in which it exists with 
the aim of promoting the consistent and coherent development of both 
bodies of law. It has also posited the use of soft law practice notes as a way 
of promulgating this type of development and thereby promoting access 
to justice. Finally, it has noted the value of simple statutory design in 
a context where the statute largely needs to be self-enforcing. These are 
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I. Introduction
The primacy of damages as the remedial response to breaches of civil 
obligations sometimes obscures the role in law of other responses to 
wrongdoing, including corrections and apologies. In defamation law, the 
case for alternative remedies is particularly strong and has been the subject 
of judicial, academic and law reform urgings over the years. At the same 
time, efforts to achieve fair and effective remedies without the inevitable 
delays of litigation have resulted in developments in dispute resolution 
processes and defences aimed at quicker resolution of defamation 
disputes. There are a number of ways in which the law affects the extent 
to which alternative processes and remedies achieve the remedial objects 
of defamation law.
This chapter reviews the recommendations for alternative remedies made 
in law reform processes in Australia since the 1970s. We refer, in particular, 
to the offer to make amends provisions introduced by state and territory 
defamation laws that encourage non-litigious and prompt resolution of 
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defamation disputes and create a defence when a reasonable offer by the 
publisher is rejected by an aggrieved person. We conclude that alternative 
remedies and the offer to make amends defence play an important role in 
Australian defamation law. We recommend, in particular, that the offer 
to make amends provisions should require a ‘sufficient apology’ as a term 
of an offer as well as a ‘reasonable correction’.
II. The Potential of Alternative Remedies 
and Processes for Defamation
The effectiveness of damages as a remedy for defamation has long been 
doubted.3 There is evidence that the primary interest of most plaintiffs, 
immediately after a defamatory publication, is the effective restoration of 
their reputation, rather than damages.4 Law reform commissions report 
that corrections and sometimes apologies are what most plaintiffs seek, 
initially at least.5 It can take years for a claim to be heard and it is doubtful 
whether the result becomes generally known to readers of the original 
defamatory statement. As a result, to a successful plaintiff an award of 
damages ‘is not a restoration of his reputation but a money reparation 
for his loss’.6
There have been numerous proposals emanating from law reform bodies 
and government reports aimed at encouraging defendants to take prompt 
steps to respond to a complaint by a person that they have defamed, and 
for plaintiffs to settle on fair and reasonable terms. These include a defence 
of prompt and adequate correction,7 giving defendants an option of either 
paying damages or publishing a correction,8 provision of an opportunity 
3  Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, Report No 11 
(Australian Government Printing Service) [253] (‘ALRC, Unfair Publication’).
4  Randall P Benzanson, ‘The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs 
Get’ (1986) 74 California Law Review 789, 791.
5  For example, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Defamation, Report 75 (1995), [8.1] 
(‘NSWLRC, Defamation’).
6  ALRC, Unfair Publication, [253].
7  NSWLRC, Defamation, Ch 8.
8  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General Working Group of State and Territory Officers, 
Proposal for Uniform Defamation Laws (July 2004) 29 (‘SCAG Proposal’).
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for reply9 and the defence of offer to make amends.10 Other proposals 
provide for court orders in the form of correction orders,11 including a 
correction order as an alternative to damages,12 vindication orders,13 
declarations of falsity,14 and retraction and apology orders15 in addition 
to damages, declarations and injunctions. There have also been calls for 
a right of reply in certain circumstances.16
Further proposals note the importance, and increased use, of mediation 
and case management of litigated matters, the availability of strike-out 
proceedings,17 and less costly proceedings to dispose of unmeritorious 
defamation claims.18
III. The Legislative Response to the Call for 
Alternative Remedies and Processes
A. Reform under the uniform defamation laws
Between 2005 and 2006, uniform defamation laws were enacted across all 
Australian jurisdictions.19 The objects of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 
(the Act), stated in s 3, include:
9  ALRC, Unfair Publication, [294].
10  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Defamation, Report No 11 (1971) [40]; New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission, Defamation, Report 75 (1995) [8.21]–[8.24]; Australian 
Capital Territory Community Law Reform Committee, Defamation Report, Report No 10 (1995) 
18–19; Attorney-General’s Task Force for Defamation Law Reform (NSW), Defamation Law 
Proposals for Reform in NSW (September 2002) 6–7. 
11  ALRC, Unfair Publication, [258]; Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, 
Revised Outline of a Possible National Defamation Law, July 2004, 34 (‘A-G’s Revised Outline’).
12  SCAG Proposal, 29.
13  Attorney-General (ACT), Defamation Report in the ACT (September 1998) 6–8.
14  NSWLRC, Defamation, 103.
15  ALRC, Unfair Publication, [257]; see also Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 273.
16  ALRC, Unfair Publication, [156], [178], [294]; A-G’s Revised Outline, 32; see also John 
Fleming, ‘Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies for Defamation’ (1978) 12 University of British 
Columbia Law Review 15; Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 
2008) Ch VIII.D.2; Patrick George, Defamation Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd edn, 
2012) Ch 40; David Rolph, Defamation Law (Lawbook Co, 2016) Ch 17.
17  A-G’s Revised Outline, 29–30.
18  Ibid. 31.
19  The Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) is representative of the uniform defamation laws enacted in 
each of the Australian states and territories. The national laws are enacted by the: Defamation Act 
2005 (Qld); Defamation Act 2005 (SA); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic); 
Defamation Act 2005 (WA); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) and the Defamation Act 2006 (NT).
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(c) to provide effective and fair remedies for persons whose reputations are 
harmed by the publication of defamatory matter, and
(d) to promote speedy and non-litigious methods of resolving disputes 
about the publication of defamatory matter.
Consistent with s 3(c), there were significant amendments aimed at 
encouraging vindicatory responses to defamatory publications other than 
damages.20 Subsections 38(1)(a)–(b) respectively provide for evidence 
of published apologies and corrections to be admitted in mitigation of 
damages. Section 20 provides that an apology is not an express or implied 
admission of liability or admissible as evidence of fault or liability. This 
section ‘is designed to encourage defendants to say sorry’21 and is consistent 
with the Commonwealth Attorney-General Department’s conclusion 
that defendants are more likely to apologise for, or retract, defamatory 
statements if their apology or retraction is not taken to be an admission of 
liability.22 There were also significant amendments introduced by the Act 
to the damages remedy, which created a cap on defamation damages for 
non-economic loss and abolished exemplary or punitive damages.23 There 
appears to be strong support for uniform defamation laws in Australia 
although differing views remain as to the appropriate liability rules, 
defences and damages available.24
B. Alternative remedies (remedies other 
than damages)
Despite the proposals outlined above, no provisions were introduced 
under the uniform defamation laws to confer power on the courts to 
order or to recommend alternative remedies. Plaintiffs need therefore to 
rely on negotiated outcomes and offers of compromise to achieve these 
outcomes, or use the offer to make amends provisions.
20  Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 20, 38(1)(b).
21  NSW Hansard, Defamation Bill, 18 October 2005, the Hon Henry Tsang, Parliamentary 
Secretary, referred to in Hunt v Radio 2SM Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2010] NSWDC 43, [36] (Gibson DCJ) 
(‘Hunt’).
22  A-G’s Revised Outline, 33.
23  Part 4, Div 3, ‘Remedies’. 
24  See submissions to NSW Department of Attorney-General and Justice Review of the Defamation 
Act 2005 (‘NSW Review’). This five year review is required by s 49 of the Act. The submissions 
are available at www.justice.nsw.gov.au/justicepolicy/Pages/lpclrd/lpclrd_consultation/lpclrd_stat_
reviews.aspx#ReviewofDefamationAct2005.
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C. The offer to make amends
The offer to make amends provisions in Pt 3 Div 1 of the Act create 
a mechanism that aims to encourage parties to settle a defamation claim 
quickly without a trial and on terms that recognise the value of remedial 
responses other than the payment of damages, seemingly consistent 
with the objects in s 3(c)–(d). Broadly speaking, these provisions allow 
a  publisher (referred to here as ‘defendant’) to offer to the aggrieved 
person (referred to here as ‘plaintiff’) to publish a correction and pay 
expenses, and, optionally, to publish an apology and to pay compensation. 
If the plaintiff accepts the offer to make amends, they are barred from 
commencing or continuing an action in defamation.25 If the plaintiff does 
not accept the offer, then in subsequent proceedings the defendant may 
rely on the fact of having made a reasonable offer as a complete defence.26 
If the defendant is successful at trial, the plaintiff may also have to pay 
indemnity costs for having unreasonably failed to accept a reasonable offer 
to make amends.27 If the plaintiff is successful, the defendant may have to 
pay indemnity costs for unreasonably failing to make a settlement offer.28
It is difficult to calculate how often the offer to make amends provisions 
are being used because of the private nature of settlement. The volume of 
reported cases considering offer to make amends provisions to date is small 
but there are indications that the provisions are being used more than under 
previous legislation. The provisions have been described as a ‘simpler and 
more streamlined process of offer to make amends’29 and as a ‘revolution’ 
in defamation law.30 Suggestions have been made to address uncertainties in 
their operation.31 It has also been commented judicially that the provisions 
operate to the disadvantage of plaintiffs over defendants.32 
25  Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 17(1).
26  Ibid. s 18(1). 
27  Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 40(2)(b), (3). This is the same inquiry as to whether an offer 
is ‘reasonable’ for the purposes of the defence under s 18(1): Sleeman v Tuloch Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] 
NSWDC 111 (19 July 2013) 10 [25] (Gibson DCJ) (‘Sleeman’).
28  Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 40(2)(a). A ‘settlement offer’ includes a reasonable offer to make 
amends: s 40(3).
29  Hunt, n 18 [36]. 
30 Andrew Kenyon, ‘Six Years of Australian Uniform Defamation Law: Damages, Opinion and 
Defence Meanings’ (2012) 35 University of New South Wales Law Journal 31, 35.
31  See, for example, NSW Bar Association, ‘Submission to the New South Wales Department of 
Attorney-General and Justice, Review of Defamation Act 2005’, undated, 19; Matthew Collins, ‘Five 
Years On: A Report Card on Australia’s National Scheme Defamation Laws’ (2011) 16 Media and Arts 
Law Review 317, 322–23.
32  Pingel v Toowoomba Newspapers Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 175 (16 July 2010) 21 [62]–[63] (‘Pingel’); 
Pedavoli v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (2014) 324 ALR 166, 173) (‘Pedavoli’).
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IV. Meeting the Potential of Alternative 
Remedies and Processes in Australian 
Defamation Laws
Based on past experience and concerns it seems unlikely that consensus 
will be reached easily across governments on an expansion of remedial 
alternatives. Instead, the offer to make amends provisions continue the 
Anglo-American preference for attaining desirable objectives by ‘rewards 
rather than force’;33 that is, by creating a defence to a defamation 
claim when a reasonable offer has been made to a plaintiff, rather than 
compelling, for example, a right of reply. These provisions seek to balance 
the objective of effective and fair remedies with promoting speedy and 
non-litigious resolution of disputes. 
A. The potential for further development 
of alternative remedies
There is merit in ongoing consideration of the remedies of retractions 
and apologies, corrections, rights of reply and declarations of falsity.34 
Realistically, legislation for a right of reply and for corrections and 
apologies is unlikely as the legislatures have made it clear they prefer 
to encourage and not compel these remedial actions. In the absence of 
legislation expressly conferring power on the court to make these orders, 
courts are unlikely to grant them as common law remedies, in part due 
to concerns about interference with a publisher’s freedom of expression.35
B. Correction and apology as required components
Given the unlikelihood that more extensive remedial powers will be 
enacted in the near future, the offer to make amends provisions need to 
strike a fair balance between the s 3(c)–(d) objects. At present, s 15(1)(d) 
of the Act mandates the inclusion of a ‘reasonable correction’ in an offer 
to make amends. If the defendant does not include an offer to publish 
33  Fleming, n 16, 24. 
34  For support, see Rolph, n 16, [17.110]–[17.1.30]; Milo, n 16, 269–78. 
35  Summertime Holdings Pty Ltd v Environmental Defender’s Office Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 291, 
297; Robyn Carroll, ‘Beyond Compensation: Apology as a Private Law Remedy’ in Jeffrey Berryman 
and Rick Bigwood (eds), The Law of Remedies: New Directions in the Common Law (Irwin Law, 2010) 
323, 370–71.
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a reasonable correction, then the purported offer to make amends will 
be invalid.36 By contrast, the absence of an offer to publish an apology 
will only be relevant to the ‘reasonableness’ of the offer in determining 
whether a defence exists if the offer is rejected and for the purposes of 
awarding indemnity costs (s 40). The plaintiff can only obtain an offer 
of  apology by negotiation with the defendant. If the plaintiff proceeds 
with litigation, the defendant can rely on alternative defences, not just 
their offer to make amends.37
Section 38(1)(a) of the Act recognises the ability of an apology about the 
publication of a defamatory matter, as well as a published correction, to 
mitigate damage to a plaintiff’s reputation and injured feelings. The Act 
makes a distinction in s 15 between ‘corrections’ and ‘apologies’ (though 
neither term is defined) notwithstanding that these terms are often 
used interchangeably and correction sometimes is incorporated within 
apology.38 George notes that, ‘[i]n practice, apologies are usually related 
to the meaning of the words, corrections usually relate to misstatements 
of facts’.39 Making amends for publication of a matter that ‘is or may 
be defamatory’ (s 13(1)) must surely involve more than correction 
of a  misstatement of fact. In Szanto v Melville, Kaye J reasoned that 
a correction for s 15(1)(e) requires at the very least a ‘plain acknowledgement 
that the defendant defamed the plaintiff’.40 The line between correction 
and apology in this context is not clear, as acknowledgement that 
a publication is defamatory is more than a correction of fact.
The offer to make amends defences in the UK and Ireland, which have 
similar purposes, require a ‘suitable correction’ and a ‘sufficient apology’.41 
In the absence of a broad statutory definition of ‘correction’ in the Act 
36  Szanto v Melville [2011] VSC 574 (4 November 2011) 57 [169] (Kaye J).
37  Contrast the operation of the offer to make amends defence in the UK and Ireland where 
reliance on the offer to make amends defence precludes reliance on alternative defences.
38  See, for example, Pedavoli, n 32, 180. The A-G’s Revised Outline, n 11, equates correction with 
apology and proposed that ‘apologies’ be defined to include retractions and voluntary corrections: 33. 
Contrast the NSWLRC, Defamation, n 5, which defines a ‘correction’ as a ‘collective term for retractions, 
apologies and replies … [which] recognises that the purpose of all three forms of expression is to correct 
public misconceptions as to the plaintiff’s reputation, and as to the true facts’: 14 [2.14].
39  George, n 16, 419, who concludes that the usefulness, therefore, of correction orders may in 
practice be limited.
40  [2011] VSC 618, 7–8.
41  Defamation Act 1996 (UK) c 31, s (2)(1); Defamation Act 2009 (Ire) s 22(5)(a). This also reflects 
the fact that reliance on the defence created by these provisions necessarily involves conceding that 
the publication was defamatory: Nail v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] EMLR 362 paras 34–36; 
[2005] 1 All ER 1040, [19] CA.
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in Australia that incorporates apology, we submit that s 15 similarly 
should require both a ‘reasonable correction’ and a ‘sufficient’ apology or 
an apology that is ‘reasonable’ in the circumstances.42 What constitutes 
a sufficient apology and what will be a reasonable offer for purposes of 
s 18(1) of the Act in each case will be highly fact sensitive and judged in 
light of all of the circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, it may be 
sufficient to apologise for any offence caused by the publication.43 In more 
serious cases, acknowledgement of the falsity of the defamatory statement 
may be necessary.44 The defence that arises by making a reasonable offer 
to make amends, after all, is based on an offer to make amends for harm 
caused by publication of matter that is incorrect. Further, ss 1945 and 20 
are intended to address concerns that an offer of apology will be used 
adversely as evidence of an admission of fault.
Finally, if there is a concern that this amendment would be tantamount 
to compelling a publisher of matter that ‘is or may be defamatory’ to 
apologise, this is countered by the fact that a defendant is not under any 
compulsion to offer an apology (or a correction for that matter). Use 
of these provisions is optional. The choice not to use them may detract 
from the ‘speedy and non-litigious’ object in the Act but that needs to be 
balanced against the ‘effective and fair remedies’ object.
C. Less costly proceedings for minor matters
Concerns remain about the high cost of proceedings to resolve some 
matters relating to offer to make amends proceedings.46 Suggestions that 
merit attention include that the Act be amended to provide for lower cost 
court options47 and consideration be given to conferring jurisdiction on 
42  See also Robyn Carroll and Jeffrey Berryman, ‘Making Amends by Apologising for Defamatory 
Publications – Developments in the 21st Century’, in Kit Barker, Ross Grantham and Karen 
Fairweather (eds), Private Law in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 2017) Ch 24.
43  For example, Sleeman, n 27. It was also considered reasonable in this case to offer the apology 
without an offer to pay compensation. The text of the apology is available at Sleeman v Tuloch Pty Ltd 
(No 4) [2013] NSWDC 111. 
44  For example, Ell v Milne (No 9) [2014] NSWSC 489 (11 April 2014) 10 (McCallum J).
45  See Pingel, n 32, [24]–[25] (Fraser JA), 41–42 [165]–[166], [169]–[170] (Applegarth J).
46  Bridgette Styles, ‘The Power of a Timely Apology’ (2013) 51(7) Law Society Journal 24. 
47  See Hunt, n 21, [56].
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low cost tribunals.48 The outcomes of a review of the Act conducted by 
the NSW Department of Attorney-General and Justice may well provide 
other recommendations relating to the offer to make amends defence.49
V. Conclusion
Through common law principles and now a number of provisions of the 
Act, the law attaches importance to prompt, fair and effective remedial 
responses to defamatory publications. The private nature of settlement, 
however, makes it difficult to calculate the rate of use and satisfaction 
with the laws and provisions that result in matters not coming to court. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to draw attention to aspects of the 
Pt 3 Div 1 provisions that will promote object 3(c) more coherently and 
consistently.
48  NSW Review, n 24, NSW Bar Association Submission.
49  This five year review is required by s 49 of the Act. The submissions to the Review are available 
at: www.justice.nsw.gov.au/justicepolicy/Pages/lpclrd/lpclrd_consultation/lpclrd_stat_reviews.aspx# 
ReviewofDefamationAct2005. At the time of writing, the call for submission was closed and no 
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Designing Reparation: Lessons 
from Private Law
Simone Degeling1 and Kit Barker2
I. Introduction
This chapter is concerned with reparations schemes in domestic law which 
are intended to repair grave historical injustice. Recent examples include 
the Defence Abuse Reparations Scheme (DART) established to deal with 
institutionalised abuse within the Australian Defence Force (ADF)3 and 
the model of redress proposed by the Commonwealth Royal Commission 
into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (‘Royal Commission 
Model’),4 discussed here with particular reference to clergy abuse in the 
Australian Catholic Church. We argue that such schemes – precisely 
because they are being proffered by the institutions bearing moral and legal 
responsibility for the wrongs done – ought more closely to map the ethical 
commitments and remedial lessons of private law.5 Although private law 
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claims through the courts have often failed for technical or evidential 
reasons,6 this failure should not, we say, be permitted to obscure the fact 
that private law has a distinctive and particularly powerful normative 
approach to remedying injustice, which is backed by procedural systems 
that are transparent, relatively consistent and respectful of individual rights 
and dignity. Private law has a centuries-old tradition of understanding the 
types of injustice involved and of appropriate ways of remedying them, 
and its norms can usefully be brought to bear on domestic reparations 
system design. One of the most important norms informing private law 
in this arena, which we argue ought to be permitted more fully to animate 
reparations design, is the norm of corrective justice.
II. Corrective Justice
There is, we accept, no single conception of corrective justice. The canon 
is voluminous and we do not attempt to traverse distinctions and 
differences here.7 However, it may fairly safely be asserted that corrective 
justice is distinct from distributive justice and that it has certain, basic, 
precepts. Corrective justice assumes a bilateral relationship of right and 
duty between victim and wrongdoer which has been infringed by the 
wrongdoer. Corrective justice is then done by requiring the wrongdoer to 
restore the victim as closely as possible to the position he or she would have 
been in, had the injustice not been done. In doing this, the needs (past 
and current), relative resources and character of the parties are ignored. 
In contrast to distributive justice, which contemplates broader political, 
6  For example, limitation of action or want of a proper defendant to sue. See, for example, Trustees 
of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565.
7  See generally: Peter Benson, ‘The Basis of Corrective Justice and its Relation to Distributive 
Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 515; Jules L Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University 
Press, 1992); Jules L Coleman, ‘The Practice of Corrective Justice’ (1995) 37 Arizona Law Review 
15; John Gardner, ‘What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice’ (2011) 30 Law 
& Philosophy 1; Dennis Klimchuk, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Corrective Justice’ in Jason W Neyers, 
Mitchell McInnes and Stephen G A Pitel (eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Hart Publishing, 
2004) 111; Dennis Klimchuk, ‘On the Autonomy of Corrective Justice’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 49; Anthony T Kronman, ‘Contract Law and Distributive Justice’ (1980) 89 Yale 
Law Journal 472; Lionel Smith, ‘Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice’ (2001) 79 Texas Law 
Review 2115; Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University Press, 1995); Ernest 
J Weinrib, ‘Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice’ (2000) 1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1; 
Ernest J Weinrib, ‘The Normative Structure of Unjust Enrichment’ in Charles Rickett and Ross 
Grantham (eds), Structure and Justification in Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2008) 21; Ernest J 
Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012); Richard W Wright, ‘Right, Justice and 
Tort Law’ in David G Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon, 1997) 159; 
Richard W Wright, ‘Substantive Corrective Justice’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 625.
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social or economic ends and which often distributes resources to victims 
by reference to criteria of immediate need, the purposes of monetary 
awards in corrective justice are simply to protect prior rights and restore 
the parties, as best as can be done, to their original normative positions. 
Corrective justice is thus wholly backward-looking and fundamentally 
concerned with eradicating the ills of the past, accepting, of course, 
that one cannot literally turn back time. When corrective justice is 
implemented, this may have beneficial side-effects which are distributive, 
or which create incentives for wrongdoers to alter their future conduct, 
but such impacts are not the point of doing corrective justice, merely 
its incidental side-effects. These do not derogate from the fundamentally 
restorative character of the law’s aims, institutions and remedies. Since 
a corrective justice system must be administered by public courts with 
legitimating authority, this in turn requires the system that supports 
corrective justice and its results to be open, accountable, appealable and 
consistent in its treatment of victims. 
The balance of this chapter briefly examines selected aspects of the DART 
and the Royal Commission Model in the light of private law’s ethical 
commitments as a system of corrective justice, and makes suggestions as 
to how these schemes may be improved. It is important to remember 
that, in both instances, institutional responsibility for the relevant abuses 
is accepted, or is assumed within the terms of the scheme to have been 
accepted. In relation to abuses in the ADF (as with those in the Catholic 
Church),8 public apologies have hence been made by institutional 
representatives at the highest level.9 Similarly, in the Royal Commission 
Model, a person is only eligible for redress if ‘he or she was sexually abused 
8  See, for example, Pope Francis, ‘Address to Members of the International Catholic Child 
Bureau’ (Speech delivered on 11 April 2014), w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/
april/ documents/ papa-francesco_20140411_ufficio-cattolico-infanzia.html; Homily of Pope Francis, 
Holy Mass in the Chapel of the Domus Sanctae Marthae with a Group of Clergy Sex Abuse Victims, 
7  July  2014, w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/2014/documents/papa-francesco_ 
20140707_omelia- vittime-abusi.html.
9  Department of Defence (Cth), Statement from General David Hurley, Chief of the Defence 
Force, 26 November 2012; ‘Abuse in Defence’ Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 26 November 2012, 13105 (Defence Minister Stephen Smith). See, for example: 
‘Young men and women have endured sexual, physical or mental abuse from their colleagues, which 
is not acceptable and does not reflect the values of a modern, diverse, tolerant Australian society … 
Acknowledging the past and taking responsibility for it is only the first step’ (Smith, emphasis added).
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as a child in an institutional context’,10 which (according to definitions 
of Recommendation 45) broadly encompasses situations in which an 
institution is directly or indirectly responsible for the harm.11 
While we acknowledge that any general assumption of responsibility for 
the harm is conceptually distinct from a particular victim demonstrating 
that an institution has infringed his or her rights to the standards 
normally demanded in a court of law in a private law action (such as 
a negligence action), this does not, we argue, derogate from the moral 
force of responsibility having been accepted and from the possibility of 
more meaningful repair.12 Despite the fact that some of the traditional 
requirements of private law actions may not have been demonstrated, 
it is still valid to characterise the infringement of personal rights which 
has taken place as a violation of duty and right and to look upon the 
development of remedial solutions in that light. Both DART and the 
Royal Commission Model implement a system of payment which, 
although directed to recognising the suffering of the victim, abandon the 
commitment to protecting prior entitlements.13 Contrary to this position, 
we argue that the norm calling for reparation is not one that is satisfied by 
discretionary distribution, but one which is founded in the original right–
duty relationship between victim and wrongdoer, and which demands the 
doing of corrective justice when that relationship is violated. Although 
both schemes are careful to make clear that reparation payments do 
not of themselves discharge any legal liability,14 it must be the case that 
payment under either scheme, which itself rests in part on the funding 
of that scheme by the implicated institutions,15 is in substitution for 
10  2015 Report, Recommendation 43.
11  Ibid. Recommendation 45.
12  Note that while even private law does not assume that the making of a mere apology amounts 
to an acceptance of legal liability, the apologies that have been made here are of a different order, 
accepting responsibility for the wrong even while denying legal liability.
13  2015 Report, Recommendation 15; DART, Second Interim Report to the Attorney-General and 
Minister for Defence (2013) (‘DART Second Report’), Appendix M: 1.5, 1.6 and 2.1. 
14  The 2015 Report at page 389 discusses redress as providing an alternative not an addition to 
civil litigation and in Recommendations 63–65 suggests that as a condition of making a payment a 
redress scheme should require an applicant to release the institution and any government from further 
liability for institutional child sexual abuse. DART Second Report, Appendix M, 1.6.2, expressly 
confirms payment does not affect any rights of the applicant. Nonetheless, the assumption of both is 
that mere payment does not discharge liability and conversely (and perversely) that of itself payment 
may suggest some institutional responsibility for the harm.
15  2015 Report, 31–32 and Recommendation 35; DART is funded by the Department of Defence. 
See, for example, DART, Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and Minister for Defence 
(September 2014) (‘DART Seventh Report’) 30.
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moral obligations generated by wrongdoing. Accepting responsibility for 
wrongdoing, in our view, means accepting responsibility to do corrective 
justice, or at least doing something that more approximates corrective 
justice than distributive schemes of welfare-provision. Accepting 
responsibility may not mean accepting legal liability, but it still means 
accepting the responsibility to do corrective justice. 
Informed by this norm, reparations schemes should more particularly 
reflect the circumstances of each victim. Amounts available should be 
increased to acknowledge the physical, mental, economic and emotional 
interests infringed, as well as the delay that has been involved in making 
compensation available. Similarly, the financial caps proposed on 
reparation amounts could be revised upward, even if they do not reach 
precisely the same level as would be awarded by a court of law. While we 
appreciate that neither scheme is intended to effect full compensation,16 
and as such is not a direct analogue for a claim pursued via private law 
mechanisms in which the individual circumstances of the plaintiff are 
considered, awards under both DART and the Royal Commission Model 
could, and should, be more highly individuated out of respect for the 
personal dignity of every individual involved. Instead, however, DART 
adopts a stepped approach calibrated to the severity of the abuse, with 
a fixed award at each step17 and general factors to guide the decision maker 
in determining entitlement and level of payment.18 Similarly, the Royal 
Commission Model suggests a three-step scale of payment19 to be assessed 
and determined by a matrix of the level of abuse, impact of abuse, and 
additional elements.20 Neither of these schemes appears to compensate 
for lost earnings (which conceivably could be a very substantial loss), 
although it is difficult to tell because the administrative apparatus does not 
ask about the losses suffered by the particular victim. Instead the schemes 
focus on the particular events or incidents giving rise to the complaint. 
In other words, reparation is given for ‘abuse’ and its broad brush impact; 
there is no inquiry into loss.
16  2015 Report, 220–25; DART Second Report, Appendix M: 1.6.1.
17  DART Second Report, Appendix M: 4.6. 
18  DART, Fourth Interim Report to the Attorney-General and Minister for Defence (2013) 9 (‘Fourth 
Report’).
19  2015 Report, Recommendation 19.
20  Ibid. Recommendations 16 and 17. 
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Procedural aspects of both schemes also merit consideration. Outcomes 
and reasons for decisions in relation to individual applicants (suitably 
anonymised) under DART and the Royal Commission Model have 
not been (DART) and appear not to be intended to be provided (Royal 
Commission Model). Apart from the obvious point that greater legitimacy 
and consistency might be achieved via greater transparency, there is 
a related point which concerns the right to appeal. The making, or not, 
of a payment under DART is final and cannot be appealed.21 The Royal 
Commission Model specifically contemplates the need for appeal rights, 
described as ‘an internal review process’22 which, to the extent that the 
redress scheme is ‘established on an administrative basis, should be made 
subject to oversight by the relevant ombudsman through the ombudsman’s 
complaint mechanism’.23 In creating an appeal mechanism, we similarly 
suggest that the lessons of private law be permitted to infuse the drafting 
process. Appeals should be available on the merits of a particular award, 
informed, where relevant, by publicly-available, parallel decisions. 
The running of time must also be accommodated. Neither scheme 
contemplates a permanent system of reparation. Indeed, DART is soon 
to close24 and the Royal Commission Model envisages a filing deadline 
and a scheme of finite duration.25 While we acknowledge the desire for 
financial certainty on the part of governments and institutions, and 
the efforts being made to effect institutional change such that historic 
patterns of abuse are not repeated, the inflexibility of the current system 
seems unfair. Admittedly, DART has already been extended beyond its 
initial life.26 However, the experience of judges awarding damages in 
parallel cases is that those who suffer psychiatric illness or impairment, 
itself the product of abuse, may perversely be unable to appreciate their 
own interest in bringing a claim, and thus delay. In these circumstances, 
21  DART Second Report, Appendix N. Note, however, in DART Seventh report, 12, there is 
a procedure for Reconsideration of Decisions ‘in reviewing matters previously assessed as out of scope 
or not plausible on receipt of requests for reconsideration from complainants’.
22  2015 Report, Recommendation 61.
23  Ibid. Recommendation 62.
24  Similarly, DART-funded counselling will not be available after 30 June 2016 and the last date to 
be referred to counselling is 31 March 2016: Defence Abuse Counselling Program Factsheet (www.
defenceabusetaskforce.gov.au/Outcomes/Pages/DefenceAbuseCounsellingProgram.aspx) (accessed 26 
February 2016). Similarly it is hoped that the restorative engagement program will conclude by 31 
March 2016. See DART Terms of Reference (n 3).
25  2015 Report, Recommendations 46 and 48.
26  Initially required filing by 31 May 2013. Subsequently amended to allow ‘complaints from 
women who experienced sexual abuse at ADFA during the period 1991 and 1998 and registered … 
by 30 September 2015’. DART Terms of Reference (n 3).
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a  more permanent and perhaps comprehensive scheme could be 
established, with the capacity to extend filing deadlines in the same 
manner as all courts applying limitations statutes. Additionally, we note 
the Royal Commission Model’s advice27 suggesting removal of limitation 
periods applying to claims for damages brought by a person, where that 
claim is founded on personal injury resulting from sexual abuse of that 
person in an institution when the person is, or was, a child. While this 
reform to limitation periods in civil litigation may well be a welcome 
innovation, it also demonstrates the need for some discretion in applying 
filing deadlines in the reparations mechanism. Equally, we query whether 
all potential applicants for reparation who fail to file before the deadline 
will necessarily succeed in litigation (even with an extension of limitation) 
given the other barriers to success, such as the death of witnesses etc.
Finally, mention must be made of the standard of proof to be applied. 
DART requires an applicant to demonstrate ‘mere plausibility’.28 The 
Royal Commission Model proposes ‘reasonable likelihood’,29 which 
is lower than the common law standard of proof. In doing so, the 
Commission makes the point that it remains: 
sceptical of whether schemes that purport to apply higher standards … 
really do [so] … or if they have any real meaning or any work to do 
in determining applications where there is no ‘witness’ other than the 
applicant and no other ‘evidence’ against which … [allegations of abuse] 
… can be balanced.30 
The Commission also noted that its proposed payment levels exceeded 
those in DART31 and that, commensurate with this higher level of 
payment, oral hearings may be required in addition to documentary 
evidence.32 
There is obviously a trade-off in the design of both systems in that, at 
least compared to civil litigation, the amounts available are less, but 
so is the burden of proof to be met. Notwithstanding this, the Royal 
Commission Model also requires applicants to release institutions and 
governments from any civil liability, whereas in DART the right to 
27  2015 Report, Recommendations 85–88.
28  DART Second Report, Appendix M: 4.5. 
29  2015 Report, Recommendation 57.
30  2015 Report, 371.
31  Ibid. 376.
32  Ibid. 363 and Recommendations 51–55.
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
328
seek damages in addition is expressly preserved. Given, however, that 
the decisions of neither system are public, it is simply not possible to 
know whether or not a higher standard of proof has in any particular 
case been met (or, in egregious cases of abuse, perhaps conceded). In such 
instances, it should be open to the decision-maker, we suggest, to award 
higher amounts than currently proposed, assuming that impacts on the 
particular circumstances of that victim may be demonstrated.
III. Conclusion
It is possible our parliaments will increasingly have to draft statutes 
implementing systems of reparation. This discussion has briefly touched 
on two examples of contemporary relevance, but there are many others. 
We only have to search the records of parliamentary debate to identify 
apologies given for past decisions leading to injustice for which civilised 
societies now express regret and may seek to make redress.33 The message 
we have is that, in designing reparation systems, we should not forget 
that these injustices attract our attention precisely because they infringe 
our notions of moral right and duty. The norms of corrective justice 
remind us that the claimant seeks redress as a matter of prior entitlement 
from institutions which have acknowledged moral responsibility for the 
wrongdoing in question, even if this has stopped short of conceding legal 
liability. Reparation in these cases is not, and should not be, drafted along 
distributive lines that merely seek to meet the most immediate needs 
of victims, or which compromise their original rights for other social 
policy objectives.
33  For example: United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 24 February 
2010, Vol 506, col 301 (Gordon Brown, Prime Minister) (forced child migration); and Julia Gillard, 
‘National Apology for Forced Adoptions’ (Speech delivered at the Great Hall of Parliament House, 
Canberra, 21 March 2013) (forced adoption).
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Apologies, Liability and Civil 
Society: Where to from Here?
Prue Vines1
I. Introduction
In this chapter I argue that there is a major need for obligations law to 
expand its consideration of what amounts to compensation, in order 
for true corrective justice to operate. For my purposes I will mainly 
consider the law of negligence for personal injury. There is good reason 
to think that an excessively legalistic approach to compensation has been 
problematic, even merely in terms of the monetary amounts that plaintiffs 
receive, for example, for personal injury. It may be time to abandon the 
idea of restitutio in integrum (putting the injured person in the position 
they would have been in if the accident had not happened) in respect of 
damages, so rarely does this actually appear to happen,2 and replace it with 
a combination of monetary and other forms of compensation including 
apologies. In this chapter I consider why an apology might be seen as part 
of corrective justice, and argue that any reduction or lack of litigation 
caused by apologies might occur because one of the aims of tort law, that 
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of corrective justice, has been met by the apology itself. This requires us to 
consider the nature of loss as it is felt by the person and as it is recognised 
by the legal system in tort.
In this chapter I define an apology as a communication between parties 
expressing regret for harm that has been done by one party to the 
other, acknowledging fault, and accompanied either by compensation 
or a promise to ensure the wrong will not happen again.3 I argue that 
in the law of torts there is a place for both the spontaneous and the 
coerced apology.
II. The Needs of Civil Society Go Beyond the 
Rule of Law
As lawyers we are constantly aware of the rule of law and its importance 
for civil society. However, how this is considered depends partly on the 
‘thickness’ of the rule of law concept. Where a ‘thin’ rule of law concept is 
used, referring to bare legal rules, there may nevertheless be a real lack in 
the civil society which is facilitated by that rule of law. By this I mean that 
when bare legal rules are used, a formalistic and less substantive idea of 
the rule of law is in play. A ‘thicker’4 idea of the rule of law, I argue, sees it 
embedded in the culture of the society in which it operates, and therefore 
partakes of a richer sense of what the rules mean. This means, for example, 
that the purpose of the rule is more likely to be applied than the literal rule 
because the law can take account of the context within which it operates. 
Another way of considering this is through an expressive theory of law,5 
that the rules of law operate in a way which goes beyond the minimal 
verbal content, and in their expression may touch and affect social norms. 
3  See, inter alia, Prue Vines, ‘Apologising for Personal Injury in Law: Failing to Take Account of 
Lessons from Psychology in Blameworthiness and Propensity to Sue’ (2014) 16 Psychiatry, Psychology 
and Law 42.
4  Drawing on Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive theory of Culture’ in 
Clifford Geertz (ed), The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, 1973) who saw ‘thick’ description in 
ethnography as a way of including the context and often the perspective of the observer.
5  Cass Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’ (1996) 144(5) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 2021; Elisabeth S Anderson and Richard H Pildes, ‘Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement’ (2000) 5 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1503.
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As our understanding of both moral reasoning and rationality, along with 
neuropsychology, develops, it becomes clearer that the emotional life of the 
human being cannot be severed from reason6 and has a large part to play 
in the development of moral and other values. Emotional responses such as 
disgust, fear, guilt and anger often underlie our ‘rational’ discourse and help 
to shape the values articulated in the rational discourse. Law then should 
reflect an understanding of the emotional life of the people it affects.
The apology is best thought of as a communication of emotion and 
values: the emotion is remorse or ‘sorriness’ and the values are those 
which have been damaged by the wrong which is being apologised for. 
In this way an apology is an exemplar of the notion that reason and 
emotion can combine to produce and/or reflect values. Where a wrong 
has occurred, the best apology occurs where the wrongdoer spontaneously 
and promptly apologises, acknowledging the wrong and seeking either to 
prevent it happening again and/or providing compensation. In some cases 
this reduces the desire to sue or allows for early settlement.7 But this is not 
the only possible use of an apology. The fact that the apology recognises 
values means that in some circumstances even a coerced apology can have 
value for the victim. This is because where the court or society requires 
an apology from the wrongdoer the victim feels vindicated. In such a case 
what matters for the victim is their standing in the community; the fact 
that the wrongdoer has not (sincerely) acknowledged their wrongfulness 
does not matter, because the broader community has done so. 
III. The Treatment of Apologies in Civil Liability
One recent shift in the legal landscape has been an increasing interest in 
apologies in transitional justice, and within the legal system. Within the 
legal system this has been embodied in the move to protect apologies 
from automatically creating liability by legislation in many countries since 
1996.8 This has been done for two main reasons: to reduce litigation, and 
6  For example, Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); Dylan Evans and Pierre Cruse (eds), Emotion, Evolution and Rationality 
(Oxford University Press, 2004).
7  Prue Vines, ‘Apologies and Civil Liability in the UK: A View from Elsewhere’ (2008) 12(2) 
Edinburgh Law Review 200–30.
8  All Australian jurisdictions, most US States, England and Wales, most Canadian jurisdictions and 
Scotland all now have various forms of this legislation. See, for example, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) 
ss 68–69. The legislation varies considerably in its scope and its definition of apology, but mostly prevents 
the apology (however defined) from being admissible as evidence of liability or from creating liability. 
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to ensure that the normal processes of civil society (apologising when one 
has done something wrong) are not disrupted by an excessively legalistic 
(one might argue ‘thin’ or ‘non-expressive’) view of law. Apologies, 
although often seen as merely offering sympathy or acknowledgement of 
fault, may also have a remedial aspect.
Liability in negligence generally results in damages. Damages operate as 
compensation, as a marker of wrongdoing and as acknowledgment that 
redress is needed. Apologies do some of the same work. Damages also 
address needs and many people regard this as the most significant aspect 
of damages. If damages are only about need, then a no-fault scheme is the 
best way to deal with loss.9 
The idea that damages put the person back into the position they were 
in before the wrong happened10 has become almost laughable. However, 
damages are often seen also as the central vehicle of corrective justice in 
that they operate to redress the balance between the parties by correcting 
the loss suffered by one party at the expense of the other who caused it. 
Apologies can be part of this corrective justice process if one considers 
damages as practical reparation and apology as emotional reparation for 
the emotional and moral pain suffered by the victim. Some have called 
this ‘symbolic’ reparation, but this is only symbolic if one does not regard 
humiliation or emotional pain as real.
IV. Corrective Justice: Balancing Symbolic, 
Emotional and Monetary Needs
A. Corrective justice and apologies
Aristotelian notions of corrective justice focus on the dyad where one 
party hurts the other, and then the balance between the parties must be 
corrected or equalised. Michael S Moore’s definition is as follows:
9  See, for example, Harold Luntz, ‘Reform of the Law of Negligence: Wrong Questions – 
Wrong Answers’ (2002) 8(2) UNSWLJ Forum: Reform of the Law of Negligence: Balancing Costs and 
Community Expectations 18.
10  See above n 3.
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a corrective justice view of tort law asserts that we all have primary moral 
duties not to hurt others; when we culpably violate such primary moral 
duties, we then have a secondary moral duty to correct the injustice we 
have caused. Tort liability rules are no more than the enforcement of these 
antecedently existing moral duties of corrective justice.11 
This firmly focuses on the relationship between law and morality. Moore’s 
definition is ‘thin’ in that it does not take much account of the relationship 
between law, morality and emotion. I would argue that part of the 
necessary correction of the injustice includes recognition of the emotional 
need for vindication12 which I see as part of corrective justice. Other 
corrective justice theorists have also generally used a ‘thin’ view of law. 
For example, Weinrib,13 referring to the fact that Aristotle talked about 
the correlative relationship between the parties in terms of equalising gain 
and loss, dismisses the fact that in negligence there is no gain apparent. 
When we look at what is happening, the injured person has a loss, and in 
paying compensation the wrongdoer in turn suffers loss. Weinrib argues 
that this is merely a problem of terminology and the loss or gain is only 
‘normative’. But to say that the correlativity is ‘only’ normative misses 
a great deal of the moral richness of tort law. It may be that there is a gain 
when someone negligently inflicts injury on another: that gain is a gain 
in power,14 which we mostly pay little attention to, but nevertheless it is 
a gain which needs to be countered by a loss of power. It can be argued 
that an apology, which is necessarily humbling, reduces that gain and 
redresses the wrong and that this is one of its reparative functions.
Apologies focus on the moral wrongfulness of the action taken by 
the perpetrator. This seems to differ from negligence law which only 
makes a person liable for a wrong when the wrong has caused a harm 
(outcome responsibility).15 However, psychological studies have shown 
that the more serious the consequences are, the more likely there is to 
11  ‘Causation and Responsibility’ (1999) 16(2) Social Philosophy and Policy 1 at 4.
12  Jason Varuhas, ‘The Concept of Vindication in the Law of Torts’ (2014) 34 (2) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 253.
13  ‘The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice’ (1994) 44 Duke Law Journal 277.
14  Aquinas suggests that ‘a person striking or killing has more of what is evaluated as good, insofar, 
that is, as he fulfils his will, and so is seen to receive a sort of gain’ in James Gordley, ‘The Aristotelian 
Tradition’ in David Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 
1995), 138.
15  Steven Perry has argued in ‘The Moral Basis of Tort Law’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 449, 
497 that the individualised sense of fault which focuses Weinrib’s corrective justice theory should be 
modified by outcome responsibility to better reflect the law of negligence. 
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be attribution of moral responsibility to the person who caused them.16 
That  is, outcome responsibility does seem psychologically to increase 
people’s perception of moral fault. The assignment of responsibility 
is a  very complex part of human behaviour17 to which the law should 
respond. The psychological needs of individuals and communities, and 
the needs of moral communities, are part of the social context in which 
tort law operates and it is important to have some kind of link between the 
legal and the moral/psychological universes. Apologies, both spontaneous 
and as remedies, can do some of this work.18
Corrective justice’s goal of equality between the parties and co-relativity 
between the wrong and the righting of the wrong requires proportionality 
between the wrong, the harm and the compensation. Compensation for 
negligence may not do this, despite the assumption of corrective justice 
that the loss is the same as the wrongfulness. In a negligence action the 
wrong may be small, but the loss very large. The distinction between loss 
and wrong and the possible disproportion between the wrong and what is 
seen as redressing the wrong causes major problems in social perceptions 
of the legitimacy of negligence. The fact that apologies focus on moral 
wrong, and that they have a healing and reparative function of their 
own, may be used to redress partially this disproportion in some cases. 
It is important to be able to avoid a punitive response.19 In cases where 
apologies have been ordered, judges have emphasised that such apologies 
are ordered for redress not punishment.20 
16  Kelly Shaver, ‘Redress and Conscientiousness in the Attribution of Responsibility for Accidents’ 
(1970) 6 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 100; Elaine Walster, ‘Assignment of Responsibility 
for Accidents’ (1966) 3 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1973; David Kanouse, ‘Language, 
Labelling and Attribution’ in Edward E Jones et al (eds), Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behaviour 
(General Learning Press, 1972).
17  The psychological studies of attribution show a number of things of interest to negligence 
theory, including first that the assignment of moral responsibility is very complex and may be altered 
by very subtle semantic shifts, second that levels of generality of explanation beget explanations 
at similar levels of generality, and third that there is indeed a naïve sense of moral responsibility. 
See, inter alia, Sally Lloyd-Bostock, ‘Attributions of Cause and Responsibility as Social Phenomena’ in 
Joseph Jaspars, Frank Fincham and Miles Hewstone (eds), Attribution Theory and Research (Academic 
Press, 1983).
18  Prue Vines, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability 
Arena’ (2007) 1 Journal of Public Space 1–51, epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/publicspace/home; 
Robyn Carroll, ‘Beyond Compensation: Apology as a Private Law Remedy’ in Jeff Berryman and Rick 
Bigwood (eds), The Law of Remedies: New Directions in the Common Law (Irwin Law, 2010) 323.
19  Carroll, above n 18.
20  Carroll (above n 18) refers to De Simone v Bevacqua (1994) 7 VAR 246 (a harassment case); 
Falun Dafa Association of Victoria Inc v Melbourne City Council [2004] VCAT 625; Ma Bik Yung v Ko 
Chuen [2002] HKLRD 1.
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B. The conception of loss, apologies and 
compensation
The recognition of loss for the purposes of negligence has developed 
over time from the purely physical (e.g. personal injury and property 
damage),21 to economic loss and mental harm. The latter is still restricted 
in Australia (but not everywhere else) to psychiatrically recognisable harm 
and distinguished firmly from ‘distress or sorrow’.22 However, in other 
domains loss includes injury to personhood, reputational torts being the 
obvious example. At present when a tort arises, damages are awarded for the 
recognised losses, but this fails to account for the fact that when a person is 
harmed a loss may occur which is felt as an injury to personhood, caused 
by the wrong as well as the harm. This loss, the emotional reaction to the 
wrong, can be characterised as a normative loss separate from the physical 
realm. It may well be an experiential loss for the person, but it is also an 
objective injury to personhood or human dignity which it is important 
for the legal system to consider in terms of expressive theory or a ‘thicker’ 
view of law. It is important to recognise this sort of loss because, if fault 
is not acknowledged, some litigants will remain unsatisfied, even if they 
do obtain some form of compensation. It is this type of loss for which 
an apology may compensate. A damages award coupled with an order to 
apologise is more likely to vindicate both the physical and emotional loss 
caused by the harm and give satisfying redress.
V. Conclusion
The distinction and/or the disproportion between wrongfulness and loss 
in negligence law can be addressed to some extent by apologies. When 
spontaneous and immediate, apologies may reduce the desire to sue or 
make it easier to settle early. As remedies, coercive apologies may offer 
better vindication than damages alone. The law of obligations has taken 
insufficient care to maintain civil society by failing to adequately recognise 
the emotional content of the disputes which the law seeks to deal with. 
21  For example, in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Mrs Donoghue sued for personal injury 
(gastro-enteritis) and nervous shock (psychiatric harm). It is doubtful whether she could have sued for 
nervous shock then had she not had the physical injury as well. Until Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller 
& Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 it was assumed that pure economic loss was the domain of contract 
and that one could not sue for it in negligence, and so on.
22  Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 per Windeyer J at 403 and much repeated; 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 30 and its equivalents.
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The treatment of apologies in civil liability is a case in point. The usual 
advice not to apologise ignores the needs of civil society and its members 
for responses other than monetary damages. Reform of the law should 
move towards the significance of humans’ emotional as well as legal life, 
maintaining the balance of symbolic, emotional and monetary needs 
in the response to civil wrongs. It is time to order apologies along with 
damages in such cases. Apologies and damages in various combinations 
may address both the aims of corrective justice and compensation better 
and more comprehensively than the declaration of liability in a judgment 
with damages awarded, as a form of recognition of the fact that the nature 
of loss is broader than the legal system normally allows. Considering 
apologies in this way, rather than ignoring them, will allow us more 
completely to meet the claims of corrective justice; and offers a better 
chance of the tort process offering real healing than it does at present.
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1  Murdoch University.
2  In this chapter, no distinction is made between these concepts and ‘consent’ is used for all of them.
Renovating the Concept 




This chapter advocates reform of the concept of consent as it is used in 
contract and property law. The concept of consent/assent/intent2 that 
underpins these laws is outdated and no longer functions as it ought 
to do. We must reassess the relationship between consent and legal 
responsibility, which is embedded in the foundations of property and 
contract law, and recast the legal concept of consent in light of current 
knowledge and in accordance with 21st century norms and values. These 
fundamental changes should then drive, and provide direction for, specific 
reforms of the rules about whether, how and by whom consent must be 
proven in property and contract claims.
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II. The Problem with Consent
A. Underlying issues
Liberal ideology tethers responsibility to consent. In the context of private 
law, this means that, unless specifically justified (for instance by policy 
considerations), responsibility and obligation arise only from that which 
one has freely chosen. Yet, in practice, it often happens that undertakings 
are enforced and conveyances upheld notwithstanding that they were 
made in circumstances which suggest an alarmingly poor quality of 
consent. This is strikingly evident in cases pertaining to contracts and 
conveyances by elders.3 
This discrepancy arises from a tension within liberal ideology: between 
its  associated ideas of freedom of the individual (pursuant to which 
consent is a prerequisite for legal obligation) and the legal formalism which 
facilitates the rule of law. Although consent is fundamental, it is invisible. 
Crafting laws about consent necessitates regulating ‘the unseeable interior’ 
of the self, the mind. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the most 
problematic cases occur within contexts traditionally designated as ‘private’ 
and so placed outside the purview of the law, that is, inside the home, the 
family and the marriage. Insofar as lawmakers have tended to see the home 
as something to be shielded from intrusion, it constitutes another kind of 
‘unseeable interior’. The same might be said of the institution of marriage. 
The challenges presented by the task of maintaining the connection 
between responsibility and consent raise apprehensions, which have 
strongly influenced laws about consent. The primary concern is that 
consent is a matter not amenable to proof, so that challenges going to 
consent are easily made, but difficult either to substantiate or to refute.4 
Another concern is that, even where consent is compromised, it may be 
unfair to an ‘innocent’ party to reverse the transaction or release the subject 
from their undertaking, especially where that party has given value and/
or relied upon the undertaking. Finally, it is considered that the public 
interest is not best served by too readily releasing individuals from their 
undertakings and reversing transactions because this undermines security 
of receipt, security of title and economic efficiency.
3  See, for example, Johnson v Johnson [2009] NSWSC 503 and Anderson v Anderson [2013] QSC 8.
4  Concern intensifies where the one who seeks to challenge the enforceability of an undertaking 
on the basis of consent is not the person who gave it, especially where that person is deceased so that 
direct evidence of her state of mind is unobtainable.
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B. Effect on consent law
The concept of consent that emerges from laws skewed by these concerns 
has been warped in its formation and does not function properly. The most 
important aspects of this problem are briefly described as follows.
1. Inverted relationship between procedural law 
and substantive law 
Normally substantive law holds primacy over procedural law – rules 
about what must be proven precede a consideration of how this ought to 
be achieved. However, in regulating consent, the issues of first concern 
have been the location of the onus of proof and the means by which that 
burden can be discharged.
Foremost among the procedural strategies for dealing with the ‘unprovable’ 
nature of consent are the presumption of capacity and the effective 
‘externalisation’ of consent. Both common law and statute provide that 
every adult person is presumed to have the capacity to manage their 
own affairs.5 In addition to this, strong preference has been given6 to 
objectively ascertainable acts (over testimony about subjective intentions) 
as proof of consent. External evidence of consent has come to stand in 
place of consent itself. Thus, proving consent typically involves no more 
than establishing that the subject was an adult and that they complied 
with the pertinent formal requirements or otherwise acted in a manner 
that ‘a reasonable bystander’ would take to be an indication of consent. 
It falls to the party who would challenge on the basis of lack of consent 
either to prove that the subject lacked capacity or to make out one of the 
defences grounded in vitiated consent.7
This has two consequences: (i) regardless of who brings suit, the risk 
arising  from the difficulties inherent in proving consent is borne by 
the party who challenges consent, rather than the one who relies on it; 
and (ii)  the constituents and qualities of effective consent are seldom 
investigated, because the issue tends to be won or lost on allocation of the 
onus of proof.
5  Attorney General v Parnther (1792) 3 Bro CC 441, 443; 29 ER 632, 634; M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 
10 Cl&Fin 200, 210; 8 ER 718, 722; Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51, [36]. See also 
legislative provisions, such as Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 4(3).
6  By means such as: the statutory imposition of formal requirements (e.g. executed deed, signed 
written instrument/evidence); the parole evidence rule; and the adoption of objective standards in 
ascertaining contractual assent or donative intent.
7  Such as non est factum, duress or undue influence.
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2. No model of consent
Perhaps for want of opportunity therefore, the case law has provided 
no model to guide the development of laws which better connect 
responsibility to consent. Instead, consent remains out of focus: hiding 
in plain sight. It is not as well understood as it might be and mechanisms 
intended to facilitate it often miss the mark.8
3. Vitiated consent is too difficult to establish
An image of consent does emerge from the case law. However, this is no 
model; it is merely a reflection of the composite effect of laws laid down 
without the benefit of a blueprint and strongly influenced by concerns 
about proof. In operation, consent appears to be a binary and morally 
loaded concept.
(a) Binary
The effect of the presumption of capacity is that consent is either wholly 
present or absent. To displace the presumption, it must be proven that the 
subject failed to understand even the ‘general nature of the transaction’9 
in question to the extent that they could not have understood it even 
if it had been explained to them.10 Conversely, once the presumption 
has been rebutted, the other party can enforce the undertaking only if 
they can prove that it took place during a ‘lucid interval’.11 This suggests 
that persons are either ‘lucid’ (having full capacity) or wholly incapable. 
A similar approach is taken in the defences going to consent.12 There 
is no contemplation of an ‘acceptable level’ of consent, nor of ‘degrees’ 
of freedom where it pertains to the will.
8  For instance, independent legal advice is usually taken to be sufficient to counter a claim of 
vitiated consent. See, for example, the dictum of Lord Nicholls in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge 
[2002] 2 AC 773, [54]. However, while such advice can provide the subject with the prerequisites 
for an independent decision, no advice can relieve her from the effects of a power imbalance that 
impinges upon her freedom of choice.
9  Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423, 438 citing Ball v Mannin (1829) 1 Dow & Cl 380; 
6 ER 568. 
10  Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423, 437–38.
11  McLaughlin v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd [No 2] (1904) 1 CLR 243, 277; Edna May 
Collins by her next friend Glenys Lesley Laraine Poletti v May [2000] WASC 29, [54]; and Stone v 
Registrar of Titles [2012] WASC 21, 42.
12  See, for example, non est factum, which requires proof that the subject believed the instrument 
to be radically different from what it actually was (Petelin v Cullen (1975) 132 CLR 355, 359) and 
‘presumed’ undue influence, which can be defended only by demonstrating that the undertaking in 
question was ‘the result of the free exercise of the … [subject’s] independent will’ (Johnson v Buttress 
(1936) 56 CLR 113, 138).
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(b) Morally loaded
Even where it has been proven that consent was absent or very badly 
compromised, this might not suffice. The defence of non est factum 
requires proof of a blameless absence of consent: that the subject’s radical 
misapprehension as to the nature of the instrument was not the result of 
carelessness or otherwise their own fault.13 In cases of incapacity falling short 
of non est factum (where consent was very badly compromised), the subject 
must also prove that the counterparty to the transaction knew or ought 
to have known of their incapacity.14 Thus, nothing less than an absence 
of consent will, of itself,15 suffice to absolve the subject from responsibility.
Taken together and in conjunction with the presumption of capacity, 
these factors make it very difficult to succeed in making a challenge based 
on vitiated consent. 
4. Legal notion of consent is outdated and unrealistic
The concept of consent which emerges from the cases does not accord 
with what we now know about choice and decision-making. For instance, 
its binary character does not operate well in circumstances where cognitive 
ability fluctuates or declines gradually and unevenly. Consequently, it can 
prove extremely difficult for persons suffering from dementia or mental 
illness to access the defence of want of capacity, even when their condition 
has reached the stage where it is patently unsafe to assume that their 
consent was of a quality sufficient to form the basis of legal responsibility.16
III. Towards a Solution
We need a theoretical model of consent that will provide a schema for 
reform. This model should be based on an up-to-date understanding of 
decision-making and choice17 and a reassessment of the role of consent as 
a prerequisite for responsibility.18 At a minimum, it should illuminate the 
essential attributes of binding consent.
13  Gallie v Lee (1971) AC 1004, 1019 cited with approval in Petelin v Cullen above n 12, 360.
14  Imperial Loan Company v Stone (1892) 1 QB 599, 602–3; Anderson, Stone v Registrar of Titles 
citing Collins Edna May Collins by her next friend Glenys Lesley Laraine Poletti v May [2000] WASC 
29, [57] citing Crago v McIntyre [1976] 1 NSWLR 729. This is supposedly to justify why ‘as between 
two innocent parties’ the law should side with the one who asserts absence of consent. However, it has 
been insisted upon even in cases where the transaction in question was a gift.
15  That is, without requiring an examination of the other party’s knowledge and/or behaviour. 
16  See, for example, Johnson v Johnson above n 3.
17  Including the conditions and circumstances by which these may be constrained.
18  Autonomy may not be the only value to be considered.
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A. Guidelines for change
We can then set about reforming the laws by which this model is given 
effect. In embarking upon this process, the following guidelines should 
be observed.
1. Open, not restrictive
The restrictive approach triggered by a preoccupation with the limitations 
of knowledge should be abandoned. More is to be gained by opening 
ourselves to the science and scholarship available within and beyond the 
law to develop our understanding of consent. For instance, lawyers should 
not be reticent to look to medical science for a better understanding of the 
processes of cognition. Property and contract lawyers might look beyond 
the boundaries of their own field to make fullest use of the resources 
available from legal scholarship. For example, feminist legal theory offers 
a rich source of scholarship on the impact of imbalance of power on 
freedom of choice.19
2. Substance over procedure
Given the nature of consent, difficulties of proof and a degree of 
uncertainty are inevitable and this should be reflected in our management 
of the relationship between procedural and substantive law. Procedural 
law should not be allowed to ‘take over’ to the extent that the means 
of proof dictate the nature of that which is to be proven.
3. Sensitivity to context
Context is critical. Different public policy considerations will apply, 
depending upon whether the undertaking was made: inter vivos or by 
will; for value or by way of gift; and in a personal or commercial context. 
It may be that the model will change, or that more than one model is 
required, depending upon the relational and/or transactional context.
4. Responsibility and human dignity
So strong is the association between personal dignity and notions of 
autonomy (encompassing both freedom of choice and responsibility 
for that which has been chosen) that attempts to accommodate the 
vulnerable are sometimes met with an indignant protest that to do so 
would infantilise the individual or class that it is sought to assist. This 
19  See, for instance, Rosemary Hunter and Sharon Cowan (eds), Choice and Consent: Feminist 
Engagements with the Law and Subjectivity (Routledge, 2007).
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is understandable; such efforts have sometimes been paternalistic.20 
However, legal responsibility should be disentangled from personal worth 
and human dignity. It must be possible to delimit personal responsibility 
without condescension. For instance, surely it would not demean persons 
who have received a diagnosis of dementia to be relieved of the onus 
of proving incapacity.
5. Avoid paternalism
As matters stand, those who seek to disclaim liability by challenging 
consent are usually obliged to cast themselves as incapable or dependant. 
In renovating these laws, we should not settle for paternalistic ‘solutions’, 
which deal with the matter by providing ‘protection’ for those perceived 
to be weak or deficient. Disability is not deficiency and vulnerability is not 
weakness. Dependence is a natural consequence of living in the connected 
and interdependent way that we are supposed to live. We should rather 
aim to craft laws that support disability and safeguard the capacity to be 
vulnerable.
B. Suggestions for change
More specific suggestions for change are as follows.
1. Enabling consent
The legal mechanism by which consent is entrenched as a prerequisite 
for responsibility should do more than merely withhold support where 
consent was absent. It should include strategies for creating an environment 
which facilitates and supports the making of consensual undertakings and 
transactions.21 These might include mandating the provision of access 
to assistance and support appropriate to the nature of the vulnerability, 
such as: 
• assistive technologies to augment communication and cognition;
• assisted decision-making22 where impaired cognition is the relevant 
source of vulnerability;
20  For example, see Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 195 CLR 395, 424 (Kirby J).
21  Property and contract lawyers would do well to look to the scholarship of disability law 
and policy scholars for assistance with this project. See, for example, Dr Anna Arstein-Kerslake, 
‘An Empowering Dependency: Exploring Support for the Exercise of Legal Capacity’ (2016) 18 
Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research 77.
22  Whereby the subject may appoint someone to assist or represent her in making the decision 
in question.
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• information and explanation where these are needed; and 
• independent advice where vulnerability arises from dependence or 
difficulty in discerning one’s own interests.
2. Relief from responsibility where consent was impaired
Both the law with respect to capacity and the defences going to consent 
might be enhanced by making relief on the basis of vitiated consent easier 
to access. However, insofar as these accommodations would be made to 
enhance autonomy by delimiting the ambit of personal responsibility, 
they ought only to be available to the subject personally.23 
(a) Capacity
There are circumstances (such as where the subject had been diagnosed 
with dementia or mental illness causing serious cognitive disturbance) in 
which it is appropriate to dispense with the presumption of capacity. 
(b) Consent
The law should offer a defence grounded solely on the fact that consent 
was so badly impaired that the state will not lend its assistance to enforce/
endorse the undertaking or conveyance in question. This would not 
require:
• the other party to have behaved reprehensibly or to have breached any 
duty;24 or
• that consent was wholly absent.
Equitable doctrine provides an ideal vehicle for this. Indeed, it is arguable 
that, in Australia, the doctrine of undue influence25 and the second limb 
of Yerkey v Jones already go some of the way towards performing this 
function.26
23  And not, for instance, to the executor/administrator of her estate. This might go some way 
towards assuaging the concern described in n 4. 
24  It is suggested that this objective would be more cleanly accomplished by means of an action 
located in unjust enrichment, rather than by casting it as a ‘wrong’.
25  Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 474 and Bridgewater v Leahy 
(1998) 194 CLR 471, 478–79.
26  Yerkey v Jones 63 CLR 649, 685–86, and affirmed in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 
195 CLR 395, 405 and 409.
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IV. Conclusion
If consent truly is critical to legal responsibility, then it should not 
be reduced to a formality or a foregone conclusion. In the absence of 
a model of consent to guide their development, property and contract 
law have been too greatly influenced by concerns about proof and fear 
of uncertainty. This has made relief on the basis of vitiated consent too 
difficult to access. The state frequently lends its support to the enforcement 
of undertakings and the endorsement of conveyances notwithstanding 
that there is a serious danger that the subject’s capacity to understand the 
decision or to exercise a free choice was badly impaired. In such cases, 
it is clear that the laws of capacity and consent do not serve to promote 
autonomy. The urgent need to reform the laws about consent presents 
an opportunity to reassess the relationship between responsibility and 
consent and to construct a more accurate and effectual model of consent. 
This model can be used to drive changes in property and contract law that 
will facilitate the attainment of effective consent and provide better access 
to relief in cases of vitiated consent. Thus renovated, consent will be better 
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Nudging Charities to Balance 
the Needs of the Present against 
Those of the Future
Ian Murray1
I. Introduction
This chapter explains the need for some temporal rules in charity law. 
It raises the underexamined issue of the point in time at which charities 
are expected to produce a public benefit from resources that they hold. 
Timing is critical to identifying which persons will benefit. Will they 
be members of the present generation that have provided resources or 
collectively granted concessions to the charity? Will future generations 
benefit instead? 
The temporal issue will impact in different ways depending upon 
a  charity’s  purpose and the means it uses to achieve that purpose. 
The  considerations that apply to a bushfire disaster relief charity will 
diverge from those relevant to a university intended to last in perpetuity. 
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Nevertheless, to remain relevant to as broad a group of charities as possible, 
this chapter looks in general terms at the gaps in existing constraints and 
proposes reforms that would better promote an intergenerational balance.
II. The Need for an Intergenerational Balance
There is a theoretical and practical need for temporal rules. Turning to 
theory, key charity law goals are to facilitate the pursuit of charitable 
purposes independently from the state and to incentivise the production 
of goods for the benefit of the public in pursuing those purposes. This 
appears from economic theories that explain the production of public 
and quasi-public goods by the not-for-profit sector (including charities) 
in place of government production.2 These goals are also supported 
by examination of the justification for charity tax concessions3 and 
on a doctrinal analysis of charity law’s functions.4 An additional goal 
is to generate trust and confidence, on the part of those giving to and 
receiving benefits from charities, that funds received by the charity will 
be applied to the charitable purpose. This goal is drawn from analysis 
of the expressive function of charity law5 and from economic and legal 
theories that seek to explain why goods are produced by the not-for-profit 
sector rather than the private sector.6 Implicit in the goal of incentivising 
the production of goods is the need for goods to be produced before the 
end of time. Arguably, the trust and confidence goal also bolsters this 
conclusion. However, these goals provide limited guidance about the 
appropriate time. 
From a practical perspective, grappling with the issue is critical. While 
hoarding by Australian charities does not appear systemic at present, 
there is some potential for accumulation and evidence of significant 
2  Burton Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Economy (Harvard University Press, 1988); Estelle James and 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Nonprofit Enterprise in Market Economics (Harwood Academic Publishers, 
1986) 20, 27–31.
3  Gino Dal Pont, ‘Conceptualising “Charity” in State Taxation’ (2015) 44(1) Australian Tax Review 
48, 50; Evelyn Brody, ‘Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption’ 
(1998) 23(4) Journal of Corporation Law 585.
4  Matthew Harding, Charity Law and the Liberal State (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 38–41, 
44; Dal Pont, above n 3, 50.
5  Harding, above n 4, 38–41, 44.
6  By reference to information asymmetries: Henry Hansmann, ‘The Role of Non-profit Enterprise’ 
(1980) 89(5) Yale Law Journal 835, 843–45. The theories supplement the subsidisation of public 
goods rationale above.
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variation in savings rates across the not-for-profit sector.7 Further, the 
level of Australian philanthropy is increasing, as are public expectations of 
charities. Moreover, concerns have been mooted in Australia and abroad.8 
In addition, research by the Charity Commission for England and Wales 
indicates that many charities may not have any formal policy for the 
retention and maintenance of reserved assets, including a significant 
proportion of charities that hold reserves.9 This suggests some charity 
controllers may not be considering the question.
III. Gaps in Existing Constraints
There are various legal rules that apply to restrain the accumulation of 
assets by charities. These rules provide a mechanism for dealing, at least 
partially, with governance fears that accumulated funds may be lost or 
improperly applied. They also enable some limits on the perpetuation 
of a charity creator’s control. However, they are materially deficient in 
addressing the timing issue.
A. Tax rules
I have discussed elsewhere the tax rules that potentially restrict asset 
retention by charities.10 The key rules comprise:
• A minimum annual distribution requirement, generally of 5 per cent 
or 4 per cent of the market value of a fund’s net assets for certain 
deductible gift recipient charitable ancillary funds. 
• To be exempt from income tax a charity must, amongst other 
requirements, ‘apply its income and assets solely for the purpose for 
which [it] is established’.
7  See, for example, Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Australian National Accounts: Non-Profit 
Institutions Satellite Account 2012–13’ (Cat No 5256, 28 August 2015).
8  ‘The Native Title Divide’, The West Australian (Perth), 27 March 2010, 32; Charles Mitchell, 
‘Saving for a Rainy Day: Charity Reserves’ (2002) 8(1) Charity Law & Practice Review 35, 41 
(fundraising organisations); James Fishman and Stephen Schwarz, Nonprofit Organizations: Cases and 
Materials (Foundation Press, 4th edn, 2010) 7 (US hospitals, universities, museums and religious 
organisations).
9  Charity Commission, ‘Tell it Like it Is: The Extent of Charity Reserves and Reserve Policies’ 
(Research Report No RS13, November 2006) 8–9, 11.
10  Ian Murray, ‘Charity Accumulation: Interrogating the Conventional View on Tax Restraints’ 
(2015) 37(4) Sydney Law Review 541.
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
350
Assuming that recipient organisations use the funds within a reasonable 
time, the minimum distribution rule promotes some spending for the 
present. While the income tax exemption rule may discourage material 
retention of resources in practice, the better view is that the rule does not 
permit the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) to monitor accumulation 
beyond ensuring compliance with the charity’s governing rules and the 
law. In this way, the rule acts as a fall-back to trustee and director duties, 
rather than an additional constraint.
B. Perpetuities rules and general charity 
supervisory mechanisms
The need to select from sanctioned categories of ‘charitable purpose’ 
imposes some constraints upon donor control.11 Further, the rules 
against remoteness of vesting and against accumulation potentially apply 
where there is accumulation in the narrow sense of taking some of the 
income from a capital sum held by a charity and adding that income 
to the capital. In contrast, the rule against indestructible trusts does not 
apply to charities, which may be perpetual. Accordingly, one might have 
expected that the rules against remoteness and accumulation, which are 
targeted specifically at balancing current and future generations’ interests 
in the freedom of disposition of property, would partially address the 
timing issue by limiting mandated accumulation to the perpetuity period. 
However,12 the rules against remoteness and accumulation have been 
abolished for charities in South Australia and potentially Tasmania and 
the Northern Territory.13 Further, even in jurisdictions where they apply, 
the rules do not effect a constraint on accumulation in circumstances 
where property is expressed to be given on trust for charitable purposes, 
pursuant to the terms of which the trustees are required (or permitted) 
to accumulate income.14 
11  See, for example, Rob Atkinson, ‘Reforming Cy Pres Reform’ (1993) 44(5) Hastings Law Journal 
1111, 1114–15.
12  Unless an accumulation provision stops a trust from being characterised as having a charitable 
purpose.
13  Ian Murray, ‘Accumulation in Charitable Trusts: Australian Common Law Perpetuities Rules’ 
(2015) 9(1) Journal of Equity 30.
14  Ibid; Ian Murray, ‘Accumulation in Charitable Trusts: Australian Statutory Perpetuities Rules’ 
(2014) 8(2) Journal of Equity 163.
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Mechanisms, such as administrative schemes, cy-près schemes, winding-
up processes and trustee expediency provisions do permit some degree 
of change.15 They therefore limit the charity creator’s control over 
charity property. However, their scope, particularly when applied at the 
instigation of a regulator, is relatively confined. 
C. Governance duties
Charity controllers, be they trustees, company directors or committee 
members, are subject to a range of common law and statutory duties of care, 
skill and diligence and of loyalty and good faith. Duties that apply to the 
exercise of fiduciary powers would require controllers to act upon genuine 
consideration in exercising powers to retain or accumulate assets.16 This 
means that charity controllers must take account of (material) relevant 
considerations and should not take account of irrelevant considerations.17 
This imposes procedural constraints on accumulation, as charity 
controllers are likely obliged to conduct a broad survey of the persons who 
might benefit from pursuit of the relevant charitable purpose, along with 
the likely relative financial circumstances of these persons in the present 
and the future.18 However, as the procedural requirements are not clearly 
articulated and as judicial review is focused on maintaining the integrity 
of the process rather than the merits of the ultimate decision, there is 
significant flexibility. Additionally, the Charity Commission for England 
and Wales research on reserves policies discussed above suggests that many 
controllers may not be aware of the duties.
IV. Reform
The timing of charity benefits involves, by definition, matters of 
distribution. The extent to which charity controllers should be subject 
to obligations in retaining or distributing charity assets, so as to distribute 
benefits to different generations, is essentially a matter of ethics.
15  Ibid.
16  See, for example, Karger v Paul [1984] VR 161, 163–66 (McGarvie J); Rosemary Teele Langford, 
‘Solving the Fiduciary Puzzle: The Bona Fide and Proper Purposes Duties of Company Directors’ 
(2013) 41(3) Australian Business Law Review 127, 130–31, 134.
17  Scott v National Trust [1998] 2 All ER 705, 718 (Robert Walker J).
18  Cf Re Hay’s Settlement Trusts [1982] 1 WLR 202, 209–10 (Megarry VC).
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A. Is there a relevant ethical basis?
There are a range of philosophical theories that attempt to articulate 
what obligations are owed by the present generation in relation to past 
and future people. While the content and concept of ‘intergenerational 
justice’ remain debated, it is often used for such theories, as they typically 
apply notions of ‘justice’ from political philosophy to relations between 
non-contemporaneous persons.19 
For instance, intergenerational justice may mean that the current 
generation owes a duty grounded in ‘distributive justice’ to redistribute 
resources, to some extent, to persons, whether in the same or in future 
generations, based on the degree to which this would satisfy their 
fundamental social and economic needs.20 The notion of distributive 
justice inevitably requires attention to Rawls’s ‘difference principle’,21 
being the second condition of the following principle:22
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they 
are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity; and second [the difference principle], they 
are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. 
The difference principle permits differences in socioeconomic status 
of  individuals, but only to the extent that such differences improve the 
absolute position of the most disadvantaged members of society, for instance 
because they incentivise greater productivity and hence greater wealth for 
society. If they do not, then resources should be redistributed to those 
disadvantaged persons. However, Rawls applied the difference principle 
to contemporaneous persons, not non-contemporaneous persons. In the 
intergenerational context, Rawls conceived of intergenerational savings 
obligations to preserve capital so as to enable the establishment and then 
19  See, for example, Axel Gosseries and Lukas Meyer (eds), Intergenerational Justice (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 1–4; Joerg Tremmel (ed), Handbook of Intergenerational Justice (Edward Elgar, 2006). 
20  See, for example, Frederic Gaspart and Axel Gosseries, ‘Are Generational Savings Unjust?’ (2007) 
6(2) Politics, Philosophy and Economics 193, 201–4, 209, 211–12; Dieter Birnbacher, ‘Responsibility 
for Future Generations’ in Tremmel, above n 19, 34. Welfare economics adopts this basis when using 
certain social welfare functions: cf Robin Broadway and Michael Keen, ‘Redistribution’ in Anthony 
Atkinson and François Bourguignon (eds), Handbook of Income Distribution (North Holland, Vol 1, 
2000) 677, 680–83.
21  Many other philosophers also embrace notions of distributive justice based upon a reallocation 
of resources to satisfy basic social and economic needs.
22  John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press, 2001) 42–43. See also 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Clarendon Press, 1972) 76–83, 302–3.
353
32 . NUDGING CHARITIES TO BALANCE THE NEEDS OF THE PRESENT
maintenance of just institutions.23 These savings obligations acted as 
a substitute for and constraint on (rather than application of ) the difference 
principle. Subsequent philosophers have, however, demonstrated that 
distributive principles can be applied to some extent between generations, 
that cooperation can take place between generations and that it is possible 
to transfer resources between generations, even if there are difficulties.24
Of course, in applying distributive principles across generations, one 
has to contend with the issue of choosing between those in need in 
one’s own  generation and those in need in future generations – who 
may potentially be better off, overall. In this context, some writers have 
demonstrated that the principles can discourage both intergenerational 
‘dissaving’ and saving.25 Therefore, some theorists have favoured 
Benthamite-type utilitarian approaches to maximising social welfare 
across generations, which take less account of distributive justice and 
encourage greater saving.26 
Intergenerational justice has also been interpreted as requiring that the 
current generation avoid the pursuit of benefits that would impose costs 
on future generations, where to do so would result in the world being 
handed on in a lesser state to future generations, or in a state that fails 
to meet ‘sufficientarian’ standards for members of future generations.27 
Such approaches may be based on distributive justice or on notions 
of sustainability. However, sustainability principles can themselves 
be conceived of in distributional terms, or otherwise incorporate 
distributional matters.28 
Finally, conceptions of intergenerational justice that derive from Rawlsian 
notions of justice are concerned with the rules for society’s basic structure 
and hence do not directly apply to actions taken by societal associations 
such as charities. Accordingly, if guidance was to be obtained from 
23  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Clarendon Press, 1972) 285, 291–93.
24  Janna Thompson, Intergenerational Justice: Rights and Responsibilities in an Intergenerational 
Polity (Routledge, 2009) 117; Tremmel, above n 19. 
25  Gaspart and Gosseries, above n 20, 203–4, 209, 211–12 (once society has accumulated sufficient 
capital to establish just institutions). Cf Birnbacher, above n 20, 34.
26  See, for example, Birnbacher, above n 20, 32–33.
27  See, for example, Lukas Meyer, ‘Intergenerational Justice’, in Edward Zalta (ed), Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 edn), plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/justice-
intergenerational/ (sufficientarianism relates to whether persons are below a threshold of harm); Peter 
Laslett, ‘Is There a Generational Contract?’ in Peter Laslett and James S Fishkin (eds), Justice Between 
Age Groups and Generations (Yale University Press, 1992) 24, 29–30, 44–45.
28  Tremmel, above n 19, 7–9, Chs 1–2.
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a Rawlsian notion of justice, then its requirements may need to shape 
charity law itself – viewed as part of the basic structure.29 Alternatively, they 
may inform the principles of ‘local justice’30 that ought to be considered 
by charity controllers. Certainly, intergenerational justice has been used 
as a moral guide to the actions of private and governmental actors under 
a basic structure as well as to the formation of that structure.31
B. Implementing obligations
There are significant practical and theoretical impediments to 
implementing obligations based on theories of intergenerational justice. 
The practical difficulties include the potential need for charity controllers 
to take account of other systems for achieving distributive justice, the most 
significant being the state’s role in collecting and redistributing assets. 
Would intergenerational justice demand that charities be compelled to 
conserve assets so as to counterbalance insufficient governmental regard 
for future generations? How would charity controllers determine this? 
Equally, charity controllers would have to consider whether future 
generations might be wealthier and so potentially less deserving of 
resources, although they must also consider whether the particular 
benefits they bestow will become comparatively more expensive with 
time. Charity controllers would also need to compare the costs and 
benefits, over time, of the alternative courses of action being considered. 
There are tools that can assist. In particular, while it has limits, welfare 
economics can provide insights into how to maximise social welfare in 
pursuit of an intergenerational equity distributional preference. It does 
so by using a social welfare function that applies to the aggregate utilities 
of individuals across generations.32 For instance, this can help account for 
economic growth by discounting future utilities on the assumption that 
individuals will derive lower marginal utility from additional consumption 
enabled by the transfer.
29  Cf John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press, 2001) 10–12.
30  See, for example, Jon Elster, ‘Local Justice’ (1991) 35(2–3) European Economic Review 273.
31  See, for example, Thompson, above n 24, 125–27, 150–59; Birnbacher, above n 20, 26; Michael 
Klausner, ‘When Time Isn’t Money: Foundation Payout Rates and the Time Value of Money’ (2003) 
1(1) Stanford Social Innovation Review 51. 
32  See, for example, Broadway and Keen, above n 20, 680–83.
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There is also a key theoretical difficulty. As discussed above, notions of 
what intergenerational justice requires may legitimately differ. However, 
there are some commonalities to the theories, such as the implication that 
neither current nor future persons have a moral priority over the other 
and the notion that intergenerational justice is concerned with meeting 
basic social and economic needs of members of society. 
In light of the above factors, and cognisant of the charity law goal of 
pursuing charitable objects independently of government,33 it seems 
inappropriate for the state to deal with intergenerational justice by 
mandating minimum distribution or savings rates. A limit on the 
duration of charities would also involve state intervention and would 
operate, at least in the lead up to the termination date, analogously to 
a minimum distribution requirement. Equally, the state should not 
delegate the temporal question of how much a particular charity ought to 
spend or save to a regulator like the ATO. Broadening the circumstances 
in which cy-près is available to encompass breaches of intergenerational 
justice would not only be a drastic alteration to those principles, but, 
because of the breadth of intergenerational justice and of the relevant 
factors, intergenerational decision-making would likewise be delegated to 
another arm of government – the courts.
Nevertheless, ensuring that charity controllers consider issues of 
intergenerational justice, as reasonably understood by the controllers, is 
consistent with the aims of charity law and with the theories and tools 
available. This could be achieved by interpreting the existing governance 
duty to give genuine consideration as requiring this step. Alternatively, the 
duty could be explicitly incorporated in legislation, perhaps similarly to 
s 172 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK) which requires a director to have 
regard to a range of specified matters in ‘act[ing] in the way he considers, in 
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company’. 
Either method could be twinned with a requirement to report on the 
levels of, and reasons for, retained assets, as in England and Wales where 
most registered charities that prepare accruals-based accounts need to 
report on reserves and reserves policies.34
33  This aim would be trumped by principles of justice that delineate the basic structure, if that is 
how the moral theory is implemented.
34  Charity Commission, Charity Reserves, Guidance CC19, January 2016, 9–10.
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A further step could be adopted if disclosure proves inadequate in 
conjunction with the duty identified above. It may prove inadequate 
if the costs involved in applying principles of intergenerational justice 
are too high for charity controllers and the regulator. If so, there may be 
grounds for ‘nudging’35 charity controllers by setting a default rule from 
which the charity controllers could choose to opt out. For instance, the 
default rule could involve a safe harbour default minimum distribution 
rate, such as one that is roughly consistent with generational neutrality for 
the relevant charity, in that it neither provides for saving nor dissaving. 
The current ancillary fund minimum distribution rates are likely close 
to such neutrality. 
V. Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the practical and theoretical need for 
guidance on the time at which charities are expected to produce a public 
benefit from resources that they presently hold. In essence, the question 
is the extent to which the present generation should forego benefits 
in favour of future generations. Intergenerational justice has been 
identified as a  possible theoretical base upon which decisions can be 
made, albeit there are impediments, including the range of theories of 
intergenerational justice.
Accordingly, the reform advocated is a process-focused approach which 
requires charity controllers to actively consider the interests of current 
and future generations, applying any reasonably open conception of 
intergenerational justice. Coupled with disclosure requirements, this 
reform could be adopted by incorporating it within the duty to exercise 
powers with genuine consideration, or by explicitly legislating such a duty 
for charity controllers. If the approach proves inadequate, for instance 
because it is too costly for charity controllers and regulators, then it could 
be implemented in conjunction with a safe harbour, such as a default 
minimum distribution rate.
35  Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge (Penguin, revised edn, 2009).
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Voluntary Voting for Referendums 
in Australia: Old Wine, New Bottle
Graeme Orr1
Voter turnout: to compel or not to compel? The question of compulsion 
in elections has been a perennial in Australia. In the 1960s Professor 
Joan  Rydon said, in opposition to compulsory voting, that where 
‘the apathetic and ill-informed are forced to the polls by law, it is even 
more likely that the “scum and dregs” of political life will decide who is 
to govern the country’.2 Affirming compulsory voting’s hoary status as 
‘contentious’, recent years have witnessed failed attempts to argue that 
it is unconstitutional,3 and to legislatively reverse it.4
Rydon and the libertarians have not won the day. Compulsory voting 
– introduced to this country in stages from 1915 – remains the law of 
the land. Curiously, compulsion first entered at a national level not via 
elections, but via a kind of referendum, the first conscription plebiscite 
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
360
during World War I.5 As long as the major parties support it, whether out 
of democratic principle or because it saves them the cost of ‘getting out 
the vote’, compulsion will be a fixture of Australian elections. Reinforcing 
Australia’s reputation as a pragmatic, Benthamite society rather than 
a rights-oriented one, opinion polls reveal consistent, strong support for 
electoral compulsion.6 
Such contented stasis, however, belies a ferment. All is far from well 
in electoral democracy across the ‘advanced democracies’. Symptoms 
include increased electoral volatility and declining faith in representative 
government. We might argue about the causes – economic stagnation 
or social atomisation? We might even argue whether these are problems 
needing cures, or transitions with positive potential to free-up politics 
from the two-party system. But the signs are not good.
My argument here is that compulsion, an old wine, is desirable for 
elections. But it doesn’t belong in the referendum bottle. Compulsion at 
elections makes sense because:
• Everyone has an interest in day-to-day governance.
• The promise of the ballot is to ensure those interests are heard, through 
regular elections. There is evidence that, over time, compulsion leads 
to greater turnout of marginalised groups and that this can generate 
more egalitarian policy as politicians need to consider a broader range 
of social interests.7
• The ultimate pragmatic purpose of elections, at least in Australia, 
is to turn over or recall governments and MPs. As tapestries for 
deliberation, elections are open-ended and cannot be reduced to 
‘education campaigns’, as is the ideal in referendums.8 
5  Compulsory Voting Act 1915 (Cth). In the end, plebiscites were held in 1916 and again in 1917 
under voluntary voting. Earlier in 1915, compulsion had been introduced for Queensland elections: 
Elections Act 1915 (Qld) s 63.
6  Between 1998 and 2013, support for compulsory voting ranged from a low of 69.5 per cent in 
2010 to a high of 76.7 per cent in 2007 (source, AES exit polls).
7  As postulated by Arend Lijphart, ‘Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma’ 
(1997) 91 American Political Science Review 1. For empirical support, see John M Carey and Yusaku 
Horiuchi, ‘Compulsory Voting and Income Inequality’ (2017) 59 Latin American Politics and Society 
122, a study of effects in Latin America and studies cited there.
8  Graeme Orr, ‘Deliberation and Electoral Law’ (2013) 12 Election Law Journal 421.
361
33 . VOLUNTARy VOTING FOR REFERENDUMS IN AUSTRALIA
• Contrary to Rydon, but echoing the cliché that even a dog knows 
the difference between being tripped over and kicked, under-informed 
voters do not undermine the purposes of electoral democracy. Low-
information electors act rationally when they adopt heuristics such as 
‘Are we better off than three years ago?’ or ‘Do I trust leader X more 
than Y?’
• As elections are secular rituals which help bind societies, there may be 
communitarian and symbolic reasons to compel turnout.9
These and other arguments about compulsion in elections are well assayed 
elsewhere.10 The novel – hence ‘law reform’ – part of this argument relates 
to referendums. So referendums will be our focus. In what follows I will 
briefly outline the reasoning behind changing referendum law to make 
voting voluntary. To concretise the issue I will also relate a case study, 
about the most recent constitutional referendum, held in Queensland 
in March 2016. It shows how compulsion can exacerbate manipulative 
referendum processes.
I will argue, first, that Australian referendums tend to be on matters 
of law, especially constitutional law. Constitutional law is meta-law. 
It is not reasonable to expect everyone to care, let alone have a sensible 
view about such issues. Second, compulsory voting at such referendums 
is a conservative, not egalitarian force, helping to stall constitutional 
amendment. And, finally, there are no ‘legitimacy’ reasons to compel mass 
turnout at referendums. 
I. The Argument against Compulsion 
at Referendums
Tracking the summary above, there are three planks to the argument. 
First, constitutional law is meta-law. It is unreasonable to expect, let alone 
demand, that all electors address themselves sensibly to such issues. Elites 
often respond to this simple insight by bemoaning ignorance of the law 
9  Graeme Orr, Ritual and Rhythm in Electoral Systems: A Comparative Legal Account (Routledge-
Ashgate, 2015).
10  For example, Jason Brennan and Lisa Hill, Compulsory Voting: For and Against (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). Arguments for compulsion in elections are comprehensively made in a body 
of work by Lisa Hill.
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and calling for more ‘education’. The road to ‘Getting to Yes’ is to be paved 
with more civics education and greater spending on public information 
before and during referendum campaigns.11
There is something valiant, but a little vain, in such calls. Public 
education on particular referendum proposals may be valuable. But there 
is a naïve presumption, emanating from a university- and often legally-
educated class, that because people like us find public law fascinating and 
fundamental, all people should. Combined with compulsory turnout, the 
approach seems to be that institutions and laws can not only lead horses 
to water, but make them drink it too.
The position might be different if Australia relied on citizens-initiated 
referendums (CIR) to legislate specific social or policy issues, as do some 
US jurisdictions. Clearly there are social issues, of such common concern 
or import, where it is not just reasonable but likely that most electors will 
have well-reflected, ‘values’ based responses. But the odd plebiscite on 
issues like daylight savings – or on marriage equality, as mooted for 2017 
– aside, CIR is not part of our tradition. If we governed ourselves through 
CIR alongside electing representatives, then arguments for compulsion at 
elections might apply.
Second, compulsory voting at such referendums is a conservative, not 
egalitarian force. That is, in a stable and well-off jurisdiction like Australia, 
compulsion is a small-‘c’ conservative method. In election campaigns, 
outside times of electoral volatility, it tends to dampen swings against 
incumbents regardless of the party concerned.12 
In referendums, however, it makes no sense to insist on a conservative 
method like compulsion. It gives a free-kick to ‘No’ campaigns to run 
a ‘When in doubt, throw it out’ campaign,13 of the sort Williams and 
Hume aptly characterise as ‘Don’t know? Vote “no”’.14 If the constitutional 
11  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, A Time for 
Change: ‘Yes’/ ‘No’: Inquiry into the Machinery of Referendums (Parliament of Australia, 2009) Chs 4–5 
illustrate this thinking.
12  I discuss the reasons for this in ‘Compulsory Voting: Elections, Not Referendums’ (2011) 18 
Pandora’s Box 19.
13  The ‘When in doubt …’ slogan was a centerpiece of the anti-Republic campaign in 1999. 
14  George Williams and David Hume, People Power: The History and Future of the Referendum 
in Australia (UNSW Press, 2010) 253.
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status quo requires protection, this should be explicit, say via some super-
majority requirement.15 Such brakes on constitutional reform should not 
be introduced unintentionally via compulsion. 
Australia suffers constitutional stasis, not constitutional recklessness. 
Removing compulsion would remove one unnecessary barrier to much 
needed constitutional modernisation. Former Chief Justice Mason 
identified ‘ignorance of the Constitution, now a well-documented fact’ 
as an inducement to ‘no’ cases.16
But lest it be thought that my conclusions are motivated by ‘progressive’ 
bias, I offer the following response. Any presumption that compulsion 
at Australian elections benefits parties of the left over parties of the right 
is unproven. Indeed, in its tendency to reinforce the status quo it may 
simply reinforce exogenous political advantages, such as Labor’s at state 
level (dominated by concerns about service delivery) and the conservative 
Coalition’s at national level (demarked by a focus on national security 
and public finance). When it comes to policy, history shows that the 
great waves of progressive reforms in the common law world happened 
in Australia under compulsion at roughly similar times as they occurred 
under voluntary voting in New Zealand and the UK. This implies that 
political culture is more likely to be determinative of policy outcomes 
than differences in the voting system.
Third, once it is appreciated that referendums are quite different beasts 
to elections, the claim that compulsory voting ‘legitimises’ outcomes 
unravels. Representative government directly impacts everybody’s life, 
every day. Few referendum questions do. It is a category error – as well 
as an historical and structural misstatement – to assert that because 
‘constitutional changes can alter Australia’s democratic structure, it can be 
argued that the duty to vote in referendums is greater than the duty to vote 
in ordinary elections’.17 Australia’s Constitution is largely process oriented 
and focused on Commonwealth–state powers, without even an explicit 
separation of powers let alone a focus on democratic rights. As a result, 
far from embracing momentous questions, referendums have most often 
concerned attempts to enhance particular Commonwealth powers.
15  The double majority rule in the Constitution s 128 is such a rule. 
16  Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Towards 2001 – Minimalism, Monarchism or Metamorphism’ (1995) 21 
Monash University Law Review 1 at 7.
17  Williams and Hume, above n 14, 49. In similar (muddle-headed) vein, see Sir Isaac Isaacs, 
A Stepping Stone to Greater Freedom (1946) 8–9.
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Other referendums have been on issues of legal significance, but of 
relatively minor import to electors generally, like the 1977 vote on 
judges’ retiring ages. Important machinery questions, on which all 
sides of politics agree need constitutional reform – such as the sclerotic 
restrictions on who can be an MP under s 44 of the Constitution – lie 
marooned like rusting vessels. It is feared that putting their reform to 
a referendum will encounter voter cynicism about the cost or importance 
of the question. Similar fears led to the abandonment of the long process 
to hold a  referendum to constitutionally recognise local government. 
If  referendum voting were not compulsory, the argument that ‘it’s not 
a bread and butter priority’ would have less traction.
Of course a few referendums do profoundly implicate questions of 
identity, notably referendums about secession.18 The one true secession 
referendum, in Western Australia in 1933, was conducted under 
compulsory voting.19 But, as the very high turnout at the 1916 conscription 
plebiscite in Australia and the 2015 Scottish independence referendum 
demonstrated,20 the momentous nature of such unusual referendums 
ensures high participation without legal compulsion.
For their part, state constitutions are largely flexible. Whether a state holds 
a referendum depends on political strategies and the happenstance of what 
issues relating to the ‘constitution or powers’ of state governments and 
parliaments have been entrenched. Territory constitutions are not even 
autonomous: they are still merely acts of the Commonwealth Parliament. 
A. When referendums go wrong – Queensland 2016
The most recent referendum on these shores was the March 2016 vote on 
whether to entrench fixed, four-year terms in Queensland’s constitution.21 
The proposal was supported by both major parties and three independents, 
representing 87 of 89 parliamentarians in Queensland’s unicameral system. 
It was also supported by major business and union leaders. Against were 
the minor parties and various academics, civil libertarians, lawyers and 
commentators.22 The ‘no’ case was not, on the whole, against fixed terms. 
18  Voting about new states or state boundaries is distinct from s 128. Indeed such votes are really 
plebiscites as they are not mandated by the Constitution.
19  Secession Referendum Act 1932 (WA) s 5(2).
20  82.8 per cent and 84.6 per cent of electors respectively.
21  Constitution (Fixed Term Parliament) Amendment Bill 2015 (Qld).
22  Disclosure: I assisted the ‘No’ case publicly in this referendum.
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Rather, it objected to longer terms without any compensating checks or 
balances in a state with no upper house, no proportional representation, 
no charter of rights and just one state-wide newspaper. Although the 
campaign was a Goliath vs David one, the referendum only succeeded 
52.8 per cent to 47.2 per cent. 
What makes this referendum of interest was its risible process. The Bill 
was passed in a day, on the final sitting before Christmas. The poll was 
called, at barely five weeks’ notice, to coincide with local government 
election day. And the ‘Yes’ case consisted largely of appeals to authority 
(recommendations by party, business and union leaders) rather than more 
valid forms of argument. 
Part of the gamble of the referendum lay in a hurried process with 
minimal public education. The only formal voter education was the early-
20th century mechanism of 1,000-word ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ pamphlets, delivered 
to households. Electoral Commission staff even reported electors turning 
up to cast their local government ballot, unaware a referendum was being 
held.23
At the heart of the problem with the process was the bundling of two 
related but separable issues into a single question. People were not asked 
whether they wanted ‘fixed’ terms, and/or ‘longer terms’. If they had, 
the answer would have been clear. Fixed terms provide stability and 
depoliticise election dates, but shorter terms enhance democratic input 
and accountability. And so it was that polling, for a public sector union 
that supported longer terms, showed that a sizeable majority of citizens 
wanted fixed terms yet a similar majority wanted to keep shorter terms. 
Electors’ democratic instincts and values were keen. But those who framed 
the question wanted longer terms above all, so an attractive option was 
bundled with an unattractive option to skew the outcome.
23 Graeme Orr and Samara Cassar, ‘When Referendums Go Wrong – Queensland’s 2016 Fixed Four-
Year Term Proposal’ (2016) 31 Australasian Parliamentary Review 161, 165.
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How does this relate to compulsory voting at referendums? A proponent 
for compulsion might retort that this example shows the importance of 
a long lead-time and consultative discussion and information, to till the 
field of public consciousness. And of more debate about how questions 
are framed, and separated or bundled.24 But here is the rub. 
There was no need for a referendum on fixed terms. Only the length of 
the parliamentary term was entrenched in Queensland’s constitution (and 
for good historical reason). Yet what amount of public education would 
it take to explain the nature of ‘manner and form entrenchment’ in state 
constitutional practice? Even MPs, highly literate political journalists and 
otherwise well-read law students were ignorant of the distinction between 
flexible and entrenched state constitutional issues. What chance regular 
citizens? On such fine points of constitutional procedure rested the fate 
of this referendum. 
II. Conclusion: Reform
In public law, the dazzle or heft of constitutional issues usually gain 
more attention than the nitty-gritty of statutory and administrative 
law.25 This  was the case until relatively recently in the law of politics. 
Unsurprisingly, it remains especially so in relation to constitutional 
reform. After all, the machinery of referendums is hardly as interesting 
as the principles and purposes informing referendums. Of more interest 
are substantive debates about reform, like the Republic, or Indigenous 
‘recognition’. Recently there has emerged a burgeoning literature on 
whether and how referendums might become more deliberatively rich 
democratic exercises.26 Intriguingly these deliberative concerns are folding 
back into machinery questions.27 
24  Some US state constitutions insist that referendums and initiatives ‘shall embrace but one 
subject’. In Queensland the issues were related but separable. They deserved two questions, albeit on 
the same ballot.
25  Graeme Orr, ‘Teaching Public Law: Content, Context and Coherence’ (2015) 25 Legal 
Education Review 299 at 307.
26  For example, Paul Kildea ‘A Little More Conversation? Assessing the Capacity of Citizens 
to Deliberate About Constitutional Reform in Australia’ (2013) 22 Griffith Law Review 291.
27 For example, Ron Levy, ‘Deliberative Voting: Realising Constitutional Referendum Democracy’ 
[2013]  Public Law 555; Rodney Smith and Paul Kildea, ‘The Challenge of Informed Voting 
at Constitutional Referendums’ (2016) 39 University of New South Wales Law Journal 341.
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My argument is not about deliberation as such. Voluntary voting would 
likely affect deliberation for better and for worse. To be implemented 
seriously, voluntary voting at referendums would have to be accompanied 
by a rule that referendums not coincide with elections, where compulsion 
would remain. This would partly disentangle partisan politics from 
referendum campaigns. 
There is also the potential that campaigns under voluntary voting may 
focus more on turning out the already committed than on ‘educating’ 
the broader electorate. If that is a risk at referendums, I would venture to 
suggest it will only arise in instances of ‘big ticket’ constitutional reform, 
where it will be mitigated by the fact that turnout will naturally be higher. 
In any event, the risk just gives us more reason to strengthen the non-
partisan, publicly funded cases at referendum time, as well as learn from 
overseas, especially UK, experience on the importance of limiting third-
party campaigns at constitutional referendums.
My argument also diverges completely from arguments against compulsory 
voting on libertarian grounds (arguments that reached a bemusing height 
in an article titled ‘It’s an Evil Thing to Oblige People to Vote’28). Rather, 
mine is an institutionalist position. Referendums in this country are 
proposals for a particular type of law reform, and it is neither reasonable 
nor fair to attempt to require people be concerned about such proposals.
With climate change bearing down upon us, it may not be kosher to 
perpetuate the metaphor of Australia being ‘constitutionally speaking … 
the frozen continent’.29 But voluntary voting at referendums might just 
melt a little of that rigid ice. It would certainly avoid giving the status 
quo ‘No’ case a head-start with ‘If in doubt, kick it out’ slogans. As the 
Queensland case study showed, voluntary voting may also take some sting 
out of manipulative processes by those proposing referendum questions.
The reform advocated here is of the ‘suck it and see’ variety. Some will try to 
argue that constitutional reform is on a deeper or more fundamental plane 
than electing representatives. To which I would ask ‘more fundamental 
28  Derek Chong et al (2005–6) 21(4) Policy 10. For a refutation of the libertarian position, see Lisa 
Hill, ‘On the Reasonableness of Compelling Citizens to “Vote”: The Australian Case’ (2002) Political 
Studies 80. As the scarequotes around ‘Vote’ in Hill’s title imply, in any secret ballot the compulsion is 
not to vote, but to turn out: see Faderson v Bridger (1971) 126 CLR 271 at 272. It would be preferable 
if ballots said ‘you do not have to record a valid vote’, a la former Electoral Act 1985 (SA) s 85(2).
29  Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (Melbourne University Press, 1967).
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to whom?’ Most people live lives in the concrete present. The question 
of who will wield executive and legislative power in the coming term of 
government is a pressing question. Constitutional law may or may not 
indirectly matter to them, but it is too much to demand that everyone 
participate in its enactment. In any event, if constitutional legitimacy has 
to be grounded in maximum turnout it is ironic, to say the least, that the 
creation of a federal Australia was achieved through voluntary voting.30 
That process, for all its racial and class flaws, is valorised today as a rare 
example of a nation born out of peaceful deliberation rather than violence 
or neo-colonial struggle. Today’s struggle, in contrast, is not to give 
birth to a new constitution, but to modernise our creaky constitutional 
structures. Such legal questions require citizen voice and participation, 
but not mandatory turnout.
30  The data is captured in Glenn Rhodes, Votes for Australia: How Colonials Voted at the 1899–1900 
Federation Referendums (CAPSM, Griffith University, 2002).
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This chapter proposes that Australia’s constitutional reform process 
could be reformed through the use of citizen-led conventions with broad 
remits to consider a range of constitutional issues. It sets out the case for 
this reform by answering three questions: why should we think about 
reforming the constitutional reform process, what is wrong with the 
current process, and how can it be improved?
II. Why Should We Think about Reforming 
the Constitutional Reform Process?
There are a number of important issues in contemporary Australian life 
that have a constitutional dimension and are the subject of discussions that 
include options for change. Federalism, the protection of fundamental 
human rights and the recognition of Indigenous persons are three 
prominent examples where the options for change are an integral part 
of the conversation. There are also other issues where analysis often takes 
a normative bent such as the process by which major international treaties 
are drafted, ratified and implemented (e.g. the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
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Agreement) and the mechanisms for holding to account private 
companies that perform public functions (e.g. the operation of overseas 
immigration detention facilities). Due to their constitutional dimensions, 
consideration of the full range of options for change requires putting the 
possibility of constitutional amendment on the table. 
Constitutional amendment will not always be the preferred option for 
change, but any discussion where the possibility is foreclosed will be 
partial and, consequently, substandard. An illustration is the National 
Human Rights Consultation Committee, which was established in 
2008 to investigate how Australia could better protect and promote 
human rights, but was precluded from recommending a constitutionally 
entrenched bill of rights.2 Taking constitutional amendment off the table 
not only eliminated one option from consideration, but also confined the 
range of other options that could be proposed. The committee’s discussion 
of the different types of statutory bills of rights was limited by the fact 
that certain models might be precluded by the Constitution’s separation 
of powers doctrine.3 The protection of fundamental human rights is an 
issue that has seen a large degree of innovation in recent decades,4 yet the 
committee was unable to consider the full range of options and determine 
which one might be the most appropriate for Australia once the possibility 
of constitutional amendment was taken off the table. The committee’s 
proposed set of reforms reflected these constraints. The reforms were so 
modest in scope that the committee and academic commentators found 
it difficult to identify what, as a practical matter, they would change.5
Even when constitutional amendment is put on the table, the difficulty 
of securing an amendment tends to confine the conversation by focusing 
on the most modest options for change. More ambitious proposals are 
dismissed not on their merits, but instead due to the common belief 
that anything more than the most modest change will be defeated at 
a referendum. We saw this dynamic emerge in the debate on constitutional 
recognition of Indigenous persons. Efforts were made to direct the 
2  National Human Rights Consultation, Report (September 2009) Appendix A.
3  Ibid. 373–76.
4  See, for example, Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory 
and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Scott Stephenson, From Dialogue to Disagreement in 
Comparative Rights Constitutionalism (Federation Press, 2016).
5  Scott Stephenson, ‘Constitutional Reengineering: Dialogue’s Migration from Canada to 
Australia’ (2013) 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 870, 889–93.
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conversation – contrary to the wishes of many Indigenous persons6 – 
towards the most modest proposals (e.g. to include a declaration in the 
Preamble to the Constitution) and away from more ambitious proposals 
(e.g. to include a legally enforceable non-discrimination provision) on 
the ground that the latter would not survive the Constitution’s difficult 
amendment procedure.7
Therefore, it is arguable that we should reform the constitutional reform 
process in order (1) to allow the possibility of constitutional amendment 
to be put on the table when discussing issues that the Constitution affects 
and (2) to allow the full range of options for change, including ambitious 
proposals, to be discussed on their merits when constitutional amendment 
is on the table.
III. What Is Wrong With the Constitutional 
Reform Process?
It is tempting to attribute the abovementioned trends solely to the 
difficulty of Australia’s constitutional amendment procedure. After all, it 
is understandable that one would want to keep constitutional amendment 
off the table or, if it is put on the table, to focus on modest proposals if 
the likelihood of success is low. And it is beyond doubt that Australia’s 
constitutional amendment procedure is difficult. Prime Minister Robert 
Menzies’ colourful comment captures this widely shared view: ‘The truth 
of the matter is that to get an affirmative vote from the Australian people 
on a referendum proposal is one of the labours of Hercules’.8 Comparative 
constitutional analysis confirms his statement, with Australia having one 
of the world’s most difficult constitutions to amend.9 However, I argue 
that the difficulty thesis is too simple. It supplies only part of the picture.
6  See, for example, Megan Davis and Marcia Langton (ed), It’s Our Country: Indigenous Arguments 
for Meaningful Constitutional Recognition and Reform (Melbourne University Press, 2016).
7  Paul Kelly, ‘To Succeed, Indigenous Recognition Must Be Handled Deftly’, The Australian, 
10 September 2014, www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/paul-kelly/to-succeed-indigenous-
recognition-referendum-must-be-handled-deftly/news-story/cd0fbee39cde82ac00297 ecc9fa4bd6d.
8  Quoted in Leslie Finlay Crisp, Australian National Government (Longman Cheshire, 5th edn, 
1983) 40.
9  George Williams and David Hume, People Power: The History and Future of the Referendum 
in Australia (UNSW Press, 2010) 11.
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The other part of the picture is the ease of the constitutional amendment 
procedure. When a constitutional amendment procedure becomes so 
difficult that it is unworkable in practice, institutional actors will be 
inclined to start again and install a new procedure – perhaps even in 
violation of the existing procedure – as has been the case in countries 
such as Canada and the US.10 Australia has not reached this point. 
The country’s small number of successful constitutional amendments – 
eight since 1901 – appears to have convinced most institutional actors 
and scholars that the reform process is fundamentally sound and that all 
that is required is better execution. This explains why many proposals 
for reform of the constitutional reform process are modest suggestions 
that focus on issues of implementation such as greater education of the 
public and more bipartisanship.11 These are valuable suggestions that are 
worthy of implementation, but they are arguably insufficient to remedy 
the problem that emerges once we put together both parts of the picture 
– the ease and difficulty theses.
Australia’s history of constitutional amendment demonstrates that it is 
possible to achieve minor or technical change (the ease thesis), but also 
suggests that major change is largely beyond the reach of the current 
process (the difficulty thesis). It has been possible to make a small 
number of amendments to the Constitution since it came into force in 
1901, but most have been minor or technical in character. One possible 
exception is the 1946 amendment granting Commonwealth Parliament 
the power to provide a range of social services, an essential component 
of the welfare state. However, even it was understood as a technical fix 
to secure a function that parliament was already performing rather than 
to give parliament power to undertake a new set of functions.12 Another 
possible exception is the 1967 amendments concerning the treatment 
of Aboriginal people. However, it made only minor modifications in 
10  The US Constitution, including its new amendment procedure, was established in violation of 
the amendment procedure contained in the Articles of Confederation (see Bruce Ackerman, We the 
People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 1991) 41–42) and in 1980 in Canada the Prime Minister, Pierre 
Trudeau, threatened to violate the constitutional convention concerning the procedure for amending 
the Constitution to install a new amendment procedure (see Scott Stephenson, ‘When Constitutional 
Conventions Fail’ (2015) 38 Dublin University Law Journal 447, 459–63).
11  See, for example, Williams and Hume, People Power, above n 9, 239; Graeme Orr, ‘Voluntary 
Voting for Referendums in Australia: Old Wine, New Bottle’, Ch 33.
12  The amendment was spurred by a High Court decision that cast doubts on the head of power on 
which parliament had relied: Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237.
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substantive terms,13 altering which level of government could legislate 
with respect to Aboriginal people and allowing Aboriginal people to be 
counted in the census. It did not, for instance, give them the right to vote 
(already by then granted through ordinary legislation), recognise them 
as the first inhabitants of Australia or prohibit racial discrimination.
Major amendment is a different form of constitutional change than 
minor or technical amendment because the former requires public 
ownership of the amendment process – it is not merely fixing an error or 
oversight, but changing the nature of the bargain that is struck between 
the government and the people. If the people do not understand the new 
bargain to be one that they have authored, there is ample reason for them 
to use the power given to them by the referendum requirement in s 128 
to reject it. Therefore, the referendum requirement is not equivalent to, or 
a substitute for, public ownership of the amendment process. It ensures 
that the people get a chance to ratify a proposal, but it does not ensure 
that they have any say over the identity or content of the proposal. 
When examining the constitutional reform process through the lens of 
public ownership, Australia has an unimpressive record albeit with some 
exceptions. The Australian Constitutional Convention convened from 
1973 to 1985 exemplifies the historical tendency to adopt an exclusive 
rather than inclusive process to the authorship of amendment proposals. 
It was comprised solely of representatives from government and, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, split along the same party lines that exist in the legislative 
chambers.14 The Constitutional Commission established in 1985 was 
scarcely any better, comprised of a group of unelected and unrepresentative 
political and legal elites such as former Prime Ministers and Governors-
General. However, the commission did take some steps to include the 
people in the process, conducting public hearings across the country 
and inviting written submissions.15 The people nevertheless had no 
direct role in contributing to the identity or content of the commission’s 
proposals – they were outsiders rather than insiders. The Constitutional 
Convention commissioned in 1998 to consider whether Australia should 
become a republic was a significant improvement over prior efforts: half 
of the delegates were elected by a voluntary postal vote while the other 
13  This is not to deny the symbolic importance of the events in 1967, especially as the proposal 
received the support of almost 91 per cent of the electorate.
14  Williams and Hume, People Power, above n 9, 28.
15  Ibid. 30.
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half were appointed by government in consultation with other groups.16 
This format had its shortcomings – in particular, the Convention focused 
on a single issue and thus most of the elected volunteers were prominent 
public figures with strong views on the issue of republicanism to the 
exclusion of ordinary members of the public. But it nevertheless helped 
generate an unprecedented level of popular interest and involvement in 
the constitutional amendment process. For instance, large numbers of 
people watched the Convention’s proceedings in person and on television.
IV. How Can the Constitutional Reform 
Process Be Improved?
The Irish Constitutional Convention held from 2012 to 2014 demonstrates 
the scope for innovation with respect to the constitutional reform process. 
My argument is not that Australia should slavishly follow the Irish model, 
but that it should prompt Australia to reconsider how, and the extent 
to which, the public can be included in the process of determining the 
identity and content of proposals for major constitutional amendment. 
The Irish Constitutional Convention was established to consider eight 
areas of reform, including the voting age, the electoral system, same-sex 
marriage and the participation of women in politics, as well as any other 
relevant constitutional amendments that it recommended. It had 100 
members: a chairperson, 33 legislators and 66 citizens of Ireland randomly 
selected in a manner designed to reflect the age, geographical and gender 
balance of the electorate. The government did not commit to proceeding 
with the Convention’s recommendations, but did commit to respond 
formally to each recommendation and to debate it in the legislature.
The Convention met over 10 weekends for a day and a half each time.17 
Sessions included presentations by experts of papers which had been 
circulated in advance, debates between groups advocating on either 
side of an issue, and roundtable discussions before votes were taken. 
The Convention considered two additional subjects (reform of the 
lower house and the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights) 
and issued nine reports, containing a range of recommendations. 
The government has responded to six of the reports thus far, and put two 
16  Ibid. 183.
17  Tom Arnold, ‘Inside the Convention on the Constitution’, The Irish Times, 1 April 2014, 
www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/inside-the-convention-on-the-constitution-1.1744924.
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of its recommendations to the people at a referendum held on 22 March 
2015. One recommendation, the legalisation of same-sex marriage, was 
accepted and the other, the reduction in the age of eligibility for the 
president, was rejected.
The Irish Constitutional Convention contains two principal insights 
that are relevant to Australia. First, it demonstrates that it is possible to 
bring the people into the constitutional reform process in a direct and 
significant way. Ordinary members of the public were given a seat at the 
table rather than, for example, an invitation to make submissions, and 
constituted a majority of the Convention, giving their views considerable 
weight. Second, it demonstrates the potential value of establishing 
a forum that has a broad remit to consider a range of constitutional issues. 
Constitutions are interconnected instruments that make it difficult and 
even problematic to consider issues in isolation. A convention with a wide 
agenda or a power to investigate (or recommend the investigation of ) 
additional issues can take a holistic approach to reform. For example, 
the Irish Constitutional Convention used its final report to recommend 
a second convention to examine, among other things, reform of the 
legislature’s upper house to complement its recommendations for reform 
of the lower house. Further, this format helps reduce problems associated 
with participants being strongly committed to a single issue, by requiring 
compromise and engagement across multiple issues.
Most reflections on the Irish Constitutional Convention have been 
positive, with commentators suggesting that it demonstrates that ordinary 
citizens can engage with complex constitutional issues in an enthusiastic 
and sophisticated manner and that this format can produce real and 
radical change.18 While it has not escaped criticism, most of the problems 
that have been identified relate to the way in which it was set up rather 
than the concept of citizen-led constitutional reform.19 For example, some 
criticisms include that the government was under no obligation to put 
the Convention’s recommendations to the people, that there was a lack of 
18  Ivana Bacik, ‘Can a Constitutional Convention Offer Real and Radical Change?’, LSE Blog, 15 
December 2014, blogs.lse.ac.uk/constitutionuk/2014/12/15/can-a-constitutional-convention-offer-
real-and-radical-change/. See also Matthew Wall, ‘Change We Can Believe In? Ireland’s Constitutional 
Convention Has Delivered’, TheJournal.ie, 23 July 2013, www.thejournal.ie/readme/column-change-
we-canbelieve-in-ireland%E2%80%99s-constitutional-convention-has-delivered-1003278-Jul2013/; 
David Farrell, ‘The Irish Constitutional Convention Offers a Potential Route-Map for Renewing UK 
Democracy’, Democratic Audit UK, 10 October 2014, www.democraticaudit.com/?p=8625.
19  But cf Eoin Carolan, ‘Ireland’s Constitutional Convention: Behind the Hype about Citizen-Led 
Constitutional Change’ (2015) 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 733.
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balance in the ‘expert’ material put before participants and the insufficient 
resources allocated to the Convention.20 These issues point to a final lesson 
for Australia from the Irish experience: the details matter.
It is not the case that any participatory forum – irrespective of its design – 
will help generate public ownership of the constitutional reform process. 
Instead, it must be a forum that is established and executed in a way that 
renders it democratic (i.e. the forum is comprised in a way that represents 
the people) and deliberative (i.e. the forum is structured in a way that 
the people’s views are heard and influence the outcome of proceedings). 
A discussion of the full range of considerations that should be taken into 
account to create such a forum is beyond the scope of this chapter, 21 but 
the Irish experience does provide a number of helpful points in this regard. 
For example, the selection process was structured in a way to ensure that 
a representative group of the population was chosen.22 Furthermore, the 
proceedings were structured in a way to minimise the risk that the political 
participants would dominate discussion and to ensure that exchanges 
were open, fair, equal, efficient and collegial.23 
V. Conclusion
A citizen-led convention with a broad remit to consider a range 
of constitutional issues would be a significant but far from radical 
development. As the Irish experience illustrates, large swathes of major 
constitutional reform will not necessarily eventuate. Indeed, the problem 
that I have identified with the current process is not a lack of major 
constitutional amendments. The Australian people are entitled to decide 
that the current arrangements serve them the best. Instead, the problem is 
a lack of opportunities to deliberate the full range of constitutional options 
and, in particular, a lack of opportunities for the people to deliberate which 
options are put on the table – that is, a constitutional reform process that 
they own. The Irish Constitutional Convention provides a contemporary 
example of the scope for innovation in establishing such a process.
20  Ibid. 745–48.
21  For a more detailed discussion of the issues, see Ron Levy, ‘Breaking the Constitutional 
Deadlock: Lessons from Deliberative Experiments in Constitutional Change’ (2010) 34 Melbourne 
University Law Review 805; Paul Kildea, ‘A Little More Conversation? Assessing the Capacity of 
Citizens to Deliberate About Constitutional Reform in Australia’ (2013) 22 Griffith Law Review 291.
22  The selection process was not, however, without its problems: Carolan, ‘Ireland’s Constitutional 
Convention’, above n 19, 741–42.
23  Arnold, ‘Inside the Convention on the Constitution’, above n 17.
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A distinctive feature of Australian constitutionalism is the absence 
(or  near absence) of popular constitutional culture. There is very little 
public deliberation about constitutional law. To the extent that issues 
concerning fundamental legal norms and values are subject to public 
debate, they are infrequently cast in constitutional terms. But is this a bad 
thing? Does Australia need a popular constitutional culture? And if so, 
how might this be cultivated? 
This chapter offers a modest defence of popular constitutional culture 
as a desirable ingredient of constitutional democracy. In the first 
place, a  constitutionally informed citizenry is required to ensure that 
the state’s exercise of public power falls within the parameters of its 
legitimate authority. But even more importantly, I argue, popular 
constitutional culture is required to effectively engage the constitutional 
amendment process, which is itself necessary to keep the Constitution 
up to date and in step with contemporary needs and values so that, 
ultimately, the Constitution can claim authority as our primary source 
of constitutional law.
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After outlining this argument and addressing some possible objections, 
the chapter offers some suggestions for how popular constitutional culture 
might be cultivated. Here I argue that educative measures are insufficient: 
reform requires addressing key features of Australian constitutionalism 
that account for the lack of popular constitutional culture – the absence 
of a central founding moment, and the character of the Constitution as 
a charter of government designed for lawyers rather than a constitution 
of the people.
II. Australian Popular Constitutional Culture 
(or Lack Thereof)
It is generally accepted that Australia lacks a popular constitutional 
culture. By ‘popular constitutional culture’, I mean public deliberation 
about fundamental legal norms and values that is cast in constitutional 
terms. By ‘constitutional terms’, I mean where those norms and values 
are understood not simply as important or desirable, but as governing 
the validity of the exercise of public power, as well as the validity of other 
(ordinary) legal norms. As Elisa Arcioni and Adrienne Stone have recently 
observed, ‘[t]o an extent that would surprise many outside observers, the 
Australian Constitution is not understood to be a repository of shared 
values, is not thought to contain fundamental principles to which the 
citizenry agree or aspire and does not frame public debate’.2 
Why is this so? At the most basic level, it is explained by low levels of 
public knowledge about constitutional law. In constitutional systems 
with written constitutions, public deliberation about constitutional law – 
where it exists – proceeds largely by reference to the written constitution, 
which serves as the primary source of constitutional law. However, it is 
also generally accepted that ordinary Australians have poor knowledge 
about the Constitution, and even low levels of awareness that Australia 
has a written constitution.3 Recent civics education studies confirm this, 
indicating both low levels of constitutional knowledge among school 
2  See Elisa Arcioni and Adrienne Stone, ‘The Small Brown Bird: Values and Aspirations in the 
Australian Constitution’ (2016) 14 International Journal of Constitutional Law 60. Arcioni and Stone’s 
thesis is that Australia doesn’t lack a constitutional culture altogether, but has a ‘modest’ constitutional 
culture, characterised by a ‘disinclination of Australians to turn to their Constitution as a source 
of shared or aspired to values and its consequent reservation to the domain of the specialist’: 63.
3  Civics Expert Group, Whereas the People: Civics and Citizenship Education (Australian 
Government Publication Service, 1994).
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students and low levels of teacher confidence with constitutional law 
topics.4 These studies also indicate that students leave school with only 
the most basic understanding of constitutional change: although most 
know that ‘a referendum’ is a process used to amend the constitution, only 
3 per cent understand the significance and implications of amendment.5
Although this goes some way toward explaining Australia’s lack of 
a popular constitutional culture, there is a deeper explanation based upon 
features of the Constitution itself. The first feature concerns the absence 
of a central founding moment defining fundamental Australian values. 
Although in comparative terms the use of procedures such as conventions 
and referendums at the time is noteworthy, the objects of federation 
were modest. As a result of its genesis as a ‘pragmatic exercise in nation 
building’,6 as well as its historical pedigree as an Act of British Parliament, 
it is fair to say that the Australian Constitution failed to ‘constitute’ the 
Australian people in any meaningful sense.7 The second feature concerns 
the character and content of the Constitution, and notably its lack of 
a bill of rights. The Constitution has been accused of being ‘inaccessible’,8 
and labelled a ‘prosaic document expressed in lawyer’s language’,9 in that 
it concerns topics about powers and structure that have little traction 
with the kind of views that ordinary members of the public hold about 
fundamental legal norms and values.10
These two features of the Constitution suggest that even if there were 
higher-levels of public knowledge about the Constitution, it would still 
be unlikely that members of the public would deliberate over matters 
concerning fundamental legal norms and values in constitutional terms. 
4  Suzanne Mellor, Kerry Kennedy and Lisa Greenwood, Citizenship and Democracy: Australian 
Students’ Knowledge and Beliefs: The IEA Civic Education Study of Fourteen Year Olds (ACER, 2002) 
xviii, 4, 73, 113, 114 (Table 7.10), 115, 122, 151 (Table BS.2), research.acer.edu.au/civics/1/.
5  Julian Fraillon et al, National Assessment Program: Civics and Citizenship Years 6 and 10 Report 
2013 (ACER, 2014) 43, research.acer.edu.au/civics/22.
6  Lael K Weis, ‘What Comparativism Tells Us about Originalism’ (2013) 842 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 842, 850.
7  See Cheryl Saunders, The Constitution of Australia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart, 2011) 27 
(observing that ‘[t]he status of Australia at the time of federation … left the idea of its people oddly 
inchoate’).
8  The Hon Justice Ronald Sackville, ‘The 2003 Term: The Inaccessible Constitution’ (2003) 27 
University of New South Wales Law Review 66.
9  Sir Anthony F Mason, ‘The Australian Constitution in Retrospect and Prospect’, in Robert French, 
Geoffrey Lindell and Cheryl Saunders (eds), Reflections on the Australian Constitution (2003) 8.
10  But see Arcioni and Stone, above n 2. 
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Indeed perhaps the reason that civics lessons on constitutional law fall short 
is that there is too little to inspire interest in the first place: the Constitution 
is too disconnected from our self-understanding as a people.11
III. A Modest Defence of Popular 
Constitutional Culture
A. The prima facie case
Such is the state of popular constitutionalism in Australia. It is a further 
question, however, whether this is an undesirable state of affairs. Some 
might say that Australia gets along fine without a popular constitutional 
culture. For instance, Jeffrey Goldsworthy has argued that Australian 
experience shows why it is not particularly important that citizens conceive 
of issues concerning fundamental legal norms and values in constitutional 
terms.12 At least when representative democracy functions reasonably 
well, such matters can be resolved through the ordinary political process 
– just as they are in systems without written constitutions. Furthermore, 
popular constitutional culture may well be a cause for concern rather than 
celebration insofar as it can lead to an undesirable form of constitutional 
politics.
Putting this concern aside for the moment, why might it be important 
for citizens to conceive of issues concerning fundamental legal norms and 
values in constitutional terms? One set of reasons concerns accountability. 
Even a federal constitutional system that consists primarily of structural 
guarantees cannot rely exclusively on the competition between national 
and subnational governments to ensure compliance with constitutional 
requirements. This is particularly so where there is great vertical fiscal 
imbalance, as is the case in Australia. If citizens do not understand what 
the constitution requires, then how can we ensure that state institutions 
operate within the bounds of power allocated to them? The ‘Mr Williamses’ 
among us are surely the exception and not the rule13 (and the ‘Mr Papes’ 
11  See Sackville, above n 8, 84.
12  ‘Constitutional Cultures, Democracy, and Unwritten Principles’ (2012) University of Illinois 
Law Review 683, 684–90.
13  The Queensland-based musician and father of six who brought the landmark challenge to the 
Commonwealth spending power in Williams v Commonwealth (No 1) (2012) 248 CLR 156. 
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the exceptions that prove the rule14). Relying on political and legal elites 
to perform this task seems undesirable as a matter of principle and 
potentially dangerous as a matter of practice. 
So, having a citizenry that is equipped to hold the state accountable is 
one reason for thinking that popular understanding of the constitution 
is important. It could be queried, however, whether this really requires 
popular constitutional culture. This brings us to a second and more 
significant set of reasons for thinking that it is important for citizens 
to conceive of issues concerning fundamental legal norms and values 
in constitutional terms. This has to do with the desirability of having 
a constitution that reflects contemporary social needs and values.
The authority of constitutional law has traditionally been understood in 
terms of popular approval: for example, as meriting approval because it 
reflects a political community’s fundamental values, or because it resolves 
coordination problems that make that political community possible. 
However, written constitutions that succeed in providing an enduring 
and stable source of fundamental legal norms and values over time can 
become out of date, reflecting the needs and values of the past rather 
than  the present. When this happens, constitutions can face a crisis 
of authority. 
The Australian Constitution arguably suffers from such a deficit. It is 
over 115 years old, and has been amended infrequently (eight times in 
total). It contains provisions that no longer reflect the needs and values of 
the Australian people. For instance, it contains provisions that expressly 
confer legislative power on the Commonwealth Parliament to make 
racially discriminatory laws, and that tacitly accept that persons may 
be excluded from a state’s voting franchise on the basis of race.15 Even 
those who dispute the proposition that the Constitution has little to say 
about shared Australian values have observed that there is a clamouring 
for the Constitution to better reflect national identity and contemporary 
political values.16
14  The New South Wales-based law lecturer and barrister who brought the landmark challenge to 
the Commonwealth spending power in Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1.
15  Australian Constitution ss 51(xxvi), 25. Both provisions are the subject matter of current debates 
about constitutional amendment.
16  Arcioni and Stone, above n 2, at 16–18.
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What does this state of affairs have to do with popular constitutional 
culture? The connection lies in constitutional amendment. The 
amendment procedure, section 128, is the primary mechanism for 
keeping the Constitution up to date. On paper it seems well-designed 
for that task, prescribing a procedure that is reasonably democratic 
and practicable. Proposing amendments only requires a majority vote 
of parliament (either a majority in both houses or twice in one house), 
as opposed to the supermajority requirements found in many other 
constitutions. Proposed amendments require approval by a majority of the 
electorate and a majority of the states at a popular referendum, as opposed 
to procedures found in many other constitutions that involve no direct 
popular involvement. In practice, however, constitutional amendment 
has proven extraordinarily difficult, even where there is evidence that 
there is broad public support in favour of change.
The trouble, I suggest, is that the amendment process cannot be 
successfully invoked in the absence of popular constitutional culture. 
The success of legislative proposal and popular referendum both rely on 
the ability of the citizenry to conceive of issues concerning fundamental 
legal norms and values in constitutional terms. Yet that is precisely what 
Australia lacks. As a result of the lack of a popular constitutional culture, 
there is a fundamental disconnect between the constitutionally prescribed 
amendment process – the mechanism designed to keep the constitution 
up to date – and the background conditions needed to engage that process. 
This is a significant problem. In the absence of an effective amendment 
procedure to keep the Constitution up to date, the alternative is progressive 
judicial interpretation. This occurs where judges ‘update’ the meaning of 
constitutional provisions to reflect contemporary social needs and values. 
Progressive judicial interpretation is both unattractive as a solution to the 
problem of constitutional change and in practice unlikely to succeed. It is 
unattractive because it makes judges, not the Australian people, the agents 
of constitutional change. Even if we are not concerned that judges will 
simply substitute their own views for the views of the people, we may well 
doubt whether judges are very good at determining what the views of the 
people are. Moreover, practically speaking it is a solution that is unlikely 
to succeed given the well-established formalist (or ‘legalist’) method of 
constitutional interpretation used by Australian judges, which favours 
a modest, text-bound approach.
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B. Objections and responses
Prima facie, then, there is a case for cultivating popular constitutional 
culture on the basis that doing so is necessary to ensure the proper 
functioning of the constitutional amendment process.17 However, 
comparative experience suggests possible grounds for objection. Experience 
in the United States in particular, where popular constitutional culture is 
extremely robust, suggests that popular constitutional culture can lead to 
the politicisation of constitutional law. 
The politicisation of constitutional law both blurs the line between 
constitutional law and other legal and non-legal norms, and has important 
implications for how the judicial role is conceived. This is undesirable for 
at least two reasons. In the first place, it undermines public confidence in 
impartiality of the judiciary. Members of the American public view the 
United States Supreme Court as a political institution where contentious 
moral questions of the day are decided based on the ideological preferences 
of the justices, and the judicial appointments process often looks more like 
a test of the nominee’s political views than an evaluation of the nominee’s 
credentials as a judge and a member of the legal profession. In addition, 
there are other costs to democracy that come with the politicisation of 
constitutional law. The sense of inevitability that political and moral 
disagreements of the day will ultimately be resolved in court as legal 
questions, to which there purports to be a correct and incorrect answer, 
may stifle public discourse and lead to polarisation. There is no need for 
reasoned political deliberation that aims to understand and accommodate 
different viewpoints if those disagreements will ultimately be resolved 
by judges. 
The modest institutional role currently occupied by the High Court of 
Australia makes these kinds of concerns seem remote. Nevertheless, it 
is worth taking them seriously. Here we can note two sets of existing 
features of the constitutional system that mitigate the possibility that 
popular constitutional culture would lead to an undesirable constitutional 
politics. First of all, there are features that lower the stakes for judicial 
appointments. These include; a mandatory retirement age for federal 
judges, which prevents strategic retirement to ensure that the appointment 
17  This is not, importantly, to claim that popular constitutional culture provides sufficient conditions 
for effective engagement of that process.
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of a new judge occurs when a particular political party is in power; and 
an executive appointment process that does not involve heavily politicised 
legislative procedures, such as interview-style hearings. 
Second, the amendment process prescribed by s 128 itself mitigates risk 
by lowering the stakes of constitutional interpretation. Comparison with 
the United States is fruitful here. The US Constitution is also very old 
and has been infrequently amended. This is typically blamed on the 
onerous amendment procedure prescribed by Art V, which imposes 
super-majority requirements for proposing and adopting amendments, 
and which does not prescribe direct involvement by the people. Article V 
greatly raises the stakes of judicial interpretation of the US Constitution: 
since the amendment process is not designed to effectively enable the 
people to amend the constitution, it is largely up to judges to update 
the constitution to reflect contemporary needs and values. By contrast, 
when functioning properly, s 128 promises to have the opposite effect. 
Indeed the amendment procedure it prescribes is frequently cited as 
a  reason in favour of a modest, textualist approach to constitutional 
interpretation.18 To the extent that popular constitutional culture would 
facilitate the proper functioning of the amendment process, then, popular 
constitutional culture has a built-in safeguard.
IV. Cultivating Popular Constitutional Culture 
I conclude with thoughts about the cultivation of popular constitutional 
culture. Although better civics education could go some way toward 
improving knowledge about the constitution, given the limited role 
that the Constitution currently plays in public discourse the potential 
of educative measures alone seems necessarily limited. What is needed, 
I  suggest, are measures that address the two underlying features of 
Australian constitutionalism that account for the lack of a popular 
constitutional culture in the first place. 
Starting with the lack of a founding moment, what is needed is 
a  (re)constitution of the Australian people. Opportunities for such 
a  ‘constitutional moment’ include the movement toward a republic, if 
and when that gains momentum. They also include the current possibility 
18  See Lael K Weis, ‘Constitutional Amendment Rules and Interpretive Fidelity to Democracy’ 
(2014) 39 University of Melbourne Law Review 240.
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of Indigenous recognition, but if – and only if – recognition takes a form 
that requires a deeper reconfiguration of the Australian body politic and 
shared Australian values than most current proposals on the table appear 
to contemplate. 
With respect to the prosaic and lawyerly character of the constitution, 
the adoption of a bill of rights is the most obvious and most promising 
prospect for engaging public deliberation on matters of fundamental legal 
norms and values. It has been suggested that the Constitution’s lack of 
a bill of rights cannot be blamed for the lack of a popular constitutional 
culture, on the basis that rights provisions and structural provisions are 
functional equivalents.19 Even if that is correct, the subject matter of the 
Constitution’s structural provisions presents a problem: overwhelmingly, 
it does not extend to topics that engage the public imagination. 
Adopting a bill of rights would change that, allowing more accessible, 
constitutionally-articulated norms and values to serve as anchoring points 
in public debate.
The modest defence of popular constitutional culture offered in this 
chapter thus presents a paradox for constitutional reform. The cultivation 
of popular constitutional culture appears to require engaging the very 
amendment process that I have just suggested cannot function properly 
in its absence. Pursuing one of the lines of reform indicated above, then, 
is essentially an act of constitutional faith: faith that the Australian people 
will rise to the occasion if and when it is presented.
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Constitutional Dimensions 
of Law Reform
Gabrielle Appleby and Anna Olijnyk1
I. Introduction
In Australia, law reform occurs in the shadow of limits imposed by the 
Constitution. This chapter engages with two aspects of the relationship 
between law reform and constitutional limits. First, how do constitutional 
limits influence parliaments’ consideration of law reform proposals? 
Second, what law reforms are needed in order to allow parliaments to 
engage in proper deliberation about constitutional limits? 
Most proposed legislation falls well within constitutional boundaries. 
In  a small (but not negligible) number of cases it will be unclear 
whether proposed legislation falls within the parliament’s legislative 
power. This is most likely when parliaments are asked to pass innovative 
legislative proposals to address emerging challenges and priorities such 
as national security, environmental and social issues. For example, when 
the federal parliament considered in 2012 a proposed amendment to the 
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) that would have allowed same-sex marriage, 
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there was considerable constitutional uncertainty about whether the 
Commonwealth’s power to make laws with respect to ‘marriage’ extended 
that far.2
In Part II of this chapter, we explore the way in which Australian 
parliaments ought to take into account constitutional limits when 
considering law reform proposals that require legislative development 
in uncharted constitutional waters. In Part III we consider current 
parliamentary practice and the ways that practice falls short of our ideal 
conception. In the final part of the chapter we propose two specific 
law reforms needed to help parliamentarians meet their obligations to 
deliberate about constitutionality: the more frequent release of advice 
provided by the Solicitor-General to the parliament, and the creation of 
a role for a constitutional law specialist to advise parliament about the 
constitutional limits of its legislative power.
II. Parliament’s Obligation to Deliberate 
about Constitutionality
What should parliamentarians do when deliberating about a proposed 
law at the boundaries of established constitutional principles? The option 
of seeking an advisory opinion from the High Court was foreclosed in 
1921.3 Another option is for parliamentarians to defer to the Executive’s 
assurances that legislation is likely to be constitutionally valid and not 
consider the issue separately for themselves. While this is often the current 
practice, we think it is unsatisfactory. 
From a purely practical point of view, parliament has an identifiable self-
interest in considering questions of constitutional validity because its own 
legislative goal will be frustrated if legislation is held invalid. But there 
are more constitutionally fundamental reasons why parliamentarians have 
a responsibility to consider the constitutionality of proposed legislation. 
Like all officials in a public institution operating within a constitutional 
democracy, parliamentarians have obligations under the rule of law. 
2  For a discussion of the debate about constitutionality on this issue, see Gabrielle Appleby and 
Adam Webster, ‘Parliament’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation’ (2013) 37 Melbourne University 
Law Review 255.
3  Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257.
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This obligation is reflected in the parliamentary oath.4 The responsibility 
of  a parliament to consider the constitutional validity of its legislative 
actions is underscored by the reality that many enactments will go 
unchallenged (which might happen for a variety of reasons, from lack 
of justiciability to lack of a willing plaintiff with standing). If parliament 
has not seriously considered whether its actions fall within constitutional 
limits, the rule of law is at risk of being undermined. In Australia, 
this aspect of parliament’s role has not attracted significant academic 
attention to date.5
Constitutionality is not, of course, the only matter parliament should 
consider when deliberating about proposed legislation. As democratic 
institutions, parliaments are responsible to the electorate and thus have 
a strong imperative to pass legislation that responds to the desires, 
and serves the needs, of the community. We noted previously that 
constitutional uncertainty often arises when parliament is experimenting 
with novel legislative approaches to new social and economic conditions 
and expectations. If parliamentarians only passed legislation when 
certain it would withstand constitutional challenge, this would rule out 
many legislative options that might be preferred from a policy point 
of view. Additionally, challenges to the validity of laws that have been 
enacted at  the edge of constitutional certainty can clarify and develop 
constitutional principles.6 
Therefore, we do not argue that parliament has an obligation to avoid 
potential constitutional invalidity of legislative reforms as an absolute 
or overriding obligation. But nor do we argue that constitutionality 
is irrelevant. Instead, we argue that when the constitutional position 
is uncertain, constitutionality should be one of several factors 
parliamentarians weigh up as part of a holistic deliberative process about 
4  See, for example, the oath and affirmation for Commonwealth parliamentarians in the Schedule 
to the Australian Constitution. 
5  The exceptions being Daryl Williams, ‘The Australian Parliament and the High Court: 
Determination of Constitutional Questions’ in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting 
Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions (Federation Press, 1996) 203; Andrew Lynch and 
Tessa Meyrick, ‘The Constitution and Legislative Responsibility’ (2007) 18 Public Law Review 153; 
Gabrielle Appleby and Adam Webster, ‘Parliament’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation’ (2013) 37 
Melbourne University Law Review 255.
6 Examples of constitutional challenges advancing our understanding of constitutional principles 
include Commonwealth v Tasmania (‘Tasmanian Dam Case’) (1983) 158 CLR 1); Momcilovic v The 
Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1; Commonwealth v ACT (2013) 250 CLR 441; and New South Wales v 
Commonwealth (‘Work Choices Case’) (2006) 229 CLR 1.
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the merits and risks of the proposal. We emphasise that this applies where 
there is uncertainty, and ought not to apply where there is consensus 
among constitutional experts that the proposal is constitutionally invalid.7 
Parliamentarians should evaluate the risk of constitutional invalidity: how 
certain is the relevant body of constitutional law? How close to the line 
does the proposed law fall? What will be the consequences if the law is 
passed and later held invalid? For example, will individuals have suffered 
non-reversible infringements of their rights? Will significant public 
expense be incurred in the constitutional challenge? Against this risk, 
parliamentarians should weigh the importance of the policy objective 
being pursued. Some policies may be so crucial they can justify a high 
degree of constitutional risk. Parliamentarians should also examine how 
the design of a proposed law affects its constitutionality. Can the design 
be changed to reduce the constitutional risk? If so, will this compromise 
the policy goal? An important part of the constitutional deliberation 
will be the consideration and weighing of alternatives by reference to 
constitutional rules and principles. 
Undoubtedly the Executive has its own constitutional obligations to 
engage with constitutional limits in the development of law reform 
proposals. But this does not relieve parliament of its obligation. In our 
conception of parliament’s proper role in constitutional interpretation, 
parliament’s contribution is different from that of the Executive. Different 
parties, and different members of parliament, will have different views 
about the importance of a given policy goal and the merits of specific 
legislative design features. Different individuals will be more or less risk 
averse and may take different views about the constitutional position. 
In a  democracy, it is appropriate that these differences form part of 
the process of deliberating about proposed legislation. Further, public 
legislative debate about the constitutionality of proposed legislative 
action, and a rigorous and detailed consideration of alternative legislative 
design that might diminish constitutional issues, may prove helpful in 
subsequent judicial review of the enactment. This is particularly likely 
when the relevant constitutional principles turn on proportionality-style 
analyses, in which the availability of viable alternative policy measures 
is relevant to validity.8
7  See further discussion in Appleby and Webster, above n 5, 292–94.
8  McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 89 ALJR 857; Betfair Pty Ltd v WA (2008) 234 CLR 418.
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III. Current Practice9
When Australian parliamentarians consider the constitutionality of 
proposed legislation, the debate tends to assume a superficial and binary 
character. Nuanced weighing of constitutional risk and careful consideration 
of how legislative design plays into that risk are almost entirely absent. 
This is at least in part attributable to the lack of constitutional assistance, 
in the form of professional legal advice, available to parliamentarians, 
particularly non-government members and backbenchers. 
While sometimes acknowledging uncertainty about constitutional limits, 
government members assure parliament the law is likely to be valid. These 
assurances will often be provided by reference to legal advice obtained by 
the government – often by the government’s most senior legal adviser, the 
Solicitor-General – but this advice will not be released to parliament. When 
parliamentarians simply rely upon the government’s assurances that it has 
received advice relating to constitutional validity, they have insufficient 
information to engage with the questions that we have asserted are part of 
robust, responsible constitutional scrutiny. They are unable to gauge the 
level of risk associated with a proposal, or consider the constitutional risk 
associated with alternative ways of achieving the policy objective. Nor are 
the reasons for taking the constitutional risk made public. 
Non-government members of parliament will often raise the risk 
of invalidity, not as a genuine issue that relates to their constitutional 
responsibilities, but as a reflexively oppositional political manoeuvre. 
Without a clear conception of parliament’s responsibilities to the 
Constitution and appropriate processes and mechanisms in place to 
achieve these, the risk is that parliamentarians will employ the Constitution 
for reasons that have little to do with either constitutional or democratic 
responsibility. By reference to the 2012 attempt to amend the Marriage 
Act 1961 (Cth) to achieve marriage equality and the debates this raised 
around the scope of the Commonwealth’s marriage power, Gabrielle 
Appleby and Adam Webster identified two fundamental concerns in 
this respect.10 The first was that constitutional uncertainty might be 
9  As there is not scope in this chapter for a detailed explanation of current parliamentary practice 
around constitutional engagement in the legislative process, we have instead outlined our conclusions 
from our previous research using case studies of parliamentary deliberation at both state and 
Commonwealth level. See Appleby and Webster, above n 5.
10  Ibid.
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used as a ‘shield’: parliamentarians not wishing to engage with divisive 
policy issues that raise difficult moral questions might simply avoid such 
a political quagmire by claiming constitutional uncertainty as a reason 
not to act. The second was that constitutional uncertainty might be used 
as a ‘sword’ to kill off the proposed reform: parliamentarians might claim 
that, because of the constitutional uncertainty, parliament should not act 
but rather the reform should be passed as a constitutional amendment by 
referendum under s 128 of the Constitution. The difficulties of achieving 
constitutional change under s 128 are well known. An argument that 
a reform ought to be sent to referendum is less likely to be an authentic 
appeal to popular sovereignty than an attempt to ensure the reform’s 
ultimate failure. As both a ‘sword’ and a ‘shield’, constitutionality 
can detract from the quality of the debate about the policy merits of 
proposed legislation. 
The cost of failure to engage in robust constitutional scrutiny is not only 
the loss of an opportunity for parliament to fulfil its constitutional and 
democratic obligations as a forum for debate about public policy. It may 
also lead to the adoption of less-than-optimal policy choices. When non-
government parliamentarians become aware of a constitutional issue but 
lack the expertise or advice to assess the risk, they may urge the parliament 
to take a constitutionally ‘conservative’ approach. They are unable to engage 
with more sophisticated questions such as level of constitutional risk, and 
possible alternatives that might achieve the same objective. It  becomes 
politically prudent for the government to take a constitutionally safe 
course. This can mean eschewing options that would better achieve the 
policy goal, and that may be valid, but are less constitutionally certain.11 
Mark Tushnet describes this inappropriate domination of constitutional 
norms over policy considerations as ‘policy distortion’.12 
Constitutional validity, and the desire to simply implement what are known 
to be valid constitutional regimes, might undermine the government and 
parliament’s engagement with the policy merits of a proposal: whether it 
11  Examples include the replication, by several states and territories, of anti-organised crime 
legislation known to be valid but arguably not best policy: see Gabrielle Appleby, ‘The High Court and 
Kable: A Study in Federalism and Rights Protection’ (2014) 40 Monash University Law Review 673; 
and amendments made shortly before the passage of the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance 
to Australia) Act 2015 (Cth) (see Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 1 December 2015, 
9508). 
12  Mark Tushnet, ‘Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination 
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty’ (1995) 94 Michigan Law Review 245.
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is responsive and tailored to the needs of the community, whether it is 
proportionate, whether human rights concerns are addressed, and whether 
it is likely to be effective. 
IV. Two Proposed Reforms
At present, Australian parliamentarians may gain assistance from a number 
of sources of advice on questions of constitutional validity. But in no 
Australian jurisdiction is there a dedicated constitutional legal adviser 
available for parliamentarians or parliamentary committees to access.
Parliamentarians most frequently rely upon the assurances or summaries 
provided by the government regarding its constitutional advice, often 
received from the Solicitor-General; and the submissions of constitutional 
experts to parliamentary committee inquiries. In this part, we identify 
shortcomings of these sources and propose two reforms to address them.
There is now an established practice that the government will release 
a summary or assurance about legal advice it has received, but not disclose 
the full advice. The practice rests not on assertions of legal professional 
privilege – which is not a valid ground on which to refuse to produce 
documents to the parliament following Egan v Chadwick13 – but on 
practice and convention.14 Pursuant to now established convention, 
parliament refrains from exercising its powers to require the production 
of government legal opinions on the basis that there is a strong public 
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of government legal advice. 
It is our view that the adherence to the convention has gone too far, at 
least insofar as it applies to advice relating to legislative proposals in areas 
of constitutional uncertainty. In these situations, the government is asking 
the parliament to be complicit in an action that raises constitutional 
risk. We argue that, where the proposal raises unresolved and complex 
constitutional questions, the public interest in disclosing government 
legal advice on constitutional validity to the parliament outweighs the 
public interest in maintaining confidentiality in the legal advice. Full 
disclosure of advice on constitutional risk would allow parliamentarians 
13  Egan v Chadwick (1999) 46 NSWLR 563.
14  See further discussion of the convention in Australia in Anthony Mason, ‘The Parliament, the 
Executive and the Solicitor-General’ in Gabrielle Appleby, Patrick Keyzer and John Williams (eds), 
Public Sentinels: A Comparative Study of Australian Solicitors-General (Ashgate, 2014) 49, 65.
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to assess the factual assumptions that underpin the advice and understand 
the subtleties and nuance of the advice and any qualifications contained in 
it, or degrees of confidence in which it is expressed.15 This would facilitate 
(although of course not guarantee) deliberation of the type that we have 
argued parliamentarians ought to engage in as responsible constitutional 
actors. Of course, full public disclosure of this advice might be limited 
sometimes by legitimate public interest claims over certain parts of the 
advice – for example, parts that might raise national security issues or 
matters of Cabinet confidentiality. There might also be legitimate reasons 
that the government wishes to maintain legal professional privilege over 
the advice, and, as such, arrangements might need to be made to ensure 
that the release to parliamentarians is done in such a way as to not waive 
this privilege.
The second source of constitutional advice frequently relied upon by 
parliamentarians is submissions and evidence from experts – academics, 
professional legal associations and legal practitioners. Such submissions 
and evidence will often give rise to a range of different opinions on the 
same issue. This we actually see as desirable: it gives parliamentarians 
a sense of the complexity and nuance of particular constitutional issues. 
It reflects the reality that there is often no easy or single resolution to most 
constitutional questions. 
However, there are a number of shortcomings with parliamentary reliance 
on such submissions. The first is that the number, spread and quality 
of submissions will differ depending on who has time, inclination and 
expertise to make a submission to a committee inquiry. Second, while 
submissions are often of extremely high quality written by the foremost 
experts in the field, they are not a direct substitute for legal advice. They 
are often prepared under extraordinary time pressures. They will often 
lack the inside factual knowledge that a full legal consideration of the 
issue requires. The author of the submission, rather than the parliament, 
will determine which issues to address.
15  See similar arguments in Harold Koh, ‘Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself ’ 
(1994) 15 Cardozo Law Review 513, 51.
395
36 . CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW REFORM
We therefore suggest a second reform: the appointment of a dedicated 
office of ‘Counsel to the Parliament’, specialising in constitutional and 
public law, to advise individual parliamentarians and parliamentary 
committees. The appointee should be a leading constitutional lawyer, 
with expertise comparable to that of the Solicitor-General. 
What is the relationship between the two reform proposals? Is it preferable 
to implement one or the other, or both? To facilitate and properly equip 
parliamentarians to engage in best possible practice in relation to legislative 
deliberation regarding constitutional norms, both reforms ought to be 
adopted. (Although, we should add, the adoption of only one or the 
other would still be preferable to the current position.) The government’s 
legal advice is likely to be informed by a more complete factual picture 
than that which might be provided by Counsel to the Parliament, simply 
because of the wider factual matrix likely to be available to the government 
and their advisers. There is also a possibility that the two officers will 
come to different positions on the constitutional questions, will assess 
the degree of constitutional risk at different levels, or will formulate 
and analyse different alternative proposals that might address the 
identified constitutional risks. Such differences would inform and assist 
parliamentary deliberation about the questions that we have argued are 
relevant for responsible constitutional engagement. Finally, we would say 
it is important that parliament has available to it dedicated constitutional 
counsel with whom it has a professional lawyer–client relationship because 
this allows parliamentarians to direct the advice received: to consider, for 
example, specific provisions or possible alternative formulations to the 
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On 12 November 2015, the House of Representatives debated the 
Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 
(Cth). The signature reforms in the Bill (enacted into law that December) 
are mechanisms for dual citizens to have their citizenship cease if they 
are involved with terrorist activity.2 The debate was the first to take place 
after the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
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(PJCIS) had handed down its report scrutinising the Bill,3 and after the 
government had issued its response to the report.4 During the debate, 
Labor MP Michael Danby observed:
The evolution of this legislation … shows the value of the committee 
system and the increasing influence of the PJCIS … Committees might be 
seen as too slow for the 24/7 news cycle and the Twitterati, but the result 
is a pragmatic solution that is best for the Australian people … and it 
shows that we parliamentarians are doing our job.5
In this chapter I examine the claim that PJCIS is wielding ‘increasing 
influence’ in the counter-terrorism law reform process. Analysing this 
claim is relevant to those interested in reform of Australia’s counter-
terrorism law framework. If we can identify a particular point in the law-
making process which is influential, then those interested in shaping the 
Australian counter-terrorism law framework can focus their efforts on it.
I summarise the extent of PJCIS involvement in ‘pre-enactment scrutiny’ 
of the alterations to the Australian counter-terrorism law framework that 
the Australian Parliament has passed since mid-2014. In this context, 
pre-enactment scrutiny refers to the processes by which a parliamentary 
committee examines a Bill before it is enacted into law by the whole 
parliament. The pre-enactment scrutiny inquiries I am interested in are 
those where a committee takes evidence from the public (through written 
submissions or hearings).
I also examine the extent to which the government has accepted 
recommendations made by the PJCIS. I accept that the question of 
how to assess the influence of parliamentary committees is evolving.6 
Nevertheless, the evidence of the past two years suggests that the PJCIS 
is capable of making recommendations that require the government to 
3  PJCIS, ‘Committee Recommends Passage of the Citizenship Bill’ (Media Alert, 4 September 
2015), www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=a178407a-96fd-4400-9781-ecafc142443f.
4  Peter Dutton, Minister for Immigration and George Brandis, Attorney-General, ‘Government 
Responds to Report on the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015’ 
(Joint Media Release, 10 November 2015), www.minister.border.gov.au/peterdutton/2015/Pages/
response-citizenship-amendment-bill.aspx. 
5  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 November 2015, 13119 
(emphasis added).
6  David Monk, ‘A Framework for Evaluating the Performance of Committees in Westminster 
Parliaments’ (2010) 16 Journal of Legislative Studies 1, 2–5.
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adjust the law reform proposals they have put to parliament.7 Together, 
these points suggest that the PJCIS now represents a key locus where 
changes to a counter-terrorism legislative proposal could be advocated 
and might actually occur.
II. The Extent of PJCIS Pre-enactment 
Scrutiny of Counter-Terrorism Law Proposals
The PJCIS is the latest parliamentary committee to have oversight over 
ASIO.8 The committee was ‘re-established’ in its current form at the 
end of 2005. The Intelligence Service Act 2001 (Cth) stipulates that the 
PJCIS is to consist of six members of the House of Representatives and 
five Senators.9 The Act also requires that a ‘majority of the Committee’s 
members must be Government members’.10 The committee has indicated 
that a ‘significant portion of the committee’s time during 2014–15 was 
focussed on examining national security legislation introduced by the 
Government’.11 
The PJCIS has conducted pre-enactment scrutiny on six of the major pieces 
of counter-terrorism legislation introduced between 2014 and 2016.12 
At the time of writing, five of the six pieces of legislation have been enacted. 
Each inquiry was initiated by the Attorney-General referring the relevant 
Bill to the PJCIS.13 This indicates that the government accepted that this 
form of parliamentary scrutiny was to be part of the law-reform process. 
It is important to remember that this type of parliamentary scrutiny is 
7  David Monk, ‘Committee Inquiries in the Australian Parliament and Their Influence on 
Government: Government Acceptance of Recommendations as a Measure of Parliamentary 
Performance’ (2012) 18 The Journal of Legislative Studies 143–44.
8 Parliament of Australia, History of the Intelligence and Security Committee, www.aph.gov.au/
Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/History_of_the_Intelligence_
and_Security_Committee.
9  Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 28(2).
10  Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 28(3).
11  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Annual 
Report of Committee Activities 2014–15 (2015) 2.
12  These acts are the National Security Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2014 (Cth); the Counter-
Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Cth); the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment Act (No 1) 2014 (Cth); the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Act 2015 (Cth) (the ‘Data Retention Act’); the Australian Citizenship Amendment 
(Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015 (Cth); and the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 
(No 1) 2015 (Cth).
13  Annual Report, above n 11, 5–8 and PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2015 (2016) 1.
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not a compulsory feature of the law reform process.14 The involvement 
of these types of committees is important, because they provide one 
structured opportunity for the public, and non-government experts, to 
provide their opinions about Bills directly to parliamentarians.15 It also 
affords parliamentarians the ability to question the departments and 
agencies which designed the legislation, and that would be responsible for 
implementing it.16 
Acknowledging that the government allowed the PJCIS to scrutinise 
the Bills does not mean that the committee scrutiny process was perfect. 
One flaw Appleby identifies is that the PJCIS was sometimes required to 
complete its pre-enactment scrutiny work on a very strict timeframe.17 
On one occasion, the committee pointedly noted that ‘it would have been 
preferable if more time had been available for the inquiry’.18 I concur that 
the time constraints placed on committee review were problematic. They 
made it more difficult for the committee ‘to comprehend, question, test 
[the legislation and] to seek public and expert opinion’19 to assist them 
in providing as comprehensive review of the Bills as possible. However, 
not all of the inquiries of the PJCIS over this period were conducted 
so quickly. For example, the PJCIS inquiry into the Data Retention Act 
2015 was allowed just under two months to take submissions (albeit 
over the summer holiday period of December to January). The overall 
time provided to the committee to complete its report was just over 
three months. 20 
14  The functions of the PJCIS do not mandate the type of pre-enactment Bill scrutiny conducted 
in this period. See Annual Report, above n 11, 19–21.
15  Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘Promoting Deliberative Debate? The Submissions and Oral Evidence 
Provided to Australian Parliamentary Committees in the Creation of Counter-Terrorism Laws’ 
(2008) 23 Australasian Parliamentary Review 39, 56. See also Richard Grant, ‘Can We Account for 
Parliamentary Committees? A Survey of Committee Secretaries’ (Parliamentary Studies Paper No 9, 
Parliamentary Studies Centre, 2009) 6, 8. 
16  PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
Bill (No 1) 2014 (2014), 11, 13: the Committee recorded evidence received from the Australian 
Federal Police and the Attorney-General’s Department about the proposed changes in that Bill.
17  Gabrielle Appleby, ‘The 2014 Counter-Terrorism Reforms in Review’ (2015) Public Law Review 
4, 4–7.
18  PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (2014) 3.
19  Appleby, above n 17, 4.
20  See PJCIS, Advisory Report into the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014 (2015), 2, 4. 
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Despite these problems, the fact remains that the PJCIS was the 
parliamentary committee most often charged with holding public inquiries 
examining proposed changes to Australian counter-terrorism law during 
this period. During 2014–16, only one of the six major counter-terrorism 
Bills was also referred to a Senate Legislation or References Committee 
for a separate pre-enactment scrutiny inquiry.21 That Bill, the Counter-
Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill, was referred 
to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee 
(SLCALC). However, the SLCALC declined to accept submissions or 
to call witnesses because the PJCIS was already conducting an inquiry 
into the Bill.22 There are two ways to interpret this. The first is to be 
concerned about the exclusion of the Senate Committee. The decision of 
the SLCALC not to hold a public inquiry angered some members of the 
cross-bench because it meant that they were unable to be members of any 
committee conducting full pre-enactment scrutiny.23 This is because all 
members of the PJCIS were members of the major parties.24 Nevertheless, 
the SLCALC’s deference to the PJCIS can also be interpreted as another 
indicium of the growing pre-eminence of the PJCIS in the sphere of 
counter-terrorism law reform. If these trends continue, the PJCIS will be 
the committee most likely to examine any future substantial proposals for 
change to the Australian counter-terrorism law framework.
III. Recommendations and ‘Strike Rate’
Another key piece of information pointing to the PJCIS playing a crucial 
role in the Australian counter-terrorism law reform process is the extent 
to which the government accepted its recommendations. In discussing 
its pre-enactment scrutiny during the 2014–15 financial year, the 
committee commented that ‘[a]cross the four Bills reviewed during the 
reporting period, the committee made 109 recommendations. All of these 
recommendations were accepted and resulted in 63 amendments to the Bills 
before the Parliament’.25
21  Although in their report into the Data Retention Act the PJCIS acknowledged that the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional References Committee was examining broader issues relating to altering the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) as a whole. See ‘Advisory Report into the 
Data Retention Bill’, above n 20, 3. 
22  Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (2014) 1.
23  For the views of the Australian Greens, see ibid. 6. See also Appleby, above n 17, 5–6 and 10.
24  Foreign Fighters Bill 2014, above n 22, 6.
25  Annual Report, above n 11, 3 (emphasis added).
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Some political scientists refer to this way of assessing influence as assessing 
a committee’s ‘strike rate’. The term ‘strike rate’ means ‘the percentage 
of … [committee] recommendations accepted and implemented by 
government’.26 Law reform scholars may be more interested in the extent 
to which committee recommendations result in concrete amendments to 
legislation as an indicium of committee influence. By either version of 
this measure, at least by its own account, the PJCIS has been remarkably 
influential. 
Examining a 2014 PJCIS report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014 (‘2014 CTLA Bill’) provides an example 
of a recommendation from the PJCIS being the acknowledged catalyst 
for an alteration to the government’s proposed amendments to Australia’s 
counter-terrorism laws. The 2014 CTLA Bill proposed amendments 
to provisions governing when the Australian Federal Police (AFP) can 
request control orders. Prior to the enactment of the 2014 CTLA Bill, 
the control order provisions allowed an ‘issuing court’ to impose an order 
allowing certain ‘conditions’ to be placed on ‘a person’ for the purpose of 
‘protecting the public from a terrorist act’.27 The AFP are responsible for 
applying to the issuing court for the order, but in most cases need to obtain 
the consent of the Attorney-General before doing so.28 The conditions 
that a control order can impose include preventing a person subject to the 
order from communicating with certain persons, or mandating that they 
‘wear a tracking device’.29
One proposed change in the 2014 CTLA Bill concerned the mechanism 
by which the AFP could apply for an ‘urgent interim control order’. Prior 
to the late 2014 reforms, a senior AFP officer could apply directly to the 
issuing court for such an order in certain circumstances. However, the 
consent of the Attorney-General to the making of the application needed 
to be granted retrospectively – within four hours of the application being 
made.30 The 2014 CTLA Bill proposed to lengthen the amount of time 
the AFP had to obtain the Attorney-General’s consent from four hours to 
twelve. The PJCIS noted that ‘some inquiry participants’ did not feel that 
26  John Halligan, Robin Miller and John Power, Parliament in the Twenty-First Century (Melbourne 
University Press, 2007) 222.
27  Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, above n 16, 6.
28  Ibid. See also Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.2 (1).
29  Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, above n 16, 6. 
See also Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 104.5(3)
30  Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, above n 16, 17.
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the ‘increase in time’ had been ‘adequately justified’.31 The PJCIS agreed, 
and recommended that the AFP be required to obtain consent within 
eight hours of the AFP applying for the urgent order. The government 
accepted this recommendation, and the legislation as enacted reflects 
it.32 Indeed, in its response the government mentioned that this change 
‘reflects the view of the Committee and some witnesses, that 8 hours 
is sufficient’.33 The impression that the PJCIS’s recommendations are 
persuasive is bolstered by the fact that the government publicly attributed 
the making of this amendment specifically to the committee’s work.34
However, when compared to the overall control order scheme, this 
change is relatively minor. In its report into the 2014 CTLA Bill the 
PJCIS noted that ‘several submitters’ had ‘in-principle objections to 
the existence of control orders’.35 The committee also noted in passing 
that another oversight body – the Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor – had recommended that the control order powers be 
completely repealed.36 Ultimately, the PJCIS concluded that it accepted 
the justification offered by the AFP that the control order powers were 
necessary.37 As such, it did not recommend the complete removal of 
control orders from Australian law. So at least part of the PJCIS’s high 
success rate may be explained if the recommendations made did not 
require major changes to the shape and scope of the counter-terrorism 
law framework. Political scientists who have studied other parliamentary 
committees have recorded the view of one committee secretary that, to 
ensure their recommendations are influential, committees can avoid 
making ‘courageous’ recommendations.38 At present, it is unclear how far-
reaching the totality of the recommendations made by the PJCIS were. 
This is an area which would benefit from further academic work.
31  Ibid.
32  George Brandis, Attorney-General, ‘Government Response to the Committee Report on the 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014’ (Media Release, 25 November 2014) 3, 
www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Documents/GovernmentResponseToCommitteeReportO
nTheCounter-TerrorismLegislationAmendmentBillNo1-2014.pdf. See Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
s 104.10.
33  Brandis, above n 32, 3.
34  Monk, ‘Evaluating the Performance of Committees’, above n 6, 8.
35  Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, above n 16, 9.
36  Ibid. 11.
37  Ibid. 21–22.
38  Halligan, Miller and Power, above n 26, 222–23. 
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There are two further complications to consider when using committee 
recommendations to assess the extent of the PJCIS’s influence on law 
reform. The first is the division amongst political scientists about whether 
using government responses to parliamentary committees is actually 
a useful way of assessing committee influence.39 Some argue it is too 
difficult to accurately quantify the impact of parliamentary committees 
in isolation, as the process by which policy is formulated contains ‘too 
many players and interactions’.40 Others think that, while imperfect, the 
government response ‘is the closest approximation … available’ of what 
the government thinks of a report.41 
The second caveat concerns the PJCIS’s blanket statement that ‘all the 
recommendations were accepted’. Closer examination of the legislative 
history of the 2014 CTLA Bill demonstrates that not all ‘acceptances’ are 
complete. One proposed change in that Bill was to expand the grounds on 
which a control order could be issued. The changes proposed to expand 
these grounds to include ‘prevent[ing] the provision of support for or the 
facilitation of a terrorist act’ and also the ‘provision of support for or the 
facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country’.42 
The PJCIS recommended ‘that, to the extent possible, the terms “supports” 
and “facilitates” [in these changes] … be based on language in the existing 
Criminal Code’ and the Bill and explanatory memorandum be altered ‘to 
reflect this’.43 The PJCIS justified this by arguing the evidence it received 
‘raised concerns’ that it was unclear what was meant by ‘the provision 
of support for’ or ‘facilitation of a terrorist act’.44 In response, the 
government noted that it accepted this recommendation ‘in principle’. 
It agreed to amend the explanatory memorandum but did not propose to 
alter the Bill.45
It is still technically correct to call this an acceptance of the committee’s 
recommendation, but it was not a complete acceptance of it.46 A complete 
acceptance would have been for the Bill and the explanatory memorandum 
39  See Monk, ‘Government Acceptance’, above n 7, 138–39. See also Ian Holland, ‘Senate 
Committees and the Legislative Process’ (Parliamentary Studies Paper, No 7, Parliamentary Studies 
Centre, 2009) 5–6. 
40  Halligan, Miller and Power, above n 26, 222.
41  Monk, ‘Evaluating the Performance of Committees’, above n 6, 8.
42  Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, above n 16, 7.
43  Ibid. 24 (Recommendation 2).
44  Ibid. 14, 24.
45  Brandis, above n 32, 2. 
46  See also Monk, ‘Government Acceptance’, above n 7, 144–45.
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to be amended. This suggests that the statement that ‘all recommendations 
were accepted’ needs to be carefully unpacked to examine the extent to 
which the legislation as eventually enacted actually reflects the PJCIS’s 
recommendations. 
IV. Conclusion
To return to the question which opened this chapter: is the PJCIS 
garnering ‘increasing influence’ in the area of Australian counter-terrorism 
law reform? On the basis of the study presented here, the answer would be 
a qualified yes. The fact that the PJCIS has considered the major counter-
terrorism law proposals put before parliament over 2014–16 makes it 
clear this is now the ‘committee of choice’ to conduct pre-enactment 
scrutiny. Even if the committee was sometimes rushed, the government 
seems prepared to have PJCIS scrutiny become a routine element of its 
counter-terrorism law-making process. If this continues, it will allow the 
committee to continue to develop its experience and expertise in the issues 
underpinning counter-terrorism law reform.
The answer to the question is qualified because the recommendations 
made by the PJCIS are not always in fact translated into amendments 
which alter counter-terrorism Bills. While on the surface the PJCIS’s strike 
rate seems impressive, the extent to which it reflects actual change to the 
law is a more complex question. Also worthy of further study is the extent 
to which the PJCIS recommendations go to the core of the way in which 
powers such as the control order regime operate. However, despite these 
qualifications, there are instances where the PJCIS’s recommendations 
have caused changes to Australia’s counter-terrorism laws.
That the PJCIS has been given an opportunity to scrutinise counter-
terrorism Bills, and that the government seems open to their 
recommendations, should be recognised. The committee appears to 
be developing into a key point of influence for those seeking to make 
the case for law reform of Australia’s counter-terrorism law framework. 
Accordingly, for those seeking change, participating in a future PJCIS 
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The Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) was 
intended to create an inter-institutional dialogue about rights. This 
chapter outlines the Charter’s dialogue mechanisms, and assesses the 
dialogue in practice. The assessment focuses on examples of institutional 
dialogue that have involved judicial decisions about rights or with rights 
implications, and executive and parliamentary reactions thereto. This 
chapter concludes with reform suggestions for the Charter, which can 
inform debates across Australian jurisdictions.
Committed parliamentary sovereigntists may consider that the Charter 
is operating precisely as intended: bringing rights issues to the fore, and 
providing a framework for debate, but not substantively hampering the 
sovereign will of parliament. Those committed to human rights, however, 
may consider the dialogue in practice demonstrates the need for reform. 
In decision-making that impacts on rights, the executive retains its 
dominance: it controls the ‘pre-tabling-in-parliament’ phase of legislative 
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development; shapes the rights discussion via extrinsic materials 
accompanying proposed legislation; and dominates parliament itself. 
Contributions by members of parliament to rights dialogue on the floor 
of parliament and through its committees are weak, with little incentive 
for stronger action. Parliamentary rights culture is nascent at best, and 
there is no political or legal cost for disregarding rights. The judiciary has 
the limited power of interpreting laws to be compatible with rights, which 
leaves the executive and parliament free reign in their responses. Reforms 
must focus on these elements. 
II. Dialogue Mechanisms
There are numerous dialogue mechanisms under the Charter. First, the 
scope of rights, and the legitimacy of limiting rights, are open to debate 
and reasonable disagreement. The Charter recognises this through 
open-textured rights, and by allowing the imposition of reasonable and 
demonstrably justifiable limitations on rights under s 7(2) – both of which 
encourage rights dialogue among the executive, parliament and judiciary. 
Second, Charter mechanisms regarding the creation and interpretation 
of legislation are meant to generate dialogue. Under s 28, parliamentarians 
must issue Statements of Compatibility (SoC) for all proposed laws, which 
indicate (with reasons) whether proposed laws are rights-compatible or 
rights-incompatible. Under s  30, the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations 
Committee (SARC) must scrutinise all proposed laws and accompanying 
SoCs against Charter rights. SARC reports to parliament, and parliament 
debates the proposals, deciding whether to enact proposed laws given the 
rights considerations. 
These pre-legislative scrutiny obligations make rights explicit 
considerations in law-making, creating greater transparency around, and 
accountability for, decisions that impact on rights. The obligations also 
create a dialogue between arms of government, allowing each to educate 
the other about their understanding of relevant rights, whether legislation 
limits those rights, and whether limits are justified under s 7(2). 
Regarding the judiciary, s  32(1) of the Charter requires all legislation 
to be interpreted in a way that is compatible with rights, so far as it is 
possible to do so consistently with statutory purpose. Where legislation 
cannot be interpreted rights-compatibly, the judiciary is not empowered 
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to invalidate it; rather, the superior courts may issue an unenforceable 
‘declaration of inconsistent interpretation’ under s 36(2). Under s 37, the 
responsible minister must table a written response to s 36(2) declarations 
in parliament within six-months. 
The executive and parliament can respond to judicial rulings. They 
may neutralise an unwanted s  32(1) rights-compatible interpretation 
by legislatively reinstating rights-incompatible provisions. They may 
amend legislation to address rights-incompatibility identified in s  36(2) 
declarations; equally, they may retain the rights-incompatible legislation. 
The dialogue process continues, with executive and parliamentary 
responses being open to further challenge before the judiciary.
To assess these dialogue mechanisms in practice, Part III considers 
examples of executive and parliamentary responses to judicial decisions 
about rights; while Part IV considers examples where judicial decisions did 
not turn on rights, but nevertheless provoked executive and parliamentary 
responses that did impact on rights. 
III. Complete Dialogue Cycles
A ‘complete dialogue cycle’ occurs when each arm of government has 
contributed to the rights dialogue; particularly, when the executive and 
parliament respond to judicial decisions about rights. This Part explores 
two examples where judicial decisions turning on rights have prompted 
executive and parliamentary responses that have been rights-unfriendly.2 
A. Decisions and responses
First, under the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic), a court 
may make an extended supervision order in relation to serious sex offenders 
‘if it is satisfied … that the offender is likely to commit a relevant offence 
if released in the community on completion of ’ a custodial sentence. 
In RJE,3 the court held that the phrase ‘is likely to commit a relevant 
2  See Taha v Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court [2011] VSC 642, where the representative response 
bolsters rights: s 51 of Sentencing Amendment (Abolition of Suspended Sentences and Other Matters) 
Act 2013 (Vic).
3  RJE v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2008] VSCA 265 (‘RJE’).
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offence’ had to mean ‘more likely than not to commit’ an offence,4 with 
Maxwell P and Weinberg JA relying on the common law right to liberty, 
and Nettle  JA relying on the s  21 right to liberty and s  32(1) rights-
compatible interpretation under the Charter. 
At the next sitting, parliament responded by overturning the rights-
compatible interpretation in RJE. The Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring 
Amendment Act 2009 (Vic) (SSOMAA) inserts s  11(2B), which states 
that s 11(1) ‘permits a determination that an offender is likely to commit 
a  relevant offence on the basis of a lower threshold than a threshold 
of more likely than not’.
Second, the Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 confers coercive 
powers for investigating organised crime. Section 39(1) abrogates the 
privilege against self-incrimination, but s  39(3) provides a residual 
immunity. In Das,5 according to ordinary interpretation, Warren CJ held 
that s  39(3) only preserved ‘direct use’ immunity, which unreasonably 
and unjustifiably limited Charter rights. This was remedied by s  32 
rights-compatible interpretation: Warren  CJ ‘read in’ words to s  39(3) 
additionally preserving ‘derivative use’ immunity. 
Parliament reversed this ruling in the Criminal Organisations Control 
and Other Acts Amendments Act 2014 (Vic) (COCOAAA). The legislation 
inserted s  39(4), which provides that nothing in s  39(3) prevents the 
derivate use of evidence. 
B. Executive and parliamentary scrutiny
The rights-scrutiny in the executive’s SoC was similar in RJE-SSOMAA and 
Das-COCOAAA. In both instances, the minister admitted to reversing the 
judicial interpretation of legislation and reverting to the legislation’s pre-
Charter understanding. In both, this was justified as a reassertion of the 
intention of the original parliament when it enacted the original law. 
Additional arguments about the reasonableness and justifiability of  the 
limitation were also offered.
4  RJE [2008] VSCA 265 [21], [53] (Maxwell P and Weinberg  JA); [97], [107], [113], [117], 
[119] (Nettle JA).
5  Re Application under the Major Crime (Investigative Powers Act); Das v Victorian Equal 
Opportunity and Human Rights Commission 2004 [2009] VSC 381 (‘Das’).
411
38 . RIGHTS DIALOGUE UNDER THE VICTORIAN CHARTER
SARC reported on RJE-SSOMAA after the amendments passed both 
houses of parliament. The report criticised the SoC for not explaining 
how the legislation was rights-compatible. The SARC report on Das-
COCOAAA highlighted how the SoC limitations analysis differed from 
the judicial analysis, but acknowledged that parliament was empowered 
to enact rights-incompatible legislation.
The parliamentary debate on RJE-SSOMAA was brief. Parliamentarians 
acknowledged the legislative reversal of the judicial interpretation, and the 
gravity of this. Although concern was expressed about the retrospective 
application of the amendment, debate focused on balancing the rights of 
the offender against the rights of victims and the broader community; and 
on legislative safeguards for the offender. The rights aspects of the Das-
COCOAAA amendments attracted little parliamentary attention – there 
was no debate about the s  39 amendment potentially violating rights, 
nor that a judicial ruling was being reversed. Ms Pulford described the 
amendments as ‘minor’;6 while Ms Pennicuik took issue with other rights-
related aspects of the legislation, but not the s 39 amendment.
C. Assessing the dialogue
In RJE-SSOMAA and Das-COCOAAA, dialogue occurred with the 
executive and parliament reasserting their views on the threshold for 
issuing extended supervision orders and ‘derivative use’ immunity. 
The  representative arms utilised dialogue mechanisms. First, the 
reasonableness and justifiability of limitations were explored, and the rights 
of competing groups balanced, under s 7(2). Second, the amendment was 
couched as reasserting parliament’s intention, which is an active factor 
in s 32(1) rights-compatible interpretation.
In RJE-SSOMAA, parliament completed debate before SARC reported. 
Although not unlawful, this undermines the dialogue. That SARC 
identified issues that the parliamentarians had not considered highlights 
the importance of SARC reports. 
In Das-COCOAAA, one interpretation of SARC’s commentary on 
the differing rights analyses of the judiciary and executive is that the 
Attorney-General should have made a statement of incompatibility. This 
has conceptual implications. If the Attorney-General simply accepted the 
6  Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 19 August 2014, 2509 (Ms Pulford).
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judiciary’s view of the unjustifiability of the limit, this may be considered 
‘judge-proofing’/‘Charter-proofing’ legislation. ‘Charter-proofing’ refers 
to the practice where the executive and parliament shape their policy and 
laws to fit judicial interpretations of rights to avoid adverse court rulings, 
and this more closely resembles a judicial monologue about rights.
However, tensions arise for democratic accountability if the judiciary and 
executive put forward competing rights analysis. Were the executive to 
simply assert an alternative narrative of rights, without acknowledging 
the competing judicial views and offering reasons for departing from 
those views, the improved rights-transparency in, and greater rights-
accountability when, law-making that we hope to gain from dialogue is 
lost. Moreover, where there is a disagreement between the executive and the 
judiciary, and this is not acknowledged via a statement of incompatibility, 
parliament is not properly alerted to the disagreement, as occurred in Das-
COCOAAA. In that case SARC, the Attorney-General and Ms Pennicuik 
engaged in rights-dialogue over other amendments, but missed the rights-
implications for s 39 and the reversal of Das.
Finally, SARC’s conclusions in Das-COCOAAA were tepid: that the 
amendments ‘may be incompatible’ and referral of the issue ‘to Parliament 
for its consideration’,7 despite SARC’s analysis suggesting incompatibility. 
As examples of dialogue, the Charter allows the executive and parliament 
to disagree with the judiciary. As examples of rights protection, reasonable 
people will disagree; but regardless, the Charter elevates parliamentary 
sovereignty over rights protection.
IV. Executive–Parliament Reactions 
Impacting on Rights
Unlike the complete cycles, some judicial decisions that did not turn on 
Charter rights have nevertheless prompted amendments that did impact 
on Charter rights. These are explored in this Part.
7  SARC, Alert Digest, No 9 of 2014, 15.
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A. Decisions and responses
In DPP v Leys,8 the court clarified the lawful combination of sentencing 
options involving community corrections orders, and corrected a drafting 
error concerning the commencement of interlinked provisions, under 
the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). Parliament codified the judicial decision 
via amendments,9 which were applied retrospectively to ensure that 500 
offenders whose sentences may have otherwise been unlawful were deemed 
to be lawful. Although retrospective application itself is rights-limiting, 
this was preferred over the rights implications of prospective legislation: 
being 500 offenders having their rights to liberty, privacy and movement 
limited because of potentially unlawful sentences.
In Director of Housing v TK,10 the Director issued a notice to vacate 
under s  250 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic) (RTA) because 
‘the  tenant ha[d] used the rented premises … for any purpose that is 
illegal’. The notice was ultra vires because in two instances the tenant’s 
drug trafficking occurred in common areas (not the rented premises), and 
in another the tenant’s drug trafficking occurred at the front door which 
was insufficient to establish ‘use’ of the rented premises. Amendments 
to the RTA ensured that drug trafficking on the rented premises or in 
a  common area triggered the ‘notice to vacate’ power; expanded the 
power to cover prescribed indictable offences; and changed the trigger 
for vacation from a police charge to the Director’s reasonable belief.11 
XFJ provides another example.12
B. Executive–parliamentary scrutiny and dialogue
These examples highlight the representative arms’ willingness to respond 
to judicial decisions by enacting rights-limiting legislation. In discharging 
pre-legislative rights-scrutiny obligations, the representative arms 
recognised potential violations of rights in all examples, but reasoned 
away the violation, or justified the violation referring to the competing 
rights of others, public safety and the like. 
8  DPP v Leys [2012] VSCA 304 (‘Leys’).
9  Road Safety and Sentencing Act Amendment Act 2012 (Vic). 
10  Director of Housing v TK (Residential Tenancies) [2010] VCAT 1839 (‘TK’).
11  Residential Tenancies Amendment (Public Housing) Act 2011 (Vic).
12  XFJ v Director of Public Transport [2008] VCAT 2303 led to the Transport Legislation Amendments 
(Driver and Industry Standards) Act 2008 (Vic). 
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In Leys and XFJ, SARC reported after the Bill passed both Houses. 
In TK, SARC directly compared the tribunal ruling with the amendments, 
challenging the rights-compatibility of the executive-led amendments, 
to no avail in parliament. 
Parliamentary contributions were mixed. In Leys, debate was truncated, 
with the amendments enacted within 72 hours, and brief parliamentary 
debate. Debate in XFJ was brief, with the competing rights of the public 
elevated over individual rights, and parliamentarians lamenting the non-
retrospectivity of the amendments (i.e. lamenting the failure to further 
violate rights). By contrast, debate in TK was relatively sophisticated, with 
the right to housing considered, the competing rights of other tenants 
balanced, the impact of the reduced evidentiary burden explored, and 
legislative safeguards recognised.
V. Reforms
These examples demonstrate the need for reform across the dialogue 
process. During the ‘pre-tabling-in-parliament’ phase of policy and 
legislative design, although the executive accounts for rights, this is in secret 
and there is no guarantee of outside influence. This is problematic because 
once Cabinet gives ‘in-principle’ agreement to legislative proposals, it is 
difficult to secure amendments. If the window for real rights-influence 
ends at Cabinet, dialogue is nothing more than an executive monologue. 
The eight-year Charter review recommends that SoCs be issued with 
exposure drafts.13 This is an improvement, but the examples highlight 
that rights-impinging legislation is unlikely to be released in exposure 
draft and likely to be rushed through parliament. Reforms must 
include: (a) changes to the political culture surrounding amendments in 
parliament; and (b) an expansion of voices influencing the pre-Cabinet-
approval phase of legislative development, with SARC and the Victorian 
Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission being consulted, 
in confidence, on draft legislation pre-Cabinet-approval.
13  Recommendation 41(b), Michael Brett Young, From Commitment to Culture: The 2015 
Review of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Victorian Government Printer, 
Melbourne, 2015) 188.
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SoCs consistently failed to explain ‘how’ a Bill was (in)compatible. 
Section 28 must be amended to require consideration of s 7(2) as part 
of compatibility assessments and evidence-based assessments. Section 
28(3) could read: ‘A statement of compatibility must state – (a) whether, 
in the member’s opinion, the Bill is compatible with human rights 
and, if so, how it is compatible by reference to s 7(2) providing evidence 
for the assessment; and (b) if, in the member’s opinion, any part of the 
Bill is incompatible with human rights, the nature and extent of the 
incompatibility by reference to s 7(2) providing evidence for the assessment.’
SARC needs strengthening. First, SARC has two weeks to report on all 
Bills introduced. SARC reports are often not available before Bills pass 
either the lower or both Houses. This mutes SARC’s contribution to the 
dialogue. Parliamentarians have suggested that SARC be convened ad 
hoc whenever ‘urgent Bills’ are presented to parliament.14 In addition, the 
Charter should be amended to prevent a Bill becoming a valid Act until 
SARC has reported, and parliament has ‘properly considered’ the report 
(see below). 
Second, although rights-incompatible analysis and ministerial requests 
for clarification convey SARC’s opinion, SARC’s recommendations are 
mild. This may be consistent with the practice of scrutiny committees, 
but SARC’s current practice ‘has had little influence over the content of 
legislation once the Bill has been presented to Parliament’.15 Were SARC 
privately consulted on proposed legislation before Cabinet approval, 
the executive might be induced to present more rights-compatible 
Bills. SARC’s public reports could then be frank rights assessments with 
(stronger) conclusions (particularly where SARC’s private concerns are 
not addressed). 
Parliament must develop and nurture a rights culture, ensuring there is 
a political cost for not protecting rights and not convincingly justifying 
limitations on rights. Non-legal methods of cultural change include: 
(a) developing strong leadership supportive of a rights-respecting culture 
(top-down approach), and identifying non-senior parliamentarians to act 
14  Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 16 August 2012, 3535 (Mr Pakula) and 
3541 (Ms Pennicuik). 
15  Above n 13, 177, citing the Chair of SARC, Carlo Carli MP.
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as change agents among the parliamentary cohort (bottom-up approach);16 
(b) better education about the substance of rights and the proportionality 
analysis informing limitations to rights, and education about the process 
of rights-scrutiny and how it feeds into the inter-institutional dialogue; 
and (c) pressure from constituents. 
Legal methods include imposing an obligation on parliament to ‘give 
proper consideration’ to SoCs and SARC reports, with a failure to give 
proper consideration precluding a Bill becoming an Act. In relation to 
SARC, s 30 should become s 30(1), with: subs (2) preventing parliament 
enacting laws prior to SARC reporting; subs  (3) requiring parliament 
to  give ‘proper consideration’ to SARC reports; and subs  (4) stating 
‘a failure to comply with sub-sections 30(1), (2) and (3) prevents that bill 
becoming an act, and any purported act is not valid, has no operation and 
cannot be enforced’.
Parliament needs costs/consequences for rights-incompatibility, which 
presents a multifaceted problem. First, unlike the Canadian Charter, 
the Victorian Charter is not a constitutional instrument, so the judiciary 
cannot invalidate rights-incompatible legislation. The latter Charter is 
a statutory instrument similar to Britain’s, but unlike Britain – which 
has a stronger parliamentary rights-culture – there is no oversight by 
a  regional human rights court that issues binding decisions. The threat 
of constitutional invalidation (Canada) or enforceable regional decision-
making (Britain) focuses the mind of parliamentarians. 
Second, judicial decision-making under the Charter has been weak. 
Section  32 rights-compatible reinterpretation as a remedy has been 
undermined and the role of s  7(2) is uncertain;17 judicial decisions on 
rights have been timid;18 and some judges have questioned the dialogue 
16  Bronwyn Naylor, Julie Debeljak and Anita Mackay, ‘A Strategic Framework for Implementing 
Human Rights in Closed Environments: A Human Rights Regulatory Framework and its 
Implementation’ (2015) 41 Monash University Law Review 218, 265–66.
17  Julie Debeljak, ‘Who Is Sovereign Now? The Momcilovic Court Hands Back Power Over Human 
Rights That Parliament Intended It To Have’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 15–51; Julie Debeljak, 
‘Proportionality, Rights-Consistent Interpretation and Declarations under the Victorian Charter 
of Human Rights and Responsibilities: The Momcilovic Litigation and Beyond’ (2014) 40 Monash 
University Law Review 340–88.
18  Julie Debeljak, ‘The Rights of Prisoners under the Victorian Charter: A Critical Analysis of the 
Jurisprudence on the Treatment of Prisoners and Conditions of Detention’ (2015) 38 University 
of New South Wales Law Journal 1332–85.
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conception.19 Recommendations to strengthen ss 32(1) and 7(2) in the 
eight-year Charter Review, if adopted, should improve the judicial – and 
thus parliamentary – engagement with rights.20
VI. Conclusion
The Victorian executive dominates the debate about rights, both in the 
pre-tabling and parliamentary phases of law-making. This dominance is 
not ameliorated by parliament or the judiciary, due to limitations under 
the Charter and cultural approaches to rights. The executive dominance of 
parliament, at least of the lower house, converts what would be an ideal, 
three-way ‘rights-multilogue’ into a two-way rights-dialogue between the 
executive and judiciary. (Indeed, the debate between constitutional and 
statutory instruments is better cast as one between judicial versus executive 
monopolisation of rights.) Without breaking the executive’s dominance 
or adopting a constitutional instrument, an executive-dominated rights-
monologue, coupled with parliamentary and judicial rights-heckling, 
is what remains.
19  HCA Momcilovic [2011] HCA 34, [95] (French CJ), [146] (Gummow J, Hayne J concurring), 
[533–534] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 




1  Professor Rubenstein, ANU College of Law, is the lead CI on the ARC Discovery Project 
DP130101954 that this chapter draws upon. Andrew Henderson is a sessional staff member of 
The Australian National University College of Law and has been employed as a Research Assistant on 
this project. His co-authorship of this chapter is testament to his own significant contributions to the 
research output. 
2  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 5(2). Superior Courts of Record make decisions 
that are determinative, and their proceedings must be recorded. The High Court of Australia is also 
a Superior Court of Record. The High Court’s records have been identified for many years as items 
for ‘permanent retention’. This has not occurred until very recently for the Federal Court. Unlike the 
State Supreme Courts, the Federal Court is a Chapter III court, which gives it a greater degree of 
prominence with an Australian judiciary. Its statutory jurisdiction, particularly in relation to judicial 
review, also means that it deals with matters directly connected to the relationship between the 
individual and the state to an extent that is simply not shared with the Supreme Courts.
Court Records as Archives: 
The Need for Law Reform to 
Ensure Access
Andrew Henderson and Kim Rubenstein1
I. Introduction
Since its establishment in 1976, the Federal Court of Australia 
(the Federal Court) has served as a site for the disputation, negotiation and 
resolution of issues fundamentally important to Australian society. It does 
so in the context of Australia’s constitutional system that adheres to the 
rule of law and open justice, in order to enforce the rights of individuals 
and navigate the boundaries of the powers of the state. As a ‘superior court 
of record’,2 the court’s collected case files constitute a permanent record 
of the proceedings before it. 
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The unique role of the Federal Court means that its records speak directly 
to an individual’s relationship with the state and identity as a citizen.3 
When resolving disputes between parties (whether between individual 
citizens or between a citizen and the state), the Federal Court inevitably 
has an impact beyond those parties, through the democratic values it 
espouses and pronounces, the methods of administrative and judicial 
decision-making undertaken, as well as its engagement as one arm of 
government in our constitutional make-up. The documents are also rich 
records of public interest and importance about the relationship between 
the individual and the state that are not readily accessible elsewhere. 
However, the public is restricted to accessing only those documents 
identified as constituting the ‘court record’. 
The definition of the ‘court record’ within an Anglo-Australian tradition 
of precedent4 is a narrowly defined set of materials and the Federal 
Court’s Rules concerning the public inspection of documents mirror 
this approach.5 The importance of the Federal Court’s records, however, 
extends beyond traditional ideas about the ‘court record’. We argue that 
the records constitute a legal, social and cultural archive documenting 
how individuals and the state have sought to describe and resolve their 
relationship with one another. The use of the term ‘archive’ here is not 
restricted to the common or popular concept of purely historical material 
or matters simply of historical interest.6 Over time, the term ‘archive’ 
has come to have a range of meanings. Conventionally understood as 
a collection of records produced by an individual or organisation and 
housed in a repository, more recently it has been reconceptualised. Today, 
an archive may be any record that has value as authentic evidence of 
administrative, corporate, cultural and intellectual activity.7 In this broader 
context, we argue that the court’s contemporary records, including its 
3  We are using the term citizen here both in the formal sense of someone who is recognised as 
a capital ‘C’ citizen under the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), but also the broader normative 
small ‘c’ citizen, being an individual who is a member of the Australian community (i.e. a permanent 
or temporary resident and not a formal citizen) who has engaged with the State and become an 
active ‘c’itizen in relying on laws to defend his/her rights. For a further discussion about the different 
meanings of citizenship in Australia, see Kim Rubenstein, Australian Citizenship Law (Thomson 
Reuters, 2nd edn, 2016) Ch 1.
4  The notion of the ‘Record’ is a complicated legal concept for the purpose of judicial review. See 
further Kirk v Industrial Court of NSW (2010) 239 CLR 531 and Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 
CLR 163.
5  Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 2.32(2).
6  Francis X Blouin Jr and William G Rosenberg, Processing the Past: Contesting Authority in History 
and the Archives (Oxford University Press, 2011), 4. 
7  Australian Society of Archivists, Made, Kept and Used: Celebrating 30 Years of the Australian 
Society of Archivists (2005).
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records of how it manages its own business, provide an account of how 
parties, including the state, describe rights and responsibilities today, 
in the here and now, as well as in the past. These perspectives can inform 
current debates over our roles and identities as citizens.
This chapter draws on an example from a much larger survey of files held 
by the National Archive of Australia about the Federal Court and identified 
as part of the Australian Research Council-funded project, The Court as 
Archive: Rethinking the Institutional Role of Federal Superior Courts of 
Record.8 It argues that the current limits on the court’s public access, 
based on historical concepts of the ‘court record’, require review and are 
a potential site of law reform in Australia. This law reform should ensure 
that the public access principles better reflect deeper understandings of 
the role and significance of the Federal Court and its records as an archive 
of value to Australian society.
II. The Federal Court in Context
Proceedings before the Federal Court can hold deep significance for the 
parties and the wider community. For example, the making of orders 
under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) may 
represent protection from unlawful executive action. The making of orders 
under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) may represent the recognition of 
deeply held spiritual and cultural connections to the land. For the legal 
profession in a common law system, judgment might represent a statement 
of what the law is – with an eye to appeal if the statement is perceived to be 
wrong. Moreover, Court judgments provide the opportunity to critically 
assess the performance of the courts and judges in terms of timeliness 
or even the extent to which they are ‘in touch’ with the community.9 
It is this process of determining a dispute between two or more parties 
that is the basis of the jurisdiction of a Chapter III court10 and represents 
the core characteristic of Commonwealth judicial power.11 However, 
8  Discovery Project DP130101954, purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP130101954. Associate 
Professor Ann Genovese from the University of Melbourne and Dr Trish Luker from the University 
of Technology Sydney have been fellow CIs on the project. 
9  Murray Gleeson, ‘Out of Touch or Out of Reach?’ (2006) 7 The Judicial Review 241, 241.
10  In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 266 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers 
Rich and Starke JJ).
11  Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ); see also James 
Stellios, ‘Reconceving The Separation Of Judicial Power’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 113, 117.
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in a common law system reliant on precedent both as a body of law and 
a tool of statutory interpretation, the effects of judicial decision-making 
are not bound in space or time but may be felt well beyond individual 
disputes.12 The application of a body of law derived from principles and 
precedent provides continuity, consistency and certainty in individuals’ 
relationships with one another and with the state.13 A decision may also 
reach back in time to either affirm or reject previous interpretations of the 
law or redefine legal and personal relationships.14 Through their reasons for 
decision, Courts reinforce the acceptance of certain ideas while rejecting 
or disapproving of others.15 In this sense, Courts play an important role 
in understanding ideas of identity, belonging, citizenship and rights.
III. The Court as Archive
The focus of lawyers tends to be on the court’s record as its end product 
– orders, reasons and judgment. Reliance on reasons alone is the study of 
precedent – what has been referred to as ‘lawyers’ history’.16 Reasons for 
decision provide a summary of the facts ‘ascertained’ by the court and 
identified as legally significant.17 In effect, the reasons present a narrow set 
of facts viewed through a particular lens.18
Insistence on a precedential or procedural definition of ‘the record’ 
ignores the record’s much more significant value as an archive. Materials 
presented by the parties provide both the canvas and the frame for the 
decision – they provide the foundation for the decision and describe 
the broader context within which the decision is made. It is here that 
Court records arguably hold more value to the researcher as a companion, 
or even contradictor, to state-run archives. 
12  Anthony Mason, ‘The Use and Abuse of Precedent’ (1988) 4 Australian Bar Review 93. See also 
traditional ideas of the common law representing common custom and usage in Rupert Cross and 
J W Harris, Precedent in English Law (Clarendon Press, 1991), 36–37.
13  Ibid. See also Mirehouse v Rennell (1833) 1 Cl. & F. 527, 546.
14  Oscar G Chase, ‘“Supreme” Courts and the Imagination of the Real’ (2015) 518 New York 
University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, 14.
15  Ibid.
16  Kinvin Wroth, ‘Documents of the Colonial Conflict: Part I – Sources for the Legal History 
of the American Revolution’ (1976) 69 Law Librarians Journal 277. 
17  Michael McHugh, ‘Judicial Method’ (1999) 73 Australian Law Journal 37. 
18  Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, 
2008), 173.
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Postmodern critiques of archives argue that, to the extent archival 
institutions are created by, and contain records of, the state, they give 
primacy to a representation of the community constructed by the state 
and exclude contradictory voices.19 Archives are no longer assumed to be 
an authoritative source of historical knowledge, but are rather understood 
to create history through the selection, organisation and provision of 
documents.20 In the context of the individual’s relationship with the 
state, state-run archives therefore might exclude or explicitly devalue or 
discredit voices of protest. Within the court’s own records, contradictory 
voices are not just heard but are explicitly required. The evidence and 
other materials submitted to the court are representative of the voices 
of those who submitted them. They do not contain just one version of 
a series of events but may contain two or multiple stories told in different 
ways and from different perspectives. Within this account are cultural and 
social assumptions – both explicit and implicit – that provide an insight 
into those relationships. Perhaps even more crucially these are snapshots 
of assumptions in conflict – of contested ideas about what is acceptable. 
This more complete archive begins to explain ‘not only what went on in 
the law’s formal processes, but what were the full … effects that law and 
the life environing the law had on each other’.21 
The records of one Mrs Law’s dispute with the Repatriation Commission 
provide a specific example of this idea of a more complete archive. 
The National Archives of Australia (NAA) retains a series of files from 
various Commonwealth departments22 and the Cabinet23 concerning 
proceedings brought by the Commonwealth challenging the award 
of a war widow’s pension to Mrs Law. James Law, Mrs Law’s husband, 
passed away from lung cancer in late 1976. During World War II he 
began to smoke heavily – a habit he did not quit until a heart attack three 
19  Blouin and Rosenberg, above n 6, 159; Ciaran B Trace, ‘What is Recorded is Never Simply 
“What Happened”: Record Keeping in Modern Organizational Culture’ (2002) 2 Archival Science 
137. See also s 2A of the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) and the definition of ‘archival resources of the 
Commonwealth’.
20  Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever (University of Chicago Press, 1996); Carolyn Steedman, Dust: 
The Archive and Cultural History (Rutgers University Press, 2002).
21  J Willard Hurst, ‘Legal Elements in United States History’ in Donald Fleming and Bernard 
Bailyn (eds), Perspectives in American History (Little Brown Books, 1971) Vol 2, 3.
22  National Archives of Australia: Prime Minister’s Department – Correspondence files; A1209, 
Appeals to Federal Court for War Widows Pension 1980–1982, 1980/558 PART 1.
23  National Archives of Australia: Fraser Ministries – Cabinet Memoranda; A12930, Memorandum 
No 639: Law v Repatriation Commission appeal to full court of the Federal Court of Australia – 
Related to Decision No 11094 1980, 639.
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years before his death. After her husband’s death, Mrs Law applied for 
a war widow’s pension, arguing her husband had died as a result of an 
‘occurrence’ during his enlistment. The Repatriation Commission did not 
agree. Mrs Law was successful on appeal before Justice Toohey, then of 
the Federal Court,24 and again when the Commission appealed to the 
Full Court of the Federal Court25 and the High Court.26 
The proceedings ultimately affected how the then Repatriation 
Commission would determine more broadly the claims for death or 
disability concerning ex-service personnel contracting lung cancer from 
smoking at the time, and into the future.27 These files provide some 
insight into how the state perceived its relationship with its citizens. 
The files tell a story not apparent from the reasons for decision. Although 
they opposed Mrs Law’s application, Cabinet agreed to meet Mrs Law’s 
costs of the litigation, to continue to pay her pension pending the 
outcome of the appeal and to investigate other benefits to which she 
may be entitled.28 The Commonwealth’s agreement to pay Mrs Law’s 
pension creates the impression of magnanimity and generosity – a positive 
depiction that arguably speaks to larger ideas of how government should 
be run. A closer reading of the Cabinet Submission recommending the 
ongoing payment of the pension, however, reveals a discussion of how the 
government might be perceived, raising a ‘general question of whether, 
as a matter of public policy an appeal against decisions involving a war 
widow … should proceed’.29 Among other factors, Cabinet was invited 
to consider how the Commonwealth’s appeal might affect its relationship 
with the community,  noting that an appeal ‘would almost certainly 
produce a very unfavourable reaction from ex-service organisations from 
which Government has already criticism over the adoption of policies 
which eroded repatriation benefits’.30 
We can review a rich range of material in the NAA due to the agency’s 
choice of materials to be kept, which help us understand the relationship 
between the individual and the state and indeed more about how the state 
24  Law v Repatriation Commission (1980) 29 ALR 64.
25  Repatriation Commission v Law (1980) 31 ALR 140.
26  Repatriation Commission v Law (1981) 147 CLR 635.
27  See Judith E Grbich, ‘Repatriation Disability Pensions: Reverse Onus of Proof Problems and the 
Determination and Review System’ (1984) 10 Monash University Law Review 73.
28  Above n 24.
29  Above n 24. 
30  Above n 24.
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perceived itself. But these do not necessarily create a complete picture, as 
they are determined by the agency responsible for the litigation, not the 
Federal Court itself.
IV. Telling the Whole Story: Court Records 
and Archives
If we understand the Federal Court’s records as an archive, we are 
immediately presented with a number of inconsistencies and questions, 
many of which are confronted by this project.
Court records are excluded from the operation of the Archives Act unless 
specific arrangements are made in consultation with the Chief Justice.31 
From the perspective of the constitutional principle of separation 
of Commonwealth judicial power, this may be appropriate. For the 
legislature to seek to define and direct a Chapter III court concerning 
the management of its records – particularly those related to the judicial 
process – may raise questions of interference.
Commonwealth courts have instead sought to address what constitutes 
their records through their Rules. The position is approached not from the 
perspective of preserving important materials, but from the traditional, 
procedural perspective. It is also done inconsistently between the courts 
themselves.32
Between the NAA and the Federal Court, there are further inconsistencies 
concerning access to materials and timing that would affect any records 
of proceedings that might be transferred. Materials accessible today in the 
Federal Court (e.g. an originating application) may not be accessible at 
31  Archives Act 1983 (Cth), ss 19(1), 20(1) and 20(3).
32  At the Commonwealth level, legislation establishing the courts is silent. Consequently, the 
matter is left to Rules, which are inconsistent across jurisdictions. For example, the High Court Rules 
require the Registrar to maintain the ‘records of the Court’ and ‘documents filed in the registry’ as 
separate things: High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 4.07.01 and 4.07.02. The Family Law Rules use 
the phrase ‘court record’ and, while providing no definition, it appears to include documents filed 
with the registry and may include correspondence and transcript: Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) 
r 24.13 ‘court document’. The Federal Court Rules adopt a similar distinction to the High Court 
but refer instead to the ‘records of the Registry’: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 2.31(1). However, 
a practice note uses ‘court file’, which extends to all documents filed with the Registry but does not 
equate it with the record: Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM23 – Electronic Court File and 
Preparation and Lodgment of Documents, 10 July 2014, [3.1], [4.4], [4.5], [5.3] and [5.4].
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Archives for 21 years.33 Conversely, materials not available at any time at 
the Federal Court may become accessible in 21 years time to anyone who 
applies to the NAA for access. 
The records concerning Mrs Law provide an example of this inconsistency 
and how the state’s records influence how it is perceived. To the extent 
that the records held by the NAA capture the Commonwealth’s position, 
they reflect a particular, and one-sided, understanding of the dispute. 
Silent in these records are the voices of Mr and Mrs Law or their family. 
Silent also are the voices of other ex-service personnel and their families 
who would be affected by the outcome of the appeals. It is here that 
the Federal Court’s records could transcend the procedural to become 
a unique archive.
Evidence of those involved in litigation, other than the Commonwealth, 
may be held by the NAA, but only where a Commonwealth agency 
considers it sufficiently important to be kept on their file. These broader 
materials, developed for the purpose of litigation, form a fundamental 
element of the judicial process before the Federal Court. Making the 
materials – which may not exist anywhere else – available begins to tell 
a more complete story about not only Mr and Mrs Law, but also about 
individual citizens’ expectations of and relationships with the state.
V. Conclusion
Developments within the Federal Court itself, compelled by its discussions 
with the NAA, reflect a realisation of the importance of the materials it 
controls. In October 2011, the NAA endorsed the Federal Court’s Records 
Authority for the management and disposal of the court’s records.34 
Certain classes of case file have been identified in the Records Authority 
as so important that their entire contents are to be permanently retained 
by NAA, namely, all native title files and ‘significant, non-native title files’. 
While the criteria for determining ‘significance’ continue to be developed, 
its inclusion as a basis for identifying records for permanent retention 
reflects the court’s understanding of its role beyond a mechanism for 
dispute resolution.
33  Archives Act s 31(1).
34  Records Authority 2010/00315821 – Federal Court of Australia, 19 October 2011.
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However, the Records Authority applies only to files to be transferred to 
the NAA. The existing statutory bar on public access to materials held 
by the NAA will continue to apply, placing those records beyond public 
access for many years to come. The records that the Federal Court holds 
are of both historical importance but also of importance today. Limited 
access places the public in a position of disadvantage in understanding 
how the state perceives its role and responsibilities. It is also inconsistent 
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A Positive Freedom of Public 
Speech? Australian Media Law 
Reform and Freedom of Political 
Communication
Andrew T Kenyon1
Proposals to reform Australian media law arise frequently; recent examples 
have included a merger of public broadcasting organisations and changing 
legislative ownership limits for commercial media. What might such 
proposals have to do with the idea of free speech, in particular as it relates 
to public discourse? Here I explore an approach to free speech recognising 
positive or structural aspects of the freedom as well as negative or liberty 
aspects. In short, free speech entails both diversity of voices and absence 
of censorship, not merely the latter. The outline presented here suggests 
changes to Australian constitutional interpretation could be warranted, or 
at least their exploration deserves attention, even if such changes appear 
unlikely soon.
There are also implications for legislative and executive action – they could 
take into account positive and structural aspects of free speech which, to 
date, are rarely acknowledged. That sort of change could more plausibly 
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happen in the short term, although it also faces challenges. In particular, 
parliament and executive appear unlikely to achieve adequate protection 
for free speech if the matter is left entirely open to their choice.
I. Some Introductory Caveats
My interest here lies in public speech or public discourse within democratic 
contexts. This focus seeks to separate free speech as a constitutive element 
of democratic government from free speech as a liberal or human right. 
As  with Eric Heinze’s recent analysis in the different context of hate 
speech,2 my aim is not to suggest that democracy supplies a complete 
approach to free speech; rather, claims to be democratic carry particular 
necessary implications for free speech. Also by way of caveat, the positive–
negative terminology is not meant to suggest that the state is ever absent 
in terms of free speech or state–media relations. The government is always 
involved; as Victor Pickard states, ‘the real question is how the government 
should be involved’.3 
Clearly, this approach to free speech involves contested terms, ‘democracy’ 
in particular. But the essentially contested nature of democracy offers some 
support to the approach outlined here. I will take democracy to contain 
a claim to political self-rule in one form or another. The repeated failure 
of democracies in practice – the ‘internal exclusions and subordinations’ 
of ‘class … gender, sexuality, race, religion, ethnicity, and global origin’ – 
does not remove the idea’s ambition and appeal. Along with its failures, 
democracy has also carried ‘the language and promise of inclusive and 
shared political equality, freedom, and popular sovereignty’.4 The point for 
present purposes is that forms of self-rule imply a particular approach to 
free speech and, I would suggest, democratic constitutional arrangements 
also presuppose it. This is reinforced by the fact that democracies may be 
reformed. That possibility for reform can be itself seen to require diverse 
public speech: ‘public discourse is the constitution of the constitution’.5 
2  Eric Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford University Press, 2016).
3  Victor Pickard, ‘Toward a People’s Internet: The Fight for Positive Freedoms in an Age 
of Corporate Libertarianism’ in Maria Edström, Andrew T Kenyon and Eva-Maria Svensson (eds), 
Blurring the Lines: Market-driven and Democracy-driven Freedom of Expression (Nordicom, 2016) 61.
4  Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (MIT Press, 2015) 44.
5  Heinze, above n 2, 6 (emphasis in original).
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It is worth noting, however, that completely elite forms of government are 
excluded from this approach; such forms of government do not require 
free public speech. But where a democratic polity claims to be not only 
about elite rule, where it claims to temper democracy’s tendencies towards 
elite domination, then wider aspects of free speech are implicated.
II. Positive Freedom of Public Speech
Draconian state restrictions on speech attest to the importance of negative 
free speech. But to suggest that speech is free whenever the state does 
not directly restrict it obscures the state’s role in public communication. 
Free speech also has positive aspects. In considering those, there are many 
intellectual sources that could be drawn on,6 including: 
• legal scholarship about free speech (using ideas broadly consistent with 
those presented here); 
• writing from media studies and media policy, where recent work offers 
clear engagement with the idea of positive freedom; 
• writing about positive liberty or positive freedom, often in political 
philosophy, although that work has surprisingly little to say directly 
about free speech or mediated speech; 
• human rights law scholarship about positive rights, which again tends 
to focus on other matters than speech; and 
• some formal law, including constitutional courts in France, Germany 
and other parts of Europe (and perhaps parliamentary processes and 
legislation in Northern Europe). The legal examples often engage 
with specific aspects of positive free speech, rather than its wider 
implications. The German Federal Constitutional Court’s analysis 
of free speech and broadcasting is a strong example of that, which 
is considered further below.
6  See, for example, law and media studies literature discussed in Andrew T Kenyon, ‘Assuming Free 
Speech’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 379; Carol C Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social 
Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society (Cambridge University Press, 1988); Sandra Fredman, 
Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University Press, 2008).
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Thus while the concept of positive free speech might appear foreign to 
Australian law, it is not at all unknown as an idea. Aspects of it can be seen 
in a host of writing across a range of disciplines, although it has tended to 
be an idea without powerful friends. Given limited space here, I simply 
use two short quotes to explore the idea.
Free speech might be considered as a bare liberty that requires only the 
absence of government restriction. It subjects government action to 
judicial scrutiny where that action would restrict speech. But free speech 
need not be seen only in such negative terms. Applied philosopher Onora 
O’Neill observes that the apparent absence of government action does not 
leave public speech free from influence: 
[L]aissez-faire communications policies merely assign the regulation of 
communication to nonstate powers. They secure a particular configuration 
of freedom of expression, which may leave some unable to find their 
voices and does not guarantee the expression of diverse views.7 
Similar ideas have been raised by many commentators, but I note the 
O’Neill example because she then suggests points of relevance here. 
In short, she argues that, in a democratic context, there should be an aim 
to enable sustained diverse public communication, while recognising the 
impossibility of complete non-interference with communication. 
Enabling sustained diverse public speech in a democratic context might 
be thought to lie ‘beyond’ free speech. But not necessarily, as Judith 
Lichtenberg explains. The multiple rationales commonly seen to underlie 
free speech can be grouped into two broad goals: 
These commitments can be described in terms of two basic principles. 
The  first we may call the noninterference or no censorship principle: 
One should not be prevented from thinking, speaking, reading, writing, 
or listening as one sees fit. The other I call the multiplicity of voices 
principle: The purposes of freedom of speech are realized when expression 
and diversity of expression flourish.8
7  Onora O’Neill, ‘Practices of Toleration’ in Judith Lichtenberg (ed), Democracy and the Mass 
Media: A Collection of Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 155, 178.
8  Judith Lichtenberg, ‘Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press’ in Lichtenberg (ed), 
Democracy and the Mass Media: A Collection of Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 102, 107 
(emphasis in original).
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She maintains that diverse, multiple voices are needed for free speech 
interests to be met. More than speech itself, it is debate and diversity of 
ideas that are required. And such debate and diversity cannot be assumed 
to exist in market-based mass media; theory and practice suggest they 
require support beyond markets.9 
III. What Role for Courts?
How might positive aspects of free speech be considered in law? 
The German Federal Constitutional Court offers a developed example of 
judgments doing just this. (Although operating within a code-based legal 
system, the Constitutional Court’s decisions have the weight of precedent, 
binding all actors except itself.) In decisions from 1961 to 2014 the 
Constitutional Court has set out detailed requirements about television 
broadcasting, drawing on the free speech protection in Art 5 of the Basic 
Law and its protection for broadcasting freedom.10 A contemporary 
translation of Art 5 reads:
(1) Everyone has the right freely to express and disseminate their opinions 
orally, in writing or visually and to obtain information from generally 
accessible sources without hindrance. Freedom of the press and freedom 
of reporting through audiovisual media shall be guaranteed. There shall be 
no censorship.11
The provision sits within particular constitutional traditions, and the 
decisions’ merits are subject to ongoing domestic debate.12 My primary 
interest here, however, lies in particular ideas about free speech seen in 
the decisions, including: free speech’s positive aspects; the broad range 
of media content covered; the constitutionality of a dual broadcasting 
system; funding public broadcasting; internal pluralism within public 
broadcasters; what can be called a ‘precautionary’ approach; and the 
contemporary media environment. Here, I mention a little more about 
9  See, for example, Andrew T Kenyon, ‘Assuming Free Speech’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 379.
10  A useful entry point is Donald P Kommers and Russell A Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence 
of the Federal Republic of Germany (Duke University Press, 3rd edn, 2012).
11  See, for example, Christian Potschka, Towards a Market in Broadcasting: Communications Policy 
in the UK and Germany (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 161 (emphasis added).
12  See, for example, Bernd Grzeszick, ‘The “Serving” Freedom to Broadcast: Subjective versus 
Objective Dimensions of a Fundamental Right’ in Hermann Pünder and Christian Waldhoff (eds), 
Debates in German Public Law (Hart, 2014) 75, 85.
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four of these areas. Overall, they illustrate the power of the idea that free 
speech requires efforts be made to provide comprehensive, universally 
available and diverse information. 
A. Free speech has positive aspects
Clearly, free speech is not merely a negative liberty for the Constitutional 
Court. Article 5’s purpose of individual and public opinion formation 
requires state action; it cannot be met merely by a negative duty. Instead, 
‘a  positive order is necessary, which ensures … the variety of existing 
opinion is expressed … as widely and completely as possible’.13 In this 
approach to free speech, broadcasting freedom is a state of affairs in 
which diversity in content is sought along with freedom from state and 
market control.
In the German context, constitutional rights establish objective principles 
as well as subjective protections for individuals.14 The state clearly has 
a ‘protective function’.15 While acknowledging the German context and 
history, here I want to flag that a similar result may be reached for free 
speech rights in other constitutional systems due to the role of public 
communication within a democratic constitutional order. 
B. The freedom is broad
Article 5 guarantees a broad freedom. While referring explicitly to freedom 
of reporting, the freedom is not limited to reporting. It serves the wide free 
speech interests protected by Art 5 as a whole – free individual and public 
opinion formation – which means it encompasses entertainment content 
as well as news and commentary. Broadcasting has the constitutional 
function of providing ‘information in the greatest possible breadth 
and completeness’ because ‘opinion formation comes about not only 
in news broadcasts, political commentaries or series on problems of 
the past, present and future, but also in audio and TV dramas, musical 
presentations or entertainment broadcasts’.16 In addition, the requirement 
is not for ‘a minimum provision to which public broadcasting is confined 
13  BVerfGE 57, 295 (Third broadcasting case).
14  See, for example, Werner Heun, The Constitution of Germany: A Contextual Analysis (Hart, 2011) 
198–200.
15  See, for example, Dieter Grimm, ‘The Protective Function of the State’ in Georg Nolte (ed), 
European and US Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 137.
16  BVerfGE 73, 118 (1986) (Fourth/Lower Saxony broadcasting case).
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or could be reduced’.17 It is for a comprehensive service, available to the 
entire population, containing substantial diversity of opinion.18 That is 
the constitutional mandate of public broadcasting.
C. A dual broadcasting system
The above requirements have led the Constitutional Court to hold that 
a dual system of public and commercial broadcasting can meet the 
constitutional requirements, but it is a system in which public broadcasting 
is primary. Commercial broadcasting has been held constitutionally 
permissible only where public broadcasting is able to meet the Basic Law’s 
mandate for opinion formation.19 While that could theoretically change 
if commercial broadcasting by itself met the constitutional requirements, 
there is no sign of that in the judicial analysis to date. 
D. Speech requires a ‘precautionary approach’
The importance of free speech means the Constitutional Court takes what 
can be called a ‘precautionary’ approach in seeking to lessen commercial 
and political pressures on public broadcasting. The quasi-foundational 
role for speech is seen even in Germany where the right to dignity 
under Art 1 of the Basic Law takes precedence over, and influences the 
interpretation of, all other constitutional rights. In its classic Lüth decision 
the Constitutional Court stated:
The basic right of freedom of opinion is … absolutely basic to a liberal-
democratic constitutional order because it alone makes possible the 
constant intellectual exchange and contest among opinions that form the 
lifeblood of such an order; it is ‘the matrix, the indispensable condition 
of nearly every other form of freedom’.20
The quoted words ending this extract come from US Supreme Court 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo.21 Their use underlines the German court’s view 
that the ‘primacy’ of speech is inherent in any democratic constitutional 
order. And the court is alive to possible concentration of power over public 
opinion. Caution against such influence is warranted because ‘when 
17  BVerfGE 74, 297 (1987) (Fifth/Baden-Württemberg broadcasting case).
18  BVerfGE 83, 238 (1991) (Sixth/North Rhine-Westphalia broadcasting case). 
19  BVerfGE 90, 60 (1994) (Eighth/Cable Penny broadcasting case).
20  BVerfGE 7, 198 (Lüth case).
21  Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 327 (1937).
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emerging developments prove to be faulty, they can only be rescinded – if 
at all – to a certain degree and only with considerable difficulty’.22 That 
is, speech requires ‘prior’ protection – protection prior to the institutional 
political process. The Constitutional Court has continued to apply this 
reasoning, maintaining that ‘precautions for the protection of journalistic 
diversity’ are necessary.23 There is nothing about the idea that is limited 
to the German context. And it is worth emphasising that the need for 
journalistic diversity is not resolved by the internet: the Constitutional 
Court has continued its approach as recently as 2014, despite the 
dramatically different context for public communication compared with 
its first broadcasting decision in the early 1960s.
A point of general interest from this precautionary aspect of the German 
approach is that neither executive nor legislature can be left to deal with 
broadcasting merely as a matter of policy entirely separate from free speech 
requirements. The free speech issues at stake mean the Constitutional 
Court sets out requirements that the legislature must meet; requirements 
which, in turn, restrict the executive’s room for action. The legislature 
cannot, for example, limit public broadcasting to its current technological 
basis.24 That would breach the requirements of Art 5. The German court 
acts because it is implausible – and unconstitutional – to leave the structure 
or architecture of public speech solely to legislative and executive action. 
If structures affecting public communication also influence political 
processes – a situation which appears undeniable – there is a sense in 
which some of the architecture of public speech must be prior to public 
debate and decisions by politicians. 
This suggests an approach in which a democratic commitment to free 
speech implies media of different institutional forms, internal organisation 
and economic base containing speech of diverse content and style, aimed 
at different ends, creating different and only partially overlapping publics, 
and seeking to influence (among other things) political decisions. Public 
debate and parliamentary or executive action could reshape this style of 
architecture of public speech to some degree, but the changes could not 
go beyond the requirements of free speech in terms of non-censorship 
and diversity.
22  BVerfGE 57, 295 (Third case).
23  Fourteenth/ZDF Treaty case (2014) [36].
24  For example, BVerfGE 83, 238 (1991) (Sixth/North Rhine-Westphalia case); BVerfGE 119, 
181 (2007) (Twelfth broadcasting case).
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The claim being made is not that the German situation fulfils such an 
approach to free speech, but that it is an example which suggests ways in 
which a formally democratic system could go some way towards that goal 
– and go further than is commonly imagined in Australia.
IV. Australian Implications
Free speech in Australia includes a freedom of political communication 
that is implied in the Constitution. It is said to secure ‘what is necessary 
for the effective operation’ of the constitutional system of representative 
and responsible government.25 The aim is to give freedom of choice to 
electors. The overall aim sounds like a plausible vision for democratic 
free speech: a free and informed choice for voters. Within the realm of 
political speech, the concept does not appear to be far removed from free 
speech serving individual and collective opinion formation, as it is said to 
do under Germany’s Basic Law. Beyond that broad similarity, Australia’s 
freedom is said not to be an individual right. Instead it is a limitation 
on legislative power26 (and a freedom to which the common law must 
comply). The first step is understandable, at least in that free speech 
is not only an individual right (when free speech is understood in the 
terminology of rights at all). Free speech has structural implications; it is 
not (only) an individual right. But the second step need not follow: free 
speech need not only be a limitation on legislative power. In Australia, 
that has been stated more than it has been explained. And the particular 
reasons that support judicial action, as seen, for example, in the German 
decisions, have not been addressed.27 
The Australian approach may well follow from old ideas that freedoms are 
residual in Australian law, but more could be considered in relation to this 
particular freedom. In stating that free speech is not an individual right, 
it appears that the High Court wanted to distinguish freedom of political 
communication from the US First Amendment. But it may well be that 
the advocates appearing before it have not provided sufficient examples 
beyond the US to allow all relevant matters to be considered in terms of 
25  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
26  See, for example, McClure v Australian Electoral Commission (1999) 163 ALR 734.
27  Even so there are Australian decisions that would be quite consistent with positive free speech: 
for example, restrictions on political speech that aim to support diversity overall could be upheld 
as  constitutional, as stated from the beginning in Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth 
(1992) 177 CLR 106.
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approaches that differ from the US one. That may not change in the short 
term, in part given the issues of standing and the types of disputes that 
may come before the High Court. But that situation remains a failing 
of Australian free speech, in terms of the diversity of speech required by 
democratic government.
Beyond courts, there are also implications for media policy, such as 
proposals about the structure or funding of public media or ownership 
limits for commercial media. Those matters raise positive aspects of free 
speech, as do issues of appointments to public media boards, statutory 
missions of media organisations of all types, and so forth. Within the 
Australian legal system these matters have been left, to date, to parliaments 
and executives, and to public debate after legislative and executive choices 
have been made relevant to the structures of public speech. The German 
decisions suggest why the communicative requirements of democracy 
may be poorly addressed under such an approach. But they also suggest 
that debate over Australian legislative and executive action could be made 
explicitly in free speech terms, and their implications support such debate 
being pursued in those terms. Matters such as the existence and funding 
of public media and commercial media ownership limits raise questions 
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The Need for Reform of Australia’s 
Birth Registration Systems
Melissa Castan and Paula Gerber1
I. Introduction
Having a birth certificate is a key to accessing the rights of citizenship. 
Most Australians take it for granted that they can prove who they are by 
producing their birth certificate. But there are a number of Australians 
– predominantly Indigenous people and those from culturally and 
linguistically diverse (CALD) communities – who miss out on the rights 
and benefits of citizenship and struggle to fully participate in society 
because their birth has never been registered or, if it was, they cannot 
produce a birth certificate to prove it.
Without a birth certificate it is near impossible to obtain a driver’s 
licence, passport or Tax File Number, or to collect your superannuation.2 
But problems can start much earlier. Schools are not supposed to enrol 
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children who do not have a birth certificate, and sports clubs will often 
ban kids from playing if they cannot produce a birth certificate to prove 
they are playing in the right age group – for example, the Under 10s 
soccer team or the Under 14s cricket team. 
Lack of a birth certificate can also be a barrier to engaging in the 
mainstream economy and developing financial literacy because it prevents 
young people from accessing the keys to economic participation, such as 
opening a bank account. Thus, the result of a birth not being registered 
is that vulnerable groups, including Indigenous children and youth, who 
may already suffer intergenerational disadvantage, find themselves even 
further behind the eight ball. They may be unable to prove who they are 
and therefore cannot access the rights of citizenship that most Australians 
take for granted.3 
Indeed, not having a birth certificate can lead to a life of isolation 
and  exclusion from society from a very early age.4 Further problems 
such as non-recognition as a citizen, increased risk of violence and abuse, 
and  increased risk of separation from family during emergencies, are 
identified as serious issues of child protection for those whose births 
have not been registered.5 Around the world, it is estimated there are 
approximately 230 million children under five whose births have never 
been registered. This equates to one in every three children under five.6 
Given the global scale of non-registration of births, the thousands of 
Australians from Indigenous and CALD communities who have not 
had their births registered may not seem like a significant problem.7 
However,  for the individuals endeavouring to negotiate life without 
a birth certificate, the problem is very large and very real.
3  Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan, ‘The Right to Universal Birth Registration in Australia’ in 
Melissa Castan and Paula Gerber (eds), Proof of Birth (Future Leaders, 2015), 3 (hereafter Proof of Birth).
4  See, for example, Grace Koelma, ‘Australian Woman Charmaine Webster Who Legally Doesn’t 
Exist Due to Unregistered Birth, Fights to Prove Her Identity’, www.news.com.au/lifestyle/real-life/
australian-woman-charmaine-webster-who-legally-doesnt-exist-due-to-unregistered-birth-fights-to-
prove-her-identity/news-story/eefbd76d0451458db64c84e6fea0cc06 (viewed 7 July 2014). 
5  UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Child Protection Issue Brief: Birth Registration, 
August 2013, www.refworld.org/docid/523fe9214.html (viewed 22 January 2015).
6 UNICEF, Every Child’s Birth Right: Inequities and Trends in Birth Registration (2013), 14, www.
unicef.org/media/files/Embargoed_11_Dec_Birth_Registration_report_low_res.pdf.
7  Will Winter ‘The Minimbah Project: Facilitating Birth Registration and Certificates in Rural 
and Regional Communities’ in Proof of Birth, 73–74.
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This chapter seeks to identify the areas where law reform will provide 
measurable improvements and contribute to the debate about how best 
to address the diverse range of issues that prevent Australia achieving truly 
universal birth registration.
II. Unregistered Births in Australia
Australia can be proud of the fact that around 96 per cent of all births are 
registered.8 However, the fact that the vast majority of the unregistered 
births come from vulnerable populations such as Indigenous and CALD 
communities is a cause for great concern. While the problem of non-
registration is being acknowledged and addressed in developing countries,9 
there is still a reluctance to recognise that a wealthy, OECD country such 
as Australia has similar problems with under-registration of births within 
several of its minority groups. 
There are two distinct, but related, factors underpinning the lack of birth 
certificates in Australia, namely:
1. Births are not being registered, so no certificate is available.
2. Births are registered, but a birth certificate was not obtained at the 
time, and cannot now be obtained because of an inability to (i) satisfy 
the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (BDM) ID requirements 
and/or (ii) pay the fees associated with acquiring a birth certificate.
There are several steps involved in registering a birth and getting a birth 
certificate, beginning with notification of a birth by the hospital or 
midwife and concluding with lodgement of a birth registration form by 
the parents. Notably, the statutes regulating birth registration impose 
significant potential penalties for late registration.10 Additionally, while 
registering a birth is free, applying for a birth certificate is not. A fee must 
be paid at the time of submitting the form.11
8  A J Lanyon and David John, ‘Australia’s Civil Registration and Vital Statistics System’, in Proof 
of Birth, 53–54.
9  UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Child Protection Issue Brief: Birth Registration, 
August 2013, www.refworld.org/docid/523fe9214.html (viewed 22 January 2015).
10  For example, in Victoria a fine of up to $1,400 can be imposed.
11  The fees range from $31 in Victoria and $53 in New South Wales. Some jurisdictions, such as 
Victoria, have a fee relief scheme in place for Indigenous Australians.
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III. How to Increase Birth Registration Rates 
within Indigenous Communities
There are a diverse range of factors and issues that underlie non-registration 
of births by members of Indigenous communities. The multiplicity of 
causes necessitate an interdisciplinary response that incorporates legal, 
health, statistical, and community based approaches to the issues. 
Furthermore, any recommendations and reforms to birth registration, 
access to birth certificates and changes to identification documents should 
only be considered after proper consultation with, and the participation 
of, Indigenous communities and representative organisations. This 
is consistent with best practice for law reform regarding Indigenous 
Australians, and adheres to the Free Prior and Informed Consent standard 
in Art 19 of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The majority of Australians do not experience any significant difficulty 
registering a birth and obtaining a birth certificate. For this reason, it 
cannot be said that the entire birth registration system is broken or in need 
of a major overall.12 Rather, as Lanyon and John suggest, what is required 
is ‘the development and resourcing of targeted strategies to address the 
sub-groups of the population more likely to be at risk of not registering 
the birth of a child’.13
With this in mind, there are five areas where improvements could be 
made that would make a significant difference to how accessible and user-
friendly the birth registration system is for disadvantaged sections of the 
community. These areas are:
A. Education
Although birth registration is recognised as a human right in international 
law,14 in Australia it is more often perceived as a responsibility than 
a right. One of the ways to increase birth registration rates in Indigenous 
communities would be to increase awareness of birth registration as 
a human right that every child has, and to highlight the benefits that flow 
to children from having a birth certificate.
12  Melissa Castan and Paula Gerber, ‘The Way Forward’ in Proof of Birth.
13  A J Lanyon and David John, ‘Australia’s Civil Registration and Vital Statistics System’ in Proof 
of Birth, 55. 
14  See Art 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Art 7 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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The importance of birth registration to the child needs to be emphasised 
at a number of key life events, such as at the birth of the child, at baby 
health check-ups, at school enrolment, and when youths (and others) 
contemplate getting drivers licences.
Requiring BDM registrars to raise awareness about the importance of 
birth registration requires legislative reform since the current statutory 
regime does not include any mandate to provide public education about 
birth registration.15 Such legislative reform will need to be accompanied 
by a budget allocation that provides registrars with the funding necessary 
to develop and deliver educational programs and to implement more 
effective communication strategies. 
Education about birth registration could also be usefully undertaken 
by federal agencies. For example, Centrelink and Medicare could help 
increase birth registration rates by inquiring of parents whether they have 
registered the child’s birth, and providing tangible assistance to obtain 
a  birth certificate, if parents have not yet obtained one. In this way, 
incidents of non registration could be addressed early in a child’s life.
B. Service delivery
In most Australian jurisdictions, birth registration offices are based in the 
capital cities. Many of the communities and people who have the most 
difficulties accessing registration processes or certificates live in rural or 
remote locations, making physical access to the BDM registry facilities 
a significant burden. 
Victoria is a notable exception. It has established approximately 25 regional 
Justice Centres with trained staff who are able to process applications 
for birth registration. The cost of running outreach programs is not 
insignificant. However, the success of community-led ‘registration drives’16 
and other efforts to reach communities in remote regions is testament to 
the value of such initiatives. For example, the Department of Transport, 
Fines Enforcement, Births, Deaths and Marriages and Centrelink17 
15  The Victorian Law Reform Commission made such a recommendation in relation to the 
Victorian legislation VLRC Birth registration and Birth Certificates Report (2013).
16  See Will Winters, ‘The Minimbah Project: Facilitating Birth Registration and Birth Certificates 
in Rural and Regional Communities’, Ch 6 in Proof of Birth.
17  See Alice Barter, ‘Indigenous Driving Issues in the Pilbara Region’, Ch 5 in Proof of Birth.
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regularly provide a ‘one stop shop’ for Indigenous communities in remote 
parts of Western Australia, and this has facilitated the registration of many 
births from these communities.
Another way of decentralising birth registration and certification processes 
is to use mobile birth registration units, and train non-registry personnel 
to assist in birth registration processes. Such initiatives have proven 
successful in Argentina, which uses mobile units to service the region of 
Patagonia, and Chile, which has three state-of-the-art vans fitted out with 
computers and satellite connections to the central registry.18
Whether the outreach programs are initiated by community groups, 
NGOs or government, they always require the cooperation and support of 
the relevant BDM registries, including making key staff available on site. 
In terms of law reform, then, registrars should be given specific powers, 
policies and resources to facilitate outreach programs, in cooperation 
with community groups or other government agencies, on a continuing 
basis. A commitment by registrars to regular outreach programs targeting 
communities where there is evidence of low levels of birth registration 
would likely see a significant improvement in birth registrations within 
these communities.
C. Technology
There are two distinct ways in which digital technologies can facilitate 
birth registration. The first is to increase the accessibility of the systems. 
At present, birth registration requires the completion of a paper application 
which must be submitted in person or by post. To make birth registration 
processes more accessible to all, there is an urgent need to move towards 
online processes and away from purely paper forms of birth certificate.19
There are digital birth registrations systems in place in other countries 
that Australian governments should be closely examining. There is much 
we can learn from the innovations being implemented in Uganda and 
other African nations making use of web-based technologies and smart 
18 UNICEF, ‘Birth Registration: Right from the Start’ (2002) 9 Innocenti Digest 19, www.childinfo.
org/files/birthregistration_Digestenglish.pdf. 
19  We note, however, that in areas where there are issues of low literacy, digital technologies 
of  themselves will only address the issues of under-registration when supported by funded case-
workers who can assist with the registration process.
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phones.20 Digital technologies make the registration and certification 
processes far more accessible and have led to a sharp increase in birth 
registration rates.
The second way that digital technologies can assist with birth registration 
is to enhance the exchange of information between government 
departments and agencies in different jurisdictions. Such sharing of 
information between different registry offices would have been of great 
assistance to Charmaine Webster, who was repeatedly directed to search 
the BDM registers in every state in order to establish where she was born.21 
Charmaine’s experience is likely to be the experience of many others who 
have spent years searching for a record of their birth across eight different 
registries around Australia.
D. Financial assistance
It is well known that having to pay a fee makes it more difficult for people 
from a low socioeconomic background to obtain a copy of their birth 
certificate. The fees may also operate as an unintended deterrent to birth 
registration, due to confusion between the (free) act of registering, and 
the request for certificates (which currently cost between $31 and $53).22 
We concur with the view expressed by the UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child that BDM registries across Australia should automatically 
issue the first birth certificate for free upon registration of Indigenous 
births.23 There are revenue implications for the registries in issuing free 
birth certificates. However, given that Indigenous births account for only 
roughly 5 per cent of all births in NSW each year, this should not represent 
a significant fiscal barrier. Even in the Northern Territory, where the 
proportion of Indigenous births is higher, the amount of revenue waived 
would be only a very small proportion of the registry’s overall budget.
20  See Jack Regester, Ch 10 in Proof of Birth.
21  Grace Koelma, above n 4.
22  Melissa Castan and Paula Gerber, ‘The Way Forward’ in Proof of Birth.
23  Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on Australia, 28 August 2012, 
CRC/C/AUS/CO/4, www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/co/CRC_C_AUS_CO_4.pdf.
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All registries should also adopt a policy of a fee waiver for certificates, 
accompanied by eligibility criteria, as is the case in Victoria. Healthcare, 
pension and concession cardholders or others receiving Centrelink 
support (such as Youth Allowance or ABSTUDY) should be eligible for 
a fee waiver. This should be supported by a change to the relevant BDM 
Acts. There should also be residual discretion on the part of each registrar 
to waive fees on a case-by-case basis if an individual does not fall within 
the abovementioned groups, such as in situations of hardship. Some 
registrars already have such power under the relevant statute, but may 
not be exercising their discretion often, if at all. Registrars could consider 
revising their policies and procedures regarding fees for certificates, 
to ensure that information about fee waivers is readily accessible to all 
potential applicants.24
Fines and penalty provisions are also in need of reform. They are 
likely to be the cause of some barriers to registration of births. Many 
of the documents, forms and websites setting out information on 
birth registration warn people that failure to register a birth within the 
prescribed period may result in a fine. In reality such fines are rarely 
imposed. Registrars recognise that punishing people for registering (even 
when late) acts as a disincentive to others to submit late registrations. But 
members of the public have no way of knowing whether they will or will 
not be subject to a penalty, and are likely to assume that the penalty will 
be applied. This acts as an unintended disincentive to late registration. 
It is therefore recommended that all references to fines and penalties be 
removed from materials provided to the public.25
E. Reduce reliance on birth certificate as proof 
of identity
The perceived heightened risk of identity fraud has led to increased 
concerns regarding access to birth certificates and improper purposes 
for which they may be used. While this may be appropriate as a general 
approach, it  has had significant impacts on people without birth 
certificates. Registrars must balance competing obligations between 
keeping the BDM registers secure and ensuring that all people have access 
to vital community services.
24  Melissa Castan and Paula Gerber, ‘The Way Forward’ in Proof of Birth.
25  Ibid.
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Strict identification procedures have been implemented by BDM 
registries and numerous other government departments and agencies, 
as well as private service providers (such as banks and superannuation 
funds). Reforms should be implemented to facilitate proof of identity 
without compromising the risk of fraudulent activities.26 For example, 
the Department of Transport in Western Australia has a ‘Verification of 
Identity’ form to assist participants living in remote areas to apply for 
a driver’s licence where they are unable to meet the standard proof of 
identity requirements. This is a welcome development that other states 
and territories should consider.27 
It would be useful for other licensing authorities and agencies to accept 
alternate forms of identification, for example, a certificate of Aboriginality,28 
when a person cannot produce a birth certificate.29 Reducing reliance on 
birth certificates for proof of identity would help to increase Indigenous 
people’s access to appropriate services and facilitate engagement with 
mainstream civil society.
IV. Conclusion
This chapter has identified law and policy reform strategies that would 
facilitate easier access to the birth registration system by Indigenous 
communities and other vulnerable groups. Given the limited scope of 
this chapter, there are a number of aspects and issues regarding birth 
registration and certification that have not been addressed here. For 
example, it is worth considering whether the demands of the registration 
or certification processes themselves impact on traditional Indigenous 
naming practices and associated customs. Those working in law reform 
and advocacy for birth registration must be mindful of the historical 
26  There are now Commonwealth ID guidelines that make some proof of identity processes easier, 
and others harder: see Commonwealth of Australia, National Identity Proofing Guidelines  (Canberra, 
2014), www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/IdentitySecurity/Documents/NationalIdentityProofing 
Guidelines.pdf. The suggestion of recognising ‘alternative’ identity processes is a positive development; 
see [5.1.3].
27  See www.transport.wa.gov.au/licensing/proof-of-identity.asp.
28  See, for example, the requirement of ‘Proof of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander Identity’ 
requirements for Centrelink at www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/forms/ra010, and AIATSIS ‘Proof 
of Aboriginality’ at aiatsis.gov.au/research/finding-your-family/before-you-start/proof-aboriginality.
29  See, for example, the requirements for proof of identity in order to claim superannuation: 
Australian Super, ‘A Guide to Providing Proof of Your Identity’, www.australiansuper.com/~/media/
Files/Forms/A%20guide%20to%20providing%20proof%20of%20your%20identity.ashx. 
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misuse of past systems employed to identify Indigenous people, both in 
Australia and the rest of the world.30 When seeking to improve access to 
the birth registration system for Indigenous birth Australians, we must 
ensure that the registration processes do no harm to those they seek 
to aid. As already noted, it is vital that any new law and policy reform 
only proceed following thorough consultation with Indigenous people 
themselves.
30  See Rod Hagen, ‘Traditional Australian Aboriginal Naming Processes’, Ch 7 in Proof of Birth.
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There are many legitimate reasons for governments to keep secrets. 
Exposing the information collected, developed or used by government 
can undermine a government’s effectiveness, inhibiting the provision 
and creation of new information. Exposure can adversely affect private 
individuals and businesses. However, public disclosure can also subject 
government action to scrutiny, enhance trust, or provide a resource to 
be utilised for private or collective gain. Balancing the costs and benefits 
associated with disclosure of government information is difficult, and 
has led in Australia – including at the Commonwealth level – to an 
increasingly complex array of regulation and restriction.
This chapter demonstrates that complexity through two recent cases 
involving the disclosure of Commonwealth Government information 
by individuals working within government. The first looks at attempts 
to protect witnesses to conditions in Australian immigration detention 
centres. The second looks to the ramifications of engagement by public 
servants with social media. Both suggest that the possible benefits of 
disclosure of government information can be obscured by the risk of more 
immediate adverse consequences. The complexity and uncertainty of the 
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various forms of regulation in this area itself acts as a disincentive for 
government disclosure. A common framework for assessing the balance 
of public interests is needed.
II. Restrictions on Government Disclosure
Unauthorised disclosure of information that is not already publicly 
accessible, when relayed in circumstances implying limitations on the use 
or disclosure of that information, is protected by the courts through the 
equitable action for breach of confidence.2 However, breach of confidence 
applies differently when government is involved. In Commonwealth v John 
Fairfax & Sons3 the Commonwealth Government was not able to rely 
on confidentiality to prevent further distribution and partial newspaper 
serialisation of a series of diplomatic briefings and cables. Mason J declined 
to accept the cables were confidential, despite their classified status:
The court will not prevent the publication of information which merely 
throws light on the past workings of government, even if it be not 
public property, so long as it does not prejudice the community in other 
respects. Then disclosure will itself serve the public interest in keeping 
the community informed and in promoting discussion of public affairs. 
If, however, it appears that disclosure will be inimical to the public interest 
because national security, relations with foreign countries or the ordinary 
business of government will be prejudiced, disclosure will be restrained. 
There will be cases in which the conflicting considerations will be finely 
balanced, where it is difficult to decide whether the public’s interest in 
knowing and in expressing its opinion, outweighs the need to protect 
confidentiality.4
The concern over public disclosure of the cables was not with their 
content but what the fact of release might mean for the relationship 
between Australia and the countries concerned. As the Secretary of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs at the time suggested: ‘[i]t is much more 
likely to facilitate our future relations if the government has been seen to 
try its utmost to prevent that [disclosure] happening’.5
2  Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434, 443.
3  (1980) 147 CLR 39 (‘Fairfax’).
4  Ibid. 52.
5  Ibid. 46.
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Mason J was not persuaded that ‘the degree of embarrassment to 
Australia’s  foreign relations which flow from disclosure is enough 
to justify interim protection of confidential information’.6 Confidentiality 
of government information depended on the possible effect on a recognised 
government interest outweighing the public interest in disclosure. Striking 
that balance continues to define the limits of government secrecy, both 
in terms of how it is struck, and who gets to decide. 
III. Role of Legislation
In various ways Fairfax is a high-water mark for openness in government. 
The case came at a time when the traditional view of the need for 
government secrecy, based on the Westminster system’s reliance on 
responsible government and a politically neutral public service, was 
starting to be questioned. The process of law reform in this area has 
meant that inherent limitations on the executive’s capacity to generate 
and maintain secrecy have been largely overtaken by reliance on legislative 
authority to collect, and disclose, information.7
By the time Fairfax was decided, freedom of information legislation had 
already been introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament, though it 
would take until 1982 to be enacted. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 
(Cth) (FOI Act) was meant to shift the emphasis away from executive 
discretion towards establishing a right of access subject only to listed 
categories of exceptions. In doing so it set out a range of government 
interests which could be used by the executive to justify withholding 
disclosure, expanding upon those interests considered legitimate in 
common law conceptions of confidentiality.8 
The FOI Act was closely followed by the Archives Act 1983 (Cth), 
providing for the preservation and future public use of government 
records. A recognition of the need to maintain public trust in the way 
government collects, uses and stores private information also led to the 
6  Ibid. 54.
7  See Daniel Stewart, ‘Assessing Access to Information in Australia: The Impact of Freedom 
of Information Laws on the Scrutiny and Operation of the Commonwealth Government’ in 
John Wanna, Evert Lindquist and Penelope Marshall (eds), New Accountabilities, New Challenges 
(ANU Press, 2015).
8  Stewart, above n 7.
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Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). Much more recently, the Public Interest Disclosure 
Act 2013 (Cth) (PID Act) was introduced to augment the protection for 
whistleblowers to disclose wrongdoing and maladministration.9 
Each of these pieces of legislation was introduced in recognition of the 
benefits of government disclosure of information but takes a very different 
approach to regulating the different interests involved. There are also 
a  wide range of general policies, standards and guidance that impact 
how government agencies handle information. The National Archives 
of Australia has identified some 72 such instruments which, directly or 
indirectly, need to be considered by Commonwealth agencies and, in 
some cases, non-government bodies, including those that contract with 
government to provide services to the public.10 
Subject matter specific legislation providing for the collection or use of 
information also plays an important role. In Re Smith Kline & French 
Laboratories (Australia) Ltd and Secretary, Department of Community 
Services and Health,11 for example, information supplied to the government 
for the purposes of regulatory approval of a pharmaceutical product could 
be used for approval of a competitor’s version of the same substance. 
Confidentiality was limited by the legislative objective of enhancing 
public health and safety. 
In other circumstances the legislative context may place limits on the use 
and disclosure of information. In Johns v Australian Securities Commission12 
the High Court stated:
A statute which confers a power to obtain information for a purpose 
defines, expressly or impliedly, the purpose for which the information 
when obtained can be used or disclosed. The statute imposes on the 
person who obtains information in exercise of the power a duty not to 
disclose the information obtained except for that purpose.
9  Note that external public interest disclosures can be made under the PID Act only in a narrow 
range of circumstances and usually only after an internal disclosure has been made: see Philip Moss, 
Independent Review of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, www.dpmc.gov.au/resource-centre/
government/review-public-interest-disclosure-act-2013 (viewed 20 April 2017).
10  National Archives of Australia, Legislation, Policies, Standards and Advice and Your Agency’s 
Accountability, August 2015, www.naa.gov.au/information-management/information-governance/
legislation-standards/index.aspx (viewed 17 May 2016).
11  (1991) 28 FCR 291.
12  (1993) 178 CLR 408.
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Identifying the purposes for which information was obtained, and the 
subsequent limits on further use or disclosure of that information, is 
therefore a statute-by-statute proposition. Even interpreting the limits of 
explicit provision in legislation for disclosure or, more usually, preventing 
disclosure, involves assessing the intended role of information disclosure 
in light of the context and purpose of the statute as a whole. 
It is the complexity of the interaction between these multiple sources 
regulating disclosure of government information which gives rise to the 
need for reform. The effect is often to leave disclosure to the discretion of 
the executive. A common framework would allow more explicit reference 
to the public interest in government disclosure when balanced against the 
interests protected through individual statutes.
IV. Court Sanctioned Disclosure
AS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Ruling No. 3)13 is one 
of a number of class action cases relating to the conditions in immigration 
detention centres with which Australia is involved. This case concerned 
a negligence claim arising from medical treatment available on Christmas 
Island. An interim application was brought to protect the ability of 
witnesses to speak to lawyers for the plaintiffs without facing possible 
prosecution. 
Section 42 of the Border Force Act 2015 (Cth) makes it a criminal offence 
for an entrusted person to record or disclose protected information. 
Entrusted persons include Immigration and Border Protection employees 
as well as a variety of persons who provide services to the department, 
including state, territory and foreign government employees, and 
government contractors and consultants. This includes medical staff at 
the centre. Protected information is information obtained by entrusted 
persons in that capacity. Under s 42(2) an offence is not committed where 
the record or disclosure is: authorised under various explicit circumstances, 
including where it is necessary to prevent or lessen serious threat to the 
life or health of an individual; made in the course of employment or 
service; required or authorised by law; or required by an order or direction 
of a court or tribunal.
13  [2015] VSC 642.
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While s 42 has been the subject of considerable criticism, the explicit 
reference in that section to the making of a court order or direction 
enabled that court to protect voluntary disclosure by witnesses. The main 
concern of the Victorian Supreme Court in this matter then became 
how the obligations under s 42 related to other legislative and common 
law duties. Ultimately s 42 was held not to enable the court to release 
witnesses from other obligations or potential liabilities. 
For example, s 70 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) makes it an offence for 
Commonwealth officers, including persons performing services for or 
on behalf of the Commonwealth, to publish or communicate, without 
authority, any fact or document which they know or possess by virtue of 
being a Commonwealth officer and which is their duty not to disclose. 
Section 70 does not in itself create a duty not to disclose. That duty may 
arise under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth), for example, or potentially 
under contractual or equitable obligations of confidentiality. It is not 
clear if s 70 applies to oral opinions or advice; the breadth of publication 
or communication seems limited only by intention; and there appears 
no need to demonstrate harm to any public or private interest, whether 
anticipated or actual.14 
The uncertainty over what information might be disclosed by witnesses 
and which relevant duty of non-disclosure might be in issue meant that 
the court in AS was not willing to make an order protecting witnesses from 
s 70. Similarly, while the court was willing to set aside any obligations 
of confidentiality which involve ‘an interference with the administration 
of justice’, the nature of the obligation and extent of that interference 
had to be identified with precision. Many future court hearings might 
be required to consider how obligations of confidentiality might arise, 
and be overcome.
14  Justice Susan Kenny, ‘Secrecy Provisions: Policy and Practice’ (Address to the National 
Information Law Conference in Canberra, 24 March 2011), www.alrc.gov.au/news-media/2011/
secrecy-provisions-policy-and-practice#_ftn48. 
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V. Engagement With the Public through 
Social Media
Starr v Department of Human Services15 considered the fairness of the 
dismissal of a departmental employee after he had made several comments 
on public discussion forums including Whirlpool and Sportal. The 
comments were made over nearly a three year period, on his own time and 
on his own computer. They had come to the department’s attention after 
several comments in which he had corrected some information posted 
by the department’s social media unit. The department investigated and 
discovered earlier comments which, together with departmental records, 
enabled the employee to be identified. The investigation also revealed 
several comments where the employee had expressed his frustration at 
having to deal with ‘junkies’ and ‘spastics’ and ‘deadbeat leeches’, that 
a large proportion of clients were not genuine, and that processing times 
were disgraceful.
The Fair Work Commission found these later comments to be in breach 
of the APS Code of Conduct16 and various departmental policies and 
guidelines.17 These included obligations to avoid conflicts of interest;18 not 
use information or one’s position to cause a detriment to the government;19 
uphold APS values of ethical, respectful, accountable and impartial service 
and the integrity and good reputation of the Australian Public Service;20 
and not disclose information obtained in connection with employment 
as a public servant under the Public Service Regulations 1999.21 
However, the Commission also found that the penalty of dismissal was 
disproportionate to the gravity of Mr Starr’s misconduct, having regard to 
all the circumstances including that his conduct did not affect his actual 
15  [2016] FWC 1460.
16  Public Service Act s 13.
17 For example, Department of Human Services, Social Media Policy for Departmental Staff, www.
humanservices.gov.au/corporate/media/social-media-department/social-media-policy-departmental-
staff (viewed 20 April 2017). See also the recently revised Australian Public Service Commission, APS 
Values and Code of Conduct in Practice, ss 4 and 6, www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-
publications/values-and-conduct (viewed 20 April 2017).
18  s 13(7).
19  s 13(10).
20  s 13(11) and s 10.
21  Which includes non-disclosure of such information ‘if it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
disclosure could be prejudicial to the effective working of government’, or communicated or received 
in confidence, unless otherwise authorised or already in the public domain: r 2.1. 
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work performance, caused no demonstrated detriment to the department, 
was engaged in impulsively rather than with deliberation, and consisted of 
a small number of widely interspersed comments over a period of years.22
In doing so the Commissioner interpreted the APS Values and Code of 
Conduct through the lens of the Constitutionally implied freedom 
of political communication:
which, to the extent necessary to maintain the effective operation of the 
system of representative and responsible government provided for by the 
Constitution, operates to preclude the exercise of legislative power to 
curtail the freedom.23 
That meant the need for a public servant to be apolitical only restricted 
political comments which could compromise the ability of public 
servants to carry out their functions, in this case taking into account the 
administrative rather than political nature of their particular role. It also 
meant that some harm to the department would have to be demonstrated. 
Damaging the department’s reputation for treating people with respect 
and impartially and fairly was such a harm. Correcting erroneous 
information was not. 
VI. Further Reform
The secrecy provision discussed in the case studies above are arguably 
relatively limited in their scope. The Australian Law Reform Commission, 
in its Secrecy Laws and Open Government in Australia report,24 examined 
some 506 secrecy provisions in 176 pieces of legislation, including 358 
distinct criminal offences. The ALRC recommended repeal of s 70 along 
with the even more complex s 79 of the Crimes Act, and replacing them 
with a general secrecy offence for unauthorised disclosures that have 
a demonstrated adverse effect on the public interest through: 
• harming security, defence or international relations; 
• interfering with an investigation of criminal offences; 
• endangering life or physical safety; or 
• prejudicing public safety. 
22  [2016] FWC 1460 at [93]. 
23  [2016] FWC 1460 at [72], citing Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 
520 at 559–62.
24  Report No 112, 2010.
457
42 . SIMPLIFyING GOVERNMENT SECRECy?
In those circumstances disclosure would have to be: in the course of an 
officer’s functions or duties; authorised by an agency head or minister by 
declaring that the disclosure would, on balance, be in accordance with the 
public interest; or already in the public domain.25 
The ALRC considered more specific secrecy protection should only be 
enacted where necessary, and generally through an express requirement 
that the disclosure has caused, or was likely or intended to cause, harm to 
a specified public interest. A blanket protection against disclosure would 
be warranted only for limited categories of information, such as national 
security or where a relationship of trust between the government and 
individuals is integral for an effective regulatory system but not able to be 
proved in a criminal prosecution.26 
The ALRC’s recommendations recognise the need for a common 
framework in which eroding the public interest in government disclosure 
could be justified. Such a framework was recently discussed in McCloy v 
State of New South Wales,27 where the protection of the implied freedom 
of political communication was held to involve three questions: 
1. Does the law effectively burden the freedom of political communication 
in its terms, operation or effect? 
2. Are the purposes of the law and the means adopted legitimate, in the 
sense they are compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative government? 
3. Is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to advancing that 
legitimate purpose? In other words, is it proportional?
Proportionality in turn requires that there be no suitable and reasonably 
practicable alternative means of achieving the same purpose, and the 
importance of that purpose outweighs the extent of the restriction on 
communication. 
As a general framework, assessing the proportionality of any legislative 
restriction on disclosure of government information involves a value 
judgement of whether the particular harm caused by the disclosure in 
question outweighs the public benefit in disclosure. Legislation still has 
25  ALRC Report 112, Recommendations 5–7.
26  Ibid. Recommendations 8–9.
27  [2015] HCA 34.
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a legitimate role in setting out the range of interests that might need 
protecting, but more than merely speculative evidence of the harm should 
be required before any particular disclosure is prevented.28 
VII. Conclusion
As the case studies set out in this paper suggest, identifying the limitations 
on disclosure of government information is a complex task. The uncertain 
operation and interaction of the various legislative and other restrictions 
can only act to further deter disclosure. Despite the long history or reform 
in this area, government disclosure often remains a matter of government 
discretion. 
However, the general approach to government confidentiality of Mason 
J in Fairfax, reflected more recently in the approach of the ALRC and 
the emerging approach to proportionality in the implied freedom of 
political communication, suggests that a common framework is possible. 
Few government interests in themselves justify limiting disclosure. Other 
interests require identifying both the nature and extent of any adverse 
effect caused by the disclosure in question and considering alternative, less 
restrictive means to achieve government purposes. Any remaining harm 
has to be balanced against the benefits of disclosure. By making more 
explicit the values involved in that balancing of the effects of disclosure, 
a more developed and accepted understanding of the benefits of disclosure, 
now and in the future, might be realised.
28  See Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force (No 3) [2015] FCA 1370.





1  All of ANU College of Law, The Australian National University.
2  The Legal Profession Uniform Law (LPUL) was enacted in NSW in 2014 and then adopted in 
Victoria by the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014. The LPUL came into force in both 
jurisdictions in July 2015 and replaced the NSW and Victorian Legal Profession Acts (2004). 
Australian Legal Practice: 
Ethical Climate and Ethical 
Climate Change
Vivien Holmes, Stephen Tang, Tony Foley 
and Margie Rowe1
I. Introduction
This chapter discusses new research into the ethical climate of Australian 
legal workplaces. Our research confirms that ethics are perceived as a lived 
culture in legal practice. We know from other research that appropriate 
regulation can encourage senior management to create organisational 
cultures which support ethical behaviour. Unfortunately, the new Legal 
Profession Uniform Law (LPUL), in force in NSW and Victoria,2 takes 
a step backwards in this regulatory space. We join calls for reforms that 
will see the promise of such regulation renewed.
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II. Research into Workplace Ethical Culture3
The past 25 years has seen considerable research on the impact of the 
organisational environment on employees’ behaviour.4 The idea that 
a person’s workplace environment might influence them toward (un)ethical 
behaviours is now well accepted. One significant stream of research 
in this field has been research into the ‘ethical climate’ of workplaces, 
‘ethical climate’ being defined as ‘the shared perception of what is 
correct behaviour, and how ethical situations should be handled in an 
organization’.5 The most commonly used instrument of measurement 
in such research is Victor and Cullen’s Ethical Climate Questionnaire 
(ECQ), a questionnaire designed to ‘tap respondents’ perceptions of how 
the members of an organization typically make decisions concerning 
“events, practices, and procedures” requiring ethical criteria’.6 In 2010, 
in light of further research into ethical decision-making, Arnaud revised 
the ECQ and came up with a further questionnaire, the Ethical Climate 
Index (ECI),7 which we used in our research (see below).
Significantly, in a meta-analysis of research into sources of unethical 
decisions at work, Kish-Gephart8 found that the most significant 
dimensions of ethical climate for predicting (un)ethical behaviour were 
as follows:
• ‘Principled’, where there is a focus on following rules that protect 
the company and others;
3  ‘Ethical culture’ and ‘ethical climate’ are defined differently in the literature, but the concepts 
overlap. This chapter uses ethical culture in the sense of it being a subset of organisational culture, 
‘representing a multidimensional interplay among various “formal” and “informal” systems of 
behavioural control that are capable of promoting either ethical or unethical behaviour’. Linda Klebe 
Treviño, Kenneth D Butterfield and Donald L McCabe, ‘The Ethical Context in Organizations: 
Influences on Employee Attitudes and Behaviors’ 8 Business Ethics Quarterly 447, 451.
4  Jennifer J Kish-Gephart, David A Harrison and Linda Klebe Treviño, ‘Bad Apples, Bad Cases, 
and Bad Barrels: Meta-Analytic Evidence About Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work’ (2010) 95 
Journal of Applied Psychology 1; David M Mayer, ‘A Review of the Literature on Ethical Climate and 
Culture’ in Oxford Handbook of Organizational Climate and Culture (Oxford University Press, 2014).
5  Bart Victor and John B Cullen, ‘A Theory and Measure of Ethical Climates in Organizations’ 
(1987) 9 Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy 51.
6  John D Cullen, Bart Victor and James W Bronson, ‘The Ethical Climate Questionnaire: 
An Assessment of Its Development and Validity’ (1993) 73 Psychological Reports 667, 669.
7  Anke Arnaud, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethical Work Climate: Development and 
Validation of the Ethical Climate Index’ (2010) 49 Business and Society 345.
8  Kish-Gephart, Harrison and Treviño, above n 4, 21.
463
43 . AUSTRALIAN LEGAL PRACTICE
• ‘Benevolent’, which ‘focuses employee’s attention on the well-being 
of multiple stakeholders, such as employees, customers and the 
community’;
• ‘Egoistic’, which promotes ‘an “everyone for himself ” atmosphere’.
According to Kish-Gephart, the stronger the ‘principled’ and ‘benevolent’ 
climate dimensions, and the stronger the communication of ‘the range 
of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour’, the ‘fewer unethical decisions 
in the workplace’.9 Conversely, the stronger the egoistic dimension, the 
more likely is unethical behaviour.10
III. The Ethical Climate of Australian 
Legal Practices
Our research explored the ethical climate of Australian legal workplaces, 
as perceived by new lawyers. Our target population was lawyers within 
3–12 months of entering the profession. We surveyed 325 new lawyers 
across all Australian jurisdictions and across all practice types: Private 
63.6  per cent (Small: 32.6 per cent, Medium: 12.3 per cent, Large: 
13.8  per cent, In-House: 4.9 per cent); Government 22.8 per cent; 
Community 8.9 per cent; Other 3.1 per cent. Respondents’ median age 
was 26 years. Most were full-time employees (91.5 per cent) and nearly 
two-thirds were female (62.3 per cent).  
Using Arnaud’s ECI and other validated instruments, we constructed an 
online survey to measure respondents’ perceptions of the ethical climate 
of their workplace, as well as the following factors:  
• Organisational Learning;
• Perceived Professionalism/Professional Identity;
• Meeting of Basic Psychological Needs; 
• Job Satisfaction & Career Satisfaction;
• Psychological Distress & Optimism; 
• Work Environment: employer type, practice area, etc.;
• Demographics & Legal Education Background.
9  Ibid.
10  Ibid.
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IV. Respondents’ Perceptions 
of Ethical Climate
We used Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to test whether the 17 ECI 
survey items could be reduced into a smaller number of identifiable 
ethical climate dimensions. The results suggested that there were three 
such dimensions.11 Two are essentially positive:
• Integrity and Responsibility, representing a sensitivity to ethical 
behaviour and formal ethical rules, and an inclination to be compliant, 
conscientious and accountable;
• Ethic of Care, indicative of a culture in which people express empathy 
and understanding to each other and strive, as professionals, to develop 
positive and respectful relationships.
The other is principally negative:
• Power and Self-Interest, signifying that power, control and instrumental 
outcomes are more important than principles such as honesty, ethical 
rules or relationships; that people would be willing to break rules 
to obtain personal benefit.
Each dimension is an independent contributing factor to how ethical 
climate is perceived. That is, participants perceive that their workplace 
climate contains more or less of each one of these qualities. Figure 43.1 
shows that the distribution of these dimensions is quite wide. We note 
that these three ethical climate dimensions are very similar to the three 
noted by Kish-Gephart as being predictive of (un)ethical behaviour.
11  This is not to say that there are not other ethical climate dimensions existing in law firms, simply 
that we have been able to distil three independent ingredients of ethical climate as measured on the 
ECI for newly admitted lawyers.
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Figure 43.1: Density plot showing the distribution of each ethical 
climate factor
Source: The authors
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V. Predictors of Ethical Climate
We investigated a set of factors as possible predictors of the ethical climate 
in participants’ workplaces. As a preliminary we controlled for age and 
gender, and found no significant effects for either of these factors.
A. Practice type
We investigated the extent to which the ethical dimensions identified by 
respondents depended on the type of practice – ‘private practice’ (small, 
medium, large), ‘in-house’, ‘government’ or ‘community’ – in which 
respondents were employed. We found perceptions of the integrity/
responsibility ethical dimension were dependent to a small degree on 
practice type: lawyers in private practice overall (including in-house) had 
lower perceptions of this dimension than those working in government 
or community practice.
We then compared differences between ‘private practice’ (small/
medium/large practices as a whole) and in-house lawyers. We found 
nothing additional to the above about the integrity/responsibility ethical 
dimension. But we found that lawyers in in-house practice had higher 
perceptions of the power/self-interest dimension (large law firms were also 
trending in the same direction) when compared with lawyers in medium 
and small law firms. It seems that on the whole, in-house lawyers (even 
allowing for the relatively small number of responses obtained) seemed to 
perceive their workplace as characterised by a preparedness to break rules 
when necessary.
Combining these analyses we looked at whether working in a particular 
practice type produced particularly weak perceptions of any of the 
dimensions. We found that lawyers in small/medium firms gave low 
ratings to the (positive) integrity/responsibility dimension, and at the 
same time, low ratings to the (negative) self-interested dimension. This 
suggests almost an ethical vacuum or apathy, the absence of an ethical 
consciousness, an indication that these young lawyers had entered a world 
of practice where ethics were invisible (at least to them).
Surprisingly, we found that other structural features, such as working 
in a litigious/non-litigious practice, or serving a certain kind of client 
(personal, corporate, government), were not predictive of particular 
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ethical dimensions. Our conclusion is that overt structural characteristics 
of the lawyers’ practices (specifically, practice type) do have a small effect 
on perceptions of a firm’s ethical culture.
B. Organisational learning culture
In addition to structural factors, we analysed the lawyers’ perceptions 
about the learning culture of the practice in which they worked. 
An organisational learning culture (OLC) is evidenced by a high sense 
of trust, by high regard for initiative, by reward and encouragement for 
participation in learning, by flexibility and adaptability to challenge and 
change.12 We found that high perceptions of an OLC were predictive of 
much higher levels of the integrity/responsibility ethical dimension. They 
were also predictive of the ethic of care dimension. Conversely, we found 
that high perceptions of an OLC were predictive of lower levels of the 
self-interest ethical dimension. 
This result reinforces the importance of looking beyond mere structural 
characteristics of practices (size, practice type, client base) to also consider 
non-structural ‘qualities’ (such as learning culture), which are significantly 
more predictive of a practice’s ethical climate and which can override the 
influence of structural factors. 
VI. Job Satisfaction and Wellbeing
Importantly, our analysis showed direct relationships between ethical 
climate dimensions and job satisfaction. A strong power and self-
interest climate dimension correlated with lower job satisfaction, while 
strong integrity and responsibility, and (especially) ethic of care climate 
dimensions, correlated with greater job satisfaction.
These findings are consistent with Kish-Gephard’s findings, that 
higher job satisfaction is related to a lower level of unethical behaviour 
in organisations.13
12  Catherine L Wang and Pervaiz K Ahmed, ‘Organisational Learning: A Critical Review’ (2003) 
10 The Learning Organization 8.
13  Kish-Gephart, Harrison and Treviño, above n 4, 12.
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We know from our previous research with these same new lawyers that 
basic psychological needs (autonomy, competence and relatedness) are very 
good predictors of wellbeing and satisfaction in newly-admitted lawyers.14 
Analysis of survey data shows direct relationships between ethical climate 
and the meeting of these needs. In particular, a strong power and self-
interest dimension has a (small) negative effect on autonomy, competence 
and relatedness, while a strong ethic of care dimension is predictive 
of greater autonomy and relatedness.
VII. Being Professional
Respondents were asked to choose, from a list of 24 factors, the 10 factors 
most definitive of ‘professional’. For the purposes of analysis, we grouped 
the 24 factors into six categories: Communication (e.g. ‘communicating 
openly, courteously and respectfully with clients and colleagues (including 
opponents)’); Ethics (e.g. ‘being honest and trustworthy, including with 
the court’); Justice (e.g. ‘having a commitment to improving society 
through your participation in the law’); Skills (e.g. ‘having a good, up 
to date knowledge of legal content and processes’); Work (e.g. ‘taking 
responsibility for your own work’); and Problem (e.g. ‘ensuring that you 
never appear weak to your colleagues or clients’). Respondents then 
ranked their 10 factors in order of importance. For example, a respondent 
might rank an item in the communications category at positions 1, 5 and 
9 in their ‘definition’ of ‘professional’. 
We correlated a respondent’s perception of the ethical climate of their 
workplace and the importance (ranking) they gave to the ‘professionalism’ 
factors. We found (from ordinal regression analysis) that, the higher 
a person rated their ethical climate on the ethic of care dimension, the more 
frequently they included communication and justice items in their top 10, 
but the less frequently they included work and problem items. The higher 
a person rated their ethical climate on the integrity/responsibility dimension, 
the more frequently they included ethics items in their top 10, but the 
less frequently they included work items. Further, higher perceptions of 
a power/self-interest climate were associated with more frequent ranking 
of work and problem items in the top 10. Inclusion of skills items was not 
14  Tony Foley et al, ‘Helping Junior Lawyers Thrive’ (2015) 89 Law Institute Journal 44.
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predicted by any ethical climate dimension. These results suggest that, 
not surprisingly, the ethical climate of a new lawyer’s workplace influences 
their understanding of what it means to be a professional.
VIII. Influencing the Ethical Culture of 
Australian Legal Practices
Our study is the first ethical climate analysis of Australian legal practice. 
But the broad ethical culture of Australian legal practices has come under 
scrutiny in other ways. In 2008, Parker and colleagues applied the concept 
of ‘ethical infrastructure’ to Australian large law firms. They used a broad 
conceptualisation of ‘ethical infrastructure’ to denote formal and informal 
management policies and the promotion of ethical dialogue and values.15 
The authors contend that large law firms should consciously design 
and implement ‘ethical infrastructures’ to both counteract pressures for 
misbehaviour and positively promote ethical behaviour and discussions. 
We note there is no reason why this call should be confined to large 
law firms.
Alongside this research, a new regulatory regime was targeting ethical 
infrastructure. Reforms in 2001 to the NSW Legal Profession Act 1987 
(replicated in the Legal Profession Act 2004 (LPA)) allowed law firms to 
incorporate, but required incorporated legal practices (ILPs) to have 
a  legal practitioner director. That director’s task was to ensure, through 
the development of ‘appropriate management systems’ (AMS), ILP 
compliance with the LPA.16 Collaboration between the NSW Office 
of the Legal Services Commissioner and the legal profession resulted 
in an ‘education toward compliance’ strategy in relation to the AMS 
requirements. ILPs were required to complete a self-assessment process 
(SAP) which evaluated compliance with 10 specific objectives of sound 
legal practice.17 Those objectives were ‘intended to help ILPs work out 
how to professionalize ethical conduct, rather than [prescribe] detailed 
15  Christine Parker et al, ‘The Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger Law Firms: Values, 
Policy and Behaviour’ (2008) 31 UNSW Law Journal 158, 160, n 6.
16  NSW LPA s 140.
17  Susan Fortney and Tahlia Gordon, ‘Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive and 
Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation’ (2012) 10 University 
of St Thomas Law Journal 152, 153.
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management systems and processes’.18 Importantly, the regulator was 
authorised to conduct a compliance audit of an ILP whether or not 
a complaint had been made in relation to the practice. So, audits could be 
done proactively, as a preventative measure. Queensland, WA, Northern 
Territory and the ACT eventually adopted a similar statutory and 
regulatory approach.19
Evaluation of NSW’s ‘light touch’ approach to regulation of the profession 
has shown it had a significant impact. Parker and colleagues conducted 
a preliminary evaluation based on an analysis of complaint rates. They 
concluded that the SAP ‘may well be guiding, encouraging, and requiring 
many practitioners consciously and systematically to think through 
practice management issues, including ethics management, for the very 
first time’.20 Other scholars describe the implementation of the AMS 
requirement as ‘a watershed event in the regulation of law firms’.21 Fortney 
evaluated the process in 2012 by surveying legal practitioner directors. 
The majority of respondents reported that the SAP ‘had a positive effect 
on different aspects of firm practice, most notably firm management, 
supervision and risk management, followed by a positive impact on client 
services’.22 It is not hard to see a link between ‘the process of learning and 
changes’23 prompted by the SAP, and an improved organisational learning 
culture (and, by inference, stronger integrity/responsibility and ethic of 
care climate dimensions). Further, Schenyer credits the NSW program 
for giving content to the concept of ‘ethical infrastructure’ by ‘identifying 
the ten types of recurring problems that infrastructure should be designed 
to prevent or at least mitigate’.24 It is clear that the LPA requirement 
of AMS was a powerful regulatory tool for improving the ethical culture 
of law firms.
18  Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon and Steve Mark, ‘Regulating Law Firm Management: 
An Empricial Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New South Wales’ 
(2010) 37 Journal of Law and Society 466, 471.
19  Steve Mark and Tahlia Gordon, ‘Innovations in Regulation – Responding to a Changing Legal 
Services Market’ (2009) 22 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 501, 511; John Briton and Scott 
Mclean, ‘Incorporated Legal Practices: Dragging the Regulation of the Profession into the Modern 
Era’ 11 Legal Ethics 241.
20  Parker, Gordon and Mark, above n 18, 495.
21  Fortney and Gordon, above n 17, 154.
22  Ibid. 181.
23  Ibid. 167.
24  Ted Schneyer, ‘On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should Promote 
Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management’ (2011) 53 Arizona Law Review 
577, 585.
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Unfortunately, the Legal Profession Uniform Law (LPUL), in force in NSW 
and Victoria since July 2015, has taken a backward step in this regulatory 
space. The requirement (on ILPs) under the LPAs to implement and 
maintain AMS has been discarded. There is now no positive obligation 
placed upon an ILP, or any other type of law practice, to implement AMS. 
Instead, a law practice may be given a ‘management systems direction’ 
by a relevant regulatory authority to ensure that AMS are ‘implemented 
and maintained’.25 However, such a direction can only be made if 
the authority considers it reasonable to do so after an examination/
investigation into a law practice, or a compliance audit.26 As the former 
NSW Legal Services Commissioner (Steve Mark) has noted, this means 
that ‘a law practice will only know what standard it is expected to comply 
with AFTER being audited and found wanting’.27 This contrasts with 
the LPA scheme which so successfully used AMS as a proactive tool to 
encourage compliance. Mark and Briton, the former Queensland Legal 
Services Commissioner, have both called for a return to the proactive 
use of AMS.28
IX. Conclusion: Needed Reform
Our research clearly shows that ethics is perceived by new lawyers as 
a lived culture in legal practice, and not simply or primarily as a personal 
disposition. The ethical climate in which a new lawyer works influences 
them towards, or away from, ethical behaviour. It moulds their perceptions 
of what it means to be a professional and what is appropriate professional 
behaviour. It affects their job satisfaction and their wellbeing. We know 
that the ethical culture of legal practices can be shaped through regulatory 
tools such as AMS, which help to improve organisational learning culture 
and ethical infrastructure. Our research shows that a significant number 
of legal practices in Australia would benefit from such improvements, and 
adds to the force of calls for a return to the proactive use of AMS in the 
regulation of the legal profession.
25  LPUL, above n 2, s 257.
26  Ibid.
27  Steve Mark and Tahlia Gordon, ‘Vale Appropriate Management Systems’ (2015) 
Creative  Consequences, creativeconsequences.com.au/vale-appropriate-management-systems (viewed 
18 November 2015).
28 Ibid.; John Briton, ‘Between the Idea and the Reality Falls the Shadow’ (2015), www.monash.
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Initiatives designed to reform and strengthen legal professional ethics are 
obviously needed. While we are constantly exposed to courageous, justice-
centred lawyers and judges, these individual examples of good lawyering 
are not the everyday reality of many peoples’ encounters with the legal 
profession.
Consider other lawyers’ continuing moral silence and diverse misconduct 
in the theft of client funds and habitual overcharging leading to constant 
appearances in courts and disciplinary tribunals; of in-house counsel 
with insufficient courage who overlook insider corruption in the Reserve 
Bank or AWB; of litigation lawyers who advise delay and obstruction as 
the preferred strategy of those Catholic bishops who have covered up 
priests’ paedophilia; of over-zealous commercial lawyering which actively 
facilitates socially and environmentally destructive development in 
Queensland and PNG, not to mention routinely callous and discourteous 
lawyer-to-lawyer behaviours across the country. To cap it all off, the global 
controversy erupting from the millions of Panama Papers, leaked from 
a  single law firm, clarifies that the international legal profession differs 
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little from the local in its attempts to dignify tax evasion as tax avoidance.2 
All of these point to an ethically challenged legal profession which (most 
unfortunately) established law associations (all voluntary groupings) 
can ill-afford to sufficiently acknowledge. And government is mostly 
silent on these problems, because there are very few attorneys-general or 
investigative commissioners who come from outside the profession. So the 
potential for institutional law reform designed to reduce misconduct and 
strengthen individual morality is very limited.
Nevertheless, if coincidentally there were a media campaign emerging 
from an egregious scandal, appropriate judicial or maverick politician 
leadership and some level of educational and professional consensus 
about the extent of current de-professionalism, then change might occur. 
Here are three achievable initiatives that might be pursued.
II. Legal Ethics and Professionalism 
Education
Addressing stronger legal ethics at the regulatory level will remain 
superficial and transitory without longer-term changes to legal education 
that strengthen wellbeing and develop justice-focused values in new 
graduates,3 especially in those who aspire to commercial legal practice. 
How can a new lawyer who, over four years or more, is consistently 
educated to maximise the short-term interests of corporate clients 
regardless of justice – and who is paid and offered promotion according 
to the energy of their immediate billing of those same clients – hope to 
avoid developing a fractured psychology? And how can they be reasonably 
expected to suddenly develop a concern for those adversely impacted by 
their clients’ operations, be they aggressively growth-focused rather than 
sustainable, tax evading rather than tax paying, or even corrupt?
To undermine and, I suggest, appropriately subvert such ego-driven 
lawyering, there is an effective and achievable educational pedagogy, one 
which operates on law students’ psyche before materialism can completely 
dominate. In-house, live client, poverty-law clinical legal education (CLE) 
2  Mossack Fonseca may now be the most widely known law firm of all, for the wrong reasons. 
See ABC News, 5 April 2016, www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-05/why-the-panama-papers-mossack-
fonseca-leaks-really-matters/7300262.
3  See Vivien Holmes, ‘“Giving Voice to Values”: Enhancing Students’ Capacity to Cope with 
Ethical Challenges in Legal Practice’ (2015) 18(2) Legal Ethics 115.
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– which explicitly articulates a virtue ethics approach, rather than the 
normally dominant role morality or consequentialism – can become a 
mandatory part of every law degree, in the interests of redirecting law 
graduates towards the essential social value of legal professionalism – 
a concern for justice. CLE is not some variant of scientology for lawyers. 
It is a powerful, globally accepted pedagogy that lacks only some law 
deans’ political courage. 
A. In-house, live client, poverty law experience – 
not just simulation
Legal clinics come in many sizes and shapes, but not all purported clinics 
will achieve for students a heartfelt desire for justice. The best of clinical 
legal education involves an in-house experience, in the sense that the 
law school rather than an external agency operates the clinical site. Law 
schools can generally focus on conscious teaching of a justice agenda more 
deliberately than an agency such as a law firm or government department. 
Similarly, clients need to be real (‘live’), if their everyday hopes and 
predicaments are to affect students emotionally. And those predicaments 
are most acute when clients are truly in need, as opposed to small businesses 
seeking advice on for example, GST compliance. Simulation is important 
and can encourage identification with clients despairing of a lack of access 
to justice, but it excels at teaching skills, not the development of a deep 
and life-changing empathy.
B. Virtue ethics – not dominant role morality 
or consequentialism
The intellectual base to justice is often assumed in law schools, rather 
than analysed and taught. Justice is a quintessential moral concept, and 
in particular a virtue in the Aristotelian sense. Justice is one of a number 
of virtues that sit inside the framework of virtue ethics, as opposed 
to the other two much better known and competing frameworks of 
consequentialism and Kantianism. But legal ethics education typically 
concentrates on the latter two methodologies, in particular role morality 
or zealous advocacy, which is an applied Kantian category that is not 
directly concerned for justice except to the extent that it coincidentally 
aligns with a client’s needs.
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Teaching of legal ethics with a justice focus must redirect its energy towards 
virtue ethics, if overall justice is to mean something more to future lawyers 
than what an individual client may desire or need.
III. Enhancing Ethical Infrastructure
The Uniform Law regulatory initiative covering NSW and Victoria is 
limping along towards a hoped-for national uniformity, but it is going 
so  slowly that it risks attracting national disability insurance support. 
There are no real signs of a national leadership vision emerging from the 
Uniform Legal Services Council; no sense of urgency about, for example, 
reforming the profoundly inadequate continuing professional development 
system, the highly partisan conduct rules which allow a single law firm to 
act against a former client in the face of that client’s utter objections, and 
no embarrassment about the way in which our law societies and regulators 
use clients’ funds without their effective knowledge.
A. Mickey-Mouse CPD
Continuing Professional Development (CPD) when first introduced in the 
1980s was deliberately minimal, in order to build a degree of practitioner 
confidence in the concept: 10 hours per annum per practitioner, no 
assessment, no requirement for or monitoring of competent delivery, 
no  face-to-face attendance requirements and minimal enforcement. 
Only  one hour per annum is required for legal ethics.4 Such a basic 
structure no longer represents a quality-driven framework, if the objective 
is to build a credible ethical infrastructure.
B. Entrenching successive conflicts of interest
There have been many criticisms of the Australian Solicitors Conduct 
Rules,5 but the most important concern the egregious sanctification of 
the practice of some major law firms when it comes to dealing with prior 
clients. The Rules, specifically r 10.2, were heavily influenced by the large 
law firms’ group (i.e. the 10–12 very large Australian law firms, many 
4  See, for example, the Legal Profession Uniform Continuing Professional Development (Solicitors) 
Rules 2015, rr 8 and 9, www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/sessionalview/sessional/sr/2015-242.pdf. 
5 See Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, www.legislation.nsw.
gov.au/viewtop/inforce/subordleg+244+2015+cd+0+N.
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of which are now global players) to permit a firm to ignore the loyalty 
those prior clients might have thought they were owed and allow them to 
act for a new client against them, regardless of the prior client’s protest.6 
This single provision does more than almost any other regulatory rule to 
establish that the real priority of the largest firms is one of business rather 
than fidelity, and that the justice agenda is not inherently a compelling 
call on their partners’ time.
C. Unconscionable use of interest earned on clients’ 
trust moneys distorts the moral funding of regulation
Unlike most other countries, Australia in effect forces many clients to 
unwittingly contribute from their trust moneys to the various activities 
which financially support the legal profession. Known generically as 
Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA), each of legal regulation, 
legal aid, lawyers’ own education and, ironically (given this conference), 
lawyers’ systemic advocacy of law reform, are regular beneficiaries of such 
money. Clients can avoid this leakage if they know to insist that they 
be paid their interest, but if they are ignorant, as most are, the transfer 
happens silently in the background. Between $50–100 million is diverted 
annually around Australia in this manner. 
Efforts have been made in the past to propose a national conduct rule 
requiring practitioners to assess whether clients could obtain a net interest 
benefit from their own funds, but have been met with professional 
silence, presumably because of the significant conflict of interest faced by 
the law societies and regulators should they pursue such a conduct rule. 
In  particular, societies and legal services commissioners would have to 
fund a greater proportion of regulatory expenses from lawyer levies, which 
is in fact what occurs in most other countries.7
It is time to redress a fundamentally unethical funding structure and 
establish a regulatory funding model that links percentage contributions 
by lawyers to the gross revenue (not taxable profit) of the firm, and 
eschews any connection to subsidies from IOLTA funds. And the question 
6  The requirement for an Information Barrier in such situations is beside the point: the prior client is 
effectively told that its earlier relationship was a business deal only, not that of a fiduciary or confidant.
7  The only major exception is South Africa, which has long operated a trust account interest 
transfer scheme similar to Australian jurisdictions.
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remains: how is it ethical – and the act of a genuine fiduciary – to not 
advise and warn clients of this clandestine subsidy, or at least to give them 
the option of keeping what is already their own money?8
D. The courage to regulate lawyers
But this clear need for a stronger local ethical culture and uniform 
infrastructure across Australia is, to many eyes, of little significance in the 
face of legal practice globalisation, with its Uber-like ‘new law’ models 
that subcontract to lawyers everywhere and hide moral accountability for 
individual lawyers’ performance inside global firms’ corporate structures, 
if not cyberspace; structures into which regulators only hesitantly venture, 
and then only in response to the rare complaint that is not resolved quietly 
and internally by managing partners who will do almost anything to 
preserve those corporate reputations. Think of George Clooney in Michael 
Clayton, but do not think such a scenario is incredible. 
Though they ought to do so, it will not be enough for the current non-
Uniform Law jurisdictions to simply adopt the apparently impressive 
compliance audit provisions of NSW and Victoria. Former Queensland 
Legal Services Commissioner (LSC) John Briton has provided a powerful 
analysis of the compliance audit powers, which only permit an LSC to 
audit where he or she has ‘reasonable grounds’ to do so.9 This seemingly 
innocuous limitation keeps the LSC relatively impotent,10 because he/she 
can rarely if ever enter a firm to check out a mere rumour or to explore 
an intuition; they will first need a formal complaint or a whistleblower. 
Currently, regulators encountering exceptional circumstances, but who 
lack witnesses, must have the courage to decide that there are reasonable 
grounds for a compliance audit and go into the largest firms. Even 
then, there is no requirement for the existence of the audit to be made 
public. But that courage and that transparency are not yet on display. 
Transparency International or another well-regarded public interest or 
consumer guardian would have much to contribute in strengthening the 
Uniform Legal Services Council if invited to join by someone in authority. 
8  See Adrian Evans, The History and Control of the Solicitors Guarantee Fund (Vic) and its Ethical 
Implications for the Legal Profession (LLM, by major thesis, Monash University, 1997).
9  Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic) s 256.
10  John Briton, ‘Between the Idea and the Reality Falls the Shadow’, www.monash.edu/law/
centres/clars/news-events/anzlec5-sustainable-legal-ethics.
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Consider for instance the huge meltdown in the share price of our 
largest listed lawyer: Slater and Gordon. The firm lost $958 million in 
market capitalisation in just six months,11 as a result of incorrect financial 
projections and perhaps bad luck, maintaining throughout that clients’ 
interests were at no time compromised.12 The firm had only until the 
end of April 2016 to convince its bankers that it has sufficient cash flow 
from completed clients’ files to fund, regardless of salaries, a net debt of 
$741m within 12 months.13 It could easily be that the firms’ clients were 
or are suffering even though debt repayments have now been successfully 
delayed, in the sense that major and continuing negative publicity about 
share price falls and unresolved class actions against the firm are prejudicing 
some clients’ confidence in their individual lawyers and/or causing them 
to query case management decisions, particularly those concerning case 
settlements.14 
Is there a link between Slater and Gordon’s firm-wide financial decisions 
about projected earnings and its case management policy? We don’t know, 
but the published accounts for the six months to December 2015 are 
enough of a public indicator that a compliance audit is needed, and we 
do not know that that has happened. If it has occurred, there has been no 
public announcement that the audit is complete and that the firm is in 
the clear. Suffice to say, law reform in ethical infrastructure is needed and, 
in the case of listed corporations that also want to be law firms, will need 
to provide for much greater investigative capacity and transparency than 
is currently permitted by the Uniform Law. 
IV. Personal Ethical Accountability
If ethical infrastructure can easily go further, then why not individual 
ethical accountability? It would be a central mistake to think it is enough to 
move on the institutional or systemic front, but not on the personal. I have 
suggested that the assessment of an individual lawyer’s general morality – 
11  Jonathan Shapiro, ‘Slater and Gordon Recruit Jumps Ship as Stock Sinks to New Low’, The Age, 
Business News, 29 March 2016, 21.
12  Ibid.
13  Ibid.
14  News Limited reported on 2 May 2016 that the firm had avoided corporate shame and 
restructured (delayed) its debt repayments by 2–3 years under a deal with its lead banker, Westpac, 
www.news.com.au/finance/business/breaking-news/slatergordon-lenders-nod-for-restructure/news-
story/b3ad8a69956a636359aa24895d24cd42.
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involving not just their understanding of ‘lawyer types’ and general moral 
methodologies, but also the strength of desirable psychological traits and 
attitudes such as the virtues of honesty, courage and integrity – ought 
to become mainstream as a part of strengthening the CPD process, not 
to mention the fundamental purpose of improving personal conduct.15 
More specifically, what appears to be needed is the recognition that 
character-strengthening is likely to be the new parameter in enhancing 
professional ethics. Accordingly, general morality personal ethics education 
and qualitative assessment of character at set intervals after admission 
is called for.
These reforms are technically achievable, either voluntarily at the behest 
of individual law associations – who might take the view that it is better 
to get in first and manage the process from inside the profession – or 
compulsorily as a condition of annual licensing, at the direction of a future 
Uniform Legal Services Council.
The various technical options for assessing these qualities were recently 
canvassed in the UK,16 but no one inside the profession or within an 
Attorney-General’s office has yet bitten the reform bullet. Why the 
hesitation? There remains a considerable and primitive suspicion among 
practising lawyers that psychology is essentially an occult enterprise, or 
has at least the potential to substantially impact on their decision-making. 
The former fear is regrettable, but the latter is partially correct. A lawyer 
who is assessed psychologically as part of their routine annual licensing, 
not because of some perceived mental health problem, but to measure for 
reasonable levels of integrity and social empathy, is arguably more likely 
to understand and connect with clients who are deserving of more justice 
than their bank accounts will run to. Such positive attitudes are likely to 
impact favourably on the decisions they make to run cases and increase 
access to justice. They may also begin to improve public perceptions 
of legal professional reputations. There are well-accepted psychological 
15  See generally Adrian Evans, Assessing Lawyers’ Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 
Melbourne, 2011).
16  Richard Moorhead, Victoria Hinchly, Christine Parker, David Kershaw and Soren Holm, 
Designing Ethics Indicators for Legal Services Provision, UCL Centre for Ethics and Law, Working 
Paper No. 1, 2012, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2159296. 
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scales (personal attribute inventories and psychological inventory 
questionnaires) that have been developed to measure, among many other 
things, an individual’s degree of honesty and integrity.17  
Professional integrity is a key social good that the legal profession can 
use not just to improve overall conduct and reputation, but to sustain 
lawyers’ relevance in a modern technologically-infatuated business world. 
There is in fact no in-principle reason why a lawyer’s measured levels of or 
capacity for integrity would not attract professional acceptance as a value-
add mechanism, if some of the latest predictions for removing lawyers 
from lucrative transactional work altogether came to fruition. Think for 
example, of the emerging Blockchain technology, which the major banks 
at least consider capable of establishing (among several other lawyer-
excluding apps) an encrypted binary equivalent of the old ‘chain of title’ 
so important in the conveyance of general law land.18
In the face of continuing major ethics failures among lawyers, there 
is a  tangible prospect of improved conduct as a result of heightened 
awareness  by practitioners of their own ‘integrity ranking’, and of the 
marketing opportunity offered by such rankings. There will be fears 
about privacy and state control of lawyers, but these are arguments 
that are already essentially lost in the Australian context, and becoming 
historical only.19 
V. Conclusion
I suggest that each of the above suggestions in legal professional regulation 
be undertaken as a matter of urgency by government in the interests of 
a reimagined ethical role for lawyers in contributing to a sustainable 
21st century society.
17  A well-known example of such an instrument is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. 
See www.verywell.com/what-is-the-minnesota-multiphasic-personality-inventory-2795582.
18  See Fabian Horton, ‘Chain Reaction’ (2016) 90(4) Law Institute Journal 69. If the true ‘value 
add’ of a lawyer to a standardised contract is his/her integrity, and that integrity is measured, then the 
active insertion of the lawyer into that transaction, despite the purported Blockchain guarantee, could 
add to the client’s overall satisfaction by offering an additional level of safety, in the face of what will 
be inevitable efforts to hack the chains of code and expose the transaction to fraud.
19  WikiLeaks and its investigative imitators have established that broad scale electronic surveillance 
of all sorts is pervasive. In relation to State control of lawyers, the Uniform Legal Services Council is 
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Since Lawyers Work in Teams, 
We Must Focus on Team Ethics
Justine Rogers1
I. Introduction
James Hardie, AWB, McCabe, Foreman and the Catholic Church cases 
have revealed how ethical misconduct occurs within and by lawyers’ teams. 
They have made clear that ethical decision-making and behaviour are 
beset by group dynamics and that individual morality corrodes without 
the right sort of consultation. This chapter presents team ethics as due 
for action, being a decisive but under-recognised part of lawyers’ practice 
and morality.
Lawyers today need to know how to rely on and support each other in 
teams. People working in teams to pursue shared objectives is a basic fact 
of organisational functioning.2 Due to client demands, the complexity 
of issues and changing practice conditions, teamwork constitutes an 
increasing proportion of legal activity.3 This is particularly so in large law 
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firms, and government and in-house departments. However, teams are 
also found in and cut across multiple legal entities and disciplines.4 Teams 
can be hierarchical or collaborative,5 and vary in their degrees of formality, 
stability and self-consciousness.6
Most importantly for this chapter, the team is a central mediator of 
ethics. All of us develop morally as members of social groups, including 
of our workplaces, which are now the central sites for lawyers’ identities. 
More and more, lawyers recognise and resolve ethics issues within a team 
structure. Teams acquire strong or weak ethics cultures and voice climates. 
An ‘ethics culture’ consists of the organisation’s formal structures and 
informal, shared and learned stories, attitudes and behaviour relevant to 
ethics.7 Culture to the organisation is what personality is to the individual: 
a hidden, yet unifying theme that provides meaning, direction and 
mobilisation. An ‘ethics voice climate’ gets at whether speaking up about 
ethics issues is encouraged,8 or whether, at the other end, there is a ‘climate 
of silence’.9 Within a single organisation, the teams’ ethics cultures and 
climates can vary, and/or diverge from those of the organisation. These 
deviations can act as destabilising forces,10 though they also offer the 
possibility for new, positive ideas and routines to develop, for potential 
diffusion then throughout the organisation.
However, despite the expansion of team activity, legal practice is marked 
out, and typically perceived, as self-reliant and competitive.11 ‘Lawyers 
often think about their own ethical behaviour as a matter of individual, 
independent judgment in the specific context of their own clients in their 
own situation’.12 The disciplinary architecture fortifies these beliefs.13 
The conduct rules, for instance, attend to certain features of a lawyer’s 
relationship with their colleagues, as people they may consult with on 
4  Weinstein and Morton, above n 2, 2–3.
5  Gardner and Valentine, above n 3, 213–14.
6  Alex Steel, Anna Huggins and Julian Laurens, ‘Valuable Learning, Unwelcome Assessment: 
What LLB and JD Students really think about Group Work’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 291.
7  Lei Huang and Ted A Paterson, ‘Group Ethical Voice: Influence of Ethical Leadership and 
Impact on Ethical Performance’ (2014) 43 Journal of Management 1157.
8  Ibid. 3–4.
9  Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison and Frances J Milliken, ‘Speaking Up, Remaining Silent: The 
Dynamics of Voice and Silence in Organizations’ (2003) 40(6) Journal of Management Studies 1353.
10  Christine Parker et al, ‘The Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger Law Firms: Values, 
Policy and Behaviour’ (2008) 31 UNSW Law Journal 158, 173–74. 
11  Weinstein and Morton, above n 2, 2.
12  Parker et al, above n 10, 166.
13  Ibid.
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ethical matters, but not as team-members working together, clarifying 
and defending ideas with one another, and whose behaviour affects that 
of others.
This chapter examines the scholarship and draws on the author’s own 
(2014) study of UNSW law students’ ethics capacities, to chart some of 
what we know about the influences of the team on ethics, both general 
and specific to law. The aim is to convey its sweeping significance to 
initiate change.
Part II outlines some of the negative potential impacts of the team on 
ethics. Part III examines the positive. The chapter uses Rest’s model of 
ethical decision-making, developed between the 1980s and 1990s, to 
delineate these influences. Rest and his colleagues understood moral 
behaviour as involving at least four interlinked and necessary psychological 
components. The processes are:
1. Moral sensitivity or interpreting a situation as having ethical dimensions 
and imagining those affected and cause–effect chains of events.
2. Moral judgment or judging which action would be morally justified. 
3. Moral motivation or giving priority to moral values over others, and 
taking personal responsibility for moral outcomes.
4. Moral character or having the courage to persist with moral action, 
overcoming fatigue, temptation and countervailing pressures.14 
Rest’s model recognised the affective and non-linear qualities inherent in 
moral behaviour. Nevertheless, his theory has been extensively criticised 
for its rationalist foundations, including by ‘social intuitionist’ scholars 
who have uncovered that moral judgment, one of Rest’s components, is 
primarily made rapidly, emotionally and intuitively, and that any analysis 
is largely used to justify initial reactions.15 It is also regarded as too focused 
on the individual and not enough on their social and collective situations. 
Indeed, the primary content of this chapter comes from behavioural ethics 
14  J R Rest, Moral Development: Advances in Research and Theory (Praeger, 1986); J R Rest, 
‘Background: Theory and Research’ in J R Rest and D Narvaez (eds), Moral Development in the 
Professions: Psychology and Applied Ethics (LEA, 1994) (Postconventional Moral Thinking, 101–2; 
see page 10 for citations).
15  Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion 
(Vintage, 2012); see, for example, list of sources in Robert A Prentice, ‘Behavioral Ethics: Can it Help 
Lawyers (and Others) Be Their Best Selves’ (2015) 29 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public 
Policy 35, fn 124.
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research, a separate strand concerned with how people actually behave in 
moral contexts, and how the situation, specifically of being in a team, can 
nudge them towards or away from an ethical direction.16 Rest’s framework 
is used here, notwithstanding, as a helpful way of breaking up the research, 
which was in fact its original function. Further, with its ultimate focus on 
improving outwardly observable behaviour by delineating at least some 
of the major prerequisites for ethical behaviour, it also suggests valuable 
lines of action for legal education and training, and organisational and 
regulatory change. Certain implications of this second, intuitive approach 
are addressed towards the chapter’s end, which offer cautions for team-
based ethics. 
The conclusion is a set of recommendations for education, practice, 
regulation and scholarship. This proposal should be positioned within a 
wider reform movement that advocates for concepts of ethical conduct 
and accountability to be expanded to address their collective dimensions.17
II. Negative Impacts of the Team on Ethics
A. Moral sensitivity
• Fragmentation: teamwork separates people from the complete task, 
each other, the client, and others affected by their decisions, limiting 
the possibility for ethical awareness.18 
• Self-confidence bias: teams assume their inherent morality and may, 
then, perceive moral questioning as unnecessary or even threatening.19 
• Moral exclusion: teamwork can encourage beliefs that only members, 
or powerful members within it, are entitled to moral considerations.20
16  Max H Bazerman and Francesco Gino, ‘Behavioral Ethics: Towards a Deeper Understanding 
of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty’, Annual Review of Law & Social Science (forthcoming) 9.
17  Kimberly Kirkland, ‘Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism’ (2005) 35 
University of Memphis Law Review 631; Parker et al, above n 10; Milton C Regan Jr, ‘Nested Ethics: 
A Tale of Two Cultures’ (2013) 42 Hofstra Law Review 143.
18  Parker et al, above n 10, 163–65.
19  Irving L Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Houghton 
Mifflin, 2nd edn, 1982) 256–57.
20  Parker et al, above n 10, 165.
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B. Moral judgment
• Groupthink: cohesive groups tend to strive for consensus and make 
assumptions about unanimity. Their members self-censor, ignore 
alternatives, and dehumanise outsiders,21 or at least polarise their views 
to accord with those of the leader or majority.22  
• Conformity bias: the inclination to coordinate or comply is stronger 
if members have identified with the group or if they risk exclusion or 
shame.23
• In-group bias: outside voices tend to be restrained since they represent 
interruptions to valued relationships within the team.24 As a pertinent, 
though less obvious example, the legal academic-teacher is, to some 
extent, an outside voice in their students’ analyses of legal ethical 
issues. The students have already begun to forge relationships, real and 
imagined, with the legal profession. A student in my research told me: 
‘I want to hear from law firms and lawyers that being ethical is in their 
best interests, not just from academics’.
C. Moral motivation
• Diffusion of obligation: team members can believe that responsibility 
for ethical issues lies with someone else.25 
• Myth of invisibility: a team can give individuals a sense of protection 
from outside scrutiny.26
• In general, group work encourages learned passivity.27 
21  Janis, above n 19.  
22  Cass R Sunstein and Reid Hastie, Wiser: Getting beyond Groupthink to Make Groups Smarter 
(Harvard Business Press, 2015).
23  Janis, above n 19, 5–8; Patricia H Werhane et al, Obstacles to Ethical Decision-making: Mental 
Models, Milgram and the Problem of Obedience (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 102–3.
24  Ibid. 106.
25  Jennifer K Robbennolt and Jean R Sternlight, ‘Behavioral Legal Ethics’ 45(3) (2013) Arizona 
State Law Journal 1107, 1149.
26  Werhane et al, above n 23, 116.
27  Ibid. 119.
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D. Moral action
An individual in a group may decide not to speak up or otherwise persist in 
unethical behaviour if the costs outweigh the benefits.28 These assessments 
can be inaccurate both ways; that moral action would or would not be 
worthwhile.29 There are three risk factors:
1. Safety
Raising an ethics issue can upset relationships within the group,30 and 
risks, or is seen to risk,31 labelling, exclusion and retaliation.32 To make 
this assessment, team members use social information about culture 
and climate, primarily the leader’s informal conduct, including any 
undermining behaviours,33 as well as the leader’s routine attitudes towards 
uncertainty and mistakes.34 A climate of silence is related to a punitive 
culture, or a workplace in which it is not safe for employees to raise and 
learn from their mistakes. 
2. Likely impact
Individuals assess their likely ability to initiate change in relation to 
their level of autonomy in their job.35 They also evaluate whether past 
wrongdoers were disciplined36 and systemic problems corrected,37 or 
whether raising the issue was, or seemed, futile.38 A student reported: 
‘I would need evidence that something was done about complaints to 
bother reporting anything’.
28  Jeffrey A LePine and Linn Van Dyne, ‘Predicting Voice Behavior in Work Groups’ (1998) 
83(6) Journal of Applied Psychology 853.
29  Ethan R Burris, ‘The Risks and Rewards of Speaking Up: Managerial Responses to Employee 
Voice’ (2012) 55(4) Academy of Management Journal 851.
30  Shahidul Hassan, ‘The Importance of Ethical Leadership and Personal Control in Promoting 
Improvement-Centered Voice among Government Employees’ (2015) 25(3) Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 697.
31  Gardner and Valentine, above n 3.
32  James R Detert and Ethan R Burris, ‘Leadership Behavior and Employee Voice: Is the Door 
really Open?’ (2007) 50(4) Academy of Management Journal 869.
33  M Lance Frazier and Wm Matthew Bowler, ‘Voice Climate, Supervisor Undermining, and Work 
Outcomes: A Group-Level Examination’ (2015) 41(3) Journal of Management 841.
34  Detert and Burris, above n 32.
35  Hassan, above n 30, 703; Robbennolt and Sternlight, above n 25, 1180.
36  Linda K Treviño, Gary R Weaver and Scott J Reynolds, ‘Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: 
A Review’ (2006) 32(6) Journal of Management 951.
37  Robbennolt and Sternlight, above n 25, 1179.
38  Prentice, above n 15, 40; Huang and Paterson, above n 7, 7–8.
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3. Harm to other interests
The benefits of collaboration appear to accrue at the collective.39 
This  appears wasteful within a ‘stars culture’ in which the individual’s 
expertise and client relationships generate status.40 Further, the team itself 
can act as the centre of patronage networks needed for advancement as 
well as a mechanism of evaluation. Research into government professionals 
shows a negative relationship between performance monitoring and 
‘improvement-centred employee voice’, or the propensity to make 
suggestions to improve the organisation, including its ethical culture.41 
One student said: ‘To be ethical, I’d need to see support for the person 
voicing the concern, proof that you won’t be condemned or bullied 
or overlooked for promotion’.
The strain of group dynamics has an upsetting, diminishing influence 
on each of these components. Teamwork can deplete time and cognitive 
resources as energy is diverted to impression management, and the 
logistics of organising and integrating expertise.42 Lawyers tend to be more 
self-protective, less interpersonally sensitive and less steady in the face of 
pressure than the general population.43 Teamwork can create extra feelings 
of exposure and incompetence.44 Shame tends to lead to turning inward 
and away from others,45 and fear of exclusion can result in contempt 
towards the team.46 Though not a typical response, one student reported 
that teamwork in my course was ‘bad for wellbeing and reminded me of 
high school’. Nonetheless, there is potential for team-based ethics to be 
highly beneficial and productive.
39  Gardner and Valentine, above n 3, 215.
40  Gardner and Valentine, above n 3.
41  Hassan, above n 30, 714. 
42  Gardner and Valentine, above n 3, 215.
43  L Richard and L Rohrer, ‘A Breed Apart?’ (2011) The American Lawyer 43.
44  Elisabeth Dunne and Mike Rawlins, ‘Bridging the Gap between Industry and Higher Education: 
Training Academics to Promote Student Teamwork’ (2000) 37 Innovations in Education and Teaching 
International 361; Steel, Huggins and Laurens, above n 6, 318–19. 
45  Treviño, Weaver and Reynolds, above n 36.
46  Madan M Pillutla and Stefan Thau, ‘Actual and Potential Exclusion as Determinants of 
Individuals’ Unethical Behaviour in Groups’ in David DeCremer (ed), Psychological Perspectives on 
Ethical Behaviour and Decision-Making (IAP, 2009) 107. 
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III. Positive Impacts of the Team on Ethics
A. and B. Moral sensitivity and moral judgment
A team has the potential to enhance ethical sensitivity and judgment 
by increasing the chance that someone will detect the ethics issue in 
the first place, and then by offering the opportunity to examine a wider 
survey of beliefs about the problem and the objectives for addressing it. 
Further, a team presents the possibility for an analytical process in which 
stereotyping about stakeholders is reduced and the range of harms likely 
to be considered is extended.47 
C. Moral motivation
A team identity grounded in ethics is a powerful, intrinsic motivator if it 
is meaningful for members48 within their specific context. A team with 
a salient ethical identity is more likely to foster a collective confidence in 
which ethical issues are regarded as opportunities not threats.49 Indeed, 
members come to regard unethical conduct as a form of harm to their 
team, which must be managed and prevented.50
D. Moral action
Ethics leadership is arguably the most determinative of whether or not 
a member or members of a team are likely to seek to resolve an ethics 
issue, at all or at least by seeking advice from within the team. An ethical 
leader is an ethical role model who treats people fairly and actively 
gives the team the context to prepare for and engage in critical, ethical 
thinking, including by having a discussion without the leader’s presence 
if that is likely to improve ethical dialogue.51 Ethical leaders recognise 
their colleagues’ uniqueness, ask extra questions to encourage deeper 
conversation, follow up on ethical decisions,52 and adopt a change-
47  Werhane et al, above n 23, 104.
48  Robbennolt and Sternlight, above n 25, 1181.
49  Marlene E Turner et al, ‘Threat, Cohesion, and Group Effectiveness: Testing a Social Identity 
Maintenance Perspective on Groupthink’ (1992) 63(5) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 781.
50  Treviño, Weaver and Reynolds, above n 36, 969; Robbennholt and Sternlight, above n 25, 1177.
51  Hassan, above n 30, 701–2.
52  LePine and Van Dyne, above n 28.
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oriented style.53 The types of conversations they guide advance ethics-as-
deliberation and ethics-as-possibility.54 The phenomenon becomes, then, 
‘teamthink’, not groupthink.55 
The relevant leader here is someone with whom the team regularly 
interacts. In more collaborative, ad hoc groups, with potentially shifting 
memberships, these issues are more challenging since much of the value 
of teams of which we know rests on time and trust.
IV. A Couple of Cautions
A. The deliberative ethics problem
A rational, reflective approach would seem to be vital in reducing the 
harmful psychological drives induced by the team and the non-conscious 
emotions that can bedevil our responses to ethics issues when left on our 
own. However, putting aside here an important debate about the ultimate 
power of emotion and intuition over reason, in certain circumstances, 
automatic responses are more ethically appropriate.56 Deliberation can 
disrupt these responses by strengthening attachments to rule-guided 
criteria and/or by increasing the chances of non-moral factors being 
considered.57 
B. The team ethics problem
The necessity for outsider input to the team to help reduce the risks of 
ethical parochialism and fading has already been implied in the discussion 
so far. In addition to this external contribution, individual team members 
must retain the ‘identity space’58 for their own, independent reflection. 
Where needed, lawyers must be able to make disclosures about or otherwise 
exercise dissent against the team and the client, separate from team processes. 
53  Detert and Burris, above n 32.
54  Neck and Manz, above n 2; Mark G Edwards and Nin Kirkham, ‘Situating “Giving Voice to 
Values”: A Metatheoretical Evaluation of a New Approach to Business Ethics’ (2014) 121(3) Journal 
of Business Ethics 477. 
55  Neck and Manz, above n 2.
56  Chen-Bo Zhong, ‘The Ethical Dangers of Deliberative Decision Making’ (2011) 56.1 
Administrative Science Quarterly 1.
57  Ibid.
58  G R Weaver, ‘Virtue in Organizations: Moral Identity as a Foundation for Moral Agency’ (2006) 
27(3) Organization Studies 341.
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V. Implications
A. Legal education and training
National university regulations and the ‘Threshold Learning Outcomes’ 
for law now stipulate that law students acquire and be able to demonstrate 
skills in collaboration.59 Meanwhile, a growing body of research is 
establishing the positive links between teamwork, and achievement, 
critical thinking, problem-solving ability, creativity and wellbeing.60 
Nonetheless, teamwork remains a fringe part of the law degree, and there 
is, unfortunately, scant pedagogical material to use to teach teamwork and 
its relationship to lawyers’ ethics. 
Until this material is developed, at the very least, educators need to make 
law students and lawyers aware of the ways in which teams impact ethical 
decision-making and behaviour. More helpful also would be to inculcate 
in students skills to deliver and receive ethics information within a team.61 
In light of the cautions above, the emphases here should be on dialogue, 
possibility and action.62 
B. Legal practice
Managers and other professional leaders should support the educational 
suggestions above. Moreover, they need to recognise, develop and reward 
ethical lawyers at each level and across each team-type. Research shows 
that those in a team with higher moral reasoning are not more likely than 
others to emerge as leaders. Firms need to consider actively identifying 
these individuals for leadership programs.63  
They also need to contemplate how ethical behaviour is to be reinforced 
within and across teams. Valuable starting questions might be: ‘What 
sorts of conversations do we need to engage in to help bring our core 
59  Australian Learning & Teaching Council, Resources to Assist Discipline Communities to Define 
Threshold Learning Outcomes (TLOs): An Outcome of the ALTC’s Learning and Teaching Academic 
Standards (LTAS) Project (Australian Government Department of Education, Employment and 
Workplace Relations, Canberra, 2011) 5. See Steel, Huggins and Laurens, above n 6, 297–98.
60  Ibid. 295. 
61  An excellent base is Mary Gentile’s Giving Voice to Values program, currently used at ANU 
College of Law and UNSW Law.
62  Edwards and Kirkham, above n 54.
63  Treviño, Weaver and Reynolds, above n 36, 957.  
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ethical concerns [and obligations] and those of others into the open?’64 
Are these conversations likely to happen in light of the rest of our firm 
culture and climate? These may need to be considered for intra-firm, 
inter-disciplinary, cross-jurisdictional and global teams as well.65 
C. Professional regulation
Team-based ethics should be a part of the profession’s Continuing 
Professional Development (and assessment?). More contestable is the tacit 
case for team-based regulation and discipline.
D. Legal scholarship
Writers have called for more research on the team as an ethical decision-
making unit and on team-level ethical phenomena.66 Some lines of inquiry 
that would be fruitful are:
• Types of ethical cultures and climates within hierarchical and 
collaborative teams, and within and across legal practices.
• What kinds of ethical discussion currently take place and among 
whom?67 
• What types of ethics issues are addressed and which are off-limits?68 
Are discussions in terms of rules or do they include values behind 
rules?69 Whose behaviour or objectives are (allowed to be) questioned?
• When might unethical conduct of a team require team discipline?
• Is the client part of the team? Is it possible to say, in certain situations, 
that the client is the leader of the team? What does this mean for 
lawyers’ ethics?
• Finally, does teamwork in law firms improve, or have potential to 
improve, ethical outcomes?
64  M G Edwards et al, ‘Voicing Possibilities: A Performative Approach to the Theory and Practice 
of Ethics in a Globalised World’  in D E Palmer (ed), Handbook of Research on Business Ethics and 
Corporate Responsibilities (InfoSci-Books, 2015) 249.
65  Ibid. 
66  Treviño, Weaver and Reynolds, above n 36, 968.
67  Burris, above n 29, 870.
68  Huang and Paterson, above n 7, 2.
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The Legal Roots of a Sustainable 
and Resilient Economy: 
New Kinds of Legal Entities, 
New Kinds of Lawyers?
Bronwen Morgan,1 Joanne McNeill2 and Isobel Blomfield3
This chapter seeks to persuade professional lawyers and ecologically-
minded social entrepreneurs that a significant gap in legal professional 
services currently exists in the ecosystem of support for small-scale 
sustainable economy initiatives. The chapter has four parts. Part I makes 
a general case for the proposition that legal reforms facilitating the growth 
of small-scale sustainable economy initiatives (SSEIs) are an important 
dimension of facilitative environmental law. Part II identifies existing 
patterns of support. Part III draws on the limitations of these existing 
patterns, when understood in the context of the distinctive needs of SSEIs, 
to sketch an outline of four possible responses to this gap. These are: 
cultivating a vital yet elusive sense of what we call ‘the touch’; introducing 
novel hybrid legal forms for the conduct of SSEI activity; developing and 
adapting specific technical skill sets to the SSEI context; and improving 
the cost, accessibility and relevance of legal support.
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I. Addressing Environmental Challenges 
‘From the Inside Out’
A key challenge facing environmental law in the near-to-medium-
term future is the degree to which its effectiveness is constrained by its 
structural relationship to commercial law, and the related implications 
for legal professional services. In responding to environmental challenges 
through the medium of law, regulatory responses are limited by their 
secondary relationship to the internal structure of economic exchange: 
they effectively bolt environmental goals onto the edifice of commercial 
exchange as a protective afterthought. A more productive approach lies in 
reworking the tacit legal underpinnings of commercial activities. Creative 
use of commercial and transactional legal strategies has the potential to 
weave social and ecological values into the heart of exchange, and thus 
to address environmental law goals ‘from the inside out’. 
The primary genesis of this chapter is grounded in data collected between 
2013 and 2015 in the Activism and Enterprise Project (the ‘A&E 
Project’4) which was funded to explore the basic insight stated above. 
The A&E project carried out primary empirical research into community-
based sustainability initiatives and grassroots innovations responding to 
climate change challenges, across a continuum from social activism to 
social enterprise. The purpose of the research was to explore the legal and 
regulatory frameworks that helped or hindered these innovative initiatives, 
a subset of which we are now calling SSEIs. The social significance of 
these initiatives was that they reconfigured economies and established 
alternatives to unsustainable practices. The capacity of SSEIs to make 
a positive contribution to the overall social fabric and to the building of 
resilient communities is related to how they negotiate life-cycle shifts: 
from vision to early experimentation and then to stable operation. These 
shifts are shaped in important ways by law and regulation. 
A brief example of an SSEI can illustrate what is at stake. The Open 
Food Network (OFN), based in Melbourne, provides a digital platform 
and related services that link producers and consumers of local ethical 
food, enabling, as its website states ‘farmers, eaters and independent food 
4  Short-form for Australian Future Fellowship Award FT110100483 held by Professor Morgan for 
‘Between Social Enterprise and Social Movement: Responses to Climate Change at the Intersection of 
Rights and Regulation’. The support of the ARC for this work is gratefully acknowledged. 
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enterprises to connect, trade, manage Food Hubs and coordinate logistics’. 
As a web-based platform that curtails the power of the middleman, OFN 
emphasises its desire to create positive social change of a systemic kind, 
one that will disrupt the existing dominance of large-scale commercial 
provision of food or housing. It has open-source principles at the centre 
of both its software and its human relations, designed to support small 
community groups anywhere in the world in setting up local initiatives 
easily and at low cost. However, OFN has struggled to source legal advice 
that helps it build an income stream flowing through its provision of 
a software platform while simultaneously protecting the inbuilt sociality 
and affordability of the practices of like-minded groups around the world 
in a collaborative community. Clear and affordable legal advice would 
greatly assist projects such as OFN to replicate horizontally, rather than 
scale up, and thus to expand the SSEI sector in a sustainable manner. 
The growth of SSEIs is not easily defined as the emergence of a ‘sector’. 
Drawing on the A&E project as well as data from the International 
Comparative Social Enterprise Models (ICSEM) research project,5 we 
can say that SSEIs prioritise social relationships, some degree of economic 
democracy, interdependency and values other than economic efficiency 
and low costs, including but not limited to ecological values. They are 
a subset of social enterprise, and overlap with some aspects of the sharing 
economy: not the turbo-sharing economy of Airbnb and Uber, but smaller-
scale, more socially-oriented versions of these technologically innovative 
enterprises. But it is fair to say that the definition of an identifiable sector 
in this context remains diffuse. This is, in part, precisely because the legal, 
financial and organisational structures of our current economy do not sit 
comfortably with these types of initiatives. Therefore the very ‘gap’ that 
underpins the discussion presented here undermines their visibility. The 
suggestions for reform in this chapter are therefore intended to draw out 
the institutional potential of SSEIs and to improve the ‘fit’ between them 
and their larger ecosystem. 
5  See emes.net/research-projects/social-enterprise/icsem-project/. Australia has a team participating 
in this international project, including two of the authors of this chapter.
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II.  Existing Pathways of Legal Support 
for SSEIs
There are three main sources of existing support. 
A) First, some law firms provide advice to social enterprises, but most 
focus on not-for-profit and limited pro bono advice. Generally, law firms 
that provide professional legal services to the social enterprise sector in 
Australia are not easily identified as such without prior knowledge of 
personal contacts. Legal practitioners, particularly those in large urban 
areas, draw primarily on their existing commercial experience to provide 
advice on legal matters to social enterprises generally, and therefore to the 
SSEI subgroup also. This expertise tends to divide into not-for-profit and 
for-profit specialisms and experience. Most of these firms also offer pro 
bono services; however, the majority require the entity to be not-for-profit 
to be eligible to access these.
The recent advent of technology-enabled clearing houses designed 
to assist small businesses and start-ups to find relatively low-cost legal 
advice is potentially relevant to some SSEIs. These are being heralded as 
‘disruptive services’6 for their potential to make access to professional legal 
services easier and more affordable for small businesses. They typically use 
standard commercial documentation and the underlying assumptions of 
for-profit business models and legal structures.
Some smaller firms with more of a creative and hybrid focus are recently 
emerging. Clearpoint Counsel7 is one example with a core focus on 
SSEI-relevant services. Branded as ‘Legal Services. Reimagined. Simply’, 
it offers ‘holistic, collaborative and entrepreneurial services’, stressing that 
‘we believe law should be a tool to empower you’. In addition to a variety 
of more traditional commercial advice, it offers specialist advice on ‘social 
enterprise and sustainable economies law’ as well as ‘B Corporation 
Training and Certification’.
6  In Australia, examples include LawPath, LegalVision, LegalZoom, AdventBalance: see www.
lawyersweekly.com.au/opinion/16286-legal-market-ripe-for-disruptive-innovation and the recent 
establishment of the Law Society project on the Future of Law and Innovation in the Profession 
(FLIP): www.law.unsw.edu.au/sites/law.unsw.edu.au/files/images/lib/future_of_legal_profession.pdf.
7  www.clearpointcounsel.com. 
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B) Second, cognate initiatives have emerged to service social enterprise 
specifically and in some cases SSEIs. Some, such as Business Enterprise 
Centres, Justice Connect and Get Mutual provide services predominantly 
tied to specific legal forms (for-profit, not-for-profit and cooperatives 
respectively). These have limited use for SSEIs that seek to establish hybrid 
business models that draw on both profit and not-for-profit dimensions. 
Others, such as the Expert Advice Exchange of the NSW Government, 
a  sub-initiative of the NSW Environmental Defenders’ Office, Lex 
Mundi Pro Bono Foundation and the University of Melbourne Law 
School Sustainable Business Clinic, do serve hybrid initiatives but are all 
very small, specialised and embryonic. Overall, they privilege not-for-
profit structures as the primary eligibility criterion, while more than half 
the social enterprises responding to two recent surveys in Australia had 
chosen for-profit or cooperative structures.8 
C) Finally, social enterprise capacity-building programs broker select 
initiatives to access legal advice, sometimes at ‘low-bono’ fee levels, 
when needed.9 These usually provide fairly general ‘legal matters’ style 
workshops or other material to groups of participants in a standard 
format, or ‘template’ style advice (e.g. on purchaser agreements, insurance 
arrangements or volunteer contracts). They sometimes also secure 
individualised legal support. But such support is only available to entities 
admitted to the program after a lengthy application process, and is often 
vulnerable to dispensing untimely or overly standard advice ill-suited to 
bespoke and/or complex arrangements. 
In short, many of the existing avenues of support are shaped by 
assumptions of a divide between not-for-profit and for-profit legal 
structures which maps onto a related gulf between pro bono advice and 
expensive commercial advice. Moreover, while pro bono legal practitioners 
generally have access to well-developed networks, for those attempting to 
build their expertise and skills around working with social enterprises and 
SSEIs, there is no way, other than word of mouth, for them to identify 
each other or to expand opportunities to share knowledge and expertise. 
8  ICSEM project, above n 5 and Stephen Bennett et al, Legal Models Working Group Report (Social 
Innovation, Enterprise and Entrepreneurship Alliance, July 2014), www.employeeownership.com.au/
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Legal-Models-Working-Group-Draft-Final-Report.pdf. 
9  See, for example, National Pro Bono Resource Centre, Review of Parramatta City Council’s Social 
Enterprise Pro Bono Legal Panel (2011), on file with second author.
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III. Four Dimensions of an Effective 
Ecosystem of Professional Legal Support
A. Supporting legal practitioners to cultivate 
‘the touch’
There is, then, a felt demand for a more extensive and effective ecosystem 
of professional legal support for small-scale initiatives that confound 
traditional distinctions between for-profit and not-for-profit economic 
activity. The key limitation of the existing pathways is an overarching 
unmet need that is challenging to convey succinctly. It can perhaps best 
be described as a culture fit with values prominent in the social enterprise 
sector and the SSEI subgroup, a ‘contextual sensitivity’ or, as described 
by one interviewee, ‘the touch’. ‘The touch’ is grounded in a mix of 
shared values, especially economic democracy, community development, 
a holistic worldview and an understanding of how to meld social 
relationality with practical governance. It is partly experiential, embedded 
in tacit craft knowledge, and partly normative, linked to a set of ethical 
and political commitments, though not to any particular ideology.
By virtue of this elusive status, it is likely something that is best fostered 
in experiential peer to peer settings, particularly ones that link a network 
of both legal and non-legal professionals who are committed to the 
ethos involved. Such a network might have considerable value for legal 
professionals in both large firms and small firm or solo practice settings. 
For the former, it would provide professional development channels to 
help legitimise social enterprise generally and SSEI specifically as viable 
‘market segments’. For the latter, there is evidence that some working in 
this area identify themselves as ‘corporate refugees’ from ‘war-torn law 
firms, battered and wanting to … move away from negative, adversarial, 
competitive and risk-averse models of practising’.10 There may also be 
opportunities to tap into technology-based networks that ‘reduce the 
impediment of geographical distances’ and create a ‘virtual legal practice’ 
which allows for small firms to aggregate work while simultaneously 
10  Bronwen Morgan and Declan Kuch, The Sharing Economy: More than the Sum of its Parts? 
Implications for Legal Services (2014), Summary Report of Janelle Orsi Australia Workshop Series, 
UNSW Law School, www.activismandenterprise.weebly.com/uploads/2/2/3/2/22323902/140317_-_
orsi_aus_tour_unsw_writeup_-_final.pdf.
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allowing them to stay competitive in the marketplace.11 These can 
connect and support sole practitioners, such as Lawyer Mums Australia12 
or clusters of ‘dormant’ legal practitioners, such as in Northern NSW,13 
potentially interested in developing new and different practice streams.
B. Introducing hybrid legal models for economic 
enterprises
Legal forms matter too, however. SSEIs face intractable problems here in 
falling between traditional classifications of not-for-profit and for-profit. 
For the former, SSEIs typically generate and distribute earned income 
in ways quite different from standard charities. The latter may find the 
generic corporations template used by standard for-profit companies do 
not typically integrate SSEI-specific characteristics into the ‘DNA’ of 
the entity, nor protect them over the long term. Either way, a simplified 
choice of legal form that would allow trading, investment and income 
flows to supplement grant-based support and without adding undue 
organisational complexity, especially in relation to reporting, governance 
and tax status, would benefit SSEIs. It would also assist them in protecting 
their purpose and preventing private extraction of their assets as a result of 
changes of form, buy-outs or winding-up. 
A range of innovations around hybrid legal structures are emerging 
that help to address these issues.14 Some of these are statutory legal 
models, such as the Community Interest Company in the UK that 
melds shareholder investment with an asset lock and capped dividends; 
or the Benefit Corporation structure in the US that enables directors to 
pursue a general public benefit without fear of shareholder retaliation. 
Other innovations offer special clauses such as the use of ‘golden shares’ 
to protect social mission;15 or model rules, adopted by voluntary choice 
of the entity, for modifying the constitution of a standard corporation, 
11  Caroline Hart, ‘Sustainable Regional, Rural and Remote Legal Practice in Queensland: 
The Importance of Innovation in Alliances and the Use of Information Technology’ (2011) 16(1) 
Deakin Law Review 225, 252.
12  A Facebook group: see www.facebook.com/LawyerMumsAustralia/.
13  Morgan and Kuch, above n 10. 
14  Bronwen Morgan, ‘Transcending the Corporation: Social Enterprise, Cooperatives and 
Commons-Based Governance’ in Thomas Clarke and Justin O’Brien (eds), The Oxford Handbook on 
the Corporation (Oxford University Press, in press).
15  Nick O’Donohoe and Simon Rowell, ‘Going for Gold’ (Big Society Capital, 2015), www.
bigsocietycapital.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Golden%20Share%20Report.pdf.
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such as the Fair Shares model16 (which securely embeds social purpose 
and integrates founders, producers, employees, customers, service users 
and investors equally into core governance processes), and a voluntary 
certification version of the Benefit Corporation approach, a ‘B-Corp’ 
brand, in essence, that validates governance, transparency, environmental 
and social impact through third-party certification. However, none of 
these are in widespread use in Australia, although the B-Corp brand 
is gaining some traction.
C. Adapting specific technical skill sets to the 
SSEI context
While the existence of a hybrid legal form would assist in defining a 
distinctive legal site for SSEIs, they often encounter ongoing regulatory 
grey areas in trying to secure operational stability. Advice better suited 
to large-scale commercial operation tends to convey a reported ‘fixation 
with legal impediments’17 and to fit poorly with SSEI culture. Pro bono 
advice is all too often ‘off-the-shelf ’, overly complex and unwieldy for 
SSEI purposes and adds layers of unnecessary complexity to operations. 
While a sense of ‘the touch’ helps here, there are also technically distinctive 
aspects to SSEI operations. For example, ownership arrangements may 
include designing flat governance structures, protecting commitments to 
economic democracy, recognising ‘sweat equity’ returns, and structuring 
‘end of life’ distributions that mix grant and investment income. 
Intellectual property issues may require expertise in open source and 
other commons-based forms of licensing, while employee contracts may 
systematically blur lines between staff and volunteers, and novel forms of 
land use, leasing and insurance relations often predominate. 
This range of technical knowledge provides positive opportunities for the 
professional network suggested above to develop targeted seminars and 
training, potentially linked to continuing professional education and/or 
the development of new curricula in university degrees. 
16  See www.fairshares.coop/.
17  Morgan and Kuch, above n 10.
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D. Improving access
The inaccessibility of legal advice is a centuries-old problem, but of 
bittersweet intensity here, given the potentially transformative ideals 
of  SSEIs. Access can be improved both by enhancing relevance and 
reducing cost. A publicly available database of SSEI professionals from 
the network could encourage user-driven rankings and reviews to animate 
referrals and relevance. To stem the problem of one-size-fits all, overly 
didactic template advice, purpose-focused clusters within the network 
could deliver group-based training sessions to assist with the customisation 
of template advice. One-stop shops for particular sectors (e.g. food, 
energy) could develop referrals and partnerships between and beyond the 
legal profession. Clusters could also be geographically based, especially in 
regional areas, running local clinics covering a wide range of issues.
Since cluster-based strategies essentially allow ‘bulk purchasing’ of 
legal advice, they will help to reduce cost, opening up the possibility 
of widespread availability of ‘low bono’ services. These can be underpinned 
by, for example, transparency of costs charged on network sites, fee caps 
for particular types of advice, or retainers that include access to a specified 
quantity of advice within a given period. A broader cultural shift in 
expectations about what a typical private lawyer is entitled to earn is also 
part of this:18 perhaps ‘community enterprise lawyer’ could complement 
‘community legal centre’ legal identities.
IV. Conclusion
Overall two key reforms would assist in closing the gap in professional 
legal services for SSEIs in Australia: the establishment and promotion of 
hybrid legal models, whether statutory or self-regulatory, for enterprise 
activity; and the establishment and coordination of an SSEI-specific 
professional development network for legal practitioners and other key 
service providers. An effective professional network would prioritise ‘the 
touch’, break down divisions between not-for-profit/for-profit/cooperative 
legal status, facilitate ‘trusted’ partnering and/or referral between legal 
practitioners, widen access to and reduce the cost of legal services, and 
18  RMIT Centre for Innovative Justice, Affordable Justice (2013) 48, mams.rmit.edu.au/
qr7u4uejwols1.pdf.
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develop clusters based on purpose and geography. While acknowledging 
the limits of purely legal reform in this area, we hope this discussion 
will catalyse a broader interest in cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary 




1  Professor, Law School, La Trobe University.
2  ‘Soliciting the Right Kind of Mediator’ (2005) 79(4) Law Institute Journal 22 (News section). 
3  The wearing two hats analogy is also used for lawyers who act as advocates and negotiators 
(see Bobette Wolski, Skills, Ethics and Values for Legal Practice (Lawbook Co, 2nd edn, 2009) 116) and 
in-house counsel who are also the company secretary (Emilios Kyrou, ‘Legal Professional Privilege for 
General Counsel Wearing Two Hats’ (2000) 5 Law Society Journal 42).




Professional legal bodies promote the use of lawyers as mediators because 
of their specialist skills, and claim that ‘with their skills, training and 
experience solicitors are ideally placed to be mediators’.2 Many lawyers 
train to be mediators. However, they face a challenge; how to reconcile 
their various professional responsibilities while wearing two distinct hats: 
officer of the court and neutral third party.3
In this chapter, I discuss issues facing lawyers acting as mediators including 
clash of values, identification of systemic injustice, parties’ access to 
information and advice and dubiousness of mediators’ immunity against 
legal liability. Initially, I outline models of mediation, the accreditation 
system of mediators and detail the numbers of lawyers who offer mediation 
services. In conclusion, three reforms are proposed.
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II. Mediation and Accreditation
Courts and tribunals require disputing parties to use alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) processes often as a condition precedent to accessing 
these forums. This integration is reinforced in legislation; for example, 
an objective of the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) is to ensure 
people take genuine steps to resolve disputes before instituting civil 
proceedings. Mediation is the most common form of ADR utilised in all 
forms of litigation.   
In practice, there is significant variation in the context and process of 
mediations. There are at least four models of mediation: facilitative, 
evaluative, settlement and transformative. The facilitative model 
underpinned early developments in community mediation; however, 
with the increased use of court-related mediation, the settlement and 
evaluative models are commonly used in practice. The models are not 
necessarily distinct alternative forms of practice but rather ‘tendencies in 
practice’. Within any one mediation, different modes might be adopted 
at different times.4 
With the exponential growth in numbers of mediators in the 1990s, the 
desire to ensure quality and accountability in mediation practice led to 
the development of accreditation and practice standards for Australian 
mediators. The National Mediator Accreditation Scheme (NMAS) became 
operative in January 2008. In 2017 there were 3,216 mediators accredited 
by Recognised Mediation Accreditation Bodies (RMABs).5 
Mediators who are (voluntarily) accredited must comply with the Approval 
Standards as well as the Practice Standards. The standards specify practice 
and competency requirements for mediators; inform participants and 
others about what they can expect of the mediation process and mediators; 
set out minimum practice requirements and allows mediators to develop 
or comply with additional standards if they so wish.6 The standards 
provide that where a mediator practices under a legislative framework, 
4  Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process and Practice (LexisNexis, 3rd edn, 2011) 43–45.
5  A list of accredited mediators is available on the Mediator Standards Board website: www.msb.
org.au/.
6  National Mediator Accreditation System, Part III, Practice Standards (2015).
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this prevails over any inconsistency with the standards. Additionally, the 
standards state a mediator must adhere to the ethical code prescribed by 
the professional organisation of which they are a member.7
III. Lawyers as Mediators
The legal profession was initially sceptical of the expansion in ADR which 
was in part a response to critiques of the traditional adversarial legal 
dispute system, including criticism of the dominant and controlling role 
of lawyers. Some lawyers, however, quickly embraced mediation within 
the scope of their professional services. For instance, in 1989, Lawyers 
Engaged in Alternative Dispute Resolution (LEADR) was formed to 
promote the use of alternative dispute resolution instead of litigation.8 
Since that time, many lawyers, both barristers and solicitors, have trained 
in mediation. Lawyers’ professional organisations (including Law Societies 
in Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland and New 
South Wales, and Bar Associations in Queensland South Australia and 
Victoria) accredit lawyers to be mediators and also have a responsibility 
to monitor the standards. The legal professional associations actively 
promote the benefits of engaging a mediator with lawyers’ skills. In 
court-annexed mediations, the mediator chosen will invariably be a legal 
practitioner. Lawyers’ professional indemnity insurance policies now 
consider mediation to be a ‘legal service’ and lawyers acting as mediators 
are insured against liability in this work.9 
The professional bodies for both solicitors and barristers have dedicated 
directories for the public to identify lawyers who are also mediators. 
An  indication of numbers of lawyers who also mediate is that 
10.58 per cent (213) of barristers10 and 1 per cent (101) of solicitors are 
accredited mediators in Victoria. Law firms are also promoting a specific 
focus on providing dispute resolution services. For example, in Victoria: 
7  Ibid. cll 1.3 and 8.3. 
8  LEADR opened its organisation to non-lawyers in 1990s and recently amalgamated with the 
Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators to form the Resolution Institute: www.resolution.institute/.
9  For example, see Law Society of New South Wales, Guidelines for Mediators Who Act as Mediators, 
www.lawsociety.com.au/resources/adr/MediatorsPanel/index.htm. 
10  Victoria Bar, Barrister’s Directory, www.vicbar.com.au/barrister-directory/mediator-arbitrator-
search/search-for-a-mediator and Law Institute of Victoria, www.liv.asn.au/Mediators (viewed 21 April 
2017).
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McFarlane Legal: Dispute Resolution is a law firm that practises solely 
in the  area of resolving disputes using alternative dispute resolution 
techniques – predominantly mediation, arbitration and facilitation. 
‘We  are experts in the area and we have an enviable track record of 
resolving the great majority of disputes that come before us’.11 
There are separate codes of conduct for lawyers and accredited mediators 
but, as the National Mediator Standards indicate, the lawyer’s professional 
obligations prevail over any conflicting mediator standards. The lawyers’ 
code of professional conduct is designed ‘to assist solicitors to act ethically 
and in accordance with the principles of professional conduct established 
by the common law and these rules’.12 In this code the definition of 
‘court’ includes ‘an arbitration or mediation or any other form of dispute 
resolution’.  
Some state law societies have adopted specific guidelines for solicitors 
who  act as mediators.13 Similarly, the Law Council of Australia has 
approved Ethical Standards for Mediators that are intended to serve as 
a guide for the conduct of mediators, to inform the mediating parties of 
what they should expect, and to promote public confidence in mediation 
as a process for resolving disputes.14 
IV. Issues for Lawyers Who Act as Mediators
Comparing the usual practice of lawyering with mediation practice, 
there is a fundamental variance between a rights versus interests-based 
approach. ‘Interest-based processes are concerned with finding solutions 
that meet the needs and interests of the parties involved. Rights-based 
processes are concerned with determining outcomes based on rights, 
rules and law.’15 The National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory 
Council (NADRAC) noted the ‘alternative’ in ADR sometimes refers to 
‘interest-based’ dispute resolution processes as an alternative to ‘rights-
11  www.mcfarlanelegal.com.au/.
12  Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015, cl 3.1. 
13  For example, Law Society of NSW, above n 9.
14 Law Council of Australia, Ethical Standards for Mediators, Updated Version, August 2011, 
learnedfriends.com.au/getmedia/b72ee6c5-cbf4-4c8f-b170-cd7bc66fd5cf/Walker_Ethical-
Guidelines.aspx.
15  National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, ADR Terminology: A Discussion 
Paper (2002) 10. The interest-based approach to negotiation was popularised in Roger Fisher and 
William L Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Penguin Press, 1981). 
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based’ processes. Additionally, the core values underpinning mediation – 
neutrality, self-determination, voluntariness and confidentiality – can pose 
challenges for the mediations lawyers are often involved in. For example, 
with the increased use of court-directed mediation, parties’ ‘voluntary’ 
participation is compromised. Similarly strict adherence to concepts of 
confidentiality, neutrality and self-determination are the focus of critical 
analysis.16 
Lawyer–mediators face ethical challenges when they have to choose 
between competing values.17 In a qualitative research project exploring 
ethical and practical issues in mediation, mediators provided examples 
of ethical issues from their own experience:
• confidentiality of settlement in a mediation involving an abuse survivor 
and a church organisation raising questions about the preservation 
of the victim’s legal rights;
• tension between the mediator’s obligations to the parties and larger 
public interest questions, e.g. if there’s a point of law that needs 
clarifying;
• parties about to enter an agreement that is outside the law;
• lack of good faith and deceptive conduct by one party;
• capacity of parties (e.g. one party had an intellectual disability and the 
proposed agreement was significantly different from a likely hearing 
outcome);  workplace bullying dispute and victim was too stressed 
to be in the same room as the other party;
• inequality and power differentials, particularly where one party is 
uninformed or misinformed;
• information received in private session about potential bankruptcy 
of the party.18
The examples illustrate how mediators have to grapple with complex 
ethical conundrums. 
16  Mary Anne Noone and Lola Akin Ojelabi, ‘Ethical Challenges for Mediators: An Australian 
Perspective’ (2014) 45 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 145. 
17  Boulle, above n 4; Julie MacFarlane, ‘Mediating Ethically: The Limits of Codes of Conduct and 
the Potential of a Reflective Practice Model’ (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 49; Patricia Marshall 
‘The “Partial” Mediator: Balancing Ideology and the Reality’ (2010) 11(8) ADR Bulletin 176; Rachel 
Field, ‘Mediation Ethics in Australia: A Case for Rethinking the Foundational Paradigm’ (2012) 19 
James Cook University Law Review 41.
18  Noone and Akin Ojelabi, above n 16.
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Professional standards for lawyers and mediators are designed to assist 
an individual practitioner in resolving and avoiding ethical dilemmas. 
However, these do not address all ethical issues and they sometimes 
contain competing or conflicting provisions and values. Additionally 
the mediators’ standards can clash with lawyers’ codes of conduct.19 The 
lawyer’s duty that is most challenged, when lawyers act as mediators, 
is their duty to the court.
When an individual is admitted to legal practice in Australia they become 
an officer of the court. Consequent duties include not engaging in abuse 
of process or bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.20 The 
conduct of lawyers who act as mediators might be called into question 
when the outcomes of mediations are seen to be unjust, unfair, and illegal 
or expose systemic issues. 
For lawyers acting as mediators, the following issues are accentuated 
by their officer of the court status:
• Does a lawyer–mediator have a greater responsibility to ensure just 
and lawful outcomes?  
• What responsibility does the lawyer–mediator have for ensuring parties 
are well informed, especially about rights they may be foregoing? 
• Should lawyer–mediators breach confidentiality when it is in the 
public interest or there is systemic abuse?21 
• Can lawyer–mediators seek immunity in their Agreements to Mediate? 
Lawyers acting as mediators should be exemplars, guaranteeing their 
mediation practice facilitates access to justice rather than impedes  it. 
A requirement that lawyer–mediators ensure parties, who are foregoing 
legal entitlements or rights, are aware this is the case, and are encouraged 
to seek information and legal advice, is needed. The duty to administration 
of justice should prevail and, when lawyer–mediators recognise that 
19  Ellen Waldman (ed), Mediation Ethics: Cases and Commentaries (Jossey-Bass, 2011); Noone and 
Akin Ojelabi, above n 16.
20  Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 s 2.2.25; Gino Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility 
(Thomson Reuters, 2013) 536.
21  Dominik Leimguber, ‘Confidentiality, Public Interest and the Mediator’s Ethical Dilemma’ 
(2013) 24 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 187; Mary Anne Noone, ‘ADR, Public Interest Law 
and Access to Justice: The Need for Vigilance’ (2011) 37(1) Monash University Law Review 57.
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the agreement available to the parties is unfair, they have an ethical 
responsibility not to be complicit in the acceptance of the injustice 
without taking some action.22  
In 2000, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) noted several 
factors that may indicate when ADR processes are unsuitable for resolving 
a dispute and court adjudication is more suitable. They were:
• when a definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter is required 
for precedential value;
• when the matter significantly affects persons or organisations who are 
not parties to the ADR process;
• when there is a need for public sanctioning of conduct or where 
repetitive violations of statutes and regulations need to be dealt with 
collectively and uniformly; 
• when parties are unable to negotiate effectively themselves or with the 
assistance of a lawyer;
• in family law matters, where there is a history of family violence.23
The Victorian Parliament Inquiry into Alternative Dispute Resolution 
recommended ADR providers publish, in a de-identified form, regular 
case studies and reports on systemic issues and any other issues of public 
interest that arise as part of their ADR processes.24 Recommendations 
aimed at improving the ‘appropriateness’ of ADR services included 
training for ADR practitioners on cross-cultural differences and power 
imbalances, recognition of the difficulties of people with language 
difficulties and limited literacy, as well as the provision of information 
and legal advice prior to involvement in ADR. 
Another challenging area for lawyers acting as mediators is conducting 
the process in a way which is fair, even-handed, objective and unbiased. 
Lawyers normally work in a partisan way where they seek to advance 
the interests of only one party in a dispute. Additionally lawyers may be 
chosen as mediators by parties, with the expectation, based on promotional 
22  Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia (Butterworths, 2nd edn, 
2002) 230.
23  Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice 
System (ALRC, 2000) [6.62].
24  Parliament of Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into Alternative Dispute Resolution 
and Restorative Justice: Final Report of the Victorian Parliament Law Reform Committee (Victorian 
Government Printer, 2009) 84.
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material, that they bring their expertise to the process and will perform an 
evaluative function of liability and other issues.25 NADRAC has suggested 
that practitioners’ responsibilities include identification and disclosure 
of ‘any existing or prior relationship between the practitioner and the 
parties; any interest in the outcome of the dispute; any present or future 
conflicts of interest; any values, experience or knowledge that may prevent 
a practitioner from acting impartially’.26 When lawyers act as mediators, 
the concern for impartiality and neutrality is accentuated. It is generally 
accepted that legal practitioners should not act as a mediator in a case 
involving their own client although this is not specifically prohibited.27 
Certainly they should be experts in identifying conflicts of interests but 
until recently their broad knowledge and skills have been embedded in an 
adversarial approach.28 These skills do not easily transfer to mediation and 
additional training is required. The legal profession has recognised this 
concern with impartiality and sought to address it in the codes of conduct 
for lawyer–mediators in both New South Wales and Queensland.29
The promotion of lawyers as mediators by their professional organisations 
for ‘their special skills, training and experience’ implies a level of knowledge 
and expertise above that of other mediators. Lawyer–mediators are likely 
to be held to a higher standard of care than non-lawyer–mediators.30 
Anecdotally, many barristers undertake evaluative or settlement-focused 
mediations. A series of cases, recently summarised by Spencer, ‘disclose an 
apparent lack of clarity by parties, lawyers and mediators as to the status 
of the parties’ intentions to be bound by an agreement that is subject to 
the execution of formal contract’.31 In summarising these cases Spencer 
raises the spectre of mediator liability as he argues that in all the cases the 
lawyers and the presiding mediator should ‘have anticipated the issues 
that ultimately arose for adjudication by the courts’. It seems likely that in 
25  Boulle, above n 4, 221.
26  National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Maintaining and Enhancing the 
Integrity of ADR Processes: From Principles to Practice Through People (NADRAC, 2011).
27  Law Council of Australia, above n 14, cl 3.
28  Christine Parker and Adrian Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 
2014) 228–36.
29  Boulle, above n 4, 490: Queensland Law Society Standards of Conduct for Solicitor Mediators, s 4.1 
and NSW Law Society Guidelines for Solicitors who Act as Mediators, s 5.1.
30  Boulle, above n 4, 723.
31  David Spencer, ‘Landing in the Right Class of Subject to Contract Agreements’ (2015) 26 
Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 75.
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the near future, particularly if the mediator is a lawyer who should know 
about the need to be clear about the intention to be bound, that person 
may also be joined as a third party to litigation: 
It seems that the eagerness to conclude mediation caused critical 
matters not to be negotiated and therefore left the intention of parties 
immediately bound in doubt … Some mediators, many of whom in 
court-annexed mediation schemes are legally trained, fail to establish the 
parties’ intentions to be immediately bound. Parties can be forgiven, since 
they are not legally trained; however, lawyers and mediators should know 
better.32
A related issue for lawyer–mediators is the use of immunity clauses in 
agreements to mediate. This practice by lawyers is questionable both 
legally and ethically.33 It is common practice for mediators to get the 
parties to sign an Agreement to Mediate, especially when it is not court-
related mediation. Lawyers’ professional associations provide precedent 
Agreements to Mediate to their members. These agreements routinely 
contain a clause where the parties grant immunity from liability to the 
mediator. For example:  
The mediator will not be liable to a party for any act or omission in the 
performance of the mediator’s obligations under this agreement unless the 
act or omission is fraudulent.34
When the mediator is a legal practitioner, there is real doubt about the 
appropriateness and lawfulness of such exclusion clauses. At common law, 
lawyers cannot, by means of an exclusion clause in the retainer agreement, 
reduce their standard of care or exempt themselves from liability for 
default in the performance of their professional responsibilities.35 In 
Victoria, lawyers were, until recently, also legislatively prohibited from 
contracting out of liability to their clients unless this is permitted by other 
legislation such as the professional standards scheme.36 If a lawyer does 
enter into such an agreement, it is said to be void.37 
32  Ibid. 84.
33  Mary Anne Noone, ‘Liability Matters for Lawyer Mediators’ (2007) 81(10) Law Institute 
Journal 52.
34  Law Society of NSW, Agreement to Mediate, cl 25.
35  Dal Pont, above n 20, [5.180]; see also Wilkinson v Feldworth Financial Services Pty Ltd (1998) 
29 ACSR 642.
36  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 7.2.11 (2).
37  Ibid. s 7.2.11 (3).
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Three policy reasons for prohibiting lawyers from limiting their liability are: 
public confidence in lawyers and the justice system would be diminished 
if lawyers could avoid actions for negligence by having a broadly worded 
exclusion clause in the retainer agreement; the public service aspect of 
professionalism is inconsistent with the notion that lawyers can exclude 
liability to their clients; and by including an exclusion clause in the 
retainer, the lawyer is putting their own interests above their clients and 
this is a conflict of interest and duty.38 Given that mediation is accepted as 
one of the services lawyers can provide, these same reasons should apply 
to the Agreement to Mediate used by lawyers. 
Mediation is a legal service offered by many lawyers and the relevant legal 
professional indemnity insurance schemes provide cover for mediations 
conducted by lawyers if they form part of the normal work of the legal 
practice.39 There is a major contradiction between the required unlimited 
liability of legal practitioners and the limited liability lawyers seek when 
they work as mediators. It is illogical for lawyers simultaneously to be 
permitted to sign agreements containing exclusion clauses. The public 
policy reasons prohibiting exclusions clauses generally in a lawyer’s 
retainer apply equally in the context of a lawyer acting as mediator signing 
an agreement with the parties. This is the case especially if one or more 
of the parties are not legally represented. 
Lawyers who act as mediators should be concerned about the lawfulness of 
exclusion clauses in Agreements to Mediate. Lawyers acting as mediators 
must fulfil their professional responsibilities and not seek immunity in 
mediation. In the context of the general critique of mediators’ immunities, 
lawyers should be enhancing the administration of justice by leading the 
way and removing exclusion of liability clauses from their Agreements 
to Mediate.
V. Conclusion
Lawyers who act as mediators face challenges when wearing the two 
distinct hats of lawyer and mediator. As officers of the court, lawyers do 
have additional responsibilities which cannot be put aside when they act 
as mediators. Lawyers who are mediators should be exemplars of ethical 
38  Dal Pont, above n 20.
39  Confirmed by representative of Victoria’s Legal Practitioners Liability Committee, June 2015.
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and appropriate mediation practice. They should be impartial, treat the 
parties fairly without bias, ensure the parties have access to information 
and advice to realistically assess the proposed mediated agreement and 
avoid all conflicts of interest. Additionally, lawyer–mediators should not 
seek to limit their liability by the use of exclusion clauses in Agreements 
to Mediate. 
To address some of the concerns raised in this chapter, three specific 
suggestions for inclusion in the various codes of conduct for lawyer–
mediators are: 
• a requirement to ensure parties are aware of legal rights (access to 
information and/or advice) before agreeing to forego them in the 
negotiated settlement;
• procedures established for mediators to report systemic issues that they 
identify in disputes they mediate; and




1  Senior Lecturer, The Australian National University, Legal Workshop.
2  Christine Coumarelos et al, Access to Justice and Legal Needs: Legal Australia Wide Survey: 
Legal Need in Australia (Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, 2012); Liz Curran and 
Maryanne Noone, ‘Access to Justice: A New Approach Using Human Rights Standards’ (2008) 15(3) 
International Journal of the Legal Profession, 195.
Enabling Marginalised Voices to 




Often the processes for law reform enable only certain voices to be heard, 
facilitating involvement by the most well-resourced pressure groups or 
lobbyists, the articulate and well educated. Yet laws affect us all. For some 
people, especially in lower socioeconomic contexts, government policies 
and laws affect every element of life from income security to the habitable 
condition of public housing to access to health services and pensions. People 
with poor literacy and numeracy have unequal access to opportunity and 
rarely have a voice or a way to provide feedback. The current structures 
for seeking input from these groups into law reform are problematic. They 
assume knowledge of the processes and of the law and legal rights, and the 
confidence to take action which is often absent for these groups.2
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As a result, laws that deeply affect these communities are made in 
isolation with little input from those with direct experience. It is left to 
community agencies and peak bodies to try to relay experiences of their 
clients. This second-hand input is valuable, but does not give voice to 
the affected communities and their direct lived experience. If law reform 
is disconnected from lived experience, it is consequently blunt and 
less effective. 
This chapter highlights why the current approach to law reform is 
problematic in the context of participatory democracy. It explores the 
obligations of lawyers and identifies innovative ways that law reform can 
occur beyond traditional avenues for law reform. It presents three case 
studies which have had a significant impact in changing laws, regulation 
and behaviours and demonstrate different law reform processes that can 
be timely and responsive to the immediate need of individuals. Some 
suggestions for inclusive law reform are also offered. 
II. The Role of Lawyers in Law Reform 
Lawyers have an obligation to uphold the rule of law and maintain the 
integrity of the legal system.
The following principles which underpin the rule of law3 are relevant 
to this discussion:
• The law is made by representatives of the people in an open and 
transparent way;
• The law and its administration is subject to open and free criticism 
by the people …;
• The law is capable of being known to everyone, so that everyone can 
comply.
As noted, sections of the community often do not know the law, or 
know where to turn, nor do they have the confidence to action their 
rights.4 They  seldom have resources to enable their voices to be heard 
as to how the laws that affect them are shaped. As Davis notes, this sits 
in a context of  often professional lobbyists and well-resourced groups 
3  See Rule of Law Institute of Australia, Principles, www.ruleoflaw.org.au/principles/.
4  Curran and Noone, above n 2.
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that provide  input.5 This scenario has implications for the rule of law. 
Furthermore, executive governments in Australia have extended their own 
powers6 limiting court review. This practice has affected human rights 
cases by limiting court scrutiny of executive action.7
Under the Australian Solicitor’s Conduct Rules (Vic, NSW) rr 3 and 4, 
lawyers have duties to the administration of justice.8 Accordingly, legal 
professionals have a role in identifying systemic problems because of 
their explicit obligations to ensure confidence in and integrity of the legal 
system. Being a lawyer is not limited just to the delivery of legal services 
as part of an industry. Lawyers as officers of the court have a deeper ethical 
obligation to identify and respond to systemic problems that impede 
confidence in the legal system and undermine its integrity. The advocacy 
by lawyers for clients through law reform and campaigns for change to 
policy administration9 are core to the lawyers’ ethical duties where laws 
are unjust and unfair. 
5  Ian Davis, ‘Targeted Consultations’ in Brian Opeskin and David Weisbrot (eds), The Promise 
of Law Reform (The Federation Press, 2005) Ch 10, 148–59, 154.
6  See ABC Radio National, ‘Gillian Triggs Criticises “Executive Overreach” in Defiant Speech’, 
AM, 6 June 2015 (Simon Lauder), www.abc.net.au/am/content/2015/s4250111.htm.
7  See Children, Youth and Families Amendment (Permanent Care and Other Matters) Act (2014) 
(Vic); Office of the Public Advocate, ‘Legal and Child Welfare Groups Call for Reinstatement of 
Child Protection Powers for Children’s Court’ (28 February 2017) www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/
childrens-matters-media-release; Michael Chaaya, ‘Proposed Changes to the Review of Migration 
Decisions: Sensible Reform Agenda or Political Expediency?’(1996) 19(4) Sydney Law Review 547.
8  See Frederick Ellison on the obligations of legal professionals to seek the social good, in Michael 
Davis and Frederick A Ellison (eds), Ethics and the Legal Profession  (Prometheus Books, 1986) 18; 
Simon Longstaff, The Lawyer’s Duty to the Community (The Ethics Centre, 1 March 1995), www.
ethics.org.au/on-ethics/our-articles/before-2014/the-lawyers-duty-to-the-community. Former Chief 
Justice the Hon Murray Gleeson has also noted the obligation of the legal professions to ensure 
the public welfare and maintain confidence in the legal system – see Murray Gleeson, Are the 
Professions Worth Keeping? (Speech delivered at the Greek-Australian International Legal and Medical 
Conference, 31 May 1999), www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/
gleesoncj/cj_areprofe.htm; Murray Gleeson, Public Confidence in the Courts (Speech delivered at 
the National Judicial College of Australia, Canberra, 9 February 2007) 6-7, www.hcourt.gov.au/
assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/gleesoncj/cj_9feb07.pdf; Carl T Bogus, ‘The Death of 
an Honourable Profession’ (1996) 71(4) Indiana Law Journal 911.
9  Liz Curran, ‘Attorney General George Brandis Set to Silence CLCs’, The Saturday Paper (online), 
14 June 2014, www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/opinion/topic/2014/06/14/attorney-general-george-
brandis-set-silence-clcs/1402668000.
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III. Why Evidence- and Practice-Based 
Research Are Critical for Good Law Reform
Evidence- and practice-based experience and research that are linked 
to and not remote from day-to-day experience of laws can inform 
effectiveness, efficiency and positive outcomes. In 2007 the author 
wrote ‘[i]f  governments of any political persuasion want to remain 
connected with the public and stay in power, they need to listen to their 
public. On  many occasions, politicians claim to be connected to 
their communities. Often in reality, this is not the case’.10
Effective service programs (or laws that have been evaluated as effective) 
are often under-resourced or disbanded by government without empirical 
basis. The Productivity Commission made this point and called for research 
into this situation to inform government policy in Recommendation 24.11
The author further noted in 2007, ‘The process of law reform is very 
slow to reap results as it often involves a sustained and persistent effort to 
raise awareness and change often entrenched cultures’.12 At that time the 
author struggled to find literature related to the process of law reform that 
focused on engaging with public experience. Then, in 2013, the author 
was again commissioned to examine seven law reform projects.13 Since the 
author’s report in 2007, the conduct of law reform had changed, and was 
more creative, strategic and responsive to community, and less reactive. 
The author’s 2013 study revealed multiple strategies to overcome 
problems with people’s experience of the law. The author was able to 
identify successful and impactful law reform initiatives of community 
legal centres (CLCs) (often conducted in collaboration with the people 
affected or other agencies). The processes used showed a strategic and 
10  Liz Curran, Making the Legal System More Responsive to Community: A Report on the Impact 
of Victorian Community Legal Centre (CLC) Law Reform Initiatives, 2007, 4.
11  Productivity Commission, Commission Inquiry into Access to Justice Arrangements Report: 
Volume 1, Inquiry Report 72, 2014, 37, 43, 75–76.
12  Curran, above n 9.
13  See Liz Curran, Solving Problems – A Strategic Approach: Examples, Processes & Strategies 
(Legal Workshop, The Australian National University College of Law, 13 May 2013), law.anu.edu.au/
sites/all/files/legalworkshop/final_report_solving_legal_problems_curran_calc_13_march_2013.pdf.
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multipronged approach to law reform using innovative approaches that 
directly engaged client experiences of the impact of the law and developed 
solutions to problems.14 Some are discussed below.
IV. Case Studies
The following two case studies, ‘National Bulk Debt Negotiation’ and 
the ‘Do Not Knock Sticker’, were initiated by CLCs. A third case study 
is about direct community advocacy to a Parliamentary Inquiry. All of 
these case studies demonstrate ways lawyers can have a more direct role 
in empowering communities with the skills they might need to make 
arguments (something lawyers consider as part of their own professional 
toolkit) and enable community members to present their case first-hand 
to lawmakers.
A. Case study one: Bulk debt negotiation
The National Bulk Debt Project (the Project) which is still ongoing, aims 
to protect the income of those experiencing long-term financial hardship. 
It has not only led to a decision by creditors to desist in pursuing loans 
against the most vulnerable or disadvantaged but to changes in practice, 
codes of conduct and hardship provisions. 
The project used unconventional approaches to bring about law reform 
and changes in predatory and poor practice.15 It aims to assist judgment-
proof debtors struggling to repay. ‘Judgment-proof ’ means there is no real 
likelihood that debtors can pay, that is, because they need all their income 
just to pay for food, rent and utilities or, as in Victoria, they have legislative 
protection from being sued. Instead of negotiations taking place for each 
client separately (which takes time and resources), they were bundled 
together into a ‘bulk negotiation’. All cases involved clients on a  low 
income. In the author’s report of 2013, the examination of the project 
noted that many clients had multiple debts. Most clients experienced 
disadvantage including mental illness, dis ability, ill health or were full-time 
carers. Cases were collected en masse by financial counsellors and CLC 
14  Ibid. 8.
15  A project of the West Heidelberg Community Legal Service, the Victoria Law Foundation, 
NSW and Victoria Legal Aid and Footscray Community Legal Service. The author discloses that she 
was Director of the West Heidelberg Community Legal Service at that time and secured the project’s 
initial funding.
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lawyers and the clients’ circumstances were documented by a volunteer 
and taken in bulk to each bank by the project lawyer. The project has since 
been extended to other industries. In many instances, the client either did 
not owe the debt in the first place, proceedings were prohibited by law 
or it was unrealistic to pursue them due to their personal circumstances 
(e.g. cancer or disability), which served to highlight problems in debt 
collection practice. Few of the complainants previously could have 
actioned their legal rights due to a lack of knowledge, resources or access 
to legal assistance on an individual case-by-case basis.
1. Impact
This project has made the banks see that their pursuit is harmful and 
often costly and inefficient. The debts taken in bulk have avoided costly 
individual court processes, poor recovery, harmful practices and waste 
of corporate resources. 
The author’s 2013 report revealed that the project has directly assisted 
over 2,500 debtors and negotiated waiver or closure of debts worth more 
than $15 million.16 Updated on 12 April 2016, additional impacts of the 
project include:
• 70 per cent of debts were waived. 
• A National Hardship Register introduced in January 2014 is directly 
traceable to the work of the project. 
• Criteria and processes developed via bulk debt negotiations have 
been specifically incorporated into some of the major banks’ business 
practices. 
• The Code of Banking Practice has been updated with minimum 
standards for signatories.17
The project in this case study has led to the reform of banking practices. 
It has saved money, not just for the banks in wasted processes, but also in 
reduced court proceedings (previously undertaken as individual matters 
in courts on a case-by-case basis). It has also reduced stress and anxiety 
16  Curran, above n 13, 26–34; Denis Nelthorpe and Kate Digney, The Bulk Negotiation Project: 
Client Profiles and Client Outcomes (West Heidelberg Community Legal Service and Victoria Law 
Foundation, 2011) 3.
17  J Holland, Negotiating Bulk Debt: Outcomes from the Bulk Debt Negotiation Project (unpublished 
report for Victoria Legal Aid, West Heidelberg Community Legal Service, Legal Aid NSW, Good 
Shepherd Australia & New Zealand, 2016). The author thanks Denis Nelthorpe for sharing this report.
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for those with debts. Moreover, it has revealed many debts were not being 
lawfully pursued, giving rise to other systemic issues for the regulators. 
Poor laws affect lives; they can do harm, cause stress and lead to poor 
health.18
B. Case study two: ‘Do Not Knock’  becomes law 
of trespass
The Consumer Action Law Centre (CALC) in Melbourne was receiving 
complaints about door-to-door sales including high-pressure techniques 
to get people to sign contracts; misleading and deceptive conduct; faulty 
goods and services; the targeting of vulnerable groups; and the use 
of fraudulent contracts and conduct.
A novel and practical sticker affixed to the front door of a person’s home 
saying ‘Do Not Knock’ served to deflect aggressive predatory sales 
practices (which targeted public housing estates with concentrations of 
new arrivals, elderly and people with a disability and poor literacy skills) 
while leading to a change in precedent. Law reform was achieved with 
a community awareness campaign; a sticker to protect people day-to-day; 
the compilation of complaints and provision of data to the regulator; 
media exposure; collaboration between council, the regulator and 
community agencies, legal and non-legal; and court action. 
1. Impact
The sticker is used on doorways across Australia and is distributed by 
CALC, local councils and governments. 
CALC collected complaints from consumers about continued ‘door 
knocking’ despite having the sticker on their door. These complaints 
were logged in bulk with the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC). The ACCC then lodged a case in the Federal Court 
against a utility company. The court ruled that ignoring a sticker risks 
18  Pascoe Pleasence, Nigel J Balmer and Alexy Buck, ‘The Health Cost of Civil-Law Problems: 
Further Evidence of Links between Civil-law Problems and Morbidity, and the Consequential Use 
of Health Services’ (2008) 5(2) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 351.
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a fine of $50,000.19 The case before a single judge of the Federal Court 
was upheld on appeal. If the sticker is ignored, it constitutes trespass. 
Changes have also been made to industry codes.
This case study goes to show how a creative idea such as a ‘Do Not Knock’ 
sticker can have a significant impact in changing laws. The case illustrates 
how clients can be included and empowered to participate directly in law 
reform through a trusted intermediary (in this case CALC). It involved 
a  collaboration of financial counsellors and social workers alongside 
affected clients. Further details about the approaches and processes are 
available in the 2013 report.20
C. Case study three: Enabling community voice
Community members in a public housing Residents’ Group (RG) in West 
Heidelberg (one of the poorest locations in Australia) were empowered to 
make their own submission. They had consistently reported poor housing 
for over a decade with no response.
The Victorian Government called a Parliamentary Inquiry into Public 
Housing in Victoria. The inquiry was called with a very limited lead-time 
at Christmas. The author (then Director of the West Heidelberg Legal 
Service) saw an inquiry advertisement and brought it to the residents’ 
attention. The residents wanted to participate in an inquiry but had no 
idea how or what to do. They felt no one would listen to them. A plan 
of action and training was developed identifying what skills would be 
needed to participate in the inquiry. Enabling RG participation involved 
intensive sequential building-block training that was responsive to needs 
and gaps in skills, as very few members of the RG knew anything about 
decision-makers and processes. Many were fearful of departmental 
reprisals and so systems were developed to protect community members 
such as using numbers rather than names in the Focus Groups residents 
conducted with public housing residents. This underlines why people feel 
discouraged from participation in law reform processes.
19  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Neighbourhood Energy Pty Ltd [2012] 
FCA 1357. 
20  Curran, above n 13, 29–34.
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These Focus Groups were recorded and transcribed by a pro bono law 
firm and formed into a written submission. The RG were called to ‘give 
evidence’ before the Parliamentary Inquiry. At first the parliamentarians 
directed questions to the author who had to firmly defer to the RG. 
Once the parliamentarians listened to the RG, the often brutal reality 
of life on a public housing estate led the parliamentarians to conclude 
it was ‘the most powerful and compelling submission’ and later adopted 
some recommendations of the RG. One politician noted at the 
hearing it was ‘a most significant moment in democratic participation’. 
V. Suggestions for Inclusive Law Reform
The author recognises that in a context of limited resources and funding 
for law reform bodies21 it is hard to think about non-traditional approaches 
to law reform. The ALRC,22 Victorian Law Reform Commission23 
and other bodies have tried to increase public participation.24 Many 
of these processes rely on computer access, which is effectively a form 
of social exclusion for those without internet access or computer literacy. 
Community agencies are also under significant resource constraints, 
as noted by the Productivity Commission (PC) in its Final Report on 
Access to Justice Arrangements.25 The author’s 2013 report26 shows that 
this has not prevented innovations in law reform practice occurring. 
Many initiatives derive from a need to find better ways of responding 
due to a  lack of capacity for one-on-one cases, identifying the systemic 
causes in multiple cases and working collectively to address problems at 
the source.  
21  Michael Kirby, Plenary Address delivered at the Inaugural National Law Reform Conference, 
Canberra, 14 April 2016.
22  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Talk to Us (24 September 2015), www.alrc.gov.au/
talk-us.
23 See Victorian Law Reform Commission, About Community Law Reform (26 May 2016), www.
lawreform.vic.gov.au/all-projects/about-community-law-reform.
24  Ian Davis, ‘Targeted Consultations’ and Roslyn Atkinson, ‘Law Reform and Community 
Participation’ in Brian Opeskin and David Weisbrot (eds), The Promise of Law Reform (The Federation 
Press, 2005) Ch 10, 148–59; Ch 11, 160–74.
25  Productivity Commission, Commission Inquiry into Access to Justice Arrangements Report: Volume 
2, Inquiry Report 72, 2014, 696–700.
26  Curran, above n 13. 
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Law reform agencies and regulators can learn from these case studies. 
Scarce resources need not be an inhibitor. Initiatives can include:
• facilitated Focus Groups instead of written submissions where targeted 
participants are de-identified, enabled, and supported in a safe space 
(Case Study Three); 
• submissions developed through community lunches and conversations 
with people directly affected by policies. These gatherings could be 
facilitated by community agency linkages to bring together affected 
communities; 
• training and working with communities through their trusted 
intermediaries, be they ‘peer-to-peer’ learning or skilled-up, supported 
by legal and non-legal professionals, which the case studies above 
demonstrate can enable civil participation; 
• anonymous input (for those who fear reprisals or are embarrassed or 
do not want public attention);
• advice telephone lines set up to help people navigate having their 
views heard through either direct support in making oral or written 
submissions;
• closer liaison with community groups and organisations about their 
trend identification of systemic issues (Case Studies One and Two);
• problem-solving of individual complaints by collective complaints 
(e.g. National Bulk Debt Negotiation). 
VI. Conclusion
The author has argued that it is possible for law reform processes to engage 
better with the people often marginalised by society who are deeply 
affected by laws and their administration through innovative approaches.27 
Law Reform bodies with their expertise can bring about a reality check by 
facilitating connected and realistic, practical policy responses that capture 
and channel voices into evidence-based research. 
27  Catholic Commission for Justice, Development and Peace, ‘“It’s Not Easy Walkin’ in There”: 
Aboriginal Reconciliation: Towards Practical and Culturally Respectful Solutions (Catholic Commission 
for Justice, Development and Peace, 1999).
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There is a role for lawyers, consistent with their professional duties to the 
rule of law, to ensure confidence in and integrity of the legal system, and 
to empower and upskill communities. Lawyers have a significant role to 
play in demystifying the political and legislative processes and enabling 
participation and in advocacy and empowering communities to ensure 
the law protects them and is fair and just. 
In its Final Report on Access to Justice Arrangements,28 the Productivity 
Commission stressed that there is a ‘disconnect between legal need and 
government funding’29 and a need for innovative holistic approaches to 
problem solving.30 It endorsed the systemic work done by agencies.31 This 
view contrasts notably with government actions actively discouraging 
such systemic work.32 The PC encourages regulators to respond to such 
systemic issues and be more proactive in stopping problems at their core 
and preventing additional costs.33 
This view might be considered a ‘call to action’ to law reform bodies. 
Given the significant obstacles many people have to having their voices 
heard in law-making, the public is increasingly disengaged. If we truly 
inhabit a participatory democracy, we need to find ways for people who are 
often hindered by personal circumstances to have a direct voice. Arming 
community service agencies (so often stretched in terms of resources and 
demands of service delivery) with the ability to build capacity within 
communities to engage directly with law reform can lead to greater 
input and change. If this occurs, policy will be more relevant, responsive, 
timely, comprehensive and effective. This is needed at times of increasing 
worldwide public alienation from legislative and political systems.
28  Productivity Commission, Commission Inquiry into Access to Justice Arrangements Report: 
Overview, Inquiry Report 72, 2014, 28.
29  Ibid.
30  Productivity Commission, above n 11 (Vol 1), 171–176; n 21 (Vol 2), 713; Overview, above 
n 28, 43.
31  Productivity Commission, Overview, above n 28, 12, 11, 31; n 21 (Vol 2), 708–713.
32  See new cl 5 inserted by federal government funding agreements with legal aid commissions and 
community legal centres. See also Curran, above n 9.
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The End of Ramism: And the 
Shape of Things To Come
Craig Collins1
I. Introduction
In his opening address to the National Law Reform conference, Michael 
Kirby, from his vantage point spanning several decades and by reciting 
a few lines from W B Yeats’s Sailing to Byzantium, perfectly captured the 
conference theme as: 
set upon a golden bough to sing 
To lords and ladies of Byzantium 
Of what is past, or passing, or to come.2
From the vantage point of a golden bough set high above the terrain 
bounded by 500 years of Western university and legal education, this 
chapter speaks of Ramism as something past and something passing. 
It  also postulates what, in the digital age, is still to come. As Kirby 
observed, all of this is pretty fundamental to what legal academics do and 
how we do it.3
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Ramism was a Renaissance movement which, by harnessing the power 
of letterpress printing, transformed university education. The Ramists 
introduced a new method which, by becoming so deeply entrenched 
over centuries, has sunk beneath our consciousness. The point in talking 
about the ending of something so seemingly obscure as Ramism is to raise 
awareness that our current method of university education does indeed 
have a beginning. Further, this method was born out of past technological 
innovation. And, with this technology becoming superseded, some quite 
profound implications follow for future method in university education. 
Specifically, this chapter identifies three challenges to which legal education 
should be geared in the near-to-medium-term future:
1. becoming self-aware of, and detaching from, our Ramist imprinting;
2. reimagining and reshaping law curricula for a post-Ramist world; and
3. riding the wave of new media.
Given the extent of the technological shift which has already occurred, 
none of the above challenges are matters of choice, so much as challenges 
to our adaptive capacity. This chapter focuses on proposed legal and policy 
responses to these challenges, including recalibrating the requirements for 
admission to practice as an Australian lawyer. More particularly, the chapter 
argues for reducing the weighting attached to the ‘academic requirements’ 
‒ and expanding the ‘professional legal education requirements’ ‒ as our 
single best policy response to the larger forces confronting legal education 
in Australia today.
To begin, it is useful for us to grasp how the last great wave of technological 
innovation transformed method in university education.
II. The Renaissance Ramists
Petrus Ramus was a Professor at the University of Paris from 1551 until 
about 1568. His book, Professio Regia, published posthumously in 1576, 
carries the first use of the Latin word ‘curriculum’ (‘race’ or ‘racecourse’) 
in an educational context. For all that, as Adrian Johns says, ‘[a]mong the 
heroes of intellectual history, few can be less heroic’ than Ramus.4 Walter 
4  Adrian Johns, ‘Foreword’ in Walter Ong, Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue (University 
of Chicago Press, first published 1958, 2004 edn) v.
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Ong describes Ramus as a ‘shoddy scholar’. Johns refers to him ‘at best 
… as an inveterate intellectual opportunist. At worst … his ideas seem 
“close to the view of a madman”’.5 At one time, the French King Francis 
I banned Ramus from teaching or publishing any philosophy due to his 
incompetence.6 
Much to the chagrin of the scholarly elite, Ramus still succeeded in 
destroying the established Aristotelian-dialogical method of university 
education. His method harnessed the power of letterpress printing, 
reducing and simplifying knowledge as ‘schema’ and ‘content’ on the 
printed page and moving deductively and hierarchically from the general 
to the particular. Accordingly, ‘in making logic spatial [the Ramists] 
in effect bound reason and memory to the kind of page that the press 
made. They turned books into containers of knowledge’.7 It now ‘became 
possible for the … university lecturer to focus the whole pedagogical 
economy on the spatial arrangement of material before his pupils’.8 But 
this was a ‘dry as dust’ approach to curriculum which applied a crude logic 
and was ‘orientated entirely to sight, not to sound’:9
As a movement, it was by and large anti-dialogic, anti-dramatic, anti-
poetic, and anti-symbolic … Dynamic, face-to-face interaction as the 
source of knowledge was ‘eclipsed’ … by the viewing of pages. This 
amounted to the inculcation of a new set of ‘mental habits’, prior to 
almost all reasoning, and upon which modern thought would rest.10
While there was a transitional struggle and rearguard action by 
traditionalists, within ‘two generations, Ramism was becoming less evident, 
not because it ceased to exist, but because it had been incorporated into 
the standard organisational protocol for books themselves’.11 As a concept, 
Ramism soon fell into obscurity because ‘nobody argued about it any 
more. It had become second nature’.12 And, of course, just as printing 
press technology proliferated, textbooks spread like wildfire ‒ changing 
the shape of university education for centuries to come.
5  Ong, above n 4, 24.
6  Johns, above n 4, viii.
7  Ibid. vii.
8  Ibid.
9  Ibid. ix.
10  Ong, above n 4, 318.
11  Johns, above n 4, ix.
12  Ibid.
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III. Challenge of the Common Law
Ramists maintained that their pedagogy could be applied to ‘[a]ny 
conceivable subject ‒ rhetoric, politics, law, history, biography, medicine, 
physics, mathematics’ and so on.13 As Johns notes, ‘[t]heir ambition was to 
use this so-called ‘method’ to supplant university teaching in its entirety. 
And, remarkably enough, they more or less succeeded’.14 
The kind of university law contemplated by Ramists was Roman and 
Canon law. Both presented a neat fit with Ramism, with deductive 
processes flowing down from higher, binding legal propositions and with 
the precision of Latin drawing sharp conceptual lines upon the page. 
English common law was rather different. For one thing, it was not the 
subject of university education until some two centuries after Ramus ‒ 
when Sir William Blackstone assumed the first Chair in Common Law 
at Oxford in 1757. Customary law followed a more inductive approach, 
flowing from the ground up. This was ‘unwritten law’ based upon a form 
of collective, social-habit memory. The role of lawyers was mainly confined 
to process and remedy, not so much reasoning about substantive law from 
first principles. Verdict and liability reposed within the hands of juries, 
which determined disputes without reasons. This kind of law would prove 
to be a very bad fit with Ramist pedagogy ‒ and remains so to this day.
Blackstone was the first to try fitting the square peg of the common law 
into the round hole of a Ramist structure, eventually producing Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England. In the absence of having any other 
schema to hand, he adopted the structure of Roman law texts. In doing 
so, Blackstone famously offered an architectural metaphor: comparing 
Roman Law with the fine symmetry and proportions of the classical style, 
and the common law inheritance with the rambling ‘old Gothic castle’, 
‘erected in the days of chivalry, but fitted up for the modern inhabitant’.15 
Recognising the limitations of his own achievement, Blackstone said ‘it is 
impracticable to comprehend many rules of modern law, in a scholarlike 
scientifical manner, without recourse to the antient’. Lawyers, too, 
regarded Blackstone’s book as a crude and simplistic attempt to capture 
13  Ibid. vii.
14  Ibid.
15 Carol Matthews, ‘A “Model of the Old House”: Architecture in Blackstone’s Life and 
Commentaries’, in Wilfred Prest (ed), Blackstone and His Commentaries (Hart Publishing, 2014) 33. 
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the art and mystery of common law. Indeed, Michael Lobban has argued 
persuasively that attempts by Blackstone and Bentham to impose system 
and coherence upon the common law ‒ by delineating positivist rules and 
narrow sources of law ‒ were ‘outside the mainstream of what lawyers 
thought the law was about’.16 Propelled further by John Austin, Professor 
of Jurisprudence at the University of London from 1826, legal positivism 
was an academic construct. Here was a tool for making the common law 
fit the square hole of a Ramist framework.
Ramism was further entrenched by the casebook method developed at 
the Harvard Law School by Professor Christopher Langdell in the 1870s. 
This approach was ‘based upon generalisations ‒ principles and categories 
of classification ‒ from the data of reported cases’.17 The notion of legal 
science arose from applying Aristotelian logic to bounded casebook 
‘content’, skewing learning towards the projected ruminations of appellate 
judges while marginalising the more practical, lawyerly preoccupations 
with process and remedy. This new method ‘demanded a new cadre of 
academic specialists’,18 as ‘[o]nly full time scientists can pursue legal 
science’19 within ‘an autonomous field of knowledge’.20 In the United 
States, ‘Harvardism ‒ which by 1900 meant primarily the case method 
taught by a full time faculty … spread to law schools everywhere’.21
IV. Late Ramists: Australian Legal Academics
In Australia, until the 1960s, the predominant mode of legal education 
remained the apprenticeship model, through articles of clerkship. From 
then, with full-time law students and a new cadre of full-time legal 
academics growing in significant numbers, the Langdellian casebook 
method was adopted as the model of curriculum. The notion of law so 
framed was ‘law as science’. As Nick James notes:
16  Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760–1850 (Clarendon Press, 
1991) 13.
17  Robert Gordon, ‘The Case For (and Against) Harvard’ (1995) 93 Michigan Law Review 1231.
18  Ibid. 1234.
19  William La Piana, Logic & Experience: The Origin of Modern American Legal Education (Oxford 
University Press, 1994) 57.
20  Gordon, above n 17, 1234.
21  Ibid. 1235.
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This approach to teaching law deemphasized the connections with legal 
practice and, at the same time maintained the separation of law from other 
disciplines in the university … Legal scientism thus served to enhance and 
protect the discipline’s new found academic credibility.22
Surveying the landscape in 2000, David Weisbrot suspected ‘that if 
Professor Langdell walked into a contemporary law school in the United 
States or Australia … he would feel right at home … the nature of the 
core curriculum, the dominance of doctrine, and the basic approach to 
pedagogy have changed very little’.23
This also reflected the approach taken to prescribing the ‘academic 
requirements’ for admission to legal practice. This approach embodied 
a Ramist framework listing 11 categories of legal knowledge, with each 
category further subdivided from left to right across the page. Known as 
the ‘Priestley 11’, this would define textbook ‘content’ ‒ as it continues to 
do so today. While the range of elective courses proliferated around this 
compulsory core, these were still shaped and delivered by the casebook 
method and Ramist pedagogy. 
And so, with the Ramist notion of curriculum dating from the 1570s, 
it was only from the 1960s that Ramism strongly took hold in Australian 
legal education. As it happened, this was right at the tail end of the Ramist 
wave, just as the seeds of its own destruction were sparking into life. 
For, in 1969, the infant internet first ‘spoke’.24 
V. The Internet Ends Ramism
By the 1990s, John Perry Barlow, an early prophet of the digital age, 
was highlighting how the ‘new wine’ of information was rapidly being 
detached from the ‘old bottles’ of physical containment, such as books. 
22  Nickolas James, ‘A Brief History of Critique in Australian Legal Education’ (2000) 24 Melbourne 
University Law Review 965, 968. 
23  David Wiesbrot, ‘What Lawyers Need to Know, What Lawyers Need to be Able to Do: 
An Australian Experience’ (2000) Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors 21.
24  Agence-France Press, ‘Internet Is 40 Years Young’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 
30  October 2009, www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/internet-is-40-years-young-
20091030-hp5d.html. 
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‘With the advent of digitization’, he said, it became ‘possible to replace all 
previous information storage forms with one meta-bottle: complex ‒ and 
highly liquid ‒ patterns of ones and zeros’.25 
By 2000, while campaigning against copyright law’s futile protection of 
‘old bottles’, Barlow proclaimed that ‘the great cultural war has broken out 
at last. Long awaited by some and a nasty surprise to others, the conflict 
between the industrial age and the virtual age is now being fought out 
in earnest’.26 In the face of this contest, the age of letterpress printing 
remains, to evoke Yeats, something passing ‒ and virtually lost.
While the early phase of this cultural war is the tangible decline of 
books and the transfer of content online, this still presupposes a Ramist 
mental framework and traditional university curricula. But as digital 
natives grow in number across our teaching and learning spaces, a larger, 
more fundamental conceptual shift is emerging. Indeed, looking ahead, 
Microsoft founder Bill Gates has predicted as one of his four ‘big bets’ for 
the next 15 years that ‘better software will revolutionise learning’ and that 
‘online education will flourish’.27
VI. The Shape of Things to Come
Marshall McLuhan described Ramus as ‘the first man in history to “surf” 
on a wave of information launched by new media’.28 This same opportunity 
is now presenting itself. If Ramism reflects a mentality made possible by 
letterpress printing, then what reconfigurations might cyberspace permit? 
McLuhan and Ong studied Renaissance Ramism with a view to better 
understanding the present. What can we learn from the past about the 
shape of things to come? From what direction will this new shape emerge? 
Answering the first question invites reflection about all of those things 
left out by Ramism: the dialogic, dramatic, poetic and symbolic. Some 
balance needs to be restored towards sound and voice, including the 
value of dynamic, face-to-face interaction as a source of knowledge ‒ now 
25  John Perry Barlow, ‘The Economy of Ideas’ (1994) 2.03 Wired 1, archive.wired.com/wired/
archive/8.10/download.html. 
26  Ibid.
27 Bill and Melinda Gates, 2015 Gates Annual Letter, www.gatesnotes.com/2015-annual-letter?WT.
mc_id=01_21_2015_DO_com_domain_0_00&page=0&lang=en. 
28  Johns, above n 4, ix.
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through synchronous interactions online. ‘Interaction’ is the key word, 
but of a kind different from eyeballing the page. New media permits 
multimedia engagement. 
Reimagining the shape of law curricula requires some measure of self-
awareness of, and detachment from, our Ramist imprinting. The bodily 
form of Ramism is not just the printed page, nor the Priestley 11. It is also 
carried by the biological wiring of our brains. In this way, Ramism might 
be understood as the imprint left upon our minds by so much learning 
and teaching from books and from the conventional shape of university 
curricula. Accordingly, modern academics are all Ramists. Indeed, there 
is probably no segment of humanity which is more invested in Ramism 
‒ and less interested in seeing learning in any other way ‒ than university 
academics.
If the Renaissance is any guide, then the shape of new law curricula will 
be imagined and designed by ‘inveterate intellectual opportunist(s)’, 
much like Ramus himself. It is unlikely that innovation will be driven 
by elite professors and established academics, having built their success 
and reputations upon the foundations of a Ramist worldview. Even so, 
following the pattern of the past, it is a pretty sure thing that, within 
a generation or two, there will be few (if any) Ramists left.
VII. Initiation into the Discipline
In Australia, we face a widening gulf between our system of university 
legal education and a legal profession necessarily driven by market 
responsiveness, global competition and rapid technological change. And 
yet reform debates still seem stuck within existing frameworks. By lifting 
our gaze to the horizon, arguing about the actual content of the Priestley 
11, and whether we should have a Priestley 12 and so on, seems almost 
as trivial as fighting over flapping fish stranded on a retreating shoreline ‒ 
just as a tsunami is gathering force out at sea.
For the profession, the opportunity is presented to reconceptualise 
accredited legal education in a manner which is far less ‘Ramist remote’ 
from the actual experience of entry-level lawyers. While tapping into 
the latest global developments in technology, education and learning 
psychology, the profession has a large role to play in reconstructing the 
entry pathway from the ground up. Rather than confining attention to 
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the bounded terrain of ‘content coverage’, the real question is this: what 
qualities and capabilities are both necessary and desirable for human 
initiation into the discipline of law?
VIII. Conclusion
The above historical account has sought to situate Australian university 
legal education within the larger context of Ramist pedagogy and text-
book method. It has also sought to present a case that we are, indeed, 
facing the end of Ramism. If this last proposition is accepted, then three 
particular challenges for university legal education seem to follow for the 
near-to-medium term future:
1. becoming self-aware of, and detaching from, our Ramist imprinting;
2. reimagining and reshaping law curricula for a post-Ramist world; and
3. riding the wave of new media.
In historic terms, the academic requirements for admission to practice 
as an Australian lawyer (the Priestley 11) were only recently devised and 
entrenched, reflecting a Ramist conception of knowledge and pedagogy. 
If the above account and identified challenges are accepted, then it is hard 
to imagine the validity and relevance of those academic requirements 
surviving the end of Ramism.
By contrast, the practical legal education requirements for admission 
to practice are far less shaped by Ramist pedagogy. Practical skill and 
knowledge, combined with professional values, have always been 
inculcated in other ways. The academic trajectory from Blackstone 
to the university law curricula of today, via the Langdellian casebook 
method, has only ever occurred in parallel with the more deeply-rooted 
community of discourse ‒ the kind of mind and talk ‒ by which lawyers 
themselves achieve mastery within the profession itself. New media offers 
opportunities for replicating online the kinds of interactions and support 
which propels this model of development. Indeed, with the vacuum left 
by the end of Ramism, the solution presenting itself is more akin to the 
way that lawyers have been learning and developing all along without it.
Accordingly, this chapter calls for recalibrating the regulatory balance in 
legal education ‒ proposing that less weight be attached to the academic 
requirements and more weight to the practical legal education component 
‒ for the purposes of admission to practice as an Australian lawyer. 
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Practical legal education, which seeks to replicate the nature of learning 
within the profession itself, remains a less encumbered, more grounded, 
innovative and adaptive space. And it is from this direction that law 
students will be much better placed to surf the wave of new media into 
the legal profession of the future. 
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Rebecca is a new member of staff in the new University of Kioloa Law 
School. She is an environmental lawyer, loves teaching and learning 
and thinks the subject of her research so important that, in the words 
of Naomi Klein, this changes everything. She wants to design an 
entirely new law curriculum for students and structure it thematically in 
environmental law. Every subject will be taught in part through the lens 
of the environment – environmental regulation and the part it can play in 
many subjects within the legal curriculum; the history of environmental 
concern, and the history of indigenous cultures’ sustainable use of land 
and sea; the history and science of climate change, the place of policy 
and role of governmental intervention, the rise of consumer movements 
resisting commercial exploitation of the world’s resources, and much else. 
It will have options in law, literature and the environment, re-wilding 
nature, the future of sustainable cities, and the like. And it will be entirely 
online. It’s designed not just for students interested in environmental law, 
but for anyone doing any job linked to the environment in, for example, 
regulation, policy, innovation, bioscience, medscience, enforcement and 
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW IN AUSTRALIA
540
much else. Professional accreditation in law might be integrated, possibly 
in other disciplines too, as optional streams. It will include a Masters 
option as well which, being offered online, will be available internationally. 
Her Dean can see the idea working financially and supports it politically at 
the Law School Management Group, and staff are interested, all the more 
so in that the small group of environmental lawyers in the Law School, 
all equally interested in the idea, will be doing most of the design work 
on the curriculum and will be fronting-up the proposal for accreditation.
But what’s required of accreditation? She begins to map it out. First there’s 
the Law School Teaching and Learning Committee that has to approve 
the general curriculum design and the individual subjects; and since this is 
a new curriculum, it will want to see marketing reports and staff resource 
reports (to ensure the Law School can resource the proposal) and much 
else. Then the proposal goes to the University Education Committee which 
is far from a rubber-stamp job, and will look at how the curriculum affects 
the university brand, amongst other issues. Then NSW accreditation is 
sought. There is liaison with the profession, with environmental groups, 
and many others. 
Next she begins to think about how the curriculum will be judged at the 
various stages. She looks at the current (2016) regulatory guidelines for 
higher education (HE) programs in Law in Australia, which include the 
following:
1. Council of Australian Law Deans (CALD) Standards;
2. Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF);
3. TEQSA HE Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) 2015 
(with a new framework that came into force 1 January 2017);
4. Learning and Teaching Academic Standards Statement;
5. Generic Framework on Internationalising the Law Curriculum;
6. National PLT Competences.2 
2 CALD Standards are available at www.cald.asn.au/docs/CALD%20-%20standards%20 project%20 
-%20final%20 -%20 adopted%2017%20 November%202009.pdf. Australian Qualifications Framework; 
see www.aqf.edu.au. The TEQSA provides an overview of the new HE Standards Framework, www.teqsa.
gov.au /teqsa -contextual -overview-hes-framework. The Academic Standards Statement is available at www.
cald.asn.au /assets/lists /ALSSC %20 Resources/Kiftetal LTAS Standards Statement2010.pdf. The CALD 
Internationalising Framework is set out at curriculum.cald.asn.au/generic-framework/. 
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She is dismayed by the cascade of standards, competences, statements, 
guidelines, outcomes, many of them overlapping, sometimes 
contradictory, expressed in vague lexis that gives little real indication of 
actual educational standards. There is no meta-document that guides her 
through all this, or the maze of accreditation process across Australia’s 
states and territories. How is her innovation going to survive such weight 
of regulatory command and admonition? On closer inspection, each code 
bears the marks of its makers, their interpretation of what legal education 
has been, their present anxieties, their attempt to prescribe the future and 
to close down and command. But these are not her anxieties or her hopes. 
She, not they, will be designing the innovative program and helping 
students learn. But already she can feel her excitement fading at the sheer 
scale of this task. She puts the project to one side. Maybe next year.
II. Regulation and the Anxiety of Influence
What Rebecca faces is the result of ‘decentred regulation’ which, as Black 
describes it, is characterised by five factors: complexity, fragmentation, 
interdependence, overlapping public and private interests, and 
ungovernability.3 Extensive regulation begets more regulation, in spite of 
best practice codes arguing for the opposite, which increases tension and 
competition between the regulatory actors and further destabilises the 
field.4 There is almost no empirical evidence to support the concept that 
educational quality will be improved by greater competition accompanied 
by less regulation. On the other hand, it is well known that a greater 
volume of regulation does not necessarily lead to better education. This 
was recognised by the then DIICCSRTE (Department of Industry, 
Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education) 
which commissioned a report to reduce regulatory burden on Australian 
HE generally. The aim was laudable, but could only mitigate against an 
ungovernable system that will inevitably grow in size and complexity.5 
3  Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation 
in a “Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103.
4  See Judith Healy and Paul Dugdale, ‘Regulatory Strategies in Safer Patient Health Care’ in 
Judith Healy and Paul Dugdale (eds), Patient Safety First: Responsive Regulation in Health Care (Allen 
& Unwin, 2009) 1.
5  See Kwong Lee Dow and Valerie Braithwaite, Review of Higher Education Regulation 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2013) Appendix A, ‘Assuring Quality While Reducing the Higher 
Education Regulatory Burden’.
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This is by no means limited to Australian legal education. In recent 
decades legal education regulation internationally has accelerated in 
volume, pace and intensity.6 In the last decade we can cite seven such 
movements. In 2006–9 the Law Society of Scotland laid aside a small-
scale review of the primary program in professional training, to review, 
nationally, the entire legal educational process, from day one of law 
school through to point of qualification after traineeship (and there was 
also consideration of Continuing Professional Development, CPD).7 
In Canada, the Federation of the Law Societies of Canada carried out, like 
the Law Society of Scotland, two years of national consultation relating to 
criteria for approving common law degrees for the purpose of entry into 
bar admission programmes in Canada.8 
Meanwhile in England the three leading regulators of professional 
education, CILEx (Legal Executives), the Bar Standards Board (BSB) and 
the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) began the lengthy process of 
reviewing professional legal education in what eventually became known 
as the Legal Education and Training Review (2011–13). The context 
for the review included the effects of liberalisation of the legal services 
market, implemented by the Legal Services Act 2007, and the report was 
published in 2013.9
The US has seen considerable upheaval in legal education since the onset of 
the global financial crisis, which has resulted in significant downturn in the 
numbers of positions for young lawyers, and subsequently the numbers of 
students entering law schools. This, together with dissatisfaction regarding 
many issues of regulation of legal education, led to the formation of the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force which took a little over 
a year to report on the situation in US law schools.10 Concurrently, the 
6  Julian Webb et al, ‘Setting Standards. The Future of Legal Services Education and Training 
Regulation in England and Wales’ (SRA, BSB, IPS, 2013), letr.org.uk. The authors summarised 
this in their Literature Review, and brought up to date earlier analyses of the reform movement. 
Numerous articles confirm this; for example, Andrew Boone and Julian Webb, ‘Legal Education and 
Training in England and Wales: Back to the Future?’ (2008) 58 Journal of Legal Education 79. 
7  See www.lawscot.org.uk/education-and-careers/education-and-training-policy/. 
8  See flsc.ca/national-initiatives/canadian-law-school-programs/. 
9  See letr.org.uk for the report and associated Literature Review.
10 Two reports were produced: one on the future of American law schools (see www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional_responsibility/taskforceonthefuturelegaleducation.html) and another on 
the future of the financing of legal education (see www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/
committees/aba-task-force-on-the-financing-of-legal-education-.html). For commentary, see Richard 
L Abel, ‘“You Never Want a Serious Crisis to Go to Waste”: Reflections on the Reform of Legal 
Education in the US, UK, and Australia’ (2015) 22 International Journal of the Legal Profession 3. 
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Canadian Bar Associations began the first comprehensive study of the state 
of the Canadian legal market, called the Legal Futures Initiative, which 
culminated in a report completed in 2014 called Futures: Transforming 
the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada.11 Significantly, the report and 
the initiative went hand-in-hand with another called the Equal Justice 
Initiative, both of them having implications for the future of Canadian 
legal education. 
In Australia meanwhile the Law Admissions Consultative Committee 
began to review legal educational processes and standards in a Review of 
Academic Requirements. In their initial report (completed in 2015) they 
noted the great variety of standards, codes and outcomes populating the 
regulatory space in Australia, and cited the LETR Report as follows:
the [LETR] report notes the lack of an overall and coherent legal education 
system as such. That being so, and in order to avoid a tournament of 
regulators as to who will regulate whom, the regulators are encouraged to 
consider greater collaboration … 
The report also identifies a number of overarching issues for the regulators, 
designed to promote common learning outcomes and consistency.12 
Most recently, the Law Society of Hong Kong has instructed a review of 
legal education, reporting in late 2016, following an earlier report that 
was prepared on the subject of a common entry examination, but which 
has not yet been released by the Law Society. 
All this activity denotes what the literary critic Harold Bloom has termed 
the anxiety of influence. There are complex relations between regulators 
internationally as they watch each other and the actors around them. 
Strong regulators struggle with their predecessors and their peers, in much 
the same way as writers do with other strong writers; and such leading 
regulators give models of action for regulators in other jurisdictions. 
As Bloom observes, ‘[t]o deconstruct a poem is to indicate the precise 
location of its figuration of doubt, its uncertain notice of that limit where 
11  See www.cba.org/CBA-Legal-Futures-Initiative/Home/ for information on the Initiative. 
The report cited above is available at www.cba.org/CBA-Legal-Futures-Initiative/Reports/Futures-
Transforming-the-Delivery-of-Legal-Service. 
12 The report is entitled Review of Academic Requirements for Admission to the Legal Profession, 
www.lawcouncil.asn.au/LACC/images/pdfs/01.12.14_‒_Review_of_Academic_Requirements_for_
Admission.pdf. 
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persuasion yields to a dance or interplay of tropes’.13 For Bloom, there 
were two broad categories of poetic tropes: ‘tropes of action and tropes 
of desire’.14 Replace the word ‘poem’ with that of ‘report’, and we have 
a precise description of many legal education regulators, caught between 
a deepening anxiety of influence and the need to persuade, and the tropes 
of desire and of action that lead them to attempt to regulate and command.
III. Disintermediation and Regulation
But is such regulation best for legal education? Could it be that we have, 
fundamentally, the wrong mode of regulatory activity? Let us think about 
the meta-activities that law schools are engaged in, the activities that 
Rebecca will engage in, should her program ever see the light of day. At the 
heart of law schools, and this is true of the earliest in 1088 at Bologna as it 
is of the most recently-formed law school such as the University of Kioloa, 
lies a highly complex process of mediation. Such mediation includes the 
activities of curation, of innovation and of learning knowledge, skill and 
value, all processes highly intertwined with each other. We preserve the 
past in order to transmit it to the future. But we also have a duty to 
critique, interpret and innovate, through analysis of myriad legal cultures, 
their performativities and their fields and habitus.15 We also learn, and we 
help our students to learn, how to curate, interpret, reason, practise skill, 
and learn value. Above all, legal scholars mediate the past and prepare 
students for the future; and how we do that is as much a domain of 
jurisprudential activity as any other sub-domain of that area of law. It is 
also essentially an interdisciplinary activity. 
13  Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry (Oxford University Press, 1974) 
308. ‘Tropes’ is a key term for Bloom. It refers, generally, less to the rhetorical sense of a figure or 
device (i.e. a static collection of terms such as metaphor, metonymy, and the like), and more to the 
psychological moves a writer makes within a precise historical context to persuade a reader.
14  Ibid. 401.
15  Arising from linguistics and the philosophy of language, a performativity is not simply an 
utterance or performance, but an act that effects or affects identity and action. A judge pronouncing 
a judgment is a typical example; a promise is another, particularly when treated legally as actionable, 
as in the construct of pollicitatio under Roman Law. The concept of a field or habitus derives of course 
from Bourdieu. See, for example, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Passeron, Reproduction in Education, 
Society and Culture (Sage, 1977). The idea of the ‘habitus’ has been highly influential in education, 
describing as it does the enduring and transferable dispositions in society that affect individuals, as 
embodied for example in the notion of ‘cultural capital’. For a critique of the latter concept based upon 
empirical educational research carried out at Oxford University, see Anna Zimdars, Alice Sullivan and 
Anthony Heath, ‘Elite Higher Education Admissions in the Arts and Sciences: Is Cultural Capital the 
Key?’ (2009) Sociology 43, 648.  
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Such mediation, however, is subject to intermediation by technologies, 
by economic and political forces, by social and institutional agents and 
by innovation. And it is subject to disintermediation – to the disruption 
in the process by which established intermediaries (other processes, 
workflows, technologies, agents) are removed or replaced, or the process 
itself is reconfigured. Disintermediation is an essential element of historical 
change in law school mediation, present most strikingly in the digital 
revolution of the past few decades, but present in all legal education.16
Regulators and their codes rarely acknowledge the constant process of 
disintermediation. Their reports and codes are often the result of a set of 
social pressures upon legal education or higher education, but, caught in 
tropes of desire and action, they often seek the autopoiesis of closure.17 
They attempt to close down or remediate the effects of those pressures 
through the design and enforcement of a code or a set of recommendations. 
Meanwhile social pressures such as those brought on by disintermediation 
have already morphed and produced new, often unforeseen and rarely 
intended educational and social consequences around the new code or 
recommendations. We need an approach to regulation that eschews the 
hierarchical command of much regulatory practice in the field and instead 
seeks to understand the effects of disintermediation and other social 
processes within law school assemblages and networks. 
IV. The Shared Space: A Portrait of the 
Regulator as Collaborator
Much of the architecture of regulation in Australian HE is built upon the 
regulatory principles of risk, necessity and proportionality – principles 
that have been derived from other systems of regulation but which 
I would argue are of themselves insufficient to provide ethical and effective 
regulation for higher education. What may be required is:
16  Paul Maharg, ‘Disintermediation’ (2016) 50 The Law Teacher 114.
17  As many commentators have pointed out, the self-reproductive power of a system such as a legal 
system lies in its ability to be at once open and closed: it is autopoietic. Teubner described how, ‘unlike 
neo-liberal and structuralist theories’, autopoiesis emphasises ‘the complex, the local, the closed and 
the unstable against global, coherent, artificing and equilibrating mechanisms’: Gunther Teubner 
(ed), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Walter de Gruyter, 1988) 9. For regulators, 
the concept of closure is a dominant one, where the dynamic play of agents and the creative power 
of collaborative action are seen as a threat to the command model of regulation, which seeks the stasis 
of control.
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1. A new attitude to Open Education and Open Research, and the 
encouragement of co-production and of communities of practice 
across educational institutions and across disciplines and professions. 
2. A view of regulation as comprising not just quality assurance but 
quality enhancement, where responsibility is given to the actors in the 
regulated field to regulate their own behaviour according to their own 
aims, subject to monitoring.
In the Legal Education and Training Review Report we advocated, inter 
alia, an approach to regulation that we called the ‘shared space’. It was 
summarised in the report as the sustained development of ‘a community 
of educators, regulators, policy-makers and professionals working in 
provision of legal services, drawing information from other jurisdictions, 
other professions and other regulators to identify best practices in [legal 
education] and its regulation’ (para 6.158). The approach was outlined in 
more detail in Ch 3 of the LETR Literature Review, where we investigated 
the role that design played in the shared space, contrasting it with role 
played by hierarchical regulation, and the potential it had to shape 
regulated activity:
Design can be used to enhance responsibility and accountability, and 
extend agency …; indeed it can do so by clearing a space, as it were, in 
hierarchy so that self-governance, often according to extra-legal norms, 
is possible in ways that it would not otherwise be within communities 
of practice.18
We recommended that the frontline regulators of legal education form 
a Legal Council to provide the neutral space for regulators, providers and 
many others to meet and plan this new approach. In their report, Lee Dow 
and Braithwaite similarly recommended the formation of an Advisory 
Council and a collaborative approach to co-regulation and self-regulation 
which describes regulators and institutions working in partnership. 
As Raban and Cairns describe it, citing Lee Dow and Braithwaite:
They would need to ‘share the same objective (excellence in teaching, 
learning and research, for example)’ and ‘the purpose of the regulatory 
encounter’ should be ‘to raise concerns about risks and obstructions 
to achieving (these) objectives and to work through problems to find 
a satisfactory solution’.19
18  Ibid. Ch 3, para 45.
19  Colin Raban and David Cairns, ‘How Did It Come to This?’ (2014) 18 Perspectives: Policy and 
Practice in Higher Education 112, 117.
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But excellence in teaching and learning is, as an aim, so high-level that 
in practice it means little. And under the top-down model of regulation, 
which still is the essence of this regulatory relationship, the hidden agendas 
of what constitutes excellence threaten to silence the shared conversation. 
Institutions will try to second-guess what constitutes excellence in the eyes 
of the regulator. The regulator will point to market devices (e.g. student 
choice) as proxies for excellence, an argument advanced by the Browne 
Report in the UK, and by Universities Australia, and dismissed by many 
academics.20
In the shared space by contrast, HE institutions would have much more 
agency and work closely with others, including regulators. The Scottish 
model of QE or Quality Enhancement is one model for a partial shared 
space. Regulators learn as much as institutions do from the process – 
arms-length measurement of quality is not the point of the exercise, where 
institutions lead the review of themselves, and where both regulation and 
its processes are streamlined and much more focused. Students there play 
a key role in the enhancement process. Land and Gordon describe aspects 
of it thus:
There has been a strong concern to create a sense of ownership and 
legitimation among all those with a vested interest. In particular, 
considerable emphasis has been placed on paying attention to the voice(s) 
of students and encouraging their participation not just as consumers 
of a service but, after appropriate training, as genuine partners in the 
review of quality. It has been characterised generally by a shift from audit 
to improvement, to a more developmental approach, with a focus on 
teaching and learning themes, and strong emphasis on evaluation and 
subsequent responsiveness to feedback.21
In shared spaces such as this there is the possibility that innovation can be 
encouraged, disintermediation better understood, and that open cultures 
can be developed. Along with harmonisation and streamlining of codes 
in Australian legal education regulation, there is the potential that it 
could significantly improve legal education regulation. There is even the 
possibility that, under such a regulatory regime, Rebecca’s program might 
become reality.
20  E J P Browne, ‘Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education: An Independent Review of 
Higher Education Funding and Student Finance’ (2010), www.independent.gov.uk/browne-report; 
‘Universities Australia Submission to the Review of Higher Education Regulation’ (Universities 
Australia, 2013).
21  George Gordon and Ray Land, ‘“To See Ourselves as Others See Us”: The Scottish Approach 
to Quality Enhancement’ in George Gordon and Ray Land (eds), Enhancing Quality in Higher 
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The compulsory core of legal education has not changed markedly since 
law was first taught in the university in the 19th century, despite extensive 
social change. Most recently, we have witnessed the transformation of the 
legal profession, state disinvestment in public universities, a proliferation 
of law students and a raft of new law schools. Against this backdrop, 
I question the wisdom of continuing to adhere to a standardised ‘core’ 
curriculum and uniform admission rules when less than 50 per cent 
of law graduates go into private practice and remain there. 
I outline the trajectory of change and make some suggestions as to the 
way forward. I argue that the case for diversity of the law curriculum 
should be placed squarely on the legal education agenda. I recommend 
that the Priestley 11 be abandoned, allowing law schools to focus on 
their individual strengths. Specialisation in the context of a broad liberal 
education would not only be academically desirable, it would also better 
equip graduates for a diverse range of destinations.
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II. The Production of Law Graduates
Australian higher education was radically transformed when all colleges 
of advanced education (CAEs) were incorporated into a unified higher 
education system in 1989, which led to the creation of 16 new universities 
in four years.2 Despite the orchestrated transition from an elite to a mass 
system, there was not a commensurate increase in public funding, which 
led to a shift from free higher education to a user-pays regime. The number 
of Australian law schools then rapidly increased as the new vice-chancellors 
believed that law could be taught cheaply and the income would help to 
subsidise the more resource-intensive parts of the university. Differential 
rates for HECS were introduced in 1997, with law at the top rate,3 but 
this had no discernible effect on the demand for law places. 
In 25 years, the number of law schools has more than tripled – from 
12 to 40 across 47 campuses, including Australia’s first for-profit law 
school.4 Government disinvestment in higher education also encouraged 
established law schools to increase their intakes, which were boosted by the 
lifting of the cap on Commonwealth-funded places and the introduction 
of the Juris Doctor (JD). The increase in law graduation rates has been 
phenomenal:
Year No of Graduates
1984 1,932
2001 6,149
2014 14,600 (all u/grad & p/grad law programs)
Source: Edmund Tadros and Katie Walsh, ‘Too Many Law Graduates and Not Enough Jobs’, 
Financial Review, 22 October 2015, www .afr .com/business/legal/too-many-law-graduates-
and-not-enough-jobs-20151020-gkdbyx . The collection of precise disaggregated data 
is difficult and confusing because of the varied approaches adopted by the federal, state 
and territory authorities . The Australian Council of Law Deans settled on a total of 7,583 
LLB and JD graduates in 2015 . See Melissa Coade, ‘Counting the So-called ‘Glut’ of Law 
Grads’, Lawyers Weekly, 25 November 2016, www .lawyersweekly .com .au/news/20080-
counting-the-so-called-glut-of-law-grads. This figure did not include other sources of 
graduate lawyers, such the Legal Profession Admission Board of NSW, which produced 
166 graduates in 2015–16 (NSW Department of Justice, Annual Report 2015–16, www .
lpab .justice .nsw .gov .au/Documents/Annual%20Report%202015-16 .pdf) .
2  Simon Marginson and Mark Considine, The Enterprise University: Power, Governance and 
Reinvention in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 29.
3 Along with medicine, dentistry and veterinary science, www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/
Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/archive/hecs.
4 TOP Education Institute, Sydney City School of Law: Australia’s Newest Law School (2016), 
www.top.edu.au/home/school-of-law.
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III. Sameness or Difference?
One would have thought that the proliferation of so many new law 
schools presented an ideal opportunity for diversifying the law curriculum. 
However, it had the opposite effect. Because the admitting authorities 
were suspicious of the new schools, they favoured uniformity. Indeed, the 
adoption of uniform admission rules (the ‘Priestley 11’5) coincided with 
the establishment of the first wave of new schools in the early 1990s.
Theoretically, completion of the Priestley 11 was not necessary for 
a student to graduate with an LLB but, out of deference to the profession, 
the 11  prescribed areas of knowledge were incorporated into each 
university’s compulsory curriculum. Indeed, no Australian law school 
was brave enough to bypass Priestley and specify an alternate set of 
requirements, except one, although the attempt was short-lived. When La 
Trobe began its LLB program in 1992, only two subjects were specified 
as compulsory: Legal Reasoning and Socio-legal Research Methods. 
However, within two years and before the first cohort had even graduated, 
the newly-ratified Priestley 11 was made compulsory for the award of the 
LLB, although most students had chosen to include the specified areas of 
knowledge in their course of study anyway – ‘just in case’ they decided to 
take out a practising certificate.6 
It is notable that the Priestley Committee ignored the broadening of 
the curriculum that had been occurring in law schools since the 1970s, 
choosing to prioritise doctrinal and technical competence over context 
and critique. The Victorian Council of Legal Education (the rules for 
which became the model for the Australian Uniform Admission Rules) 
rejected family law in favour of company law in 1990 on the basis that 
‘the building block components of family law were covered by “contract, 
property and trusts”’;7 gender, affectivity and family relations were deemed 
dispensable. 
5  After Justice Priestley who chaired the Law Admissions Consultative Committee of State and 
Territory Law Admitting Authorities in 1992. The specified areas of knowledge are Criminal Law 
and Procedure, Torts, Contracts, Property, Equity (including Trusts), Company Law, Administrative 
Law, Federal and State Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, Evidence, Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility. 
6  Margaret Thornton, Quinquennial Professorial Report to University Council (La Trobe University, 
Melbourne, 1995), on file with the author.
7  Council of Legal Education Victoria, Report of Academic Course Appraisal Committee on Legal 
Knowledge Required for Admission to Practise (Council of Legal Education Victoria, 1990).
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As in Canada, Priestley accorded short shrift to non-doctrinal subjects 
with a long academic tradition, such as legal theory and legal history.8 The 
centripetal pull of technocratic business-oriented law and the imprimatur 
of the admitting authorities determined what was important, underscored 
by the credentialism and vocationalism that accompanied the user-pays 
mentality.9 Even the fact that the Pearce Report had recognised the 
generalist nature of the law degree only a few years earlier was accorded 
short shrift. 
The deference towards the admitting authorities underscores not only the 
subordination of law schools to the legal profession but also the failure 
of law to develop as an independent discipline within the academy.10 
The expansion of law schools would have been an ideal time to argue 
for diversity but there is an absence of unanimity among academics as 
to just what the primary role of a law school should be – a site for the 
training of practitioners or an independent academic discipline. In recent 
years, the scales have tipped away from a liberal legal education in favour 
of vocationalism, entailing deference to known knowledge. Even from 
a  functional perspective, however, one would have to query whether 
having 40 virtually identical programs is economically rational. The 
uniformity of the curriculum arises from what Thomasset and Leperrièrre 
refer to as the infeudation of law schools to the profession.11 They suggest 
that the domination of the profession is such that there would need to be 
a revolution to slough it off.
IV. Challenging Priestley
The Priestley 11 has been subject to criticism over the years, not only from 
those seeking a more liberal orientation to legal education, but also from 
legal practitioners themselves who have felt that inadequate attention 
was being paid to what lawyers actually do.12 The response led to the 
8  Cf Harry Arthurs, ‘“Valour Rather than Prudence”: Hard Times and Hard Choices for Canada’s 
Legal Academy’ (2013) 76 Saskatchewan Law Review 73, 86.
9  Margaret Thornton, Privatising the Public University: The Case of Law (Routledge, 2012) 59–109.
10  Cf Mary Keyes and Richard Johnstone, ‘Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and 
Prospects for the Future’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 537, 542.  
11  Claude Thomasett and René Leperrièrre, ‘Faculties under Influence: The Infeudation of Law 
Schools to the Legal Professions’ in Fiona Cownie (ed), The Law School: Global Issues, Local Questions 
(Ashgate, 1999).
12  Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice 
System (Report No 89) (2000), 123–27.
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incorporation of more practice-related skills into the curriculum,13 but 
the effect was to induce not only a less liberal orientation to the law degree 
but also an instantiation of the idea that traditional legal practice is the 
logical destination for all law graduates. 
In 2015, the Law Admissions Consultative Committee (LACC) proposed 
a limited review of the academic requirements for admission, influenced 
by the Legal Education and Training Review conducted in England 
and Wales in 2013.14 LACC wanted to know whether civil procedure, 
company law and evidence, together with ethics and professional 
responsibility, should continue to be prescribed areas of knowledge and 
whether statutory interpretation should be included as a new academic 
requirement.15
The key question is whether a designated area of knowledge is foundational 
to a law degree, not whether it is a useful addition. It is suggested that civil 
procedure, company law and evidence could all be omitted as they are 
included in the PLT Competency Standards, but ethics and professional 
responsibility should be retained. To focus on legal doctrine, or law as it 
is, is to teach frozen knowledge that is likely to be out of date by the time 
the student graduates. The focus should be on principles and transferable 
knowledge. Ethics and professional responsibility are foundational, not 
only to legal practice, but to most areas of employment. The inclusion 
of statutory interpretation is also supported. Not only do we live in an 
age of statutes, but the principles and techniques of interpretation are 
poorly understood. As with ethics, interpretative skills possess a high 
degree of transferability, for they are central to all linguistic and text-based 
disciplines, including law and public policy. 
I also note that the Priestley 11 remains resolutely domestic in its 
orientation, despite the reality of globalisation, although a report 
commissioned by the Australian Government Office for Learning and 
Teaching in 2012 recommended that the law degree be internationalised, 
13  Thornton, above n 9, 81–84.
14  Legal Education and Training Review (LETR) of England and Wales (viewed 21 March 2016), 
letr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/LETR-Report.pdf.
15  LACC had not reported at the time of writing.
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favouring a ‘light-handed’ approach by the admitting authorities.16 
Some  stakeholders nevertheless expressed strong support for making 
private international law compulsory within the Priestley 11,17 which 
reflects law firms’ emphasis on profit maximisation.
V. Towards Diversity in Legal Education
Less than 50 per cent of law graduates embark on a career in private law 
firms,18 while the remainder pursue a diverse range of careers in the public 
service and the non-profit sector, business and finance, international 
institutions such as the United Nations, as well as journalism, research 
and teaching positions. Why, then, should they be compelled to undertake 
an expensive legal education predicated on the assumption that they will 
embark on private practice and earn substantial salaries on the corporate 
track?19 In any case, as the total number of solicitors in Australian law 
firms is just over 66,000,20 it would be impossible to place the majority 
of graduates in law firms. Of course, law schools are not responsible for 
ensuring that their graduates find employment and they are unlikely to be 
sued if graduates are unsuccessful, as has occurred in the US.21 However, 
vocationalism is a dimension of government policy that law schools 
cannot afford to ignore.
16  Office for Learning and Teaching, Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research 
and Tertiary Education (Australian Government), Internationalising the Australian Law Curriculum 
for Enhanced Global Legal Practice (Australian Government Office for Learning and Teaching, 
2012)  86, www.olt.gov.au/resource-internationalising-australian-law-curriculum-enhanced-global-
legal-practice-2012.
17  Ibid. 69.
18  A 2010 survey by Graduate Careers Australia revealed that only 43.7 per cent of graduates 
started work in law firms (a drop from 49.1 per cent five years earlier). See Nicola Berkovic, ‘Fewer 
Law Graduates are Choosing Practice as a Career’, The Australian (online), 1 July 2011, www.
theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/fewer-law-graduates-are-choosing-practice-as-a-career/
story-e6frg97x-1226085138499. In the US, 55 per cent of law graduates were employed in full-time, 
bar passage-required employment nine months after graduation in 2011. See William Henderson, 
‘A Blueprint for Change’ (2013) 40 Pepperdine Law Review 461, 475. 
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$58,000 according to predictions of the Australian Scholarships Group. See Australian HES online, 
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In 2011–12, most of the top-tier Australian corporate law firms became 
globalised as a result of amalgamation with London-based ‘Magic Circle’ 
firms.22 The aim was to maximise profits. Efficiencies were also introduced, 
such as resorting to companies specialising in document review, discovery 
and predictive coding in order to undertake more cheaply work traditionally 
performed by associates. The emphasis on profit maximisation has meant 
that law firms may no longer be prepared to assume responsibility for 
training substantial numbers of new graduates, who could find themselves 
vying with cheaper paralegals for entry-level positions. 
Contrary to the uniformity of destination anticipated by the admitting 
authorities, there is increasing pressure on law firms to diversify23 and 
there is criticism from within the profession that students have not had 
sufficient exposure to alternative forms of employment, such as corporate 
in-house roles.24 Social justice advocates are also critical of the notable 
shortages of lawyers in regional, rural and remote areas and the fact that 
ordinary citizens cannot afford access to legal services.25 Despite such 
needs, traditional legal practice, particularly corporate practice, continues 
to be regarded as the raison d’être of legal education.
Even if graduates enter traditional legal practice initially, they are unlikely 
to remain on a single career trajectory. A recent study of Millennials (those 
born after 1982) found that 46 per cent expect to leave their current 
employer within the next two years.26 The Pearce Report noted 30 years 
ago that more than 50 per cent of law graduates were entering diverse 
destinations, but the curriculum has failed to take adequate cognisance of 
this reality, despite the explosion in numbers. It is therefore time that we 
thought more creatively about the inclusion of transferable skills in the law 
curriculum with an eye not only to actual student destinations but also to 
22  Margaret Thornton, ‘Hypercompetitiveness or a Balanced Life? Gendered Discourses in the 
Globalisation of Australian Law Firms’ (2014) 17(2) Legal Ethics 153.
23 Stefanie Garber, ‘Firms Urged to Push into Non-legal Sectors’, Lawyers Weekly, 17 February 
2016, www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/17993-firms-urged-to-push-into-non-legal-sectors. 
24 Stefanie Garber, ‘Students Underexposed to In-house Roles’, Lawyers Weekly, 17 February 2016, 
www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/17998-students-underexposed-to-in-house-roles.
25 Productivity Commission (Australian Government), Access to Justice Arrangements: Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report (Productivity Commission, 2014).
26  Felicity Nelson, ‘Young Lawyers View Staying Put as “Career Suicide”’, Lawyers Weekly, 10 February 
2016, www.lawyersweekly.com.au/careers/17953-young-lawyers-view-staying-put-as-career-suicide.
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their educational benefits. Attention should be paid to problem solving, 
leadership, ethics, values, project management and creative thinking, as 
well as sociolegal research methods and interdisciplinary perspectives.27 
The issue of diversity in destination begs the question of whether 
difference rather than sameness should be addressed by the admitting 
authorities, although the signs are not propitious. When Alfred Reed 
suggested in 1921 that different ‘bars’ be created in the US, this was 
regarded as heretical.28 Would it be possible to develop varying gradations 
of admission in Australia today? Should we effect a divorce from Priestley 
in the interests of a more diverse and dynamic curriculum? 
The divorce could entail separating the admission and the academic 
requirements, with a national exam to follow practical legal training for 
those who wished to be admitted. Although the administration of such an 
exam would be cumbersome, it could be managed by state and territory 
admitting authorities or the Law Council. However, as Thomasett and 
Leperrière make clear, a separate exam would not necessarily overcome 
the problem of infeudation, as whatever subjects are specified by the 
admitting authorities tend to influence the content of the law curriculum, 
even if no longer compulsory.29
I believe that it should be made clear to students at the outset that legal 
practice is only one of many possible destinations for them. Accordingly, 
law schools should be free to design their own curricula. Each school 
could designate as compulsory certain basic areas of knowledge, such as 
contract and constitutional law, followed by specialisation in a cluster 
of cognate subjects, comparable to a major in the BA. Specialist streams 
could be devoted to human rights, gender, race, crime, international law, 
comparative law, environmental law, public law, commercial law, etc., in 
addition to more general offerings. I particularly want to exhort a shift 
away from an obsession with doctrine to a focus on transferable skills, 
as suggested, including negotiation, conflict resolution and an ethical 
consciousness appropriate for a dynamic global environment. This is 
where the role of collaboration rather than adversarialism, as advocated 
27  Cf Keyes and Johnstone, above n 10, 541.
28  Richard W Bourne, ‘The Coming Crash in Legal Education: How We Got Here, and Where We 
Go Now’ (2011/2012) 45 Creighton Law Review 651, 696.
29  Thomasett and Leperrière, above n 11, 198.
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by Pauline Collins,30 would come into its own. In reimagining the 
curriculum, I am not ignoring vocationalism, for a broad liberal education 
would better prepare students for a wide array of destinations in which 
a law degree would be advantageous.
VI. Conclusion
I suggest taking a leaf out of the report of the Ontario Higher Education 
Quality Council regarding differentiation among universities in Ontario 
in 2013,31 which argued that the funding formula should be amended 
to ensure that the province’s 20 universities have the resources to enable 
them to pursue a policy of achieving what each one does best. How much 
more sensible it would be for the Australian Government to do the same 
in respect of 40-plus law schools rather than accept that they all should be 
pale copies of one another.
Elements of diversity of a socioeconomic nature can be discerned as new 
schools struggle to compete with those possessing significant positional 
goods arising from age, wealth and metropolitan location. However, is 
entrenching class differences between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ the 
type of diversity that we wish to promote? A liberal legal education that 
focuses on critical thinking, values, principles and ethics in the context 
of diverse curricula offerings undoubtedly provides a superior education 
for law students, as well as constituting better preparation for a range 
of positions in a context of dynamic and uncertain social change. 
30  Pauline Collins, ‘Australian Legal Education at a Cross Roads’ (2016) 58(1) Australian 
Universities’ Review 30.
31  Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario, The Diversity of Ontario’s Universities: A Data Set 
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